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INTRODUCTION 
Planning, income distribution and economic 
policy rank high among the subjects with which 
ECLA is perennially concerned. Different as-
pects of these questions are studied from time 
to time, from a conceptual or methodological 
standpoint or in relation to specific cases. It is 
hoped in this way to build up a store of useful 
source material for economic decision-making 
which will shed further light on the long-term 
implications of the policies being implemented. 
This issue of the Bulletin has been devoted 
to an examination of these three questions. It 
includes a review of the most recent evaluation 
of the planning process in Latin America, it 
summarizes the findings and conclusions of the 
ECLA secretariat's research on income distribu-
tion and it reviews some of the effects of the 
economic policy followed since the fifties by 
two Latin American countries: Bolivia and 
Colombia. 
The section on planning reproduces three 
documents. The first is an ECLA secretariat 
paper on the present state of planning in Latin 
America, with special reference to the difficul-
ties of plan implementation. The paper was 
used as a background document for the dis-
cussions on this question at the second session 
of the United Nations Committee for Develop-
ment Planning (Santiago, Chile, 10-20 April 
1967) and at the twelfth session of ECLA 
(Caracas, 2-13 May 1967). It is followed by 
die relevant portion of the report of the Com-
mittee, which examines the role of planning and 
Latin America's experience in plan implementa-
tion. The third document contains a résumé of 
the debates on planning in Latin America at the 
twelfth session of the Commission and the text 
of the resolution adopted on that subject. 
Although the substance of all three papers is 
closely related and may even seem repetitive in 
certain aspects, it was considered useful to pub-
lish them together in view of the high technical 
standing of the Committee, which is composed 
of economists from the different regions of the 
world, and of the wide range of political opin-
ion reflected by the resolution adopted at 
ECLA's twelfth session. The papers indicate 
that there is a substantial measure of agreement 
between the diagnosis of the situation and the 
recommendations made by regional and inter-
national experts and the representatives of the 
Latin American Governments. 
The Bulletin also includes an ECLA secre-
tariat note originally submitted to the twelfth 
session of the Commission suggesting a series 
of hypotheses concerning the nature of the prob-
lems of income distribution in Latin America. 
The analysis is based mainly on the studies 
prepared on Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, and 
the fragmentary data available on other coun-
tries. From this body of information, conclu-
sions have been drawn concerning the rela-
tionship between economic growth and income 
distribution. 
The third section offers an analysis of eco-
nomic policy in Bolivia and Colombia in the 
light of their long-term development, which is 
comparable in its methodology and objectives 
to the economic policy studies of Brazil and 
Chile.^ In this analysis, a special effort has 
been made to distinguish the main policy aims 
and objectives and to determine how policy 
instruments are being used to achieve them. The 
cases of Bolivia and Colombia were chosen for 
different reasons: the first because of the in-
terest naturally aroused by the economic policy 
model instituted as a result of the 1952 revolu-
tion, which changed the structure of the economy 
and has largely shaped its present characteristics. 
Colombia's experience is interesting for some 
novel features it displays, chiefly the original 
and efficient use made of policy instruments. 
In short, these countries, together with Brazil 
and Chile, offer a wide range of experience in 
terms of different economic policy aims, the 
use made of certain instruments and their 
ability to achieve the desired goals. 
'^Economic Survey of Latín America, 1964 (United 
Nations publication, Sales No.: 66.ILG.1) pp. 288-315. 

PLANNING IN LATIN AMERICA* 
I. PAST HISTORY AND PRESENT STATUS OF PLANNING 
ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA 
1. PAST HISTORY 
The need for a development planning policy 
has only recently been recognized in Latin 
America as the result of a combination of in-
ternal and external factors. 
During the forties, the need to enlarge the 
economic infrastructure, particularly the trans-
port network and power supply, and adapt it 
to new development conditions, as well as to 
encourage relatively large-scale projects in key 
industries led to the preparation and imple-
mentation of some partial programmes de-
pendent mainly on public investment. 
Subsequently, particularly towards the end 
of the fifties, it became increasingly apparent 
that the Latin American economies lacked the 
necessary dynamism to maintain moderately 
satisfactory rates of growth, to remedy critical 
imbalances in their foreign trade and external 
financing, to contain inflationary pressures, to 
provide sufficient productive employment for a 
rapidly increasing labour force, and to im-
prove living conditions and at the same time 
fulfil rising expectations created by a knowl-
edge of the tremendous possibilities brought 
about by technological advances. Economic pol-
icy thus came to hinge on development in its 
most comprehensive sense as an economic and 
social concept encompassing both internal and 
external limitations. Furthermore, ECLA, whose 
objectives are to analyse the development prob-
lems of Latin America, and suggest technical 
norms for a development programme and meth-
ods of projecting future needs, helped to instil 
that more comprehensive outlook. While its 
work was focused more on analysis than on 
planning, the increasing use of projections as a 
method of anticipating certain problems and 
analysing policy alternatives helped to lay the 
* Document E/CN.12/772, prepared by the secretariat 
of the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
submitted to the second session of the United Nations 
Committee for Development Planning (Sant i^o , Chile, 
10 to 21 April 1967) and to the twelfth session of the 
Commission (Caracas, 2 to 13 May 1967). 
groundwork and provide a methodological tool 
for the preparations of plans. 
Bolivia, Chile and Colombia were the first 
Latin American countries in this decade to for-
mulate national development plans and to estab-
lish the necessary machinery, largely with the 
help of international technical assistance. How-
ever, it was not until the Punta del Este Con-
ference in 1961 that the Latin American Gov-
ernments recognized that planning should be 
the fundamental instrument for mobilizing na-
tional resources, bringing about necessary struc-
tural changes, enhancing efficiency and pro-
ductivity and securing more international 
financial co-operation. 
Since then, virtually all the Latin American 
countries have prepared plans of different kinds 
and scope. At the same time, the plans have 
been analysed and assessed by regional organs 
which have helped to sustain planning efforts 
by bringing them into line with the volume and 
orientation of foreign financial assistance. 
A valuable fund of experience has thus been 
built up, but its true significance may be hard to 
appreciate because planning is a relatively re-
cent phenomenon and began in very special 
circumstances. Until fairly recently, no experi-
ence had been obtained in this field, apart from 
some preliminary experiments and certain sec-
toral programmes, and the very idea of plan-
ning was resisted. There were no background 
data on which to draw for planning purposes, 
and no methodology that had already proved its 
worth in the particular circumstances of Latin 
America. Nor was there a flexible administrative 
structure which could be adapted to functions 
and methods other than those enshrined by cus-
tom and tradition. Nevertheless, this period 
was marked by the preparation of the technical 
bases for planning and the training of cadres 
on an ever-increasing scale. All the countries 
now have the necessary machinery for the prepa-
ration and orientation of plans (offices and 
general plans); the criteria used in the alloca-
tion of resources are becoming more rational. 
especially in the puWic sector, and, last but 
not least, planning has become a widely accepted 
idea. 
An account will be given below of some of 
the main features of these developments, which 
certainly denote a period of great progress. Fur-
ther improvements upon the progress already 
achieved will, however, meet with a number of 
obstacles and limitations that have been emerg-
ing, and this suggests the need for a second 
stage in which more workable systems of plan-
ning would be set up, participation in the 
preparation of the plans would be broadened 
and the institutional reforms required for really 
effective planning would be carried out.^ The 
second part of this paper will review these 
shortcomings and obstacles, and pinpoint in 
greater detail the internal and external factors 
that are hampering the execution of the plans. 
Lastly, it will draw a few general conclusions 
which may help to overcome some of the prob-
lems discussed. 
2 . PLANNING ORGANS 
Recognition of the need for planning was 
immediately followed by the establishment of 
planning ofiSces in the countries where they still 
did not exist. By now, they are to be found in 
every Latin American country, and in one case— 
that of Uruguay—^the existence of the planning 
office has been formally acknowledged in the 
Constitution. 
As planning is a new function of Government, 
the first task to be undertaken was the estab-
lishment of special planning organs. The nucleus 
was formed by the central planning offices, 
which evolved in different ways depending on 
the extent to which they were accepted as part of 
the traditional structure of government. Gen-
erally speaking, they were established in such a 
way as to become directly responsible to the 
Office of the President of the Republic. In some 
cases, an intermediate advisory body acts in a 
liaison capacity between the planning office and 
the President and his Cabinet, in which the 
major decisions are discussed and weighed. 
Table 1 lists the different policy-making and 
technical offices to be found in Latin America, 
and indicates their structure. The situation is 
less homogeneous as regards the sectoral and 
regional offices since some countries have none, 
while others are still organizing them (see 
table 1) . 
As a rule, the planning bodies act in an ad-
visory capacity to the top-level political authori-
ties. They often have other duties, such as 
helping to prepare the annual national budget 
estimates, advising on the external financing of 
particular investment projects, arid íio-ordinál:-; 
ing foreign technical assistance, , I 
3. T H E PLANS PREPARED 
In the majority of cases, the planning offices 
prepared "general medium and long-terra de-
velopment plans", for periods ranging from four 
to ten years. It was not long before nearly all 
the Latin American countries had such plans. 
The plan usually consists of a diagnosis, a set 
of projections and over-all and sectoral targets, 
a statement of the particular social goals, a 
broad assessment of changes required and fields 
for the application of economic policy, some 
indications concerning research and utilization 
of specific natural resources, public investment 
targets and estimates of external financing re-
quirements. More recently, shorter-term plans 
have been drawn up, often on a biennial basis. 
Table 2 lists the plans that have been pre-
pared in the different Latin American countries. 
Most of the long-term plans have also indicated, 
at least in the form of general statements of 
principle, the goals to be achieved in land re-
form, tax matters, education, administration, 
and national integration through infrastruc-
tural works (particularly roads and the opening 
up of new areas for agricultural settlement). In 
some cases, a salient feature of the plan is a 
large-scale project to which particular importance 
is attached.^ On the other hand, specific objec-
tives for income redistribution and measures 
or policies for unemployment and underemploy-
ment are seldom stated. 
As an integral part of the over-all plan or to 
supplement it, various countries have prepared 
public investment plans for two or three-year 
periods which, in relation to the general macro-
economic framework, specify the sectoral in-
vestment targets of Government agencies (the 
1 This analysis deals with the ieatures common to 
the whole region, so that certain comments may not be 
applicable to specific countiies. In particular, they do 
not refer to Cuba because the data available on the 
Cuban experience are inadequate. 
2 This applies, for instance, to big hydroelectric and 
irrigation works (Mantaro in Peru,- ChocóijrCerros Colo-
rados in Argentina), industrial complexes (Guayana in 
Venezuela) and roads (Carretera Marginal de la Selva) 
that predated the plan, but were fitted into the general 
framework so that their significance could be assessed 
more accurately in relation to the rest of the economy 
and for the purpose of securing external^, financing. 
Some of those projects are now being ^ple inented 
while others are still bogged down because the filial 
plan has not been adopted and financigg f lacking. , 
Table 2 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : E S T I M A T E D G R O W T H R A T E S O F T H E P R O D U C T , I M P O R T S , C O N S L 
I N V E S T M E N T A N D E X P O R T S I N T H E P E R I O D P R I O R T O T H E P L A N A N D D U R I N G T Í 
A N D A C T U A L R A T E S 
Croii domestic product 
Table 1 














Pre-plan (1957-63) . 0.5 —0.2 17.1 0.0 —0.5 —0.8 2.6 
Plan (1965-69) 5.8 4.4 7.7 7.6 4.7 5.6 5.7 
Actual rates (1965-66) . . . 3.2 2.2 7.5 7.2 —8.8 2.5 —1.8 
Bolivia 
Pre-plan (1950-58) , . . - f l . 2 0.3 —5.7 —2.4 4.1 0.9 . . . 
Plan (1963-64) 6.2 4.8 10.2 6.5 16.2 5.2 27.7 
Plan (1965-66) 5.5 3.0 11.8 7.7 7.6 4.0 10.5 
Actual rates (1963-66) . . . 5.9 3.0 7.6 6.3 9.7 6.5 9.8 
Chile 
Pre-plan (1950-59) . . . . 3.2 0.0 0.3 7.1 4.7 3.8 1.3 
Plan (1960-65) 4.8 3.7 7.3 5.0 6.6 3.9 12.0 
Actual rates (1960-65) . . . 4.1 2.0 3.8 6.2 7.0 3.7 10.1 
Colombia 
Pre-plan (1950-59) . 4.6 3.4 5.7 6.5» 1.2 4.1 2.6 
Plan (1959-64) 5.7 4.1 7.4 8.6 7.2 4.4 12.9 
Actual rates (1959-64) . . . 4.7 2.2 2.6 6.1 10.3 6.0 5.4 
Ecuador 
Pre-plan (1950-61) . . . . 5.6 5.0 6.3 5.1 6.2 5.1 7.4» 
Plan (1964-73) 
Hypothesis I 6.4 4.7 7.2 8.6 4.2 5.4 10.3 
Hypothesis II 6.5 4.7 8.0 8.5 5.1 5.7 10.1 
Actual rates (1964-65) . . . 3.3 1.0 2.1 4.5 5.4 5.1 2.3 
Mexico 
Pre-plan (1958-61) 5.3 3.0" 1.1b 6.8b - 0 . 2 4.3 5.2» 
Plan (1962-65) 5.4 4.5 2.6 6.9 8.8 5.5 8.6 
Actual rates (1962-65) . . . 7.3 4.4 4.7 10.1 9.3 7.0 12.4 
Panama 
Pre-plan (1961-63) 8.7 2.4 22.5 17.3 15.2 7.9 11.8 
Plan (1963-70) 5.5 . . . 5.3 5.0 6.4 
Actual rates (1963-65) . . . 6.5 7.6 2.7 6.2 4.6 5.3 3.9 
Paraguay 
Pre-plan (1950-64) 3.2 3.9 25.0 6.9 7.6 3.0 5.4 
Plan (1965-66) 
Hypothesis I 4.7 4.9 2.8 8.5 23.0 4.2 22.0 
Hypothesis II 5.8 . . . 29.0 5.4 32.0 
Actual rates (1965-66) . . . 3.9 3.4 0.0 1.9 10.6 5.2 1.7 
Uruguay 
Pre-plan (1961-64) 0.9 2.0 d 0.5 —4.7 —0.1 
Plan (1965-67) 4.4 2.2 d 6.0 9.1 1.70 14.5 
Actual rates (1965-66) . . . 1.8 4.9 d 0.1 —7.7 —0.6 —0.5 
Venezuela 
Pre-plan (1959-62) 2.8 7.7 3.9 5.1 —10.4 —0.6 -A.6 
Plan (1963-66) 7.6 7.9 4.3 12.0 2.2 
Actual rates (1963-66) . . . 6.0 6.9 1.7 9.0 1.7 6.2 8.8 
(Table 2 overleaf)-
SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of development plana 
and official statistics. 
® Gross fixed investment. 
b 1950-58. 
" Government consumption, 
d Included in the industrial sector. 
Table 1 
PLANNING AGENCIES IN LATIN AMERICA 
Country: 
Í , Year when first planning 
: \^<x3ency established'^ 
2, Date when present sys-
tem established 
Agencies responsible for policy lines 
(Title and membership) Technical agencies Sectoral agencies Regional agencies 
A r g e n t i n a 
1. 1961 
2 . S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 6 
Bo l iv ia 
1. 1 9 5 3 
2 . J u l y 1 9 6 3 
Braz i l 
1. 1 9 5 6 
2 . J u l y 1 9 6 3 
C h i l e 
1. 1 9 3 9 
2 . N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 4 
C o l o m b i a 
1. 1951 
2 . D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 3 
C o s t a R i c a 
1. 1 9 6 3 
2 . J a n u a r y 1 9 6 3 
C u b a 
1. I 9 6 0 
2. F e b r u a r y 1 9 6 1 
D o m i n i c a n R e p u b l i c ... 
1. 1 9 6 2 
2 . N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 5 
E c u a d o r 
1. 1 9 5 4 
2 . A u g u s t 1 9 6 1 
EI S a l v a d o r 
1. 1 9 6 2 
2 . A p r i l 1 9 6 2 
G u a t e m a l a 
1. 1 9 5 4 
2 . N o v e m b e r 1 9 5 4 
H a i t i 
1. 1 9 6 2 
2 . J u l y 1 9 6 3 
H o n d u r a s 
1. 1 9 5 5 
2 . O c t o b e r 1 9 6 5 
M e x i c o 
1. 1 9 5 8 
2 . M a r c h 1 9 6 2 
N i c a r a g u a 
1. 1 9 5 2 
2 . F e b r u a r y 1 9 5 2 
P a n a m a 
1. 1 9 5 9 
2 . J u n e 1 9 5 9 
P a r a g u a y 
1. 1 9 4 8 
2 . S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 2 
1. 1 9 6 2 
2 . O c t o b e r 1 9 6 2 
U r u g u a y 
1. I 9 6 0 
2 . N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 6 
^^enezuela 
1. 1 9 5 8 
2 . D e c e m b e r 1 9 5 8 
N a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t C o u n c i l ( C O N A D E ) : P r e s i d e n t o f A r -
g e n t i n a a n d M i n i s t e r s 
N a t i o n a l E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l D e v e l o p m e n t C o u n c i l ( P r e s i d e n t 
o f Bo l i v ia a n d t h e M i n i s t e r s w i t h e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ) 
M i n i s t r y o f P l a n n i n g a n d E c o n o m i c C o - o r d i n a t i o n . C o n s u l t a t i v e 
P l a n n i n g C o u n c i l ( e x p e r t s , press r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , e n t r e p r e n e u r s , 
w o r k e r s a n d s t a t e or r e g i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t a g e n c i e s ) . A d v i s o r y 
S r o u p o n A d m i n i s t r a t i v e R e f o r m S t u d i e s ; A l l i a n c e f o r P r o -
g ress L i a i s o n C o m m i t t e e ; a n d F u n d f o r F i n a n c i n g P r o j e c t 
a n d P r o g r a m m e S t u d i e s 
E c o n o m i c C o m m i t t e e o f M i n i s t e r s , p r e s i d e d o v e r b y t h e M i n i s t e r 
o f F i n a n c e . N a t i o n a l P l a n n i n g O f f i c e ( O D E P L A N ) 
N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l o n E c o n o m i c P o l i c y { t h e P r e s i d e n t o f C o l o m -
b i a , t h e M i n i s t e r s w i t h e c o n o m i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . C h i e f o f 
P l a n n i n g , M a n a g e r o f t h e Bank o f C o l o m b i a a n d M a n a g e r 
o f t h e N a t i o n a l F e d e r a t i o n o f C o f f e e G r o w e r s ) , a n d t h e 
E c o n o m i c A d v i s o r y G r o u p ( e i g h t m e m b e r s a p p o i n t e d b y t h e 
P r e s i d e n t o f C o l o m b i a o n t h e basis o f n o m i n a t i o n s b y t r a d e 
a s s o c i a t i o n s ) 
M i n i s t r y o f P l a n n i n g , T e c h n i c a l C o m m i t t e e f o r t h e E v a l u a t i o n 
o f I n v e s t m e n t P r o j e c t s ( M i n i s t e r s , s e n i o r o f f i c ia ls a n d p r i v a t e 
a s s o c i a t i o n s ) . C o n s u l t a t i v e P l a n n i n g C o m m i t t e e ( H e a d s o f 
D e p a r t m e n t s o f t h e M i n i s t r y o f P l a n n i n g a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
o f p r i v a t e a s s o c i a t i o n s ) 
C e n t r a l P l a n n i n g B o a r d ( J U C E P L A N ) , p r e s i d e d o v e r b y t h e 
P r i m e M i n i s t e r , a n d c o n s i s t i n g o f t h e M i n i s t e r s r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r t h e c e n t r a l e c o n o m i c a g e n c i e s 
N a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t C o u n c i l ( P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c , 
M i n i s t e r s o f F i n a n c e , P u b l i c W o r k s a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n s , 
A g r i c u l t u r e , E d u c a t i o n , H e a l t h a n d S o c i a l W e l f a r e ; G o v e r n o r 
o f t h e C e n t r a l B a n k a n d T e c h n i c a l S e c r e t a r y o f t h e O f f i c e 
o f t h e P r e s i d e n t ; a s s o c i a t e m e m b e r s : N a t i o n a l P l a n n i n g 
D i r e c t o r a n d N a t i o n a l B u d g e t D i r e c t o r ) 
N a t i o n a l B o a r d f o r E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g a n d C o - o r d i n a t i o n 
( M i n i s t e r s w i t h e c o n o m i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , t h e M a n a g e r s o f t h e 
C e n t r a l B a n k a n d t h e N a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t Bank, a n d t h r e e 
c i t i z e n s o f n o t e ) 
N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l f o r E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g a n d C o - o r d i n a t i o n 
( P r e s i d e n t o f El S a l v a d o r , t h e M i n i s t e r s o f F i n a n c e , E c o n o m i c 
A f f a i r s , A g r i c u l t u r e , L a b o u r a n d S o c i a l S e c u r i t y , a n d P u b l i c 
W o r k s , t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e C e n t r a l R e s e r v e Bank, t w o r e p r e -
s e n t a t i v e s o f p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e , a n d t h e E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y ) 
N a t i o n a l E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g C o u n c i l , O f f i c e o f t h e P r e s i d e n t 
( t h e M i n i s t e r s o f L a b o u r a n d E c o n o m i c A f f a i r s , F i n a n c e a n d 
P u b l i c C r e d i t , C o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d P u b l i c W o r k s , A g r i c u l t u r e , 
P u b l i c H e a l t h a n d S o c i a l W e l f a r e , t h e P r e s i d e n t s o f t h e Bank 
o f G u a t e m a l a a n d o f t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r t h e D e v e l o p m e n t o f 
P r o d u c t i o n , a n d t h r e e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e P r e s i d e n t o f 
G u a t e m a l a ) 
N a t i o n a l P l a n n i n g a n d D e v e l o p m e n t D e p a r t m e n t ( C O N A D E P ) 
H i g h e r E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g C o u n c i l ( P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c , 
S e c r e t a r i e s o f S t a t e f o r E c o n o m i c s a n d F i n a n c e ; C o m m u n i c a -
t i o n s a n d P u b l i c W , o r k s ; N a t u r a l R e s o u r c e s ; P r e s i d e n t s o f t h e 
C e n t r a l Bank a n d t h e D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k ; o n e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
f r o m m a n a g e m e n t a n d o n e f r o m l a b o u r ) 
I n t e r - M i n i s t e r i a l D e v e l o p m e n t P l a n n i n g C o m m i t t e e ( r e p r e s e n t a -
t i v e s o f t h e O f f i c e o f t h e P r e s i d e n t a n d o f t h e M i n i s t r y o f 
F i n a n c e a n d P u b l i c C r e d i t ) 
N a t i o n a l E c o n o m i c C o u n c i l ( M i n i s t e r s o f E c o n o m i c A f f a i r s , 
F i n a n c e , D e v e l o p m e n t a n d A g r i c u l t u r e , t h e P r e s i d e n t s o f t h e 
C e n t r a l Bank a n d o f t h e N a t i o n a l Bank, a n d t h e G e n e r a l 
M a n a g e r o f t h e N a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t I n s t i t u t e . P l a n n i n g 
O f f i c e , O f f i c e o f t h e P r e s i d e n t 
G e n e r a l O f f i c e o f P l a n n i n g a n d A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , O f f i c e o f t h e 
P r e s i d e n t 
N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l f o r E c o n o m i c C o - o r d i n a t i o n ( P r e s i d e n t o f 
P a r a g u a y , t h e M i n i s t e r s o f F i n a n c e a n d E c o n o m i c A f f a i r s , 
t h e C h a i r m a n a n d a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e M o n e t a r y B o a r d 
o f t h e Bank o f P a r a g u a y . T w o m e m b e r s o f t h e C h a m b e r o f 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a t t e n d in a n a d v i s o r y c a p a c i t y . T h e P r e s i d e n t 
m a y a p p o i n t t h r e e o t h e r m e m b e r s ) 
N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l f o r E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l D e v e l o p m e n t ( P r e s -
i d e n t o f P e r u , M i n i s t e r s of F i n a n c e a n d T r a d e , D e v e l o p m e n t 
a n d P u b l i c W o r k s , E d u c a t i o n , H e a l t h a n d S o c i a l W e l f a r e , 
A g r i c u l t u r e , L a b o u r a n d I n d i g e n o u s A f f a i r s , a n d t h e A r m e d 
S e r v i c e s D e p a r t m e n t s , a n d t h e C h i e f o f t h e N a t i o n a l P l a n n i n g 
i n s t i t u t e ) 
B u d g e t a n d P l a n n i n g O f f i c e ( d i r e c t e d b y a C o m m i t t e e m a d e 
u p o f t h e M i n i s t e r s o f F i n a n c e ; A g r i c u l t u r e ; I n d u s t r y a n d 
T r a d e ; L a b o u r a n d S o c i a l S e c u r i t y ; P u b l i c W o r k s ; P u b l i c 
H e a l t h ; T r a n s p o r t , C o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d T o u r i s m ; a n d C u l t u r e ; 
a n d p r e s i d e d o v e r b y t h e D i r e c t o r o f t h e O f f i c e ) 
P r e s i d e n t of V e n e z u e l a , in t h e C o u n c i l o f M i n i s t e r s 
S e c r e t a r i a t o f C O N A D E 
N a t i o n a l P l a n n i n g a n d C o - o r d i n a t i o n D e p a r t -
m e n t ( d i r e c t e d b y t h e M i n i s t e r o f P l a n n i n g 
a n d C o - o r d i n a t i o n ) 
S h o r t - t e r m p l a n n i n g : M i n i s t r y o f P l a n n i n g 
g r o u p s ; L o n g - t e r m p l a n n i n g : O f f i c e o f 
A p p l i e d E c o n o m i c R e s e a r c h ( E P E A ) 
O D E P L A N 
P l a n n i n g D e p a r t m e n t 
M i n i s t r y o f P l a n n i n g . P l a n n i n g O f f i c e 
T e c h n i c a l s e c r e t a r i a t o f J U C E P L A N . P l a n n i n g 
c o n t r o l a c t i v i t i e s ; N a t i o n a l Bank o f C u b a 
T e c h n i c a l s e c r e t a r i a t o f t h e O f f i c e o f t h e 
P r e s i d e n t ( d i r e c t e d by a T e c h n i c a l S e c r e t a r y ) 
G e n e r a l O f f i c e o f E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g 
T h e M i n i s t r y o f P u b l i c W o r k s a n d S e r v i c e s a n d 
c e r t a i n S t a t e e n t e r p r i s e s w o r k o u t s e c t o r a l 
p r o g r a m m e s 
In t h e M i n i s t r i e s o f N a t i o n a l E c o n o m y ; A g r i -
c u l t u r e , L i v e s t o c k , L a n d S e t t l e m e n t a n d 
I r r i g a t i o n ; M i n e s a n d P e t r o l e u m ; E d u c a t i o n 
a n d C u l t u r e ; R u r a l A f f a i r s ; H e a l t h ; a n d 
L a b o u r a n d S o c i a l S e c u r i t y 
S e c t o r a l p l a n n i n g s e c t i o n s in t h e M i n i s t r y o f 
P l a n n i n g . S p e c i f i c b o d i e s ( e . g . E x e c u t i v e 
G r o u p f o r t h e I n t e g r a t i o n o f T r a n s p o r t 
P o l i c y ) 
S e c t o r a l p l a n n i n g s e c t i o n o f O D E P L A N . S e c -
t o r a l o f f i c e s in t h e M i n i s t r i e s o f A g r i c u l t u r e , 
H o u s i n g , E d u c a t i o n a n d H e a l t h ; a n d in t h e 
D e v e l o p m e n t C o r p o r a t i o n ( C O R F O ) f o r 
i n d u s t r y 
P l a n n i n g C o m m i t t e e s ( w h i c h e s t a b l i s h t h e g e n -
e r a l p o l i c y , a n d a r e p r e s i d e d o v e r b y t h e 
M i n i s t e r c o n c e r n e d ) . O f f i c e s o f P l a n n i n g , 
C o - o r d i n a t i o n a n d E v a l u a t i o n ( t e c h n i c a l ) 
In a l l M i n i s t r i e s a n d 
a u t o n o m o u s a g e n c i e s 
in t h e d e c e n t r a l i z e d 
T e c h n i c a l P l a n n i n g O f f i c e , d i r e c t e d b y a n 
E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y 
G e n e r a l s e c r e t a r i a t o f t h e N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l 
o f E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g 
C O N A D E P 
T e c h n i c a l s e c r e t a r i a t o f t h e H i g h e r E c o n o m i c 
P l a n n i n g C o u n c i l ( d i r e c t e d b y a n E x e c u t i v e 
S e c r e t a r y w i t h m i n i s t e r i a l r a n k ) 
T e c h n i c a l o f f i c e o f t h e I n t e r - M i n i s t e r i a l C o m -
m i t t e e 
T e c h n i c a l s e c r e t a r i a t o f t h e N a t i o n a l E c o n o m i c 
C o u n c i l ( u n d e r t h e M i n i s t r y f o r E c o n o m i c 
A f f a i r s ) 
G e n e r a l O f f i c e o f P l a n n i n g a n d A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
D e p a r t m e n t s o f P l a n n i n g B u d g e t , A d m i n i s t r a -
t i v e O r g a n i z a t i o n a n d P e r s o n n e l A d m i n i s t r a -
t i o n 
T e c h n i c a l O f f i c e f o r E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l 
D e v e l o p m e n t P l a n n i n g , O f f i c e o f t h e Pres-
i d e n t ¡ E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y ) 
N a t i o n a l P l a n n i n g I n s t i t u t e ( w h o s e C h i e f has 
t h e rank o f M i n i s t e r ) , t h e A d v i s o r y P l a n n i n g 
C o u n c i l ( p r e s i d e d o v e r b y t h e C h i e f o f t h e 
I n s t i t u t e , w i t h a m e m b e r s h i p o f r e p r e s e n t a -
t i v e s o f e n t r e p r e n e u r s , w o r k e r s , p r o f e s s i o n a l s 
a n d u n i v e r s i t i e s ) 
B u d g e t a n d P l a n n i n g O f f i c e 
C e n t r a l O f f i c e f o r C o - o r d i n a t i o n a n d P l a n n i n g 
I n t h e M i n i s t r y o f A g r i c u l t u r e 
T h e s e c r e t a r i a t s o f t h e M i n i s t r i e s , t h e d e c e n -
t r a l i z e d a g e n c i e s a n d t h e e n t e r p r i s e s w i t h 
S t a t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n a l l w o r k o u t i n v e s t m e n t 
p r o g r a m m e s 
R e s e a r c h a n d p r o g r a m m i n g o f f i ces in m o s t o f 
t h e M i n i s t r i e s 
I n t h e M i n i s t r i e s o f E d u c a t i o n ; A g r i c u l t u r e , 
T r a d e a n d I n d u s t r i e s ; a n d L a b o u r , S o c i a l 
W e l f a r e a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h 
F e d e r a l I n v e s t m e n t C o u n c i l 
I n p r o c e s s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n 
M i n i s t r y f o r C o - o r d i n a t i o n o f R e g i o n a l 
c i e s ( f o r f e d e r a l r e g i o n a l p l a n n i n g e g e 
D e p a r t m e n t f o r t h e D e v e l o p m e n t 
A m a z o n R e g i o n ; D e p a r t m e n t f o r t f 
o p m e n t o f t h e N o r d e s t e . Plannin< 
in a l m o s t a l l s t a t e s , d e p e n d e n t 
g o v e r n m e n t s 
R e g i o n a l p l a n n i n g s e c t i o n o f C D l 
R e g i o n a l p l a n n i n g a g e n c i e s ( O R P I A I 
D e p a r t m e n t a l G o v e r n m e n t : A d v i s o r y C 
( p o l i c y ) a n d D e p a r t m e n t a l P l a n n i n g S 
( t e c h n i c a l ) . A u t o n o m o u s D e v e l o p m e n t 
p o r a t i o n s : C a u c a , M a g d a l e n a a n d 
B o g o t á s a v a n n a h a n d U b a t é - C h i q u i n q 
E a c h M i n i s t r y has t o t r a n s l a t e t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s 
o f t h e C e n t r a l P l a n n i n g B o a r d i n t o s p e c i f i c 
p lans f o r e a c h s e c t o r a n d un i t 
I n t h e M i n i s t r y o f A g r i c u l t u r e . T o b e e s t a b -
l i s h e d in M i n i s t r i e s w i t h e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l 
f u n c t i o n s a n d in t h e a u t o n o m o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s 
P r o g r a m m i n g o f f i c e s m t h e M i n i s t r i e s o f E d u -
c a t i o n ; P u b l i c W o r k s a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n s ; 
I n d u s t r y a n d T r a d e ; S o c i a l W e l f a r e , L a b o u r 
a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h ; F i n a n c e ; a n d A g r i c u l t u r e 
a n d L i v e s t o c k . A l s o in t h e E c u a d o r i a n L a n d 
R e f o r m a n d L a n d S e t t l e m e n t I n s t i t u t e a n d 
t h e D e v e l o p m e n t C e n t r e ( C E N D E S ) 
P l a n n i n g C o m m i t t e e s a r e b e i n g o r g a n i z e d i n 
t h e M i n i s t r i e s o f P u b l i c W o r k s , A g r i c u l t u r e , 
E d u c a t i o n a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h 
C o - o r d i n a t i n g C e n t r e f o r N o r t h e r n 
a n d N u e v i t a s 
C e n t r e f o r t h e E c o n o m i c R e c o n v e r s i o n 
A u s t r o ; B o a r d f o r t h e E c o n o m i c f 
o f L o j a a n d Z a m o r a - C h i n c h i p e ; C e 
t h e R e h a b i l i t a t i o n o f M a n a b i ; D e v e l 
B o a r d s o f El O r o , C a r c h i a n d Esn^ei 
e c 
i t r 
Of 
N a t i o n a l c o m m i t t e e s f o r s p e c i f i c p r o j e c 
t h e P a p a l c a p á n Bas in ) 
In t h e M i n i s t r i e s o f L a b o u r a n d I n d i g e n o u s 
A f f a i r s ; P u b l i c E d u c a t i o n ; D e v e l o p m e n t a n d 
P u b l i c W o r k s ; P u b l i c H e a l t h a n d S o c i a l 
W e l f a r e ; a n d A g r i c u l t u r e . A l s o in t h e N a -
t i o n a l T o w n P l a n n i n g O f T i c e a n d t h e N a t i o n a l 
E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t F u n d 
In t h e M i n i s t r i e s o f A g r i c u l t u r e , P u b l i c E d u c a -
t i o n a n d S o c i a l W e l f a r e ; a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h 
S e c t o r a l o f f i c e s in t h e M i n i s t r i e s a n d a u t o -
n o m o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s . S e c t o r a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
g r o u p s 
O f f i c e s f o r t h e p l a n n i n g o f g e o g r a p h i c a l 
in e c o n o m i c r e g i o n s , a n d p o l i t i c a l a n d a 
t r a t i v e d iv is ions , a r e e n v i s a g e d . T h e r e 
d e v e l o p m e n t c o r p o r a t i o n s f o r C u z c o , 
q u i p a . M a d r e d e D i o s , T a c n a , Pui^o 
l e a 
T h e V e n e z u e l a n C o r p o r a t i o n o f G u a y a n a 
m i t t e e t o p r o m o t e t h e d e v e l o p m e n t 
A n d e s ; a n d t h e Z u l i a n o P l a n n i n g C o u 
« T h i s r e l a t e s t o a g e n c i e s t h a t r e p r e s e n t t h e o r i g i n o f t h e p r e s e n t s y s t e m . 
central Government, autonomous agencies and, 
in some cases, State-owned enterprises), on the 
basis of draft or final projects. This is the kind 
of plan that has been most effective in bringing 
the planning offices into closer contact viith the 
budgetary organs and in modernizing and 
streamlining government budgets. These plans 
have also proposed criteria for the allocation 
of resources to projects already under way, 
projects to supplement them or new projects, 
and have had to tackle the problem of distribut-
ing resources between productive investment, 
direct development expenditure, the expansion 
of current expenditure and investment expendi-
ture in the different social services. 
Thus over-all long-term plans have made a 
major contribution to the establishment of gen-
eral development policy. Supplemented by me-
dium-term plans, they have served to rationalize 
public sector activities. However, the countries 
of the region have not made an analysis in depth 
of specific short-term economic policy pro-
grammes which help to ensure that immediate 
action is compatible with the long-term objec-
tives. 
The small number of annual operational plans, 
except for public investment schemes, can be 
explained by various factors, including metho-
dological shortcomings, inadequate descriptions 
of individual projects and failure to establish 
short-term economic policies. 
Experience with regard to regional plans has 
been varied, and the guiding principles observed 
in their formulation have not always been uni-
form. in some cases, for example, an attempt 
has been made to distribute some public invest-
ment targets of the over-all plan among the 
various regions responsible for sectoral targets. 
In other cases, the policy has been to formulate 
a general programme, more or less unrelated to 
the over-all plan, for an especially backward 
region or for a region with a very favourable 
combination of matural resources. 
4 . IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS 
Apart from the difficulty of assessing the 
various plans in terms of the actual expansion 
of economic activity, such an assessment may be 
meaningless in some instances, and in others 
may overlook or under-estimate the contribu-
tions of planning. 
A case in point is afforded by the over-all 
growth targets for the product and its major 
components. Table 3 presents, in relation to ten 
Latin American countries, the growth rates of 
the total product and of the agricultural, mining 
and industrial sectors, as well as of the aggre-
gate components of demand (imports, consump-
tion, investment and exports); in each case, the 
rates envisaged in the various plans are re-
corded, together with those attained previously 
and those reached during the early years of the 
plan's operation. 
Although such figures would seem to consti-
tute a factual basis for evaluation, it would be 
hazardous to draw final conclusions from them, 
other than the very general observation that as a 
rule there is a relatively wide gap between the 
targets of the plans and actual economic trends. 
The extent to which the plans were politically 
supported, their intrinsic nature, the evolution 
of exogenous variables mainly relating to for-
eign trade and financing, and many fortuitous 
factors would require detailed consideration of 
each specific case, although many have features 
in common, such as those discussed in the rele-
vant sections of this note. 
Much the same is true of the general lines of 
development policy followed in the plans. In 
most instances, they represent principles or pro-
posals worked out before the plans were offi-
cially sanctioned and incorporated in them as 
decisions, thus strengthening them and directly 
or indirectly helping to bring them into opera-
tion. Hence, although the progress achieved in 
certain fields may not be directly attributable <y 
to the content of specific plans, it is unrelated 
to all that the planning process involves. For 
example, since 1961—^when planning first be-
came a widespread practice—agrarian reform 
laws have been passed by fourteen of the Latin 
American countries, and most of them are adopt-
ing tax legislation and improving tax adminis-
tration with increasingly favourable effects on 
the income of the public sector. 
From another standpoint, the preparation of 
plans has compelled more thorough study of 
each country's economic situation and investi-
gation of the causes of its underdevelopment. 
The planning effort has been reflected in sub-
stantial improvements in the basic statistical 
data available, has encouraged surveys of natu-
ral resources, created greater awareness of in-
ternal and external fi^nancing problems and 
helped to identify the essential features of a 
Latin American development strategy. Although 
all this has not produced immediate and tangible 
resuks, it implies a substantial though gradual 
change in the approach to problems. As the 
process has been gradual, this change of atti-
tude has sometimes escaped notice, but when 
analysed, it reveals a considerable difference 
between the approach to development problems 
Table 3 





















National Development Plan, 1965-69. National economic budget, 1966 
Economic and Social Development Plan, 1962-71. Sectoral plans, 1963-64. 
Performance budgeting since 1961. Two-year economic and social 
development plans, 1963-64 and 1965-66 
Target plan (1957-60). Three Year Economic and Social Development 
Plan, 1963-65. Government Programme of Economic Action, July 
1964-March 1967. Ten-Year Plan, 1967-76 (in preparation) 
Sectoral short-term plans (power, steel, petroleum, etc.). National 
Development Programme, 1961-70. Five-Year Development Plan (in 
preparation) 
Performance budgeting since 1961. General Economic and Social 
Development Plan, 1962-70. Four-year public investment plans, 
(1961-64, 1962-65) 
Performance budgeting since 1964. Economic and Social Develop-
ment Plan, 1965-68 
Plan for the National Economy (annual, beginning 1962) 
Performance budgeting since 1964. Bases for national development 
(1966). Two-year development plan (in preparation) 
Bases and directives for the programming of Ecuador's economic 
development. Short-term development plan. Performance budgeting 
since 1963. General Economic and Social Development Plan, 1964-73 
Two-Year Public Investment Programme, 1964-65. Performance budget-
ing since 1964. Economic and Social Development Plan (1965-69). 
Annual public investment plans since 1966 
Performance budgeting since 1964. Economic and Social Development 
Plan (1965-69) 
Short-term plan (two-year investment plan). Emergency programmes 
(1966) 
National Public Investment Plan, 1963-64. Preliminary version of the 
Four-Year Economic and Social Development Plan, 1962-65. Per-
formance budgeting since 1964. Economic and Social Development 
Plan (1965-69) 
Sectoral plans. Short-term plan, 1962-64. Development Plan, 1967-70 
(in preparation) 
Performance budgeting since 1964. National Economic and Social 
Development Plan, 1965-69 
Economic and Social Development Programme, 1963-70. Performance 
budgeting since 1966 
Performance budgeting since 1963. Two-year plans (1965-66 and 
1967-68) 
Public investment programme, 1964-65 and 1966. Performance budget-
ing since 1963. Economic and Social Development Plan (1967-70) 
Economic Survey of Uruguay (1963). National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (1965-74) 
Four-Year Plan, 1960-64. Performance budgeting since 1963. Annual 
plan of operation (1964). National Plan, 1962, 1963-66 and 1965-68 
adopted by Governments and the public today, 
and the situation a 'few years ago. It has been 
rightly contended that the existence of a plan 
is less important than the fact that it has been 
worked out. 
One of the most direct and immediate results 
of development plans is the efifort to rationalize 
the public sector, shown both in general policy 
and in the formulation of public investment 
plans, the use of programme and performance 
budget techniques and the evaluation of projects. 
The general principles set forth in the plans 
have served to elucidate the development process 
and to weld into a whole the many piecemeal 
measures involved in government action. This 
does not mean that the decisions adopted have 
been strictly in line with the plans, but it does 
imply the existence of a yardstick to measure 
the deviations caused by unfavourable conditions 
and the extent to which favourable circum-
stances have been exploited. Furthermore, famili-
arity with the plans and public discussion of 
them at the national level, together with their 
evaluation by international technical agencies, 
have made for the inclusion of decisions requir-
ing structural reforms. 
The rationalization of public expenditure has 
been especially noteworthy in the countries 
where public investment plans have been drawn 
up, since sectoral budgets have had to be fitted 
into an over-all concept encompassing a break-
down of investment to be made by State agen-
cies and projects and preliminary projects for a 
two-year or three-year period. Although in most 
cases the quantitative targets established may 
not have been attained, diis is probably the 
type of plan that has operated most effectively 
in Latin America, among other reasons because 
it relates to one of the special provinces of the 
public sector, on which it is binding. 
The adoption of programme and performance 
budgeting has gradually superseded the tradi-
tional process and has resulted in the increas-
ingly rational allocation of public expenditure 
and investment. The efficient operation of this 
system calls for conditions that have not yet 
been fully established (skilled personnel, reliable 
statistical data, identification of executive units, 
integration of the accounting systems of the 
public sector, costing and evaluation, channels 
of communication between the central and sec-
toral budget offices, etc.). Nevertheless, in the 
countries where it is applied, budgeting and 
planning are better co-ordinated at the budget 
programming stage, and budgets are presented 
in a more rational form. At the same time, the 
processes of execution and evaluation of the 
budget are being brought into line with the new 
system, and some countries already have ade-
quate machinery for accounting, costing and 
evaluation of results. 
Where public sector projects are incorporated 
in an over-all strategy, the process of evaluating 
them has necessarily involved assessing their 
relative importance, establishing a satisfactory 
order of priorities, considering the compatability 
of projects and groups of projects and taking 
into account their direct and indirect effects on 
the economy as a whole, it has thus been pos-
sible to prevent, in part at least, situations such 
as have recently arisen in some countries, in 
which the haphazard launching of projects has 
led to disproportionately heavy external bor-
rowing or serious distortions of the structure of 
production. 
5. EXTERNAL TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION 
External technical co-operation has without a 
doubt exerted a marked influence on planning 
efforts in Latin America, directly in some cases 
and indirectly in others. It has been responsible 
for much of the headway made in overcoming 
limitations to planning. This influence has op-
erated mainly with respect to methodology, 
training of cadres, the actual formulation of 
plans, and the promotion of specific projects. 
Technical assistance in the field of planning 
methods was particularly important because the 
region was lacking in experience, statistical and 
technical data were not abundant, and the eco-
nomic and social characteristics of Latin 
America did not make it easy to transplant 
methods used in other parts of the world. Con-
sequently planning helped to develop an appre-
ciation of the efforts of international agencies 
to secure a fuller and deeper understanding of 
the Latin American economies and their devel-
opment problems, as well as the usefulness of 
their work in programming and projection tech-
niques, programme and performance budgeting, 
and preparation and evaluation of projects. 
This applies to some of ECLA's general 
studies,® and to its subsequent analyses of over-
all programming techniques,^ its specific studies 
on the development of a number of countries,® 
3 See, for example, Raúl Prebisch, "The economic de-
velopment ol Latin America and its principal prob-
lems", Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. VII, 
No. 1 (1962), pp. 1-22; Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1949 (United Nations publication. Sales No.: 
51.II.G.1); and Problemas teóricos y prácticos del creci-
miento económico (United Nations publication. Sales 
No.: 52.II.G.1; issued in English in mimeographed 
version only, under the titled "Theoretical and practical 
problems of economic growth" (E/CN.12/221)). 
4 See the provisional study on the technique of eco-
nomic development programming, revised and reissued 
in July 1955 under the following title: Analyses and 
projections of economic development: I. An introduction 
to the techniques of programming (United Nations pub-
lication, Sales No.: 55.II.G.2). 
^Analyses and Projections of Economic Development: 
IL The Economic Development of Brazil (United Nations 
publication, Sales No.: 56.II.G.2); / / / . The Economic 
Development of Colombia (United Nations publication. 
Sales No.: 57.II.G.3); IV. The Economic Development 
of Bolivia (United Nations publication. Sales No.: 
58.II.G.2); V. The Economic Development of Argentina, 
vols. I, II and III (United Nations publication, Sales 
No.: 59.II.G.3); VL The Industrial Development of Peru 
(United Nations publication, Sales No.: 59.II.G.2); VIL 
The Economic Development of Panama (United Nations 
and its discussion of programme and perform-
ance budgeting and project preparation and 
evaluation techniques.® The Commission also 
helped to relieve the serious shortage of special-
ists in these subjects, by initiating training 
courses on development planning in 1952. These 
and other activities were considerably strength-
ened by the establishment of the Latin American 
Institute for Economic and Social Planning in 
July 1962. Its objectives were to strengthen the 
training programme, help Governments to ini-
tiate the planning process and carry out studies 
on basic development problems and planning 
techniques. 
The special impact of its training efforts has 
been reflected in the fact that only very recently 
have subjects specifically relating to planning 
and development been included in the regular 
curricula of Latin American universities. The 
first planning efforts were supported only by 
small groups of technical experts trained under 
special programmes designed and implemented 
by international agencies. While such pro-
grammes could not take the place of previous 
academic training, they have fulfilled a useful 
function by laying down general guidelines and 
providing the methodological tools required to 
cope with immediate responsibilities. Moreover, 
they have helped to bring together specialists 
with different technical backgrounds and ex-
perience (economists, engineers, sociologists, 
educators, doctors, administrators) for planning 
purposes on the basis of a minimum of common 
training and language, and to fit them for the 
team work that planning entails. 
publication, Sales No.: 60.II.G.3); VIII. The Economic 
Development of El Salvador (United Nations publica-
tion Sales No.: 60.II.G.2); IX. The Economic Develop, 
ment of Nicaragua (in press); XI. The Economic De-
velopment of Honduras (United Nations publication, 
Sales No.: 61.II.G.8). 
6 "The fiscal budget as an instrument in the pro-
gramming of economic development" (E/CN.12/521); 
"Algunas consideraciones sobre las relaciones entre 
la programación del desarrollo y el presupuesto fiscal" 
(E/CN.12/BRW.2/L.5); "La experiencia de algunos 
países de América del Sur en materia de reforma pre-
supuestaria" (E/(3Í.12/BRW.2/L.10); Manual on Eco-
nomic Development Projects (United Nations publica-
tion, Sales No.: SS.II.G.S). 
The co-operation of ECLA, and later of the 
Institute, has also been extended to cover the 
provision of advisory services for the purpose 
of organizing and establishing planning ma-
chinery and formulating plans. Several coun-
tries have obtained the co-operation of "advisory 
groups", set up by these international agencies 
most often with the participation of the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) and the 
Secretariat of the Organization of American 
States (OAS), or with occasional advisory serv-
ices in specific fields.'' Later, such services were 
also offered by oflScial agencies or foreign 
foundations under bilateral co-operation pro-
grammes. 
In addition to these direct forms of external 
technical co-operation there are a number of 
different ways in which planning has been en-
larged in scope and made more effective. The 
panel of experts established under the agree-
ments contained in the Punta del Este Charter, 
whose function is to evaluate plans and make 
recommendations on external financial assist-
ance, was instrumental in improving plans and 
strengthening national planning systems. The 
Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for 
Progress was subsequently established as a com-
mittee of the Inter-American Economic and 
Social Council to make an annual review of the 
economic situation and the implementation of 
plans in each country and to estimate the amount 
of external financing required. Its establish-
ment was another milestone in the progress of 
planning in Latin America. The significant con-
tribution of the Inter-American Development 
Bank to the development of the region took the 
form, inter alia, of financing regional pro-
grammes, national planning organs and inter-
national and regional agencies engaged in plan-
ning. The expansion of the activities of 
international financial institutions (IBRD, 
United States Government agencies and others) 
has also stimulated the preparation of invest-
ment projects and helped to improve their 
quality. 
7 Advisory groups were set up in Colombia (May 
1959); Bolivia (April 1960); Haiti (end of 1961); 
Uruguay (March 1962); Paraguay (end of 1962); Peru 
(February 1963); and Central America (early in 1963). 
11. OBSTACLES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS 
Although planning in Latin America has made 
a number of important advances in certain 
aspects, it still has serious weaknesses and 
improveanent of planning and implementation of 
plans is still being hampered. Recently, the plan-
ning process has been experiencing a period of 
stagnation, and in some cases can be seen to 
have lost ground. The impetus to prepare the 
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over-all plans has spent itself, and the same 
fervour has not been applied to the tasks of 
translating over-all planning policy into spe-
cific economic policy programmes and short-
term operational plans, and establishing efficient 
instruments for the periodic review and up-
dating of plans and the evaluation of their 
implementation. 
It is in such tasks that the various limitations 
and obstacles are most apparent. Some of them 
stem from internal factors, ranging from the 
most general, including the political stability or 
amount of political support that planning efforts 
actually enjoy, to factors more directly related 
to the actual operation of planning machinery. 
In evaluating these latter factors, particular 
account should be taken of the relatively short 
period of time that has elapsed since planning 
was initiated, and of the fact that in other coun-
tries efficient planning was the fruit of many 
years' sustained effort. Moreover, a number of 
other usually serious problems, arising from 
external factors, mainly related to instability 
and the limited development of foreign trade 
and inadequate conditions of external financing 
are impeding the attainment of planning targets 
in Latin America. 
It is more pertinent, therefore, to point to the 
obstacles now hampering planning in Latin 
America and to possible ways of overcoming 
them, than to draw up a balance sheet of prog-
ress made and existing limitations. 
1. INTERNAL PROBLEMS 
(a) The functions of planning 
Although the need for planning as an instru-
ment for a coherent development policy has 
been generally accepted by Governments, there 
has been no effective unity of aims as regards 
jlanning aims and basic priorities. From the 
jeginning, a number of different attitudes 
emerged. In some instances there was a tendency 
to regard planning primarily as an instrument 
for mobilizing external financial resources and 
as an additional requirement for international 
financial co-operation, thus emphasizing the 
urgency for some kind of plan and tending to 
highlight those aspects of the plan most directly 
related to foreign aid. In others, planning was 
seen from a professional and theoretical point 
of view as an instrument for shaping the struc-
tural changes essential to Latin America's devel-
opment and an expression of an action pro-
gramme by the various economic sectors aimed 
at achieving economic and social gains which 
planning itself would help to formulate. Some-
times planning was identified as a means of 
attaining the limited goal of more rational ad-
ministration. In one way or another all these 
points of view were incorporated in the plans 
drawn up, but substantive aims of economic and 
social policy often were not reflected in specific 
decisions. 
The problem is particularly important since 
the structural changes essential to the develop-
ment of Latin America confront the planners 
with a different and more difficult task than 
planning in developed economies, where the 
changes required are usually less drastic and 
where there is a wider consensus on more issues. 
Moreover, those different outlooks have given 
rise to a destructive and sterile controversy con-
cerning the planning most suitable for Latin 
America, based on much confused thinking. It 
has been argued that "over-all" or "macro-
economic" planning should be abandoned and 
that efforts should be concentrated on building 
up a sufficient number of well-planned specific 
jrojects. On the other hand, where stress has 
yeen laid on planning as an instrument for 
formulating basic long-term policy, immediate 
problems have sometimes been neglected or de-
ferred for future study. Instead of attempting 
to co-ordinate efforts to define long-term policy, 
which are indispensable to effect the wide-rang-
ing changes essential to Latin American develop-
ment, with the machinery designed to implement 
that policy by immediate action, there has been 
a tendency to reject or underestimate one aspect 
and concentrate exclusively on the other.® 
(b) Political support for planning 
The need for planning the economic and social 
changes essential to the development process 
raises the problem of the political viability of 
Latin American plans and the amount of effec-
tive support required by the planning effort. 
The plans generally encounter resistance from 
sectors which feel threatened by specific 
measures or are exerting pressure for a larger 
share of national income. At the same time, they 
often encounter resistance from the traditional 
government administration, which is reluctant 
to institute changes and jealously guards its 
policy-making power against any possible trans-
fer of authority which may imply a reorgani-
zation of the administrative structure to facili-
® These and other problems touched upon in this 
note were the subject of detailed study at a seminar 
organized by the Latin American Institute for Economic 
and Social Planning and held in June 1965. In this 
connexion, see Discusiones sobre Planificación (Mexico, 
Editorial Siglo XXI, 1966). 
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tate the establishment of the policy-making 
machinery which planning requires. 
Thus, plans inevitably suffer from serious 
obstacles during the implementation stage which 
cannot be overcome unless the governments pro-
vide ample and sustained support, a support 
which is not always forthcoming in Latin Ameri-
can experience. 
Moreover, apart from substantive reasons, the 
difiBculties of successful planning arise to some 
extent from the manner in which the plan 
lakes shape. In some cases, there was little or 
no communication between the technical plan-
ning officials and the government departments 
during the preparatory stages. 
(c) Participation of the private sector 
The problem of political support is even 
greater where the private sector is concerned. 
Resistance from some parts of the private sector 
is inevitable whenever plans incorporate deci-
sions to institute changes affecting specific situ-
ations or interests, but there seems to be a wide 
margin of potential support which has not been 
mobilized because of deficiencies in the planning 
process itself. 
In general, there is a lack of communication 
between planning organs and the private sector. 
Rarely is any attempt made, during preparation 
of the plan, to consult representative national 
opinion groups (parliament, political parties, 
trade unions, employers' associations, universi-
ties, etc.) or the sectors directly concerned 
(entrepreneurs, importers, exporters, consumer 
associations, etc.). 
This phenomenon, like others, arises partly 
because planning is not expressed in terms of 
specific economic policy measures which might 
induce the private sector to follow particular 
guidelines. The private sector regards the plan 
as an over-all review of the economic situation 
providing valuable information on the intentions 
of the public sector, but the plan does not guide 
its activity by providing incentives or disin-
centives in the form of, for example, credit, 
trade or tax policy measures. 
(d) Operation of planning machinery 
The varying degrees of political support for 
planning, the poor definition of its functions and 
its relationship with the decision-making cen-
tres, and the limited participation of the private 
sectors, are not calculated to promote the more 
efficient operation of the planning machinery. 
On the other hand its operational flaws and 
weaknesses make yet more remote the possibili-
ties of forging closer links between the planning 
offices and the permanent decisions of the gov-
ernment authorities and other interested sectors. 
The opposition which is bound to arise from 
the traditional policy-making organs, both 
among the political authorities and in the na-
tional administration as a whole, would seem to 
necessitate some sort of "strategy" for intro-
ducing planning machinery, which would obviate 
such friction as far as possible so that planning 
could be progressively built into the adminis-
trative structure and procedures. 
In this respect, planning in Latin America 
has manifested serious shortcomings. Isolated 
as they usually are from the traditional chan-
nels of administration and decision-making, the 
planning offices have often been saddled with 
the responsibility of preparing a development 
plan with a minimum of guidance from the 
political authorities or none at all. As a rule, 
contacts have continued to be sporadic and in-
adequate throughout the formulation stage, and 
the planning agencies have not been punctual 
in presenting the technical alternatives together 
with a justification and evaluation of implica-
tions, which would have required decisions at 
the political level. In the circumstances, the plan 
which has been drawn up has not been dis-
cussed in sufficient detail by the various gov-
ernment policy-making and executory organs, 
and therefore creates resistance in the Minis-
tries and decentralized agencies. 
There have also been instances of an over-
concentration of resources and activities in the 
central planning agency. While such a concen-
tration was essential at the time, the result was 
that a high proportion of the planning experts— 
who are in any case few and far between— 
were grouped in this central office, and since 
the Ministries and autonomous agencies have 
done very little in the way of planning, that 
office has tended to assume direct responsibility 
for the preparation of sectoral plans and projects. 
While there would seem to be every justifi-
cation for making the central planning office a 
division of the Ofiice of the President of the 
Republic since the support of the Chief of State 
and his Cabinet is a sine qua non for the 
satisfactory operation of the central agency, this 
has not automatically guaranteed the institution 
the stability and backing it needs or the mainte-
nance of easy channels of communication. In 
some instances, a change of Governm-ent has 
halted planning processes that were making good 
headway, and in others it has pumped new life 
into efforts that seemed to be petering out. An 
attempt has been made to maintain communica-
tion through development councils or boards 
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consisting of Ministers, high-level officials and 
technical experts. However these organs have 
not always served their purpose. In other in-
stances they have done useful work in co-
ordinating development policy with the work of 
other departments of the national administration, 
but this co-ordination is apt to peter out at the 
operational level for lack of proper direction and 
supervision. The absence of efficient sectoral and 
inter-sectoral co-ordination machinery means 
that the co-ordination achieved at the core of 
the system weakens or disappears altogether at 
the lower levels as a result of organizational 
and procedural deficiencies. 
The direct link which exists in some coun-
tries between the head of the central planning 
office and the President of the Republic seems 
to impart greater flexibility to the central plan-
ning agency by forestalling the difficulties in-
herent in the operation of pluripersonal bodies, 
which in Latin America have, as a rule, proved 
to be slow-moving and lacking in dynamism. It 
is observable, however, that when the technical 
director of the planning office does not have 
ministerial rank or a voice in the Cabinet, he 
finds himself at a definite disadvantage, and 
the central planning agency cannot discharge 
its functions efficiently, especially that of co-
ordinating the public sector for purposes of 
implementing the plan. At the same time, the 
technical director in charge of the central 
agency is exposed to political pressures, and is 
often replaced when the government changes, 
since he is held responsible, whereas that re-
sponsibility would otherwise be assumed by the 
planning council or board. 
The sectoral planning agencies are generally 
weak and faced with organizational and proce-
dural problems. However, this is far from be-
ing the rule in the various Ministries and de-
centralized agencies. They are often regarded 
merely as operational instruments for compil-
ing statistical data; they are assigned routine 
duties which relegate programming activities to 
a secondary status, or they are used as agencies 
for the study of the most widely varying ques-
tions. They do not get the political support they 
need to carry out their functions, and are usually 
cut off from the central planning agencies, the 
operational agencies of the Ministry concerned, 
and the decentralized and autonomous agencies 
in their sector. 
Similarly, regional planning has had to cope 
with innumerable obstacles, not the least of 
which is the fact that political divisions and 
economic areas are not the same. Since the re-
gions suitable as a basis for planning often com-
prise different political divisions, each with its 
own interests, and provincial, state or local pres-
sure groups, it is very difficult to reconcile 
opinions and advance towards common objec-
tives. Furthermore, some provincial or state gov-
ernments are riddled with administrative weak-
nesses or are not sufficiently active in promoting 
economic and social development. 
In the last analysis, those problems are simply 
so many corollaries of the general rule that 
planning organs have been superimposed on an 
administrative structure which has not been 
adapted to the demands of planned development 
policy. 
In recent years, several countries have estab-
lished central organization and methods offices, 
which have assumed responsibility for adminis-
trative reform. In many cases, these central of-
fices have had no connexion with the agencies of 
the planning system, or with those in charge of 
staff and budget administration. Action taken to 
promote the reform has nothing whatever to do 
with national development activities. Thus, al-
though general planning efforts have indirectly 
served to focus attention on administrative 
streamlining, this task has usually been under-
taken independently of economic development 
policies. 
(e) "Operability" of the plans 
In addition to the problems arising from ad-
ministrative organization and the position of 
planning machinery within the administration, 
other factors help to widen the gulf between 
the planning organs and the policy-makers. 
The trouble is, in essence, that the plans 
formulated thus far cover only a part of the 
planning process; in other words, the planning 
effort has not yet been carried through to a con-
clusion, either from the standpoint of the plans 
drawn up or from that of the establishment 
and operation of effective machinery for the 
periodic revision of plans and for the supervision 
and evaluation of their practical application. 
Many of the over-all plans embody forecasts 
based on an improvement—sometimes substan-
tial—in previous trends and on the anticipation 
of potential limiting factors. As a result, the 
over-all plans leave a wide gap between macro-
economic considerations and general principles 
and their implementation by means of specific 
policies (monetary, exchange, fiscal) and opera-
tional plans. At the other extreme, some plans for 
immediate action which have begun to operate 
merely enumerate partial proposals and certain 
specific projects often without evaluating them 
in broader perspective. 
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The lack of an effective "bridge" between the 
two dimensions of the planning effort has been 
detrimental to the two types of plan, in the first 
instance because it greatly detracts from their 
viability, and, in the second, because the plans 
fail to come to grips with the fundamental ob-
stacles to development. This absence of an 
organic relationship between the long-term gen-
eral plan and the corresponding specific plans, 
in terms of the use of the various instruments 
of economic policy and mobilization and alloca-
tion of resources, is still one of the principal 
shortcomings of planning efforts in Latin 
America. 
It is as much the result of poorly conceived 
development policy as it is of failure to design 
and implement effective short-term planning 
schemes. 
(i) Definition of development policy. The lack 
of a clear definition of that policy is reflected 
in the fact that the growth targets of long-term 
plans are not usually expressed in terms of the 
employment, productivity and training of human 
resources. Despite the significance and magni-
tude of the underemployment problem in Latin 
America, most plans do not deal with it specifi-
cally and little attention is devoted to the oc-
cupational structure and educational pattern 
of the employed population. Similarly, due re-
gard is not given to the supply and demand for 
labour, or to the need to bring the economic 
expansion targets established in the plan into 
line with available manpower, and particularly 
skilled labour. The problem of sectoral differ-
ences in productivity and the assimilation of 
technology is hardly mentioned in the majority 
of the plans, and the relevant proposals are con-
fined to the broadest generalizations, no attempt 
being made at analysis in depth. 
Much the same may be said in connexion with 
the continuing high degree of income concentra-
tion in Latin America, which is another factor 
exerting a marked influence on the region's de-
velopment. The plans often allude to this prob-
lem in the diagnosis, and even go so far as to 
list certain general palliatives (absorption of the 
unemployed, increases in productivity, and/or 
price and wage, tax, public expenditure and edu-
cation policies); but these statements of prin-
ciple are not translated into specific terms, nor is 
due allowance made for the effects of the tar-
gets established in the plan and in the proposals 
for attaining them on income distribution. 
From another standpoint, although a broad 
and integrated view of development in which 
economic and social factors are closely inter-
related has been gaining wide acceptance in 
Latin America, there remains the specific prac-
tical problem of how to decide whether to al-
locate funds to particular "social services" 
(education, housing, and public health) or to 
apply them to enlarge the economic infrastruc-
ture and the immediately productive field of the 
economy. In the absence of objective guidelines, 
decisions are influenced in the end by circum-
stantial factors, such as the power of the au-
thorities responsible for the respective fields, 
or political considerations of the moment. 
Through force of circumstance rather than as 
a result of deliberate policy, there has been a 
rapid increase in the relative proportion of 
social expenditure in most Latin American coun-
tries, and this process has been encouraged by 
the direction taken by foreign aid over the last 
few years. It is a matter of conjecture how far 
this concentration of effort can be maintained, 
unless a similar effort is made to broaden the 
economic base which must sustain it. Moreover, 
serious doubts are beginning to emerge as to the 
effectiveness of certain kinds of social action 
on behalf of particular social groups, when they 
are intended to relieve shortages which really 
reflect more deeply-rooted problems of economic 
and social marginality. All this places a very 
heavy burden on those responsible for planning, 
who have neither sufficient experience nor the 
necessary technical machinery for discharging 
their responsibilities, and are hampered by the 
failure of government to adopt the political 
decisions to support them. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that, with 
the exception of Central America, most Latin 
American development plans have not explicitly 
incorporated regional economic integration 
prospects in their plans as a variable affecting 
their development policies. Integration appears 
to be following its own course, along channels 
relatively removed from planning efforts. Al-
though there are several fundamental reasons 
for this phenomenon, it would seem reasonable 
to suppose that this separate development is also 
affected by the fact that economic integration 
would raise new problems and the technical 
planners do not have the necessary methodo-
logical instruments to cope with them. 
(ii) Short-term planning schemes. The second 
problem arises from the fact that countries have 
not yet succeeded in developing and activating 
the essential technical machinery required to 
complete the various stages of planning so that 
general economic policy can be translated into 
effective and immediate action. 
Despite considerable progress in improving 
procedures for allocating public sector resources 
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by means of medium-term public investment 
plans and the use of programme and performance 
budgeting techniques for the annual Govern-
ment budget, there are still acute problems. No 
comparable progress has been made, for example, 
in working out annual operational plans, in 
economic policy or in standardizing annual 
economic budgets, etc. 
For example, in the application of public in-
vestment plans, there is a marked disparity be-
tween targets and financial estimates, either be-
cause the tax reforms on which they are based 
are not carried out to the extent or in the time 
anticipated owing to delays in international 
financing or special problems of financing local 
cost, or because any unexpected shortage of 
financial resources in the public sector affects 
investment much more than current expenditure. 
The operational capacity of the public adminis-
tration to undertake new or increased activities 
is often overestimated because there are no 
proper criteria or machinery for evaluating it 
objectively, although there has been some sig-
nificant progress in that respect. On the other 
hand, there is a general tendency to underesti-
mate the volume of projects under way and, 
consequently, to underestimate the lack of flexi-
bility in the allocation of resources because 
jriority, save in exceptional circumstances, must 
)e given to partially executed projects. 
The programme and performance budget has 
been adopted as the model for annual public 
sector budgets in most countries of the region, 
and Uruguay's new political Constitution ex-
pressly stipulates that the Executive must present 
a breakdown of the national budget by pro-
grammes. On the other hand, similar progress 
has not been made in the preparation of annual 
plans of operation, an exercise regularly carried 
out only by Venezuela. The formulation of ex-
perimental numerical models for the analysis 
of economic policy is being tried out chiefly in 
Venezuela and Chile. As regards national econo-
mic budgets, the only practical experiments thus 
far have been conducted in Argentina, where 
such a budget was drawn up and comprised a 
series of quantitative estimates of the probable 
behaviour of the chief macro-economic variables 
—^including private investment—and of the com-
patibility of public expenditure with the situation 
and needs of the national economy. 
The continuing wide disparity between the 
plans and the conduct of economic policy is 
usually most pronounced in countries suffering 
from acute and persistent inflactionary pressures. 
Those countries are confronted not only with the 
practical problems associated with the level and 
system of prices, but with the substantive dif-
ficulty of reconciling the plan's objectives with 
the requirements of stabilization policies. Grow-
ing concern with this problem has led to the 
preparation of plans specifically designed for that 
purpose. However, what happens most often is 
that two unrelated and frequently contradictory 
policies are superimposed on one another: the 
policy implicitly or explicitly related to develop-
ment plans or based on them, and the policy 
intended primarily to stabilize prices. 
(iii) Procedures for controlling the imple-
mentation of plans. The lack of progress in the 
formulation and implementation of operational 
plans is clearly demonstrated by the non-
existence of machinery for controlling the im-
plementation of plans, evaluating the problems 
which arise and insisting on the rectifications 
which are patently necessary. 
Not only must administrative organs be estab-
lished to assume those functions; it is particularly 
necessary for evaluation techniques to be de-
veloped which will be applicable to Latin Amer-
ican conditions. 
( f ) Specific investment projects 
There is no doubt that the lack of sufficient 
specific investment projects has proved a serious 
obstacle to the effective implementation of Latin 
American development plans. 
This subject was examined in detail at a re-
cent seminar at which a number of suggestions 
were put forward, which might appropriately be 
summarized here.® 
One suggestion referred to the need for a very 
broad interpretation—particularly under present-
day conditions in the Latin American economies 
—of the "project" concept, covering every unit 
of activity capable of implementing a develop-
ment plan. 
The persistent shortage of projects, despite the 
progress achieved in certain immediate factors 
which are usually regarded as decisive, posits the 
existence of other root causes. It appears that 
the shortage of projects is merely another mani-
festation of the weakness of the decision-making 
and implementation machinery, and is no more 
acute than it was before in absolute terms; in 
fact, quite the reverse. What seems to be hap-
pening is that traditional policies of unplanned 
development in one way or another provided 
incentives for public and private enterprise 
which led to the formulation of specific projects. 
9 The seminar in question was organized by the Latin 
American Institute for Economic and Social Planning 
and was held at Santiago, Chile, from 6-14 July 1965. 
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some of marked importance. There is still a 
continuous flow of investment decisions, some 
of which materialize in project form, but plan-
ning has imposed additional and much greater 
demands. 
First, projects are now required to meet speci-
fic investment objectives and targets stated in 
the plans and to fit into certain over-all strate-
gies. In so far as they are not clearly defined, 
these objectives and that policy do not provide 
sufficient incentives for suitable projects, nor do 
they in themselves represent strategic projects. 
The economic integration of Latin America il-
lustrates this point: until the political decisions 
have been taken and political agreements con-
cluded at the appropriate levels, no public or 
private initiatives in the form of specific projects 
can be launched. 
Secondly, planning not only requires the initia-
tion of a certain number of projects but also 
arranges them in the proper order of priority 
and determines the relationship between projects 
and groups of projects with due regard for 
their direct and indirect effects on the economy 
as a whole. 
Viewed in this context, the problem of pro-
moting, identifying, preparing, evaluating and 
executing projects is closely linked with the 
establishment of an effective planning system 
and with the necessary administrative reforms. 
Naturally, the difficulties of translating a develop-
ment strategy rapidly into operational plans 
cannot be disregarded, any more than the dif-
ficulties connected with the shortage of trained 
personnel, experience and technological re-
sources. When the first plans are drawn up, a 
high proportion of investment capacity—particu-
larly in the public sector—is tied up in projects 
in progress, which can only occasionally be re-
placed by other projects better adapted to the 
new plans. In other words, the maturation period 
of projects of a certain magnitude tends to be 
longer, as suggested by the experience of the 
Bank, which found that a large power or trans-
port project may take from three to five or more 
years from the time it is decided to undertake 
the economic and engineering studies to the 
time they are completed, the financing of the pro-
ject can be approved and implementation started. 
(g) Availability of information 
Improvement of the planning process in Latin 
America is being hampered by problems of the 
availability and quality of the basic information 
on which it is based. The information is mainly, 
but not exclusively, statistical data. 
There are serious deficiencies in the quantity, 
quality and timeliness of data that are basic to 
planning. Moreover, full justice has not been 
done to the statistical function within the plan-
ning effort. In general, national statistical of-
fices occupy a very subordinate role in public 
administration as a whole; their employees are 
frequently ill-paid and their staff unqualified. 
Very few have adequate financial resources or 
mechanical equipment for the efficient collection 
and elaboration of data. From another stand-
point, there are gaps in the legislation making it 
compulsory to supply certain data and, above all, 
in the machinery for giving effect to that legis-
lation. The various sectoral, regional and local 
statistical services are not sufficiently co-ordi-
nated and national statistical programmes have 
not been drawn up. 
Problems have also cropped up in relations 
with the users, one being underestimation of the 
information requirements of the public adminis-
tration and private sector. Moreover, proper 
facilities have not been set up to enable the 
offices providing the data to use them as a guide 
in decision-making. Relations with the planning 
offices in particular are usually characterized by 
sporadic demands for data made when plans are 
already in course of preparation. These relations 
have never been systematized, let alone developed 
into a mechanism providing a permanent flow 
of up-to-date information that would facilitate 
the periodic revision and evaluation of plans. 
The quality of the data is uneven, depending 
on the sector to which they refer. Foreign trade 
statistics are the most accurate, followed by 
population data, while data on domestic trade, 
services construction, road transport and unem-
ployment are particularly poor. When censuses 
are used as a basis for the work, there is a lack 
of continuity, one of the results of this being 
the preparation of a new industrial directory 
every time an industrial census is taken instead 
of the up-dating of an earlier edition. Delays are 
a common feature of the data processing, but in 
some cases attempts have recently been made to 
overcome this problem by using sampling techni-
ques. Another shortcoming is the lack of a sys-
tematic and continuous series of indicators for 
tracing short-term changes in the economy. 
Lastly, there is usually a long delay before the 
data are published. 
2 . EXTERNAL PROBLEMS 
The limitations and obstacles cited have un-
doubtedly detracted from the effectiveness of 
planning, and can only be overcome by decisions 
taken in the countries themselves and by the 
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progressive improvement of planning machinery. 
It should be noted, however, that the imple-
mentation of Latin America's development plans 
has been hampered and is still being hampered 
by serious obstacles created by the evolution of 
trade and financial transactions with countries 
outside the region. 
These obstacles are known as "exogenous" 
factors, not only because they are largely beyond 
the country's control or because they arise from 
new circumstances which could not have been 
predicted when the plans were being formulated, 
but in particular, because they alter the economic 
context in which the plans must be implemented. 
A review of recent trends makes this situation 
quite clear. In the short space of time that has 
elapsed since planning activities first began to 
gain ground, several important factors have as-
sumed considerable significance: the insufficient 
and unstable growth of exports, external debt 
commitments, the need to replenish gold and 
foreign exchange reserves, and—as a result of 
those factors—^the irregular trend of imports 
and the urgency of a policy of import restric-
tion. 
(a) Export trends 
Exports expanded irregularly, as shown by the 
fact that the annual growth rates in terms of 
volume fluctuated between a high of 9.2 per cent 
in 1962 and a low of 2.2 per cent in 1964, while 
the figure for 1966 was 4 per cent. These aver-
ages for the region as a whole reflect occasional 
violent fluctuations in certain countries, result-
ing in sharp reductions in absolute terms. 
Export trends in terms of current prices have 
been somewhat steadier. Nevertheless, thus far 
in the sixties, Latin America has lost a substan-
tial proportion of its share in world trade. The 
sharpest drop was in its contribution to total 
United States imports—from about 21 per cent 
in the three-year period 1960-62 to less than 
16 per cent in 1966—but there was also a 
marked reduction in its share of imports by 
the European Economic Community (from 6 
to 5.5 per cent) and the European Free Trade 
Association (from 5.4 to 4.2 per cent). These 
decreases have not been offset by the substantial 
increase in intra-Latin American trade. 
The recent trends were influenced by structural 
and institutional factors created by the pre-
ponderance of primary commodities in Latin 
American exports and their scant diversifica-
tion, and by the limitations, obstacles and ad-
verse conditions which continue to affect world 
trade. Although the problem may arise in part 
from the shortcomings of national export pro-
motion policies, serious imbalances are expected 
to develop, judging from projections of the fu-
ture value of exports based on trends over the 
past fifteen years and compared with the poten-
tial demand for imports. In the circumstances, 
by 1975 the trade deficit might well range from 
4,600 to 5,500 million dollars at 1960 prices. 
This huge deficit will be further inflated by the 
sums required to finance outflows in the form of 
amortization, interest and profits, with the result 
that it would become impossible to obtain new 
inflows of foreign capital. 
(b) External debt 
The gross inflow of foreign capital has reached 
high levels and increased rapidly in the present 
decade, as shown by the fact that the public 
external debt for the whole region rose from 
6,100 million dollars in 1960 to over 12,000 
million dollars in 1966. 
This is not reflected in an equally large net 
contribution to Latin American development 
financing. On the contrary, net external financing 
—defined here as the balance on current ac-
count—has fallen off' considerably as a result of 
debt commitments: from 1,100 million dollars in 
1961 it rose to its peak (1,230 million) in 1962, 
declined steeply to 500 million dollars in 1965 
and recovered only partially in 1966 (950 mil-
lion dollars). Variables which are strategic in 
the implementation of plans have not only 
shown a negative trend, but have fluctuated very 
widely. 
The critical situation in some countries has 
prompted Governments to renegotiate the cumu-
lative debt, consolidating and reconverting loans 
to mitigate the immediate effects on the balance 
of payments. However, considerable progress has 
been made in extending the scope of external 
financing to other fields of economic activity and 
in obtaining more favourable terms, although the 
interest rates on some foreign loans have in-
creased in the last two years. 
In addition, loans are generally repayable over 
a very short period. A balance sheet of the posi-
tion at 31 December 1964 shows that, in ac-
cordance with the original repayment periods, 
the debt was made up as follows: 18 per cent 
repayable in less than five years, 28 per cent 
in five to ten years and 54 per cent over more 
than ten years. But the repayment periods ap-
plicable at that time reflected a critical posi-
tion: 47 per cent of the total debt had to be 
paid off in the next five years, 24 per cent in 
five to ten years, and 29 per cent over more 
than ten years. 
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(c) Other factors 
Other factors have further reduced the al-
ready feeble impact of the growth of exports 
on real import capacity, one being the need to 
build up international reserves to a reasonable 
level in the last few years. Latin America's gross 
gold and foreign exchange holdings in 1960 
amounted to 3 , 0 0 0 million dollars, but dropped 
sharply to 2 , 2 0 0 million dollars in 1 9 6 2 ; a sub-
sequent recovery brought them up to 3 , 2 0 0 mil-
lion dollars in 1965. In other words, 1,000 mil-
lion dollars were used to build up reserves during 
those three years. Moreover, monetary liabilities, 
including balance-of-payments loans, were cut 
by 500 million dollars over the same period. In 
short, this meant a total reduction of 1,500 
million dollars in the purchasing power of ex-
ports between 1962 and 1965. 
The evolution of the terms of trade has had a 
similar effect. Although the trend has not been 
particularly unfavourable during the sixties, the 
losses due to the deterioration in the terms of 
trade since 1960 amount to roughly 1,000 million 
dollars for the region as a whole. Some countries 
have suffered more than others, Venezuela's 
losses amounting to 1,800 million dollars and 
Brazil's to not less than 500 million dollars dur-
ing the sam.e period. 
(d) Import trends 
The factors described above are responsible 
for the irregular trend of imports, and in some 
cases have necessitated a policy of import re-
strictions. This weakened the possibility of in-
creasing supplies that were urgently needed 
for the implementation of development policy 
and plans. 
The value of imports of goods and services 
in 1960 was practically the same as the value 
of exports: about 8 , 6 0 0 million dollars. Not 
until 1964 did Latin America reach the 1957 
level of imports (some 9 , 3 0 0 million dollars). 
It is even more significant that in recent years 
imports expanded more slowly than exports, the 
trade surplus being over 1,200 million dollars 
in 1966. In fact, exports amounted to about 
1 2 , 0 0 0 million dollars, compared with 1 0 , 7 6 0 
million dollars for imports of goods and services. 
3 . CONCLUSIONS 
Like every process, planning must be devel-
oped and improved. Thus far Latin America 
has gone through the first stage; it has estab-
lished planning agencies, prepared a variety of 
plans, worked out consistent development poli-
cies with some success, allocated public resources 
more systematically, trained a large group of 
professionals in new techniques locally and 
accumulated a fund of valuable experience. At 
the same time, it has encountered limitations 
and obstacles including general lack of political 
support for planning, inadequate over-all devel-
opment strategies, absence of effective co-ordi-
nation between policy and operational machin-
ery, and other more specific drawbacks. 
Measures to overcome those limitations and 
obstacles would represent a second stage of 
planning in Latin America, in which develop-
ment plans would be better formulated and, 
above all, more efficiently carried out. Some con-
clusions from the foregoing analysis might 
usefully be analysed by national agencies and 
the competent foreign financial and technical co-
operation organs. 
(a) National planning machinery 
{a) The planning systems thus far developed 
should be completed by renewed efforts in many 
areas and, in particular, by: 
( i ) Establishing a closer relationship be-
tween over-all guidelines and short-term 
operational machinery, preferably by 
drawing up annual plans of operation 
incorporating decisions to mobilize and 
allocate resources and implementing de-
tailed economic policy; 
(ii) Supplementing the process of formu-
lating and implementing plans by that 
of periodic evaluation of results, and 
establishing appropriate organs for that 
purpose. 
[b) Planning systems should be brought into 
line with long and short-term development pri-
orities : 
( i ) Through action to co-ordinate national 
planning with Latin America's economic 
integration aims; 
(ii) Through action to relate planning to 
the assimilation of new techniques, em-
ployment and training, income distribu-
tion and improvement of living condi-
tions; 
(iii) Through action to relate planning to 
anti-inflationary measures. 
(c) Stronger co-ordination should be estab-
lished between planning agencies and the politi-
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cal authorities, the national administration and 
the private sector by: 
(i) Carefully reviewing the relations be-
tween planning offices and top-level na-
tional authorities; 
(ii) Ensuring that administrative reform 
programmes allow for proper co-ordi-
nation between planning bodies and the 
general, sectoral or regional decision-
making centres; 
(iii) Establishing or improving existing chan-
nels of communication with the various 
representative bodies of the private sec-
tor (political parties, trade unions, en-
trepreneurs' associations, etc.). 
(d) Further research should be carried out 
to discover the most effective technical means of 
implementing the various planning activities. 
The following questions should be urgently con-
sidered : 
(i) Methods and techniques for preparing 
annual plans (including such instru-
ments as the national economic budget); 
(ii) Methods and techniques for evaluating 
and supervising the implementation of 
plans; 
(iii) Methods and techniques for formulating 
development policy with due regard for 
the maximum utilization of human re-
sources, the economic integration of 
Latin America, the redistribution of in-
come and a reasonable allocation of 
resources between social and economic 
objectives. 
(e) It is imperative to improve data-gather-
ing and data-processing so that reliable statistics 
and other data will be readily available for the 
preparation of plans and the supervision of their 
execution. To that end: 
(i) The offices which collect, tabulate and 
publish information should be given 
greater autonomy and provided with 
additional staff and technical resources; 
(ii) Basic programmes of urgently needed 
information should be prepared for pri-
ority action in order to ensure a steady 
flow of up-to-date data; 
(iii) Machinery should be devised and put 
into operation for providing informa-
tion on progress achieved in implement-
ing plans. 
(b) External technical and financial 
co-operation^'^ 
(а) Technical co-operation from international 
and other external sources in national planning 
activities should be encouraged. The need for 
such co-operation is greater than ever at the 
present stage, especially in the following areas: 
(i) The study and dissemination of the 
methods and techniques referred to 
above; 
(ii) The training of technical personnel in 
performing their present functions as 
well as those likely to become more 
important in the near future (annual 
plans, evaluation and supervision, etc.); 
(iii) The exchange of experience between 
planning agencies in the various coun-
tries of the region. 
(б) The provision of technical information 
and specific projections concerning the follow-
ing questions should be systematically co-ordi-
nated: 
(i) The economic growth of the various 
Latin American countries; 
(ii) World market prospects, by groups of 
products and by specific products; 
(iii) Estimates of the developing countries' 
external financing resources and needs. 
(c) External financing has exerted a pro-
found influence on national planning activities. 
It is therefore essential to continue the progress 
already achieved in the following ways: 
(i) By financing programmes of concerted 
action in many different fields, and, in 
particular, by replacing the old system 
of project financing by a new system 
which will ensure the over-all financing 
of development plans and supplementary 
and compensatory financing needs on 
suitable terms. 
(ii) By extending amortization periods and 
lowering interest rates on foreign loans; 
(iii) By allocating resources more flexibly, 
so that they are not made contingent 
upon the import content of investment 
and can cover local costs; 
(iv) By more flexible use of external financ-
ing with a view to eliminating the con-
ditions attached to certain loans; 
(v) By financing support for national and 
international planning agencies. 
1® The following conclusions contain no reference to 
foreign trade despite its importance in the execution 
of Latin America's development plans, in order to 
avoid raising issues of world economic policy. 
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PLANNING AND PLAN IMPLEMENTATION 
IN LATIN AMEHICA* 
1. At its first session, the Committee agreed 
that it should place major emphasis in its future 
work on the problem of plan implementation.^ 
Recent experience amply demonstrates that, 
while many developing countries have drawn up 
plans, few have been successful in implement-
ing them. In view of the variety of the problems 
of implementation and of the need to consider 
these problems in concrete terms, the Commit-
tee considered that it would be desirable to 
discuss them within the context of specific de-
veloping regions.^ Thanks to the generous co-
operation of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Latin American Institute 
for Economic and Social Planning, it proved 
possible for the Committee at its second session 
to review experience and problems of plan im-
plementation in Latin America. The Committee 
wishes to express its gratitude to the Commission 
and the Institute for the opportunity it has thus 
been afforded. 
* The following pages are taken from the report on 
the second session of the Development Planning Com-
mittee (E/4362) held at ECLA headquarters (Santiago, 
Chile, 10 to 20 April 1967). The members of the 
Committee consisted of : Roque Carranza, Economic 
consultant, Argentina; A. N. Efimov, Director, The 
Economic Research Institute of the Gosplan, Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics; Max Millikan, Director, 
Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, United States of America; Saburo 
Okita, Executive Director, Economic Research Centre, 
Japan; Józef Pajestka, Director, Institute of Planning, 
Poland; M. L. Qureshi, Chief Economist, Planning 
Commission, Pakistan; W. B. Reddaway, Director, De-
partment of Applied Economics, Cambridge University, 
United Kingdom; Raúl Sáez, Executive Vice-President, 
Chilean Development Corporation, Chile; Germánico 
Salgado, Director, Department of Economic Affairs, Or-
ganization of American States; Jakov Sirotkovic, Pro-
fessor, Economics Faculty, University of Zagreb, Yugo-
slavia; Jan Tinbergen, Professor, Netherlands Institute 
of Economics, Netherlands; Zdenek Vergner, Director, 
Research Institute of National Economic Planning, 
Czechoslovakia. The paragraph numbering differs from 
the original. 
1 See Official Records of the Economic and Social 
Council, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 14 (E / 
4207/Rev.l), para. 7. 
2/6í¿. , para. 18. 
A . SOME GENERAL REMARKS 
2. Development planning is an instrument 
for the formulation and implementation of co-
herent development policies, expressed in both 
qualitative and quantitative terms. Consequently, 
a failure of planning is a failure in the design 
and execution of effective policies. Planning 
viewed as a social technique is not a substitute 
for development policy. This truism, however, 
seems to be widely forgotten. There is a tend-
ency to assume that planning could supersede 
or even replace the framing of sound policies 
for economic and social development. Nothing 
could be further from the truth, and any notion 
that difficult policy decisions can be evaded by 
recourse to development planning should be 
promptly dismissed. 
3. Development planning should be thought 
of solely as a set of accounting techniques. The 
arithmetic of plans—the quantification of ob-
jectives and of resource requirements—^has too 
often been equated with the whole of planning. 
Though this is an important and necessary ele-
ment, planning must deal with the larger social 
and institutional conditions for development. 
There is little disagreement today that adequate 
growth in developing countries demands vigor-
ous action to bring about far-reaching changes 
in the social, economic and institutional struc-
ture. Such action, which in large part can only 
be qualitatively expressed, is often the primary 
condition for the achievement of development 
objectives. It is not meaningful to talk of the 
implementation of development plans if neces-
sary policies for social change, such as land 
reform and income redistribution, or the neces-
sary measures for social discipline, including 
fiscal and financial restraints, are avoided. In 
other words, the political will to develop and 
the ability to exercise substantial control over 
strategic activities in the economy are accord-
ingly the inescapable conditions for the effective 
implementation of development plans. This 
ability can be particularly strengthened by ap-
propriate development of the public sector, by 
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the assumption of a leading role by the State 
in investment and credit policy, and by the 
organized supervision of the activities of the 
private sector, including foreign enterprises. 
4. Medium-term plans (for example, five-year 
plans) rightly play a leading role as a tool of 
planning in developing countries. These have 
to be designed within the context of a long-term 
strategy for development; and this, together 
with the fact that the planning of some specific 
activities demands a longer time-horizon, may 
make the formulation of long-term plans desir-
able. On the other hand, annual plans should 
properly be component parts of the planning 
system, serving to provide the needed flexibility 
in planning and the link between medium-term 
and short-term policies. It is the absence of an 
appropriate system of annual planning and of 
the co-ordination of budgeting policies with the 
plan which has impeded eflScient plan imple-
mentation in many developing countries. 
5. The national planning system has to be 
so established that it exercises economic influ-
ence and assures the realization of national 
objectives. Experience shows that this can be 
achieved by establishing national planning as a 
function of the highest executive authorities. In 
this way, it may become the real planning of 
national policies which can be effectively im-
plemented. Both the correct designing of ob-
jectives and policy measures, and the imple-
mentation of plans depend unequivocally on the 
active participation of the policy-makers in the 
planning process. 
6. At every stage of plan formulation and 
implementation, decisions have to be made about 
the policies to be pursued and the measures to 
be enacted, and these can be taken only by those 
in government with executive power and respon-
sibility. In this sense, effective plan implementa-
tion begins at the early stages of plan prepa-
ration. Since the whole purpose of p an 
formulation is to reach decisions on economic 
and social policies to be pursued, plans have to 
be formulated by a process of successive ap-
proximations. Successively more specific drafts 
prepared by the planners have to be discussed 
with, and amended by, the policy-makers, the 
technical studies and policy decisions being 
brought together at each step. Through this 
process, general objectives are finally translated 
into concrete and .consistent programmes of 
action. 
7. Plan formulation is not an autonomous 
phase in planning. In a functioning planning 
system, the distinction between plan formulation 
and plan implementation is more formal than 
real. Planning takes place at all levels from the 
initial preparation of a general framework down 
to the planning for construction of a specific 
project; and it takes place in all phases of 
implementation as medium-term plans are broken 
down into progressively shorter programmes 
of action. Thus, the planning process has to be 
assimilated into the decision-making process of 
government as it affects development. 
8. Planning is thus a function which has to 
be carried out by the government administration 
as a whole; it involves a triangular relationship 
between the political leaders, the planning 
agency and the various ministries or other 
public agencies. Strong support at the highest 
political level for the central planning agency 
is essential in countries attempting to introduce 
an effective planning mechanism. At the same 
time, a major function of the central planning 
agency in these countries is to promote the 
reorientation of governmental administrations 
around the work of development so that the 
discipline of the plan is adopted in decision-
making. In addition to formal organizational 
arrangements, such as interministerial commit-
tees, various other steps can be taken to this 
end. The interchange of personnel between the 
planning agency and the ministries, and train-
ing programmes in planning for general ad-
ministrators and technical specialists, have 
proved useful in many coimtries. 
9. Appropriate means should also be found 
to enlist the co-operation of non-governmental 
public or private organizations and institutions 
in plan formulation and implementation. Such 
co-operation and consultation, organized in a 
manner suitable to the social and institutional 
conditions of each country, are specially im-
portant in strategic sectors of economic activity. 
Co-operation with the private sector, including 
agriculture, should promote its performance in 
accordance with the plan through the working 
of the market mechanism as well as through 
direct planning. It is extremely important that 
the Government take the necessary steps in such 
fields as fiscal policy, tax reforms, credit policy, 
price policy and agrarian reform so that the 
market mechanism may function better; through 
this mechanism, specific actions can then be 
taken to expand or contract certain kinds of 
output in conformity with the plan. 
10. A development plan is an instrument of 
action; it is not merely a diagnostic study or an 
expression of hope. Plans cannot be imple-
mented imless they define clearly the policies, 
activities and projects to be carried out; and 
these have to be adequate for the achievement 
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of the planned objectives and targets. Nor .can 
plans be executed if the physical and financial 
resources required for their programmes exceed 
available supplies; the mobilization of resources 
has therefore to be a principal concern of devel-
opment policies. A plan as a programme of 
action should, moreover, specify so far as 
possible the time phasing for initiation and 
completion of the various activities and projects 
to be undertaken, taking into account the many 
interdependencies which exist between related 
outputs and inputs. 
11. Annual or other short-term plans greatly 
assist the implementation of medium-term plans. 
They not only permit the more detailed specifi-
cation of programmes of action but can also 
serve to ensure that necessary adjustments in 
short-term measures are made within the con-
fines of medium-term objectives and policies. 
Greater attention should generally be paid to 
short-term planning and national budgeting as 
continuing activities linking current policies 
with medium-term objectives. This link can also 
be strengthened through the multi-annual plan-
ning of components of the fiscal budget. Ex-
perience also shows that the annual elaboration 
of multi-annual plans (e.g. two-year plans) has 
been found useful in some countries. Prepara-
tion of annual plans may, however, sometimes 
lead to the necessity of revising the objectives 
of the medium-term plan on which the annual 
plan should be based, for reasons such as un-
predicted changes in both internal and external 
conditions or the inconsistency and incomplete-
ness of the original plan itself. In that case, 
the medium-term plan should be carefully scru-
tinized in the light of the latest information 
available and the necessary improvement should 
be introduced in connexion with the preparation 
of the annual plan. There is a further aspect 
of annual planning which merits attention. 
Given the conditions prevailing in most develop-
ing countries, in order to assess whether a 
tolerable equilibrium will be maintained over 
the next year, it is necessary to estimate not 
only the likely demand-supply balance at the 
aggregative level but also the likely balance in 
markets for critical commodities and productive 
resources, such as foreign exchange, food, power 
and transport. No general prescription of the 
kinds and number of specific balances which 
would be relevant can be offered; they will vary 
from country to country but they are generally 
a necessary tool for assessing the consistency 
of short-term policies. 
12. The reporting and supervision of prog-
ress are necessary components of plan imple-
mentation. This is not done for the historical 
record but as a tool for controlling implementa-
tion. Procedures for reporting and evaluation 
have to be built into the plan itself, since 
progress in implementation cannot be assessed 
unless standards of performance have been 
previously specified. At the level of projects, it 
should be possible to establish, at least for 
major projects, a properly phased construction 
schedule together with a system of reporting 
which will permit timely, corrective action to 
be taken, whenever necessary. Further, suitable 
indicators should be devised to detect incipient 
shortages or other divergencies between ex-
pectations and reality; and to be operationally 
uesful, these should be available as promptly 
as possible. The indicators might also include 
information on costs and productivity. 
13. Shortage of technical personnel in the 
developing countries is one of the serious ob-
stacles to the implementation of their develop-
ment plans. In this connexion, the various 
programmes of technical assistance play a use-
ful role in that they partly make up for this 
deficiency. However, the developing countries 
would be able to make better use of the technical 
assistance facilities available to them if they 
had, as a part of their medium-term develop-
ment plans, comprehensive programmes of tech-
nical assistance required for the implementation 
of their development plans. Such programmes 
would help in the determination of priorities 
and would provide a useful basis for their 
requests for technical assistance. 
14. The successful implementation of plans 
in developing countries is also conditional upon 
a favourable external environment. Thus, the 
will to promote development needs to be shared 
by both the developing and the developed coun-
tries. The volume of external resources and 
technical assistance made available by the devel-
oped countries through favourable trade and 
aid policies conditions progress in the imple-
mentation of plans. The contribution of the 
international community to the growth of the 
developing countries during the present Decade 
has been inadequate. It is therefore necessary 
that the developed countries commit themselves 
more strongly. Perhaps no new institutions are 
needed, but an evolution of the activities and 
operations of existing international institutions 
is called for. Thus, it is conceivable that a gen-
eral pledging meeting might be held, as a 
logical extension of the pledging meetings al-
ready usual for the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP), the World Food 
Programme and aid consortia. Other arrange-
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ments involving, for example, the World Bank 
group of organizations are also conceivable, 
implying the possibility of member States de-
ciding to make contributions that such an 
institution deemed necessary. The Committee is 
of the opinion that, while such innovations 
should form part of the programme of the 
second Development Decade, action to initiate 
changes is urgently needed now in view of the 
unsatisfactory progress so far attained. 
B. PLANNING AND PLAN IMPLEMENTATION 
IN LATIN AMERICA 
1. Background 
15. The planning activities undertaken by the 
Latin American countries have been dictated by 
a variety of factors: the growing number of 
obstacles hampering economic growth which 
call for more effective and consistent action; a 
better grasp of regional development problems 
and of the need to establish priorities among 
the objectives sought and to select the most ap-
propriate methods of achieving those objectives; 
and new programmes and procedures for ex-
ternal assistance, made contingent upon internal 
efforts to mobilize resources and introduce struc-
tural reforms under broad economic and social 
development programmes. 
16. By the end of the 1950s, it was becoming 
increasingly clear that most of the Latin Ameri-
can economies did not possess the dynamism 
necessary to maintain moderately satisfactory 
rates of growth, eliminate serious trade and ex-
ternal financing deficits, control internal infla-
tionary pressures, provide sufficient productive 
employment opportunities for a rapidly expand-
ing labour force, improve the living conditions 
of the population, and fulfil rising expectations 
created by awareness of the vast possibilities 
generated by technological progress. Accord-
ingly, the pivot of economic policy had to be 
economic and social development on all fronts, 
with due regard to the internal and external 
limiting factors. 
17. Technical studies, which analysed Latin 
America's development problems, recommended 
criteria for the definition of a development 
strategy and suggested methods of preparing 
projections, helped to shape a comprehensive 
approach. Although the projections were in-
tended as a basis for analysis rather than plan-
ning, their increasing use as a means of an-
ticipating specific problems and discussing 
alternative policies gradually prepared the 
ground and furnished methodological instru-
ments for the formulation of plans. 
18. At the Punta del Este Conference in 
1961,® the Governments of the American re-
publics recognized that planning should become 
the basic instrument for mobilizing national 
resources for development purposes, for ex-
pediting the requisite structural reforms, for 
increasing efficiency and productivity and for 
soliciting more international financial co-opera-
tion. It was to constitute the essential means of 
tailoring efforts and external aid with a view to 
achieving a satisfactory development pattern 
and accelerating economic growth. At the same 
Conference, the participating Governments em-
phasized the value of economic integration, 
which is of vital importance for planning. 
19. Since the needs were so vast and varied, 
spectacular results could hardly be expected over 
the short term. At the national level, "planning 
for change" aroused opposition on the part of 
groups or sectors which feared that it would 
endanger their immediate interests. Moreover, 
in Latin America the institutional framework 
was not adequate to ensure that instrumental 
economic policies (exchange, monetary, fiscal, 
agrarian, etc.) were properly geared to develop-
ment policy requirements, and this must be 
borne in mind when analysing the efficiency of 
planning. Although planning can help bring 
about such an adaptation, where the political 
setting precludes this, the basic flaws in plan 
implementation should not be sought only in 
planning but mainly at the economic policy-
making and management levels and in the 
degree of efficiency with which this process is 
carried out. Again, even where those adverse 
circumstances do not exist, the effective use of 
such policies implies far-reaching institutional 
reform which is difficult to achieve in a short 
time. So far as the external sector is concerned, 
some factors which determine the over-all eco-
nomic situation in Latin America and which 
therefore condition planning have shown un-
favourable trends. This is particularly true of 
the instability of exports and the capacity to 
import of several Latin American countries, 
including nearly all the biggest nations except 
Mexico.'* External financial co-operation proce-
dures also failed to make use of development 
plans in a way which would have enabled them 
to identify over-all national requirements in 
respect of external resources and to adopt ap-
propriate financing procedures. 
3 Special Meeting of the Inter-American Economic 
and Social Council at the Ministerial Level, held at 
Punta del Este, Uruguay, from 5 to 17 August 1961. 
^ For further details, see paragraphs 57-60 below. 
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20. Despite those diflSculties, a useful store 
of experience has been built up, but it is too 
early to evaluate it properly. Until a short time 
ago, there had been only a few preliminary 
experiments in planning and certain sectoral 
programmes had been tried out. The basic data 
were not adequate for planning requirements 
and there were no methodological instruments 
whose efficiency had already been demonstrated 
in conditions such as those prevailing in the 
Latin American economies. Nor was there a 
flexible administrative structure, receptive to 
new functions and methods which deviated from 
the time-honoured routine. 
21. Nevertheless, in this short interval the 
technical bases for planning have been laid and 
the training of planning personnel is going 
forward. Countries have established central plan-
ning offices, which have become focal points of 
innovation, and have drawn up their first gen-
eral plans; more rational criteria are being 
applied in the allocation of resources, especially 
in the public sector; and, what is most im-
portant, planning has become a rather widely 
accepted principle. 
22. Planning agencies have developed in dif-
ferent ways, depending on the extent to which 
they have been assimilated into the traditional 
government structure. Generally speaking, the 
tendency has been to make such agencies directly 
responsible to the Office of the President of the 
Republic. In some cases, there are intermediate 
advisory bodies which ensure the liaison be-
tween the planning offices and the President and 
his Cabinet, and in which the most important 
issues are analysed and discussed. 
23. Table 1 presents a list of the planning 
agencies and indicates their composition. It in-
cludes both policy-making and purely technical 
planning organs. As a rule, the planning agen-
cies assist the top-level policy-makers in an 
advisory capacity. In addition, they often have 
other functions, such as the promotion of spe-
cific activities, participation in external financ-
ing negotiations and co-ordination of external 
technical assistance. 
24. Most of the planning offices have drawn 
up over-all medium- and/or long-term develop-
ment plans, often covering periods from four to 
ten years; within the space of a few years, al-
most all Latin American countries had such 
plans. They usually consist of a diagnosis, the 
enumeration of specific economic and social 
objectives, global and sectoral targets, a very 
general definition of the reforms required and 
the areas in which economic policy should be 
applied, a few suggestions for the exploration 
and use of certain natural resources, more 
detailed public investment targets, and a rough 
estimate of external financing requirements. Sub-
sequendy, shorter-term plans were formulated, 
generally for two-year periods. These plans were 
frequently unrelated to the general plans, and 
failed to incorporate sufficient operational ele-
ments. Table 2 enumerates the plans drawn up 
in the various Latin American countries. 
25. In any case, long-term plans have played 
a useful part as an instrument for starting to 
define over-all development policy and, in con-
junction with related medium-term plans, they 
have helped the public sector to reach more 
rational decisions. However, the planning sys-
tems are still incomplete and the operational 
elements are usually missing, and this is another 
reason for the unsatisfactory implementation of 
planned developed policy. In the following para-
graphs the various factors, both inside and out-
side the planning process, which have affected 
plan implementation are considered, and spe-
cific recommendations are made concerning pri-
orities for the work still to be done in Latin 
America in order to make plans more viable and 
improve the operation of the planning system. 
2. The political setting for the 
planning process 
26. Many of the difficulties of preparing and 
implementing development plans derive from 
the opposition they encounter, as instruments of 
change, from ruling groups in several of the 
Latin American countries. Antagonism is dis-
played by those who think that an energetic 
development policy is or may be inimical to 
their interests, and indifference is often shown 
by other groups which fail to realize, or under-
estimate, the bearing that development policy 
and its instrument—^planning—may have upon 
the fulfilment of their own aspirations. Another 
factor that has helped to shape the attitude of 
the ruling classes to planning is their disillu-
sionment at not seeing the substantive change 
in methods of external co-operation which plan-
ning was expected to bring in its train. In some 
of the ruling groups in Latin America, the idea 
has prevailed that, since planning has been 
declared part and parcel of an external co-
operation programme in the inter-American con-
text, it is a device that enables countries to 
ward off or compensate for the effects of the 
chronic instability of the external variables in-
fluencing the development process, especially 
foreign trade, and to obtain the supplementary 
resources they require to implement their devel-
opment policy. In point of fact, external co-
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operation in trade has made very little headway, 
and, where financing is concerned, although 
public loans have increased in volume, similar 
progress has not been made in respect of pro-
cedures which would have a more stimulating 
effect on the preparation of plans: progranmie 
financing to bridge with foreign resources the 
gap of the entire development programme. This 
experience has led some of the ruling groups 
in Latin America to look on planning as a 
discipline which hampers their freedom of ac-
tion without bringing worthwhile advantages at 
the international level. As a result of these re-
actions, the planning process in Latin America 
has often been cut off from the top-level deci-
sion-making centres and has met with responses 
ranging from aloofness to passive tolerance. 
Moreover, the bureaucracy itself has frequently 
regarded planning as alien to its own interests, 
which are, as a rule, identified with the tradi-
tional administrative procedures. 
27. The marginal position of planning in the 
institutional structure and the instability from 
which it has suffered, have been the result of 
this negative attitude, and have necessarily pro-
duced their impact on the ef&ciency of planning 
activities. It has not yet been possible to insti-
tutionalize the planning process, and the main 
element of cohesion and the role of the planning 
ofiice have had to depend upon the personal 
influence and prestige of the chief planning 
officer. This factor has a serious impact on the 
continuity of planning work. 
28. When groups opposed to development 
policy have the upper hand, only greater politi-
cal maturity will enable planning to be built 
into the institutional structure. But in so far as 
their opposition is grounded on mistaken as-
sumptions or indifference prevails rather than 
antagonism, these attitudes may be partly at-
tributable to the limitations of planning itself 
at the present stage. The weakness of the exist-
ing links with the decision-making centres has 
been aggravated by a number of lacunae in the 
planning process: 
(а) At the time when decisions on plan ob-
jectives were largely dependent upon the alter-
natives submitted by the planners to the execu-
tive, it often happened that insufficient stress 
was laid on the importance of having a variety 
of social objectives (such as employment, bal-
anced regional development, education, health, 
etc.), which were at least as valid as the need 
to expedite national development; 
(б ) Government requests for advisory assist-
ance in connexion with urgent problems have 
not always been met promptly enough by plan-
ning offices; 
(c ) Generally speaking, no satisfactory ar-
rangements have been made for liaison between 
those who formulate plans and those who are 
responsible for their implementation, including 
private enterpreneurs; 
(c?) Lastly, the fact that plans generally have 
not fulfilled the function of keeping government 
officials and the general public properly in-
formed about the scope of the development effort 
has constituted yet another obstacle to social 
participation. Although many of these short-
comings are due to inexperience, the small 
number of planning experts available and the 
speed with which they have had to do their 
difficult work, remedial action is not being taken 
as quickly as might be desired. 
29. A factor of a different kind, but again 
related to the overriding purposes for develop-
ment action, has been the lack of other motiva-
tions such as might have been provided for the 
countries of the region by a vigorous drive 
towards economic integration. The experience 
of Central America bears witness to the impact 
on the planning process that may be produced 
by a multinational approach to the development 
problem. In this case, national development has 
been stimulated by the economic integration 
process, whose influence has strengthened plan-
ning because of the need to define policies in 
specific sectors, for example, manufacturing. In 
the rest of Latin America, the indeterminate 
character of integration trends has prevented 
national plans from defining those policies, a 
deficiency which in turn will make integration 
itself even more difficult in future. 
3. The weaknesses of planning itself 
30. While obvious advances have been made, 
the planning process in Latin America has en-
countered various obstacles that have loomed 
particularly large at the stage of plan im-
plementation, Setting aside the defective institu-
tional organization for the management of eco-
nomic policies, and focusing attention only on 
planning proper, these difficulties are, in the 
main, due to shortcomings in the over-all con-
duct of planning activities and to lacunae in 
the design of the planning systems rather than 
to specific flaws in the various types of plan. 
To identify the main deficiencies in plan im-
plementation, therefore, it is necessary to analyse 
the weak points of the planning system as a 
whole, among which the defects inherent in the 
plans themselves are only part of the trouble. 
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31. Shortcomings in plan implementation may 
depend upon the nature of the public adminis-
tration in which the planning function is incor-
porated, on the actual substance or content of the 
plans themselves, on the procedures and methods 
applied in their formulation, and on the extent 
to which a consistent planning scheme has been 
completed, in line with the characteristics of the 
country concerned. 
(a) Deficiencies of the public administration 
32. The political circumstances already dis-
cussed are partly responsible for the difficulty of 
incorporating planning in the administrative 
structure, although these difficulties are also due 
to the inertia of the structures themselves and the 
sluggishness with which many Governments ap-
proach the work of modernizing them. Even 
planning itself has neglected this essential aspect 
of change, and plans that have explicitly outlined 
a policy of administrative reform are few and 
far between. Such steps as have been taken to 
reorganize the administration have very seldom 
made allowance for the specific requisites of or-
ganization for planned development policy. 
33. The isolated position of planning is also 
due to the superimposition of modern institu-
tions on machinery that is, as a rule, unsuitable 
for the implementation of development policy. 
To begin with, the earliest planning agencies 
were assigned advisory functions based on proto-
types that did not take into account each coun-
try's special organizational features, or its 
requirements so far as action was concerned. 
The status of the central planning office and its 
relation to the Executive were not defined clearly 
enough. Consequently its status depended upon 
the outcome of a conflict between the various 
pressure groups in the public administration, 
and sometimes the initial planning nuclei suf-
fered a loss of face. This downgrading was 
rendered more acute by the youth and adminis-
trative inexperience of the first groups of plan-
ning experts. There is no stronger testimony 
to the results of this lack of precision in de-
fining the functions and scope of planning than 
the great difficulty some countries have found 
in co-ordinating economic policies of such vital 
importance for development as tax policy and 
monetary and exchange policies. 
34. Accordingly, it is high time to consider, 
in the light of each country's circumstances, 
what place should be given to planning in the 
administrative structure. In some instances, this 
may entail a redefinition of functions and they 
should be redefined without bias. For example, 
in some special cases planning offices could be 
given a status such that they could exert direct 
influence on the decision-making process in the 
important sectors. 
35. Another aim at this stage should be the 
completion of the planning machinery. In that 
connexion, the priority hitherto accorded to the 
establishment of policy-making machinery should 
be reconsidered, on tiie basis of a selective ap-
proach, with a view to laying more emphasis 
on the evaluation machinery. Effective evalua-
tion and control constitute a valuable means of 
dovetailing planning into the administrative 
structure and influencing its operation. 
(b) Lacunae in the content of plans 
36. Planning in Latin America has not pro-
duced plans which satisfactorily fulfil their pur-
poses as regards shaping and promoting de-
velopment policy. For that purpose, as indicated 
before, every plan should formulate a strategy, 
i.e., indicate the most suitable pattern for the 
development of the economy and specify the 
means needed to ensure that development. In ad-
dition—and this function is important in Latin 
America because it is the first condition for 
social participation—^plans should also inform 
those responsible for implementation of the pre-
cise nature of their responsibility Mid the part 
it plays in the general context of the plan, and 
inform the general public of the national effort 
which the plan demands. These functions are 
fulfilled, within the planning system, by a series 
of plans relating to different levels of policy 
and decision-making. The importance attached 
to these functions in each of the plans and the 
degree of detail involved depend on the circum-
stances in each country, but it is essential that 
the functions should be carried out by the plan-
ning system as a whole. 
37. Frequently, Latin American plans either 
are not based on any specific development 
strategy or, in some cases, the strategy was for-
mulated without due regard for such essential 
problems as employment. These limitations in 
defining development policy are not only of a 
serious substantive nature, but also made it dif-
ficult to analyse the meaning of the proposed 
targets, to motivate the general public and estab-
lish a proper basis for its full participation in 
the planning process. In many cases the result 
is that the planning offices are isolated from the 
decision-making centres and from society in gen-
eral; this, in turn, makes it even more difficult to 
devise proper policies. In general, medium or 
long-term plans are one way of defining the 
viability of a development strategy. If a strategy 
does not exist or has not been made explicit. 
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planning loses its substantive force, and the 
whole emphasis shifts to the methodological 
aspects, to the detriment of actual plan imple-
mentation. The weakness of development strategy 
was particularly apparent in the fact that medium 
and long-term plans do not usually take into 
account such important aspects of employment, 
manpower training, and income redistribution 
targets and policies. 
38. Moreover, plans have frequently failed to 
specify as clearly as they should the action 
instruments for both policy and investment pro-
jects. In the matter of policies, to mention the 
most significant omissions, insufficient attention 
was paid to the operation of the price system and 
the instruments affecting prices in the proposed 
scheme of action. In the conditions prevailing 
in Latin America, structural change, irrespec-
tive of the institutional action taken and other 
machinery, cannot be brought about without 
price and income policies as effective means of 
influencing the decisions of private enterprise, 
which, generally speaking, is a major participant 
in the product and investment of the countries 
of the region. Moreover, the financing of plans 
has not been given proper attention. This weak-
ness in the treatment of policies and in the 
amount of detail in formulating projects must, 
however, be considered in relation to all the 
plans included in the planning system and not 
only to the general plan, where there is often 
every justification for not going into detail. In 
this connexion, the frequent reference to the 
lack of fully elaborated projects and specific 
detail policy outlines for achieving the targets 
of medium-term plans indicates, not an omission 
from those plans, but the absence of annual 
operational plans. 
39. Due attention has not always been paid 
to the information function of every development 
plan, which is one of the requirements for par-
ticipation. This function should meet two needs: 
those responsible for implementation should find 
in the plan the necessary elements for identifying 
their responsibilities, and the public at large, 
with the diversity of interests it represents, must 
be able to understand from the plan the objec-
tives and guidelines of the development efforts 
in which it is to participate, and to what extent 
the plan takes into account community and pri-
vate interests. In Latin American countries, for 
example, where there is a need for sweeping 
changes, this role of planning should be con-
sidered in the preparation and presentation of 
plans. Wherever the public has not been awak-
ened to an awareness of development needs, it 
is perfectly justifiable that, as has Msually hap-
pened in Latin America, the diagnosis of eco-
nomic problems should be widely publicized. 
Similarly, there is a need for a pragmatic 
strategy, both economic and political, and this 
has not usually been worked out. Moreover, 
many plans use technical terminology which 
makes the language unintelligible for purposes 
of simple direct commimication. 
(c) Defects in methods and procedures for the 
formulation of plans 
40. Another group of problems is related 
to plan formulation procedures and methods. 
In particular, the two basic problems arising in 
plan formulation are the inflexibility which 
makes it difiScult to adapt the plan to the par-
ticular characteristics and conditions of each 
country and limited participation by the private 
sector, and even by the public sector, in the 
planning process. 
41. Although the planning methods used in 
Latin America have become more flexible, they 
are still not flexible enough in many ways. The 
urgent need for action, the limited statistical 
and technical data and the lack of trained plan-
ners make it imperative to select planning pro-
cedures and machinery whose limitations will 
not substantially affect the quality of economic 
policy on the most important development issues. 
42. The choice of the planners in this re-
spect might be guided by a number of criteria, 
including the degree of interdependence among 
the various economic activities and the com-
plexity of economic and social objectives which 
the plan is intended to fulfil. In this respect, the 
Latin American countries show substantial dif-
ferences; they range from economies in which 
agriculture is the principal economic activity 
and which depend heavily on their exports, 
to relatively industrialized nations, some of 
which face the delicate task of integrating stabili-
zation policies with their development pro-
grammes. Obviously, therefore, there are a 
great many methodologies to choose from, and 
Slat choice may be decisive for the viability, 
effectiveness and timeliness of the plan. 
43. In every case, however, there is a second 
choice as regards the emphasis that should be 
placed on the various sectors or problems in 
the preparation of plans. Even in simple econo-
mies there are usually groups of very inter-
dependent activities, and, since they suffer from 
a crucial shortage of resources, in the planning 
process the greatest caution should be exercised 
in estimating the sources and allocation of those 
resources. Those planning activities or processes 
indicate priorities in planning with regard to 
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the precision with which the relevant strategy 
should be formulated and the extent to which 
the action should be reasonably coherent. 
44. In Latin American plans, as indicated 
above, those priorities have frequently not been 
respected as rigorously as they should have been 
and development strategy has therefore not been 
properly defined. The clear definition of policies 
for those activities or processes is an essential 
prerequisite for a planned development policy, 
in which that definition should be used as a 
guide in establishing priorities for the improve-
ment of information and the creation of control 
machinery. The use of indicators is therefore a 
highly useful means of evaluation. The same 
sense of priority should also help to identify the 
aspects of the plan in which it is imperative to 
describe the action instruments in greater detail. 
Detailing those instruments means besides de-
scribing them clearly stipulating sequences, 
that is, interdependence in time between the 
various programmes, policies and projects, and 
their respective components. With few excep-
tions, these relationships have not been defined 
in Latin American planning and it is to be hoped 
that the selective use of up-to-date systems of 
management analysis will remedy this deficiency 
in future. 
45. The importance of these decisions for 
planning efSciency is even more evident when 
the link with the Executive depends on timely 
action. In those cases, the establishment of plan-
ning priorities is essential if a prompt and 
satisfactory answer is to be given. Sometimes, 
when there is a serious shortage of information, 
planning offices prefer to wait until the difficulty 
is overcome, instead of trying to exert influence 
by formulating preliminary plans, accepting as 
a fact the existing gaps in information. This 
may result in a vicious circle in which the lack 
of sufficient political support might consolidate 
the initial passive attitude of the planning 
offices, and their inertia in turn might accentuate 
the lack of political support. 
46. The other weakness lies in the absence 
of machinery for the participation of the private 
sector and even of the public administration 
agencies themselves. As regards the private 
sector, opposition on the part of some groups 
would seem to be inevitable as long as the deci-
sions incorporated in the plans involve changes 
that will affect individual situations or interests; 
but this is no justification for lack of contact 
with the private sector and ignorance of its 
intentions, since in any event there is a wide 
measure of potential support of which little or 
no advantage is taken, owing to deficiencies in 
the planning process itself. Where the public 
sector is concerned, its failure to participate is 
due not only to defects inherent in the system, 
but frequently also to the existence of powerful 
autonomous agencies which are all the more 
unwilling to join in the planning process be-
cause it does not receive enough political back-
ing. 
47. The under-participation of both the pri-
vate and the public sector is particularly detri-
mental to planning, with the result that re-
luctance to participate becomes greater still. 
All these circumstances seriously handicap plan 
implementation, for many public and private 
agencies do not feel that the content of the plan 
reflects their wishes .and aims. Moreover, the 
lack of communication engenders ignorance of 
the real situation and behaviour patterns of the 
private sector, which makes it difficult to design 
the economic policy measures contemplated in 
the plan. 
(d) Incompleteness of planning systems 
( i ) Lack of operational elements 
48. One aspect of the problem which deserves 
special consideration is that relating to the hon-
existence of certain basic instruments which are 
indispensable for completing the planning sys-
tem, in particular annual operational plans. 
Hitherto, the plans formulated in Latin America 
have only partly covered the planning process; 
in other words, the planning effort has not been 
completed either from the standpoint of the 
plans drawn up, or from that of the establish-
ment and operation of efficient machinery for 
periodical revision of the plans themselves and 
supervision and evaluation of their implementa-
tion. 
49. Many of the over-all plans that have been 
prepared incorporate projections based on the 
assumption of an improvement—sometimes of 
considerable significance—in former trends, and 
on the anticipation of possible difficulties, but 
they often fail to specify the measures that may 
lead to the desired results. Thus, these over-all 
plans leave a wide gap between macro-economic 
considerations and general lines of policy on 
the one hand, and, on the other, the establish-
ment of implementation instruments in the shape 
of specific monetary, exchange, and fiscal 
measures, and operational plans. At the other 
extreme, some of the crash programmes that 
have been put into effect are simply a collection 
of piecemeal undertakings and specific projects, 
which in many cases have not been evaluated in 
the light of longer-term prospects. 
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50. The want of an effective "bridge" be-
tween the two dimensions of the planning effort 
has been equally prejudicial to both the result-
ing types of plans: to some because their prac-
tical viability is very slight, and to others 
because they do not aim at removing the basic 
obstacles to development. This situation seems 
to derive both from lacunae in the definition of 
development policy and from the failure to 
design and apply efficient instruments for the 
formulation of annual operational plans. 
51. The above-mentioned defects can be de-
scribed in terms of the following specific 
problems: 
(а) There is a lack of annual operation (or 
other similar) plans which provide the policy-
makers with a framework for making the follow-
ing year's decisions with due regard to the 
aims of medium and long-term plans, the chang-
ing combination of circumstances which may 
make it advisable to alter over-all targets, and 
the operational capacity of the administration, 
which also changes with the actual implementa-
tion of the plan; 
(б) If there is no system of annual plans, a 
weak and rather formal relationship exists 1)6-
tween the plans and the government budget, 
since the degree of precision of the budgets and 
the monetary nature of the budgetary alloca-
tions do not correspond to the content of the 
medium-term plans. The programme and per-
formance budgeting systems adopted in most 
countries of the region, while representing con-
siderable formal progress, are not reflected in 
the planning process; 
(c) In the absence of annual plans, in only a 
few cases are there partial forms of short-term 
planning that ensure the execution of projects 
of vital importance for plan implementation; 
(d) Where attempts have been made to for-
mulate operational annual plans, no specialized 
technical groups have been trained or specifi-
cally assigned to that work, which is necessarily 
complex and intensive; the technical groups 
which formulate medium-term plans have had 
to do the work sporadically; and 
(e) The lack of annual operational plans and 
of integration of these plans with national 
budgets explain why there is no system in the 
schedules and procedures for periodic revision, 
organization and appropriate control of longer-
term plans, since the usefulness of annual plans 
depends on their timely presentation and dis-
cussion, and this lack is, in its turn, a key factor 
in controlling the implementation of medium-
term plans. 
(ii) Shortcomings in statistical and technical 
information 
52. In considering the instruments available 
for use in planning systems, one thing which 
stands out is the lack of adequate information-
collecting and research machinery which is 
adapted to planning requirements. In the devel-
oping countries this machinery is necessarily 
unable to provide everything which would be 
desirable, but some improvements in the plan-
ning process would be possible if the limited 
resources available were deployed more scien-
tifically in order to supply the crucial types of 
information needed for planning. In many Latin 
American countries it is particularly important 
to improve the basic information concerning the 
natural resources which might be developed. 
53. In view of the foregoing considerations, 
the machinery both for providing statistical in-
formation and for research on techniques and 
natural resources usually has its own particular 
aims, which only in a few isolated cases, and 
seldom completely, coincide with the most urgent 
requirements of the planning process. 
54. Striking deficiencies are observable in the 
quantity, quality and timeliness of fundamental 
planning data; in particular, one common fea-
ture of the relations between planning and sta-
tistical offices is the sporadic demand for data, 
which the latter compile at the time the plan is 
being prepared, but this has not been done 
systematically and still less has it been ex-
tended to the organization of a steady and 
timely flow of information that would facilitate 
the periodic review and evaluation of plans. 
Other shortcomings are attributable to the fact 
that indicators (danger signals, etc.) that would 
make it possible to follow short-term economic 
trends are not prepared systematically or on a 
continuing basis, and to the delay usually en-
countered in the collection, tabulation and analy-
sis of data. 
55. As regards research on natural resources, 
Latin America can be described largely as an 
unexplored continent, so that, notwithstanding 
the recent major advances, very much still re-
mains to be done. In this respect, the fulfilment 
of plans depends on chance, because not enough 
is known about the natural resources that may 
be available in the course of implementation. 
56. A similar problem in plan implementation 
is the lack of a clear definition of and research 
on the most suitable production techniques for 
developing countries. This question is closely 
bound up with strategy and, in particular, re-
lates to the productivity and employment levels 
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to be attained. This problem also affects the 
actual production targets of the plan, as in the 
case of the gaps in knowledge regarding suitable 
techniques for tropical agriculture, and this 
could be fruitful field for the work of universi-
ties and other research institutions. 
4. External obstacles to plan implementation 
57. The uncertainties associated with foreign 
trade and the insufficiency of the net contribu-
tion of external financing are the main elements 
in the Latin American external sector which, 
in so far as they have limited the prospects of 
implementing development plans, have hampered 
the planning process. 
58. Although the pattern of a large number 
of Latin American exports has been relatively 
favourable in the last few years, other commodi-
ties, such as tropical products, have continued 
to slump in foreign markets, and there are no 
signs of a change in the near future. Even in the 
case of coffee, which has maintained relatively 
stable prices in the last few years, there is 
reason to fear that the situation will become 
considerably worse. It seems likely, moreover, 
that several of the products which are now 
among Latin America's major exports and 
which have enjoyed more favourable market 
conditions in recent years will also show a 
downward trend; this would happen to meat, 
for example, if the European Economic Com-
munity put its discriminatory regime into prac-
tice. 
59. Net inflows of foreign capital have not, 
moreover, improved sufficiently to support a 
determined economic development effort. In the 
last few years, as a result of the burden of serv-
icing the external debt, which in many Latin 
American countries has reached an extremely 
high level, the sizable increases in gross external 
official financing have not been sufficient to ex-
pand to any great extent the net inflow of 
foreign capital into the region as a whole. Con-
sequently, net inflows were lower than antici-
pated in the plans and in many cases insufficient 
to sustain the level of activity proposed. Further-
more, public financing procedures have not been 
developed in the direction that might have 
proved most favourable for planning: the use 
of programme loans intended to cover the total 
financing deficits of development plans. Balance-
of-payments loans to meet emergencies have been 
granted more frequently than in the past and 
sectoral programme loans normally granted 
through national financial intermediaries have 
increased, but no headway has been made with 
the institution of financing systems which, by 
virtue of commitments established sufficiently 
well in advance, would help to place planned 
development policy on a firmer foundation and 
ensure its smoother development. Lastly, con-
cern is aroused by the rising costs of external 
financing and more frequent use of tied loans. 
These factors are ultimately reflected in a de-
crease in the net inflow of foreign capital and 
a proportionate reduction of its contribution to 
the implementation of development plans at a 
time when the process might be starting to gain 
in speed and efficacy. 
60. The combined effect of all the foregoing 
factors has been such that the capacity to im-
port has remained low or has even declined in 
several Latin American countries, thus reducing 
their prospects of carrying out a planned devel-
opment policy. Even where it is essential, in 
order to overcome those limitations successfully, 
for countries to encourage production for ex-
port and devise internal mechanisms for offset-
ting some of the effects of price instability and 
managing their borrowing policy properly, there 
is no doubt that the situation calls for an effort 
from those providing external co-operation. From 
this point of view, it is of vital importance that 
the international community should take action 
in order to make commodity markets reason-
ably stable and facilitate the sale of manufactures 
produced in the developing countries. As long 
as the commodity markets remain vulnerable, 
the timely granting of compensatory or supple-
mentary credits would help to prevent iiiterrup-
tions in plan implementation. 
61. With regard to the external official financ-
ing of development, the more frequent use of 
programme loans would be very helpful. This 
would give a decisive impetus to the consolida-
tion of the planning process. The quality of the 
plans, the efficiency of the whole national plan-
ning system would have to be improved, and 
that would be precisely one of its greatest in-
direct advantages. In Latin America, moreover, 
under the Charter of Punta del Este, bases have 
been established for a multilateral system of 
evaluating plans and periodically reviewing their 
implementation. If the full potential of this 
system were turned to account, it could be used 
to facilitate programme financing. 
62. The success of planned development 
policy in Latin America, while entailing sus-
tained and increasing national effort, is de-
pendent upon the effectiveness of external co-
operation in certain critical respects, of which 
only the most important, relating to trade and 
financing, have been touched upon so far. Ex-
perience in the recent past, in Latin America as 
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in other regions, has shown that the increasing 
interdependence of individual countries makes it 
very difficult for developing countries to make 
much headway unless and until all the people 
of the world, especially the richer among them, 
join in a concerted effort to facilitate the devel-
oping countries' access to markets and supple-
ment their financial resources. In the specific 
case of Latin America, it is of crucial importance 
that the region should be able to expand its 
exports of manufactures in addition to ensuring 
an adequate supply of its traditional products 
for export at competitive prices. This implies an 
energetic drive for structural reform and higher 
productivity and these developing economies are 
very imlikely to be able to achieve this unless 
more liberal and intensive external co-operation 
is forthcoming in the future. 
63. As a result of the many obstacles indi-
cated in the present report and the lack of 
experience that inevitably hampered initial at-
tempts, planning has not yet been able to exert 
a decisive influence on the formulation of de-
velopment policy. Although the effectiveness of 
planning is limited by factors outside the plan-
ning system itself, in particular political devel-
opments at the national level, the time has come 
to consider to what extent the experience ac-
quired will make it possible to adapt its scope 
and methods in order to increase its effectiveness. 
5. Recommendations 
64. In order to accelerate the current trends 
towards improving Latin America's planning 
processes and bringing them to maturity, the 
Committee considers it important to point out 
that, although plan implementation depends 
partly on the content of plans and on the system 
and procedures for formulating them, the main 
reasons for their inadequate implementation in-
clude the indecisive nature and unsatisfactory 
application of economic development policies. 
Whether or not planning is used as an instru-
ment of government, what is important is the 
climate or framework for development created 
by a proper stable and mature handling of the 
various policy instruments and the over-all effi-
ciency of the economic system. Otherwise, not 
only will planning be ineffective but also the 
development process itself will suffer. In this 
respect, the following recommendations on plan-
ning and plan implementation assume that due 
attention will be paid to the frequently men-
tioned need to undertake economic and institu-
tional reforms in the Latin American countries 
and to adapt economic policy instruments and 
the management which applies those instruments 
to the dynamic action required to attain the 
targets which the Latin American countries and 
the region as a whole have set themselves. 
(a) Recommendations in relation to the over-all 
framework for planning 
65. The Committee considers it essential to 
strengthen the links between the planning agen-
cies, on the one hand, and the political authori-
ties and the private sector, on the other. This 
may involve, inter alia, a thorough review of 
the type of liaison that exists between planning 
offices and the top levels of government, and the 
institutionalization of liaison arrangements so 
that their impersonal and more efficient conti-
nuity operation may be ensured. 
66. The planning agencies should bring their 
activities, including the formulation of plans, 
into line with the following requisites: 
(i) They should be in a position to submit 
basic development strategy options for 
consideration by the decision-making 
centres, with explicit reference not only 
to the expansion of production but also 
to the social objectives that are of the 
greatest importance for the individual 
country concerned (for example, em-
ployment) ; 
(ii) Requests for guidance on economic pol-
icy problems in relation to development 
objectives should be promptly met; 
(iii) The private sector should be given ade-
quate opportunities to participate in all 
stages of the planning process, in ac-
cordance with each country's organi-
zational levels and procedures. 
(b) Recommendations in relation to the public 
administration 
67. The Committee considers it imperative 
to strengthen the links between planning offices 
and the public administration in general, and 
to adapt the latter to planned action require-
ments. This may involve, inter alia: 
(i) Precise definition, first of the status of 
the planning office, and second of its 
specific role in relation to certain aspects 
of economic policy (public investment, 
credit, fiscal and exchange policies, ex-
ternal borrowing, etc.). An unremitting 
effort to secure active co-operation be-
tween the executive offices and the pol-
icy-makers at all levels, institutionalized 
in some cases through interdepartmental 
committees, might make for closer co-
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operation in the planning process on the 
part of the public sector; 
(ii) Administrative reform, accompanying 
the formulation of development plans 
and devised in the light of development 
policy requirements, and at the same 
time providing for an over-all improve-
ment in the status of public officials, 
especially at the intermediate levels of 
policy-making and decision-making, by 
means of the appropriate definition of 
ranks and categories. 
(c) Recommendations in relation to the content 
of plans 
68. The Committee stresses the need for the 
various countries to define development strate-
gies which will indicate the necessary steps or 
stages of action to implement them in relation 
to genuine national objectives, as well as the 
relevant guiding principles of policies. These 
national strategies should serve to link the plans 
essentially with the completion of stages or 
phases of the strategies themselves. The national 
strategies should be progressively co-ordinated 
within a regional context. 
69. Planning could be strengthened and the 
integration process expedited if the efforts that 
have to be made in defining national develop-
ment strategies were to be extended to the Latin 
American region as a whole. The general or 
ill-defined character of integration policy should 
not preclude research on alternative development 
strategies for Latin America as a whole, in 
which integration and development are tackled 
simultaneously. The fact that no development 
options have been presented with specific refer-
ence to the integration process impedes the adop-
tion of policy decisions and hinders the possible 
co-ordination of national plans even among ad-
jacent countries. Furthermore, the formulation 
of alternative regional development strategies 
would provide bases for the discussion of Latin 
American integration, so that the negotiation of 
instruments would be geared to substantive and 
specific objectives. 
70. As regards specific problems connected 
with the content of plans, the Committee sug-
gests that attention should be given to the fol-
lowing points: 
(i) The relation of planning at the national 
level to the formulation of objectives 
and strategy for Latin America's eco-
nomic integration; 
(ii) The relation of planning to the prob-
lems of assimilating advanced tech-
niques, the employment and training of 
manpower, income distribution, and im-
proving the living conditions of the 
population; 
(iii) The need to devote more attention to 
fiscal policy, not only for the purposes 
of providing the necessary resources and 
adapting tax systems to development re-
quirements, but also with the aim of 
formulating, should the need arise, com-
pensatory policies in order to prevent 
production for export and investment in 
export activities from being discouraged 
by short-term fluctuations in external 
prices. 
71. In particular, the Committee considers it 
extremely important to analyse the problems 
arising in plan formulation and implementation 
when anti-inflationary measures are being 
adopted at the same time. The existence of in-
flation and the application of anti-inflationary 
policies not only create highly complex problems 
in planning, but make planning even more 
necessary for the purposes of shaping and co-
ordinating development and stabilization poli-
cies. In such circumstances, it is important to 
have an efficient system of operational annual 
plans and short-term action programmes. Within 
the framework of operational annual plans, it 
is possible to fix annual targets which will be 
compatible with the stabilization policy, and to 
make a detailed analysis of monetary, fiscal and 
other programmes which will be consistent with 
the objectives for the following year. The Com-
mittee recognizes, however, that this is a vital 
subject which should be discussed and analysed 
more closely and in greater depth. 
(d) Recommendations in relation to planning 
methods 
72. In view of the technical limitations of 
planning in Latin America and the need to act 
promptly and speedily, the Committee recom-
mends the use of a flexible criterion in selecting 
plan implementation procedures and planning 
methods. Plans and planning machinery should 
be adapted to the particular conditions of each 
country; they should be designed to overcome 
the really important problems, without impos-
ing a complex task beyond the capacity of the 
public administration. This recommendation 
should not be understood to mean that, at this 
stage, it is inadvisable to use the best techniques 
available if they are relevant to the character-
istics of each economy; nor does it imply that 
efforts should no longer be made to overcome 
those technical limitations, and thus be able to 
30 
use more rigorous methods in future. The recom-
mendation merely calls for a pragmatic eco-
nomic approach to planning, especially as re-
gards the use of the inadequate resources 
available in information and in planning and 
supervisory personnel, without prejudice to con-
stant improvement in the quality and precision 
of planning. 
73. Without prejudice to the previous recom-
mendation, technical instruments for the effec-
tive conduct of the various planning activities 
should be made the subject of more thorough 
study and research. In this connexion, such 
topics as the following seem to deserve particu-
lar attention: 
(i) With regard to planning techniques, the 
identification of branches of production 
on the critical path, in which imbal-
ances between supply and demand may 
seriously affect relative prices, or lack 
of care in time-phasing may prejudice 
the implementation of the plan as a 
whole; consideration should be given to 
the possible utility, for the purpose of 
implementing plans and their segments 
at the sectoral, regional and project 
levels in the developing countries, of 
such techniques as critical path and net-
work analysis; 
(ii) Price and income policies, and their use 
as instruments for the reallocation of 
resources; 
(iii) Methods and techniques for more effec-
tive production of the demand for and 
the supply of human resources and for 
planned expansion of this resource; 
(iv) Methods of analysing the implications 
for national plans of measures for pro-
moting the integration of the Latin 
American countries; 
(v) Better ways of estimating the conse-
quences of alternative policy measures 
and plan strategies for the distribution 
of income both among different groups 
in the population and among regions; 
(vi) Improved techniques for analysing the 
consequences of alternative allocations 
of resources as between economic targets 
and social ones; 
(vii) Improved procedures for diagnosing the 
critical obstacles to increase agricultural 
productivity and for devising policy 
measures to overcome them. 
(e) Recommendations on the need to complete 
planning systems 
74. The need to complete the planning sys-
tems that have been developed so far entails 
additional action on several fronts, of which the 
following two are worthy of special mention: 
(i) More effective complementarity is re-
quired between general orientation plans 
and the machinery for short-term action, 
preferably in the form of annual opera-
tional plans embodying the decisions 
necessary for mobilizing and allocating 
resources and involving detailed eco-
nomic policy programmes; 
(ii) There is a need to supplement the func-
tions of preparing and initiating plans 
by that of periodically evaluating their 
execution, taking prompt remedial action 
where necessary, and setting up the 
necessary machinery for the purpose. 
75. It is imperative to improve the methods 
of data collection so as to ensure the ready 
availability, quality and timeliness of the statis-
tics and other data required for formulating 
plans and supervising their implementation. It 
will therefore be necessary, among other things, 
to: 
(i) Prepare basic programmes for the more 
important items of information so that 
they are given priority and a continu-
ous flow of up-to-date information is 
maintained; 
(ii) Upgrade the organs responsible for data 
compilation, tabulation and publication, 
and provide them with more staff and 
technical resources; 
(iii) Pay special attention to the provision of 
statistical data for the preparation of 
short-term plans and the co-ordination 
of monetary and fiscal programmes with 
development targets; 
(iv) Indicate priorities and critical points for 
research on natural resources; 
(v) Determine which technologies are suited 
to the stage of development of each 
individual country. 
( f ) Recommendations on external technical and 
jinancial co-operation 
16. International technical co-operation in 
national planning efforts must be maintained 
and intensified. Far from diminishing, present 
needs are growing, particularly as regards the 
following points: 
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(i) Research on and dissemination of meth-
ods and techniques in connexion with 
the aspects referred to in the previous 
paragraphs; 
(ii) Training of technical planning person-
nel, both in their present functions and 
in those which they will have to under-
take in the near future (annual plans, 
evaluation, supervision of implementa-
tion, problems of strategy formulation, 
etc.) ; 
(iii) Interchange of experience between the 
national planning agencies of the differ-
ent countries, both within and outside 
Latin America; 
(iv) Studies on the co-ordination of national 
plans on the basis of development 
strategy options for the region as a 
whole; 
(v) Stronger technical assistance support and 
more effective utilization by Govern-
ments of the technical assistance for 
planning provided through international 
agencies and the institutions maintained 
by them; in that respect. Governments 
and agencies should be guided in the 
formulation and implementation of 
technical assistance programmes by the 
Committee's recommendations on plan-
ning and plan implementation. Also im-
portant is co-ordination between the 
international agencies providing techni-
cal assistance for planning and inter-
national financial agencies, in addition 
to the internal co-ordination between the 
various agencies working in this field 
in the different regions of the world. 
77. The supply of technical information and 
specific projections on aspects such as the fol-
lowing need to be systematically co-ordinated 
as a matter of priority: 
(i) The economic growth of the different 
countries; 
(ii) Prospects in international markets as a 
whole, by products and by groups of 
products; 
(iii) Forecasts on the availability of exter-
nal financing and the needs of develop-
ing countries. 
78. In respect of external financing, it is 
important that substantial progress should be 
made in the following directions: 
(i) More frequent use of programme financ-
ing procedures, and consolidation of 
systems which might help to ensure that 
they are adopted as widely as possible 
in the near future; special mention may 
be made of the multilateral and inde-
pendent evaluation of development plans, 
the conclusion of agreements on certain 
minimum standards of quality for the 
plans in question and the selection of 
criteria for evaluating progress in plan 
implementation; 
(ii) The granting of adequate compensatory 
or supplementary credits; 
(iii) Improvement of the average terms of 
external olBcial financing with respect 
both to amortization periods and in-
terest rates and to the restrictions on 
the use of funds lent for purchase 
abroad. 
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DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION ON DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 
AT THE TWELFTH SESSION OF THE COMMISSION* 
The question of development planning in Latin America was given special 
attention at the twelfth session of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(Caracas, 2 to 13 May 1967). A Committee was set up to examine it, and its 
report was adopted at a plenary meeting. The recommendation put forward by 
the Committee was also adopted by ECLA as resolution 263 (XII) of 11 May 




1. The Commission based its discussion of de-
velopment planning on the secretariat document 
entitled "Planning in Latin America" (E / 
CN.12/772). It also took into account the 
provisional text of the section on Latin America 
in the report of the second session of the Com-
mittee for Development Planning. 
2. Both in the background documents and 
during the discussions, the view was expressed 
that the time was ripe for an analysis of plan-
ning problems. Planning in Latin America had 
gone through its first stage, so to speak, and 
very significant advances had been achieved. 
However, in several instances progress had not 
been maintained, and there had even been some 
definite setbacks, which, unless counteracted, 
would foster or strengthen a growing scepticism 
about planning. 
3. Only a short time has elapsed since sys-
tematic planning was first started in Latin 
America. Hence it is easier to evaluate the prog-
ress represented by the establishment of specific 
planning instruments, the training of specialized 
personnel, the adoption of more rational criteria 
for the allocation of resources, the progressive 
elucidation of development problems and the 
measures required to solve them, and many 
other direct and indirect contributions attribut-
able to planning. 
4. It was pointed out in the discussion that 
while great strides had been made, serious 
* See the report of the twelfth session (E/4359), pp. 
66-71 and 82-84. 
difficulties and obstacles were impeding the 
improvement of planning systems and plan 
implementation. In several cases, once the 
momentum acquired by preparing the first 
over-all plans had spent itself, the tempo 
slackened when it came to expressing them in 
terms of economic policy programmes and 
operational plans. At the same time, the 
definitions of long-term development strategy 
have continued to overlook basic aspects of de-
velopment policy, and machinery for the review, 
updating and evaluation of the plans for-
mulated has not been established. 
5. Some of the problems are due to internal 
causes, ranging from factors of a very general 
nature, such as the continuity or the extent of 
political backing for planning, to others related 
to the defective functioning of the planning 
machinery. In addition, there are difficulties 
of external origin, mainly related to the in-
stability, unsatisfactory terms and insufficient 
growth of external trade and financing. 
6. The discussions of the Commission gave 
rise to a comprehensive exchange of experience 
among the participants, which demonstrated the 
considerable progress made in some countries 
in some respects and the various obstacles en-
countered. Broadly speaking, the conclusion was 
drawn from this exchange of experiences that 
defects in plan implementation are the result 
either of deficiencies in the planning process as 
a whole, or of limitations inherent in the institu-
tional and economic environment in which 
that process develops. These limitations, in 
combination with the stage of maturity reached 
in the conduct of planning activities, help to 
account for the differences in the amount of 
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progress made by the countries of the region. 
Clearly, therefore, the improvement of planning 
systems cannot in itself ensure speedy success. 
7. The statements made in the Commission 
indicated that in some countries progress was 
easier because the planning effort was carried 
forward under conditions in which a specific 
development strategy could be applied because 
it was supported by determination on the part 
of Governments to take action. In one case, 
planning began at a time when the country's 
development had to be reoriented in accordance 
with a growth model based on import substi-
tutions; abundant resources were available for 
that purpose, and the enterprise was favoured 
by a change in government. In another, plan-
ning was stimulated by a decision to integrate 
their economies on the part of a group of coun-
tries where integration opened up significant 
new import substitution opportunities at the 
regional level. In a third instance, planning 
served as an indispensable instrument for im-
plementing the decision to reorganize the econ-
omy along socialist lines. A different situation 
prevailed in other countries, where the plan-
ning effort was launched at a time when the 
growth potential of import substitution was 
beginning to weaken, and new development 
strategies, not yet sufl&ciently clearly defined, 
were required. Of course there are also inter-
mediate cases in which circumstances have been 
propitious for the partial progress described by 
a number of delegations in respect of regional 
programming within individual countries, the 
devising and application of short-term opera-
tional measures and the strengthening of cer-
tain public investment or financing programmes. 
8. Clearly, then, one of the main objectives 
of planning must be precisely to help define a 
viable development strategy. In the course of 
the discussion, it was repeatedly pointed out 
that, in the absence of clear-cut development 
policies, it was much more difficult to give a 
pragmatic content to the planning effort, and 
formal or methodological considerations were 
apt to predominate; that the planning agencies 
had fewer chances of rapidly acquiring the 
necessary prestige, and incentives for close con-
tact with the government authorities were also 
fewer; that it was harder to find leaders and 
skilled personnel to promote and sustain the 
planning movement; and that there was little 
likelihood of achieving a consensus on basic 
development objectives, and therefore of com-
patibility between the primary concerns of the 
national authorities and those of the basic 
sectors of the community to the content of the 
plans. This set of problems becomes all the 
more complicated if, as is generally the case, 
there are also external trade and public financ-
ing problems which make it more difficult to 
reconcile long-term objectives with the urgent 
demands of the moment. 
9. From the national experiences described 
in the Commission it can be inferred that since 
planning is a new process, it will not mature 
or be consolidated quickly enough unless there 
is continuity in planning activities and stability 
in the composition of the technical teams re-
sponsible for planning. In some cases setbacks 
or lack of progress are linked to changes of 
government which affect planning machinery, 
although, of course, in other cases such changes 
might have favourable effects. Hence, it is im-
portant that plans should reflect initiative, 
ability and a technically objective approach, 
should be linked from the outset to the prob-
lems which directly concern the policy makers, 
and should effectively meet each country's 
priority needs. 
10. Some of the country experiences de-
scribed also stressed the influence which plan-
ning could exert on the administration depend-
ing on its flexibility and efficiency. In some 
cases, it has been possible to give the planning 
organs greater weight in the administrative 
structure and gain acceptance for technical and 
economic criteria. If, on the contrary, as has 
been the case in other countries of the region, 
planning has to coexist with an antiquated but 
time-honoured public administration, there is a 
stronger tendency for it to work in isolation, 
unless substantive programmes of administra-
tive reorganization are undertaken at the same 
time. 
11. These difficulties were identified by the 
Commission on the almost unanimous assump-
tion that effective means of overcoming them 
could be found within the framework of the 
market economy system. But one delegation 
expressed the opinion that planning could not 
be successful in the political and economic 
framework existing in most of the Latin Ameri-
can countries, since fully effective plan im-
plementation would call for radical changes 
producing a situation in which the State could 
adopt direct decisions on the allocation of basic 
resources. 
12. With due regard for the problems con-
nected with the general content in which plan-
ning takes place, the Commission also discussed 
more specific aspects of the question. For ex-
ample, it was stated that long-term plans and 
immediate action programmes should be con-
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current and complementary. Both to facilitate 
the rapid consolidation of planning machinery 
and as part of the permanent function of plan-
ning, it is essential that broad general principles 
should be converted into short-term approaches 
and policies, including policies designed to re-
concile development objectives with the control 
of inflationary pressures and other imbalances. 
13. The experience of some countries has 
also produced some interesting results in the 
strengthening and placement of technical cadres. 
Unless planning bodies acquire prestige and 
status in the administration, there will continue 
to be frequent shifts of top-level officials. On 
the other hand, planning offices which have 
greater prestige cannot only retain their best 
qualified staff, but can transfer some of the 
technicians they train to other administrative 
bodies, thus strengthening the links between the 
latter and the central planning machinery. 
14. Another subject discussed by the Com-
mission was that of relations between the 
planning machinery and the entrepreneurial, 
labour, rural and other social sectors. Their 
participation is important, even if there are dis-
putes on planning policies, since lack of com-
munications deprive the planning bodies of 
very valuable information concerning opinions, 
possible reactions to alternative economic policy 
measures or constructive suggestions. Their par-
ticipation, moreover, is one of the important 
means of gaining support for and strengthening 
the action of planning, and contributes ma-
terially to the achievement of plan objectives. 
15. Throughout the discussion, the Commis-
sion recognized that all these questions have 
methodological aspects which must be studied 
in depth and that planning systems should be 
completed. In this connexion, special emphasis 
should be placed on the consideration of annual 
plans, the improvement of procedures for data 
collection and research and of methods for 
dealing with such problems as the control of 
inflation, income distribution and employment 
policy. It was generally agreed that national 
development plans should deal explicitly with 
the various problems relating to human re-
sources. 
16. In discussing procedures for short-term 
programming, consideration was given to the 
progress made in several countries in such 
matters as the preparation of short-term models, 
economic indicators, investment-financing, bal-
ance-sheets, and follow-up of the execution of 
basic high-priority projects. Attention was 
drawn to the need for closer co-ordination be-
tween planning and monetary and fiscal policy. 
17. The Commission recognized the need to 
formulate and implement annual plans as an 
instrument for combining and integrating the 
elements arising from long-term policy, the 
effects of market trends and improvements in the 
operational capacity of the national administra-
tion. There was an exchange of views on the 
problem of specialized personnel to perform 
those duties. The opinions expressed on this sub-
ject were, on the whole, in favour of the idea 
of allowing groups of officials to specialize, 
provided that their work remained closely re-
lated to that of the staff dealing with the longer-
term aspects of planning. 
18. Throughout the discussion, repeated 
stress was placed on the co-ordination of na-
tional development plans with Latin American 
economic integration. Unless deliberate efforts 
are made towards that end, rigidities may be 
accentuated by integration, it may be difficult 
to accelerate the pace of integration and to 
recondition certain activities, or production 
methods may be developed which are inefficient 
from the standpoint of regional integration. 
Moreover, a purely restrictive approach, i.e., 
one directed towards ensuring that the content 
of national plans does not endanger regional 
integration, is not satisfactory either. The aim 
should be rather for national planning to make 
a positive contribution to the achievement of 
integration targets. 
19. It was also agreed that the co-ordination 
of plans and progress in national planning were 
interrelated, since the harmonization of na-
tional plans for the purpose of achieving in-
tegration targets would increase the need to 
improve those plans, so that each country could 
form a clearer idea of the opportunities offered 
by integration and weigh its effects on the do-
mestic economy. Each country would then have 
objective technical criteria on which to base 
action to ensure its participation in the integra-
tion process. 
20. Some delegations emphasized that agree-
ments should be concluded as soon as possible 
to foster the exchange of experience as a first 
step towards the gradual co-ordination of some 
features of national programmes and the more 
rapid implementation of complementarity ar-
rangements, joint programmes in basic in-
dustries and sub-regional agreements and 
towards expediting the balanced development 
of infrastructure and the utilization of techno-
logical and scientific advances, in response to 
the desire for integration expressed in the Dec-
laration of the Presidents of America. One 
delegation pointed out, however, that the co-
35 
ordination of national plans could take place 
only within the framework of absolutely uni-
form objectives and intentions. Other delega-
tions expressed the view that those questions 
should be dealt with in accordance with the 
procedure of existing integration systems and 
the decisions made at the Meeting of American 
Chiefs of State at Punta del Este. 
21. That view is based on the premise that 
the application of the decisions on Latin Ameri-
can economic integration made at the Meeting 
of American Chiefs of State must to a great 
extent be a planned process and that it will be 
all the more eflFective as greater progress is 
made in national planning. 
22. The Commission devoted some attention 
to the external obstacles to plan implementa-
tion described in the background documents. In 
that connexion, the view was expressed that the 
adoption of new procedures for external financ-
ing directly related to the preparation and 
implementation of development plans had 
proved to be a powerful stimulus to Latin 
American planning, and similarly, that sub-
sequent trends in external assistance and some 
tardiness in plan evaluation had had adverse 
effects on those efforts. 
23. The Commission agreed that in view of 
the progress achieved, balanced against current 
difficulties and the new demands made on plan-
ning at the present stage of Latin American 
development, it should emphasize the need to 
intensify efforts to improve what had already 
been done and to continue the technical help 
being provided by a number of institutions. 
These considerations were summarized in reso-
lution 263 (XII) on planning in Latin America. 
With regard to that resolution, one delegation 
requested that note should be taken of its 
observations concerning regional integration 
and the decisions taken at the recent Punta del 
Este meeting, as recorded in the summary rec-
ords (E/CN.12/AC.59/SR.1-5). 
II 
RESOLUTION 263 ( X I I ) ON PLANNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
The Economic Commission for Latin America, 
Considering that through the planning efforts 
of the Latin American countries significant 
headway has been made as regards the direc-
tion and effectiveness of economic policy, the 
identification of the obstacles hampering de-
velopment and the establishment of priorities 
for, and the co-ordination of, public sector 
activities. 
Recognizing that the problems arising at the 
present phase of Latin American development 
call for a number of substantive improvements 
in the strategic features of plans and for new 
approaches to be worked out in greater detail 
in such aspects as regional economic integra-
tion, the pattern of external relationship, em-
ployment and income distribution policy, and 
the relations between those aspects and in-
dustrialization policy. 
Bearing in mind the need to accelerate the 
process of improving planning systems, with 
special reference to the implementation phase 
and the extent to which plan objectives are 
attained, 
Recognizing that planning systems have not 
yet been fully organized and that it is essential 
to improve their efficiency and balance by in-
troducing new features to complete their sphere 
of action, particularly in the matter of links 
between long-term objectives and the need for 
immediate action. 
Taking into account that planning is ham-
pered by factors of different types including 
those of an administrative and technical nature, 
and by obstacles created by the conditions gov-
erning foreign trade and external financing, 
1. Takes note with satisfaction of the study 
on planning in Latin America (E/CN.12/772), 
prepared by the secretariat, and of the section 
relating to Latin America in the provisional 
report of the second session of the Committee 
for Development Planning; 
2. Recommends that the Latin American Gov-
ernments should intensify their current efforts 
to improve and extend the scope of planning 
systems in accordance with a development strat-
egy appropriate to the economic and social 
circumstances of each country and of Latin 
America, and should, in particular: 
(a) So far as the countries signatories of the 
Declaration of the Presidents of America at the 
Punta del Este meeting^ and the countries ac-
ceding to it are concerned, strive, when prepar-
ing their national plans, to co-ordinate them in 
order to attain objectives in line with the deci-
sions concerning Latin American economic in-
tegration made at that meeting; 
{b) Endeavour to include specific aims and 
programmes for export promotion, employment 
and income distribution policies, and structural 
1 Meeting of American Chiefs of State, held at Punta 
del Este, Uruguay, from 12 to 14 April 1957 (see OAS 
official documents, OAS/Ser.K/XIV/1.1). 
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changes, in such a way as to make them com-
patible with over-all targets for economic 
growth and the promotion of agriculture and 
industry, while devoting special attention to the 
effective programming of human resources; 
(c) Endeavour, with regard to the allocation 
of resources, prices and general financial mone-
tary and economic policy, to forge more effec-
tive links between long-term planning and short-
term measures; 
(d) Encourage the reform of administration 
and information systems in order to enable them 
to meet the requirements of planning, and 
programme supervision and evaluation, and the 
improvement of the methods used in plan 
formulation; 
(e) Establish action procedures to ensure 
the support and participation on a rising scale 
of entrepreneurs, urban and rural workers, and 
other social groups in the various phases of 
planning and take steps to institute appropriate 
procedures for spreading the idea of planning 
and of plan implementation among the broad 
masses of the population; 
3. Requests the secretariat and the Latin 
American Institute for Economic and Social 
Planning to prepare technical studies, designed 
to facilitate fulfilment of the objectives referred 
to in operative paragraph 2, to endeavour to 
intensify, in co-operation with the International 
Labour Organisation and other international 
specialized agencies, their technical contribu-
tion to human resources programming, and to 
promote the exchange of experience among the 
planning offices of member States; 
4. Reaffirms the conviction of the Latin 
American countries that there is a need for the 
system for the programme financing of develop-
ment plans to be expanded and for the terms 
of international credit to be adapted to the spe-
cial circumstances of Latin America by, inter 
alia, extending repayment periods and grace 
periods, reducing rates of interests and remov-
ing restrictions which tie the use of funds to 
certain sources or countries. 
37 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN LATIN AMERICA* 
INTRODUCTION 
Studies on income distribution deal with 
three main factors: first, the characteristics of 
features of distribution patterns and the forces 
which influence or create them; secondly, the 
possible influence of difl'erent income distribu-
tion structures on the force and nature of eco-
nomic development; and, thirdly, questions re-
lated to redistribution policy, i.e., the means 
and purposes of altering a given distribution 
pattern. 
Although these three aspects certainly do not 
cover the whole of this vast problem, each of 
them presents a great many facets which cannot 
easily be analysed concurrently or exhaustively. 
Consequently, only the main issues have been 
dealt with first generally and then with an in-
creasing degree of precision. This has been the 
line followed in the programme of research on 
income distribution, and two tasks were selected 
for the initial stage. 
The first was to compile the data available 
in a fair number of Latin American countries, 
while the second was to explore systematically 
the main forces and trends of recent develop-
ment which have helped to determine the struc-
ture of income distribution in the region. 
The data on income distribution in Latin 
America given early in this article, bring to 
light significant differences with respect to the 
situation in the more developed regions. Gen-
erally speaking, the structure of distribution is 
more inequitable in Latin America. Among the 
various countries of the region, there are dif-
ferences in the degree of unequal distribution 
which seem to bear no clear-cut relation to their 
respective levels of development. 
•Document E/CN.12/770/Add.l, submitted to the 
twelfth session of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America, summarizes some of the conclusions to be 
drawn from the studies on Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
that make up document E/CN.12/770, and presents cer-
tain data on other countries. On the basis of those 
studies and data, there follow preliminary general com-
ments and hypotheses as part of the extensive survey 
of income distribution undertaken by the ECLA secre-
tariat. See also "Income distribution in Argentina", 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, volume XL No. 1 
(1966), pp. 106-13L 
This raises a number of questions. One is to 
identify the main factors which may have 
helped to shape the present structure of dis-
tribution. Another concerns the changes which 
those factors may have undergone in the course 
of time or during definite periods, either in the 
direction of greater or lesser equality, or 
changes in the social groups and their represen-
tation at difl'erent levels of the income pyramid. 
These two questions are closely interrelated 
and as far as possible will have to be dealt 
with together. In any case, the first step will be 
to identify related groups of factors; it will 
be followed by an evaluation of their recent 
evolution. 
On a purely abstract plane, the circumstances 
determining distribution patterns are defined 
academically in economic theory. Reduced to 
the simplest terms, the income of wage-earners, 
self-employed, rentiers, etc. is determined by the 
productivity of their own contribution and its 
effect on supply and demand. 
At best, however, this approximate definition 
merely reflects the ex post facto position of in-
come distribution, whereas the basic question 
is to discover the underlying or contributory 
causes of those hypothetical de facto situations. 
It is necessary, therefore, to look beyond mar-
ket forces to ascertain and systematize the 
principal factors that shape and fix different 
income distribution patterns. The approximation 
itself not only allows for a more comprehensive 
view of the problem but also—and perhaps 
primarily—offers an opportunity for socio-
economic policy to change those determinants 
so as to create different distribution patterns— 
irrespective of their nature or content. 
In the process of identifying the principal 
factors involved, some assumptions will be made 
regarding their effect which will provide a 
basis for distinguishing between those with an 
"equalizing effect" and those which produce the 
opposite result, i.e., help to maintain or ac-
centuate more or less repressive income distri-
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bution patterns. Both types of factors operate 
concurrently in every situation and period. Only 
this conflicting interplay and balance of forces 
and trends can explain the relative similarity 
of distribution patterns in economies at very 
different stages of development whose per capita 
income sometimes varies widely, as well as the 
fairly constant distribution patterns in the 
course of development of individual economies 
over periods which are long enough to have 
shown marked structural changes. 
Although no attempt is made to deal method-
ically with the other aspect of the problem— t^he 
effect of the income distribution structure on 
the vigour and nature of development— t^he 
final passages of this article contain some con-
clusions which may serve as a point of depar-
ture for subsequent research. 
I. QUANTITATIVE DATA 
0.5 — 
1. SOME GENERAL INDICATORS OF INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS 
Figure I presents a comparison between in-
come concentration coefficients^ based on avail- 0-6 
able data for seven Latin American countries— 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Mexico and Panama—and the cor-
responding figures for the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Despite the perfectly legiti-
mate reservations regarding the nature and ac-
curacy of the statistical data on which the 
comparison is based, the results are sufficiently 
eloquent to support the conclusion that, in gen-
eral, income distribution in Latin America shows 
a relatively high degree of concentration. 
However, this comparison is useful solely to 
illustrate in very general terms the gap between 
actual distribution and "equity of distribution" 
in each case. It must therefore be supplemented 
by other indications regarding specific forms of 
distribution, which will be most valuable both O ^ l — ^ United States 
in assessing the problem in more precise terms 
and in analysing the Latin American economies 
concerned. 
Distribution in Argentina, for example, shows 
a very considerable concentration of income at I T Unitsd Kingdom 
the top of the scale, a certain homogeneity 
Figure I 
COEFFIQENTS OF INCOME CONCENTRATION 
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
I • El Salvador 
i I Mexico 
I > Costa Rica 
«» Panama 
(> Argentina, Brazil 
and Colombia 
^ The concentration coefficient used is a measure of 
the relationship between the area enclosed by the 
Lorenz curve and the equal distribution line and the 
area of the triangle in which it is situated. The follow-
ing formula was applied: 
0.3 — 
7- = l — 2 
i = 1 10,000 
w h e r e 
r = concentration coefficient; 
n = number of income groups; 
fj = population in each income bracket as a per-
centage of total population; 
g^  = cumulative income percentages. 
in the middle-income groups, and fairly high in-
comes compared with other Latin American 
countries in the lowest income groups. The top 
5 per cent of all families alone received 29.4 
per cent of total personal income in 1961, and 
had an average income nearly six times the na-
tional average and nearly seventeen times the 
average of the poorest fifth of all families, 
which received 7 per cent of total personal in-
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come. In the "middle" brackets incomes rise 
relatively slowly; levels at the top of this group 
are not quite double those at the bottom, going 
from about 45 per cent to about 85 per cent 
of the national average. In the top groups, on 
the other hand, incomes rise rapidly. 
The situation in Brazil, which has similar 
over-all concentration coefficient, is different. 
Data for 1960 show that 80 per cent of the 
population receives less than the average na-
tional income, and that within this broad cate-
gory distribution is fairly even, which is a 
sign that the middle-income groups are very 
small. The average income ratios are barely 
1 to 3 between the lowest 20 per cent and the 
segments of the population in the eighth distri-
bution decile, and 1 to 2 between the fourth 
and eighth deciles. The 20 per cent at the top 
of the scale receives a very high proportion 
of total income, v/hich is very unevenly dis-
tributed, with average income ratios of 1 to 41 
between the top and bottom sub-groups. 
In Mexico, during the years 1963 and 1964, 
50 per cent of the families at the bottom of the 
scale received 15.4 per cent of total income, and 
20 per cent of these only 3.6 per cent. The 
middle-income group, i.e., the next 30 per cent 
of families absorbed 26.1 per cent of aggregate 
income and an appreciable proportion of them 
received more than the national average. A 
third category consisting of 15 per cent of all 
families received 29.5 per cent of total income, 
while practically the same proportion went to 
the top 5 per cent of the population. Of this 
segment, 1 per cent received 12 per cent of total 
income. 
In figure II some of these characteristics are 
compared with those of other Latin American 
countries, the United States and the United 
Kingdom. The figure shows the proportion of 
total income received by specific groups ar-
ranged in order of their place in the scale of 
distribution by income levels. It should be noted 
that although in every case there is a sizable 
gap between the position of the Latin American 
countries and that of the two extra-regional 
economies, each individual country of the region 
occupies a different place in the scale depend-
ing on the guiding principle applied, thus 
demonstrating certain idiosyncrasies of the dis-
tribution modules concerned. Similarly, it would 
be hard to find a sufficiently close relationship 
between distribution and stage of development, 
whether measured in terms of absolute levels of 
per capita income or the structure of the 
economy. 
From this point of view, Argentina's favour-
able position might be ascribed not so much 
to its relatively advanced stage of development 
as to other basic determinants. It has a vast 
supply of natural resources, especially land, 
and a low population density, while the ratio of 
arable to total land is higher than in most 
countries of the region. Unemployment has 
seldom been a serious problem in its economic 
development—on the contrary, there has been a 
heavy flow of immigrants—and its population 
growth rate is lower than in any other country 
of the region except Uruguay. These and other 
factors explain why the lower income groups 
receive relatively high incomes. On the other 
hand, the concentration of income in the top 
decile is essentially a reflection of the concen-
tration of property ownership, although this 
should not be narrowly interpreted as meaning 
the owning of property as such, but rather to 
include access to sources of credit, market posi-
tions, and other factors of this kind. 
The foregoing considerations do not exclude 
the possibility that some features of distribu-
tion may depend directly on absolute income 
levels. For example, in economies with a low 
average income and a high proportion of the 
labour force engaged in agriculture, a smaller 
percentage of the population is likely to have 
incomes below the national average, while the 
proportion with income equal to specific mul-
tiples of that average may well vary consider-
ably (see figure III) . 
The percentage of population falling within 
different ranges of average income also helps 
to highlight certain characteristics of distribu-
tion. Some comparisons of this kind are shown 
in figure IV, where Colombia occupies a rela-
tively favourable position, probably because the 
low-income groups consist mainly of small 
agricultural landowners earning fairly substan-
tial incomes from coffee. On the other hand. El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, Mexico and Panama in 
nearly every case show sharper disparities in 
relation to average income between the various 
groups. A more detailed analysis, however, 
would bring to light significant differences be-
tween these four countries. In Mexico, in par-
ticular, the differences are due not so much to 
a high concentration in the top segments as to 
a marked disparity between the top and bottom 
halves of the population, although the distri-
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2 . DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BY LEVELS AND 
PARTIAL DISTRIBUTION 
Regardless of the way they are expressed, the 
foregoing data relate essentially to distribution 
of income by levels. For information purposes 
and for an accurate interpretation of the par-
ticular characteristics of distribution shown, 
income distribution should be considered as the 
ultimate result of a number of "partial distri-
butions", mainly by functions, sectors of activity 
and areas. This will show the effects on income 
distribution at the national level of differences 
in productivity and average income between the 
various sectors of the economy, differences in 
the stages of development within a given coun-
try, and differences in remuneration of the 
factors of production, mainly between wage-
earners and entrepreneurs or owners. 
(a) Distribution by sectors and within each 
sector 
Naturally, differences in the productivity and 
average income of the various sectors of eco-
nomic activity directly influence total income 
distribution. The wider the differences, the 
longer the distribution curve, since the recipients 
will tend to fall into different income brackets. 
The effects will be even more pronounced if 
income distribution is very unequal within each 
sector. 
From this point of view, the three countries 
on which most information has been gathered 
show very significant disparities. 
The Argentine economy is very unusual in 
that relatively high agricultural productivity 
creates little difference between the per capita 
income of the agricultural sector and other sec-
tors of the economy. Although 1961 was a year 
of fairly low agricultural prices, the average 
income indexes in relation to the national aver-
age were 85 for agriculture, 100 for manufac-
turing and 105 for services as a whole. More-
over, there are no wide differences in the 
"internal" distribution of those sectoral group-
ings. Although distribution is somewhat less 
equitable in agriculture, the differences are 
small compared with those deriving from other 
factors, in particular from income distribution 
according to classification of functions. 
41 
Figure III 
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION WHOSE INCOME COMES WITHIN 
SPECIFIC AVERAGE INCOME BRACKETS 
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Brazil's case is quite different. The product 
per person engaged in agriculture is a little 
over half the national average and less than 
one-third of the per capita manufacturing prod-
uct, at the same time as a much larger propor-
tion of the population depends on agriculture 
for a livelihood. Thus, half the population 
comprising the poorest families includes 70 per 
cent of those engaged in agriculture and ex-
tractive industries. The middle-income brackets 
encompass 40 per cent and include two-thirds 
of the population employed in secondary ac-
tivities, mainly wage-earners. The tertiary sector 
is more heterogeneous in composition: it in-
cludes a sizable proportion of the low-income 
group (50 per cent of the lowest income group 
account for 34 per cent of total employment in 
services) it plays an important role in the 
middle-income segment and weighs decisively 
in the top 10 per cent of the population. 
The effect of sectoral disparities in income 
and productivity is even greater in Mexico. The 
agricultural per capita product is equal to less 
than one-third of the national average and less 
than one-fifth of that of non-agricultural sec-
tors. Over 42 per cent of the total number of 
workers' families and only 5.6 per cent of em-
ployee's families are engaged in agriculture, 
with the latter's average income twice or three 
times higher than that of the former. This 
sector absorbs 63.5 per cent of the own-account 
workers, who constitute the lowest income group 
outside the workers. The relatively high pro-
portion of owner-entrepreneurs engaged in agri-
culture does not have the same significance as 
in other sectors because it includes a large 
number of smallholders. Thus, while the 
average agricultural income of workers' families 
amounts to 60 per cent of the national average 
for -workers, the income of the smallholders 
amounts to less than one-third of the average 
for the owner-entrepreneur group. 
(b) Regional and urban-rural distribution 
The effects of regional disparities on income 
distribution at the national level are similar to 
the sectoral effects, and the position of the three 
countries analysed also differs considerably 
in this respect. 
In Argentina, regional and urban-rural dif-
ferences in average per capita income are far 
less pronounced than in the majority of the 
Latin American countries, and they have even 
less influence on national income distribution 
because of the higher agricultural productivity, 
advanced level of urbanization and degree of 
concentration of the population in the high-
income brackets. Although three-quarters of the 
low-income farmers are in the north and most 
of the high-income crop and stock farmers are 
in the pampa area, the former are not so numer-
ous as to weigh significantly in the distribution 
of income by levels. 
In this respect, the characteristics of Brazil's 
economy are quite the reverse. The indexes of 
per capita income in relation to the national 
average are 51 in the north-east, 60 in the north 
and central-west areas, 96 in the east and 144 in 
the south. Available data for 1960 show that 
78.5 per cent of the population in the north-
east received less than the national average, 
compared with only 28 per cent in the south. 
The bottom 50 per cent of the population in-
cludes 80.5 per cent of the population in the 
north-east and only 30 per cent of that living in 
the south area. The middle 40 per cent, on the 
other hand, includes 17.5 per cent of the north-
east population, the proportions for the central-
west, east and south being 39, 50.2 and 59 per 
cent, respectively. Lastly, only 2.8 per cent of 
the population in the north-east belongs to the 
top 10 per cent income group, as against 7.8 
per cent in the east and 11 per cent in the south. 
It is interesting to note the conflicting conclu-
sions reached on income distribution. For ex-
ample, the proportion of persons with incomes 
equaling or exceeding the regional average is 28 
per cent in the north-east, 57 per cent in the 
north and central-west areas, 16.2 per cent in 
the east, and 21 per cent in the south. Other 
indications, which also fail to yield clear-cut 
conclusions, were obtained from surveys of 
family income and expenditure conducted in 
several Brazilian cities in 1962-63. If the indi-
cator used is the percentage of income that 
would have to be re-distributed for an equitable 
distribution, the proportion would be 31 per 
cent in the State capitals and 27 per cent in the 
cities of the interior, with no correlation with 
the average level of income. In the south it 
ranged from 31 per cent (Curitiba) to 34 per 
cent (Sao Paulo) for the capital cities, and 
from only 23 to 32 per cent in the hinterland; 
in the east, from 32 per cent (Rio de Janeiro) 
to 34.4 per cent (Belo Horizonte); and in the 
north-east, from 31.3 per cent (Recife) to 35 
per cent (Fortaleza). If the indicator used is 
the number of families with incomes equal to 
the city's average income, the results vary just 
as widely: 33-35 per cent in the north-east, 28 
per cent in the north (Belem), and, in the south 
area, 23-42 per cent in the capital cities and 
21-45 per cent in the cities of the interior. 
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Nevertheless, the lowest income areas of the 
north and north-east present the sharpest con-
trast between the groups at either end of the 
scale, the diiference is less marked in the middle 
of the curve compared with the figures for Sao 
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro and there is a closer 
relationship between the average income of the 
top income group and the average in those cities. 
However, no significant relationship can be 
established between the inequality coefficients 
and the various income levels. 
Income distribution in Mexico also reflects 
appreciable disparities in average income levels 
between one region and another and between the 
urban and rural sectors. Three of the six regions 
in which the country was divided for purposes 
of income studies absorb 68 per cent of total 
personal income. Taking as a frame of reference 
average per capita income in the Federal Dis-
trict, the indexes are 35 for the south Pacific 
and central regions, 54 for the north and Gulf 
of Mexico region and 93 for the north Pacific 
area. Approaching the question from another 
point of view, average rural family income is 
43 per cent of average urban income; the bot-
tom 50 per cent of the population comprises 
68.5 per cent of rural families and only 35.5 
per cent of urban families, compared with 0.2 
and 1.7 per cent, respectively, in the top 1 per 
cent. On this basis at least it might be concluded 
that income is less unequally distributed in the 
country than in the urban areas: the proportion 
of families which have attained the average in-
come is 31.5 per cent in the country and 27.7 
per cent in the cities, which is probably so ex-
plained not only because the average rural in-
come is low, but because productivity strata are 
less dispersed in the less diversified rural 
economy. 
(c) Distribution by functions 
Despite the significant impact of the regional 
and sectoral factors described briefly above, the 
most important factor influencing the distribu-
tion patterns of most countries is the employ-
ment status of recipients in the sector or region. 
This is particularly true in Argentina, pre-
cisely because regional and sectoral disparities 
are less marked and inequality is mainly due to 
differences in the incomes of wage-earners and 
entrepreneurs. Wage-earning families predomi-
nate at the lower end of the scale and few ever 
reach the top 1 per cent. Moreover, not many 
people are forced into independent employment 
merely because they have failed to find remu-
nerative jobs with the result that there are few 
commercial and service entrepreneurs in the 
low-income sectors; on the whole the small 
farmers are virtually the only independents in 
these sectors, and they are relatively fewer than 
in most other countries. On the other hand, the 
independent entrepreneurs assume increasing im-
portance as income rises: over two-thirds of the 
families in the 10 per cent at the top of the scale 
obtain their income from individual enterprises, 
and 85 per cent of the heads of families in the 
top 1 per cent are independent entrepreneurs. 
The rentier group in general carries little weight, 
since the highest incomes are seldom obtained 
from property that is not directly involved in 
the production process. 
In Brazil, the 50 per cent of the population 
at the bottom of the income scale—which ac-
count for 19.8 per cent of total income—includes 
practically all rural wage-earners, small artisans, 
the marginal population in the big cities and a 
sizable proportion of retired persons or pen-
sioners. Only 27 per cent of the wage-earners 
employed in the secondary sector belong to this 
group, but they are mainly in the fourth and 
fifth deciles of distribution by levels. The first 
10 per cent of the lower income group comprises 
28 per cent of the agricultural population, 19.2 
per cent of those in services and 40 per cent 
of the women in the economically active popula-
tion. A second socio-economic category—namely 
the next 30 per cent of the population, which 
receives 23.9 per cent of total income—includes 
an appreciable proportion of semi-skilled labour: 
53.5 per cent of these employed in industry and 
construction, 38.8 per cent of the active popula-
tion in the tertiary sector and 36.2 per cent of 
the total number of retired persons. Although 
entrepreneurs and own-account workers predomi-
nate in the upper income brackets, they are also 
relatively numerous in the two categories men-
tioned above, mainly small-scale farming and 
the supply of independent unskilled service 
workers. 
This situation, which is quite different from 
that prevailing in Argentina is even more pro-
nounced in the case of Mexico. The 50 per cent 
lower-income group includes 62 per cent of all 
workers' families, 53 per cent of self-employed 
workers engaged in agriculture, construction, 
small business and personal services, 13 per cent 
of all employees, and 35 per cent of owner-
entrepreneurs engaged mainly in agriculture 
and services (small farmer-owners and families 
running small retail shops). A second category 
comprising 30 per cent of all middle-income 
families includes 31 per cent of the workers 
employed mainly in mining, manufacturing, the 
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petroleum industry and electricity, who receive 
42 per cent of total wages; 25 per cent of the 
independent workers; 41 per cent of the em-
ployees engaged mainly in agriculture and serv-
ices, who receive only 20 per cent of total 
salaries; and 27 per cent of all owner-entre-
preneurs, who receive 15 per cent of total income 
from property. The higher income brackets in-
clude mainly owner-entrepreneurs; they also in-
clude a sizable proportion of self-employed 
workers and employees, and only 6.9 per cent 
of workers, although the latter receive 20 per 
cent of total wages. 
The income distribution curves by function 
in the three countries are therefore quite dif-
ferent, but in all three cases this factor is clearly 
important in the over-all distribution of income 
by levels. There is also some information 
available regarding the features of "internal" 
distribution for wage-earners and entrepreneurs. 
In general, distribution seems to be far less un-
equal among wage-earners. In Argentina, for 
example, 10 per cent of the wage-earning fami-
lies with the highest incomes received 27 per 
cent of total salaries and wages for that group 
in 1961, while the same proportion of entre-
preneurs received 48 per cent of total income 
in their category. 
Nevertheless, the disparity in wage-earners' 
incomes is also relatively pronounced. Although 
this is largely due to the much lower rural wages 
paid, available data for Brazil indicate that the 
disparity does not diminish with the rise in 
the average wage, as suggested by the compari-
son between income of the wage-earning sector 
in the east and the north-east. In Brazil, there 
are sharp differences in the relative income levels 
of industrial wage-earners and entrepreneurs be-
tween one region and another, since the share 
of paid labour in the value added of manufac-
turing was about 20 per cent in the east and 
south compared with 14.5 to 18 per cent in 
other parts of the country. In Mexico, while in-
come distribution is also more inequitable in 
the non-wage-earning sector than among wage-
earners, in both cases this inequality has grad^u-
ally become more pronounced, among wage-
earners because of the widening gap between 
rural and urban wage-earners, between skilled 
and unskilled labour, and between workers em-
ployed in the traditional and the modern indus-
tries or plants, and among entrepreneurs, because 
of the equally widening gap between small and 
large-scale farmers, between artisans or small-
scale manufacturers and large manufacturing 
enterprises, and between self-employed urban 
workers and large establishments concerned with 
the provision of similar services, including small 
business. 
3 . DISTRIBUTION OF MONETARY AND REAL INCOME 
Before analysing the significance of the data 
in a broader context they should be comple-
mented by other indicators which show how 
specific factors change the distribution of mone-
tary income and ultimately lead to a somewhat 
different distribution of the good things of life 
among the different population sectors. 
In this respect, a distinction should first be 
made between the distribution of personal and 
family income, according to whether a person 
or a family is regarded as the income recipient. 
Even in the case of Argentina where the ab-
solute incomes of the poorer groups are relatively 
high and more equally distributed, the family 
serves as a kind of protection for the low-income 
group, where it is commoner for more than one 
member of a family group to be working than 
among higher income recipients. Only 1 per cent 
of the total number of families in Argentina 
have incomes of less than 500 dollars, while 
13 per cent of all individual incomes are be-
low that figure. On the other hand, most of the 
latter recipients are not heads of families, or if 
they are, another member of the family receives 
a supplementary income. 
The situation is the same or probably even 
more common in Mexico. Whereas in the agricul-
tural sector the per capita product is only one-
third of the national average, the product per 
family is approximately two-thirds. This differ-
ence is only partly explained by the fact that 
the data were obtained from different statistical 
sources; it basically shows that average family 
income from agriculture includes secondary in-
come received by other members of the family on 
a larger scale than in other activities. Put another 
way, agricultural employment absorbs 53 per 
cent of the total active population and only 43 
per cent in terms of families, which is also an 
indication of the number of rural family depen-
dants who are part of the labour force. 
Argentina offers another series of considera-
tions which are also useful in assessing the dif-
ferences between real and monetary income 
distribution. At least until 1961 tax policy had 
no great influence, since the only progressive 
levy—personal income tax—represented only 10 
per cent of total tax revenue. The tax system 
showed no signs of becoming more progressive 
and tax evasion tended to increase. Public ex-
penditure was a more decisive factor in that it 
resulted in greater benefits to the low-income 
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sectors, particularly in the way of education and 
health. Subsidies—^which were substantial— 
benefited all economic and social groups ap-
proximately in proportion to monetary incomes. 
Incidentally, Brazil's tax policy has an indirect 
effect because it reduces some of the disparities 
in regional income, the tax burden being rela-
tively heavier in the high-income areas. In the 
less developed areas, however, indirect taxes are 
heavier and in general curb the redistributive 
effects of tax policy. 
The domestic price structure is another factor 
which, particularly in Argentina, has favoured 
the low-income groups; however its redistributive 
effects have tapered off in the last few years. 
In 1962, relative food prices—which absorb 
over half of total expenditure of the low-income 
groups—were lower than in any other Latin 
American country except Brazil, as were the 
prices of other important items consumed by 
the low-income groups, except for drugs and 
medicines. On the other hand, consumer goods 
in most demand by the high-income groups were 
relatively expensive, and this difference is even 
more pronounced for investment goods. Surveys 
of prices in relation to the average for Latin 
America—^taking into account the composition of 
consumption for the various population sectors— 
show that the relative price index for the whole 
range of goods covered in their consumption 
pattern was 90 for the 35 per cent belonging 
to the low-income group and 105 for two 
population groups representing less than 10 per 
cent of the total group at the top of the scale. 
It follows that the price structure (still in com-
parison with the whole of Latin America) has 
the effect of reducing the share of total income 
of the top 10 per cent of the population by 3 per 
cent and of increasing that of the lower groups 
by 2 per cent. The gap would be wider if invest-
ment goods were also considered, but even with-
out them the price structure has a greater re-
distributive effect than tax policy. 
To sum up, the combined effect of tax policy 
and relative prices in Argentina involves a 5 per 
cent reduction in the top decile's share in mone-
tary income, thus benefiting the poorer 50 per 
cent of the population. 
Although the subject will be discussed again 
later in another context, any discussion of real 
income should also recognize the differences be-
tween the margins of saving in the different 
sectors, which might imply different relationships 
between income and consumption levels. Surveys 
on Argentina show that the bottom 50 per cent 
of the population received 27.9 per cent of total 
income and accounted for 34.4 per cent of con-
sumption expenditure. The figures for a middle-
income group comprising 40 per cent of the 
population were practically the same for income 
and consumption, and in the most affluent group 
income exceeded expenditure (27.8 and 20.5 per 
cent, respectively, for the 8.6 per cent of the 
population at the top of the scale). In other 
words, according to the distribution of consump-
tion—which in fact includes some of the concepts 
mentioned previously—the share of the top 10 
per cent may be estimated to be 7 per cent 
smaller, with the lower income half of the popu-
lation benefiting accordingly. 
It should be noted that these appraisals are 
purely illustrative and some concepts are only 
meaningful if compared with other situations, 
as in the particular case of relative price struc-
ture. Moreover, these factors, which partly offset 
the unequal distribution of monetary income, 
probably have a greater effect in Argentina than 
in any other Latin American country, and even 
in that country there are indirect signs that 
their effects have not become more pronounced 
and may even have diminished. 
4. CHANGES IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND 
ECONOMIC TRENDS 
From the economic and probably even more 
from the social standpoint, the changes in distri-
bution patterns over a long enough period are at 
least as important as the pattern in any particu-
lar year. Before suggesting any hypothesis an 
attempt will therefore be made to describe what 
little information is available and link it to 
structural changes in the economies in question 
and the economic policies most closely related 
to this problem. 
In Argentina, there was a considerable and 
progressive improvement in income distribution 
in the period before 1953. Of the three years 
for which most detailed information is available, 
inequality of distribution was least pronounced 
in 1953, whereas it was much more so in 1959, 
1961 occupying an intermediate position. The 
proportion of income received by those in the 
high-income brackets (10 per cent of the popu-
lation) was 37 per cent in 1953 and 42 per cent 
in 1959, and this increase was ahnost exclusively 
in favour of the top 5 per cent. In 1961, when 
agricultural prices were relatively low, the share 
of the high-income sectors declined, but not 
to the low level of 1953. 
In Mexico, in the much longer period between 
1940 and 1964, as a result of more or less 
drastic changes, the share of high-income families 
in total income declined, quite considerably in 
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the case of the top 1 per cent, but the relative 
share of families in the lower income groups 
also declined, and there are even indications that 
the decline was absolute as well as relative for 
the 20 per cent of families in the lowest groups. 
The reduction in the relative share of the two 
groups at the end of the scale benefited the mid-
dle categories, and a growing proportion of 
families received incomes at least as high as the 
the average for the country. This implies a cer-
tain improvement in over-all distribution, but 
an improvement at the expense of the least 
privileged sectors as well as from a reduction 
in share of the highest income groups. 
In Brazil, as will be seen below, there were 
opposing shifts in income distribution. It is dif-
ficult to arrive at a precise evaluation of the re-
sults of these changes but there seems to be no 
definite trend towards a more equitable distribu-
tion. 
These facts, together with the conclusions 
reached from a comparison of the distribution 
patterns of the different Latin American coun-
tries, point to the persistence of inequality of 
income distribution despite changes in the eco-
nomic structures and policy measures which 
should lead in principle to a progressive im-
provement in distribution. 
(a) Important changes in economic structure 
Generally speaking, changes in economic struc-
ture have a twofold effect on income distribu-
tion: in the first place, any reduction in the 
relative share of agriculture in the over-all 
product tends to reduce the proportion of the 
active population engaged in the least productive 
activity, most whom are in the lower income 
groups; secondly, there is a change in the 
relative weight of the "internal" distribution 
of sectoral income in the over-all pattern, a fac-
tor which can also be associated with progressive 
shifts resulting from a reduction in the impor-
tance of the agricultural sector. This process has 
been going on, in varying degrees, in all the 
Latin American countries. Consequently, an at-
tempt must be made to explain the absence of 
progress towards more equitable distribution 
by identifying other structural factors with op-
posing effects, or seeking the underlying causes 
in institutional or other factors. 
In Argentina, there has been a more or less 
continuous reduction in the relative importance 
of agriculture: its share of the total product, 
which amounted to 23 per cent at the end of the 
Second World War, dropped to 20 per cent in 
1953 and to 16 per cent in 1961. It is possible, 
however, that the effect on income distribution 
was not very great, since—as has been pointed 
out—the differences in productivity between the 
agricultural and the other sectors are not very 
significant. However, it should also be borne 
in mind that the internal distribution of income 
in the agricultural sector is more uneven than in 
the other sectors. With particular reference to 
the changes which occurred between 1953 and 
1959, one very significant factor adversely af-
fecting income distribution was the considerable 
shift in relative prices in favour of agriculture 
and at the expense of manufacturing; in con-
trast, the reverse occurred in the period 1959-
1961, which explains why the share of the agri-
cultural sector in total personal income fell 
from 21.4 to only 14.5 per cent. 
It is very instructive to consider the changes 
in economic structure in Brazil from the point of 
view of regional income distribution, since the 
disparity between the economic growth of the 
various regions has had a regressive effect and 
has cancelled out other more positive influences. 
Despite deliberate attempts to promote growth 
in the more backward regions, the gap between 
the different stages of development of the re-
gional productive systems seems to have 
widened. 
In the economy of the country as a whole, the 
share of the secondary sector in the over-all 
product rose from 16.7 per cent in 1940 to 24.1 
per cent in 1950 and to 32.3 per cent in 1960, 
and its share of total employment rose from 12.9 
to 16.9 and 17.4 per cent in the same years. 
Over the whole period, the relative importance 
of the primary sector fell from 37.1 to 28.5 per 
cent in terms of the product, and from 66.7 to 
54.1 per cent in terms of employment. The share 
of the tertiary sector in the product also 
diminished, from 46.2 to 36.9 per cent, but its 
share in employment increased from 20.4 to 28.5 
per cent. The distribution of employment—which 
reflects the weakening of employment capacity 
in the dynamic secondary sectors and the slower 
technological development of the services sec-
tor—is extremely important, particularly as re-
gards its consequences on the pattern of income 
distribution. The declining importance of agri-
culture has undoubtedly led to a relative reduc-
tion in the size of the low-income sectors and 
has thus helped to improve distribution; as has 
the more rapid expansion of the secondary sec-
tor, particularly manufacturing, although with 
certain reservations which will be made below. 
In contrast, the faster growth of employment 
in the services sector in relation to the growth 
of the product means that productivity is declin-
ing and that the "marginal urban" groups are 
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getting larger and larger, resulting in a deterio-
ration in the position of certain population 
groups, and in the income distribution structure. 
Industrial development undoubtedly helped to 
increase the share of the middle-income groups, 
although it also boosted income in the higher 
groups. The dynamic industries played a greater 
role in this expansion than the slow-growth in-
dustries, and this had a direct effect on indus-
try's employment capacity, as is demonstrated 
by the fact that its share in total employment 
rose from 7.7 per cent in 1940 to 9.4 per cent 
in 1950 and dropped to 9.1 per cent in 1960. 
This weakened the bargaining power of the 
workers, particularly in the fifties, to the extent 
that their share of the industrial product fell 
from 22 per cent in 1950 to 20 per cent in 1960 
in the slow-growth industries and from 26.9 to 
19.6 per cent in the dynamic industries. 
Between 1940 and 1959, although the average 
real wage was maintained, their share in the 
industrial product fell from 23.2 to 18.8 per 
cent, and in the shorter period 1955-1962 pro-
ductivity increased at an average annual rate 
of 6.1 per cent, whereas the average increase in 
real wages was only 1.9 per cent. A contributory 
factor is the high proportion of small enterprises 
paying low wages and the high concentration of 
the industrial product in a relatively small num-
ber of large enterprises, in which the share of 
the owner-entrepreneurs is much greater (in Sao 
Paulo in 1959, 4.7 per cent of the enterprises 
generated 84.5 per cent of the total income of 
this socio-economic group). 
As has been pointed out, these ovei-all trends 
varied considerably from region to region, and 
this in turn has affected the pattern of distribu-
tion. Between 1950 and 1960, the over-all prod-
uct grew at an annual rate of 5.8 per cent, 
whereas the regional rates were as follows: 6.4 
per cent for the south, 7.8 for the central-west, 
5 for the east, 5.1 for the north-east and 5.6 for 
the north. Consequently, there was an increase in 
the relative share of the south (from 48.2 to 
50.5 per cent) and the central-west, no change 
in that of the north and a decline in that of the 
east and north-east, although the effects were 
offset in the north-east by smaller population 
growth. But even more significant is the fact 
that during the fifties there was an increase in 
the relative importance of the agricultural sec-
tor in the north and north-east (from 24.5 to 
30 per cent and from 41.5 to 46.4 per cent of 
the respective regional products) and a decline 
in the share of industry (from 26.7 to 23 per 
cent and from 13.3 to 10.9 per cent, respec-
tively). On the other hand, there was a growing 
concentration of industry in the east and soutli, 
where 91.3 per cent of the total industrial 
product was generated in 1960 as against 88.8 
per cent in 1950. The agricultural product also 
increased in the north and north-east because 
new farmland was opened up and employment 
rose more than proportionally; the increase was 
not due to improvements in productivity which 
would have brought their average income levels 
closer to those of the other regions. 
It follows that in lowest income areas and the 
areas with the largest low-income groups at the 
national distribution level were most seriously 
weakened. On the other hand, the decline in 
average productivity in the services sector af-
fected the high-income areas most, and the effect 
on over-all distribution was reflected in an even 
more unequal internal distribution of income 
within those regions. 
Important structural changes also took place 
in the Mexican economy, in the context of an 
over-all growth rate which was sufficiently rapid 
between 1940 and 1964 to more than double 
the per capita income level. At the same time,. 
the urban population increased until it repre-
sented more than half of the total population, 
from being only a third at the beginning of 
the period; the proportion of the product gen-
erated in the agricultural sector fell from almost 
23 to 17.5 per cent, and the share of employ-
ment from 64.7 to 52.3 per cent; and manufac-
turing increased its contribution to the total 
product from 17.7 to 24.9 per cent and its labour 
absorption from 8.9 to 14.6 per cent. 
For a proper appreciation of the effect of 
these changes on the pattern of income distribu-
tion, other concomitant factors must be taken 
into consideration. For example, the continuation 
and extension of land reform further modified 
the nature of the agricultural population, trans-
forming larger groups of wage-earners into 
small proprietors or ejidatarios, whose improve-
ment in income was probably accompanied by a 
relative deterioration in the position of the land-
less campesinos. In addition, better use of in-
ternal resources and favourable external demand 
conditions encouraged a rapid expansion of 
agricultural exports from farms with high levels 
of capital investment and efficiency, whereas the 
rest of the sector lagged behind in technological 
progress with the result that there was a widen-
ing gap between modern agriculture, with the 
main emphasis on export crops, and traditional 
agriculture producing for internal consumption. 
In manufacturing, the capital-intensive industries 
displayed most dynamism, whereas the indus-
tries with low productivity and income per per-
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son employed continued to absorb the greater 
part of the labour force. As in Brazil, manu-
facturing also helped to accentuate the disparities 
between income levels in the different regions. 
Persistent unemploynaent and under-employment 
at the national level in all probability exerted 
pressure on wage levels, as is suggested by the 
fact that the proportion of national income made 
up of industrial salaries and wages dropped from 
6.9 to 6.4 per cent between 1940 and 1950, 
whereas the share of owner-enterpreneurs in-
creased from 9.1 to 11.5 per cent, which would 
have led to a greater inequality in the distribu-
tion of industrial income. On the other hand, the 
absolute increase in industrial employment fa-
voured the expansion of an intermediate socio-
economic category made up of skilled workers 
and technicians whose income levels place them 
in relatively high income groups in terms of the 
national income distribution structure. Finally, 
a large part of the increase in the urban labour 
force was absorbed by various services with de-
clining levels of productivity, which weakened 
the relative position of the large population 
groups, while development requirements raised 
the value of professional services and favoured 
a relative improvement in the position of the 
professional groups. Part of the business expan-
sion tended to be concentrated in large-scale en-
terprises, to the detriment of small businesses 
and small own-account tradesmen. 
(b) Some effects of the economic policy 
Over and above the contradictory effects of the 
changes in economic structure—which might be 
described as progressive from the standpoint 
of the distribution of income among the different 
sectors and regressive from the standpoint of 
distribution within each sector—are the direct 
effects of a number of economic policy measures. 
The effects of such measures are probably most 
apparent in Argentina, precisely because they 
have less bearing on distribution patterns, owing 
to the particular features of the Argentine 
economy and its structural factors. Moreover 
they have been extremely sporadic, reducing in-
equality of distribution in certain periods and 
accentuating it in others by neutralizing the 
positive influence of other factors. It should also 
be borne in mind that the existence of infla-
tionary pressures has made it diflicult for eco-
nomic policy to be neutral from the standpoint 
of income distribution, since the relative posi-
tions of the different socio-economic groups were 
constantly shifting and could only be maintained 
over the long term by making other continuing 
adjustments. 
Before 1953, measures were taken to improve 
wage levels and in the late forties the share 
of salaries and wages rose considerably. At the 
same time the prices of agricultural products 
were kept low, thus restricting profits on their 
sale, and exchange and price controls were im-
posed to prevent the wage increases from being 
nullified. Subsequently, pressure exerted by 
particular groups led to other measures which 
had contrary effects and once more accentuated 
the inequality of distribution, but they were 
mainly directed towards other problems and their 
influence on income distribution was more in the 
nature of a side-effect. In the fifties and early 
sixties, economic policy measures focused on 
combating external disequilibrium and infla-
tionary pressures: exports were encouraged and 
higher prices established for the agricultural 
sector, and conventional methods were used to 
eliminate the fiscal deficit and hold down wages 
and salaries. 
In Brazil, from the late forties up to 1960 
many of the economic policy measures were 
mainly aimed at providing incentives for chan-
nelling greater resources into "strategic" sectors 
for development. This entailed various kinds of 
stimuli and concessions for private investment: 
access to internal and external credit was 
widened, frequently with low interest rates and 
relatively long repayment periods, which in in-
flationary conditions amounted to an indirect 
subsidy and strengthened the position of the 
owner-entrepreneurs; preferential exchange rates 
were accorded to importers of certain essential 
goods and to foreign investors for remittances 
of profits and amortizations of direct investment; 
subsidized foreign exchange was made available 
to specific industries for importing inputs and 
parts; and other kinds of subsidies were 
granted to enterprises. This reduction in the cost 
of investment while prices were fixed freely in a 
protected domestic market helped to raise capi-
tal productivity and to strengthen the position 
of entrepreneurs in the distribution of income. 
As in Argentina, the tax system seems to have 
done little to redistribute income, because of 
the predominance of indirect taxation, generally 
non-discriminatory, which can often be passed 
on to the final consumer. The proportion of in-
direct taxation in total tax revenue rose from 
66.6 per cent in 1950 to 72.8 per cent in 1960. 
In the same year, 23.7 per cent of the revenue 
from direct taxation, was derived from taxes 
on labour, and the proportion would be more 
than 60 per cent if social security contributions 
are included. These and other features of the tax 
system, together with the greater margin for 
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tax evasion in less visible categories of income 
than wages and salaries, account for the rapid 
progressiveness of the taxes on those income 
brackets which in 1962 ranged from 250,000 to 
1.2 million cruzeiros and the weakening of the 
rate in the higher brackets. In the same year, 
surveys conducted in different cities revealed 
the regressive effects of income tax and social 
security contributions: in the state capitals, the 
middle groups (250,000 to 800,000 cruzeiros) 
suffered a reduction in available income, while 
the position of the higher income groups was 
strengthened, and the same applies to the cities 
in the interior. 
In the matter of wage policy, the need to 
reconcile wage and salary adjustments with the 
objective of containing inflationary pressures 
resulted, at least in certain periods, in wages 
excluded from the benefits of increases in real 
income. On the other hand, legislation on mini-
mum wages was designed to protect the lower 
wage-earning groups, although it was probably 
not enforced widely enough. In 1960 even the 
highest wages in the bottom 50 per cent of the 
population were below the amounts fixed in the 
current legislation governing minimum urban 
wages, and the average wage in the bottom 10 
per cent was only a quarter of the national 
average and 40 per cent of the lowest legal 
minimum wage established for the north-east. 
In Mexico, public action partly strengthened 
and partly nullified the effects of particular 
structural changes tending to improve equality 
of distribution. Public investment in agricul-
tural infrastructure (irrigation works, access 
roads) favoured the most modern farms; in-
dustrial development legislation favoured higher 
profits and the maintenance of relatively high 
rates of expansion among the new complex of 
modern enterprises; and the direct action of the 
Government to provide specific services for the 
establishment and expansion of public enter-
prises helped a growing number of professional 
and technical personnel to rise on the income 
scale. On the other hand, there was a progres-
sive improvement in distribution as a result of 
the minimum-wage laws, the expansion of the 
social security schemes, the increase in educa-
tional and public health services and govern-
ment housing programmes and changes in the 
tax system and public income policy. 
In recent years, specific income distribution 
objectives have become an integral part of eco-
nomic policy. The priority previously accorded 
to directly productive public investment was 
modified with a view to overcoming the relative 
lag in social services; wage policy was reframed 
with a view to improving income distribution; 
and tax reforms considerably increased the bur-
den of taxation borne by the higher income 
groups. These objectives were reflected in the 
short-term operational plan {Plan de Acción 
Inmediata) adopted to determine the allocation 
of public and private resources in the period 
1962-64. The proportion of total public in-
vestment assigned to social services, which had 
been over 13 per cent in the forties and almost 
19 per cent in the period 1959-61, rose to 
23.4 per cent in 1962-64. At the same time, 
greater efforts were made to increase the con-
tribution of income from property to the fi-
nancing of public expenditure, for which pur-
pose taxes on accumulated income, an income 
from interest on fixed-income and equity stocks 
and securities and on capital gains from trans-
fers were levied for the first time. The results 
are apparent from the growing share of income 
tax in regular Federal income: 18.9 per cent 
in 1960, 40.7 per cent in 1963 and 44.6 per cent 
in 1964; moreover, property taxes represented 
as much as 30.1 per cent in 1963, whereas taxes 
on wages and salaries accounted for only about 
14 per cent. 
Finally, legislation on wage adjustments pro-
vided for increases exceeding the rise in the 
cost-of-living index, which enabled specific 
wage-earning groups to more than make up 
their losses in real income in previous periods. 
This is particularly important in view of the 
fact that in 1960 the average income of families 
in the bottom 20 per cent income bracket was 
well below what they would have received as 
permanent wage-earners paid the minimum 
wage prescribed by law. 
II. SOME EXPLANATORY HYPOTHESES 
It is clear from the data collected that a com-
parison of the different Latin American coun-
tries does not demonstrate a close relationship 
between the degree of inequality in income dis-
tribution and the degree of development in the 
country concerned, either in terms of per capita 
income levels or in terms of specific structural 
features of the economy. It is equally clear that 
no definite tendency towards an improvement 
in distribution patterns can be discerned in the 
50 
economic development of several countries, even 
where the rate of development is relatively fast 
and where economic policy has a distinct forma-
tive influence. 
More detailed knowledge and analysis of par-
ticular situations is required to explain these 
facts fully, but it was thought advisable that at 
least some preliminary hypotheses should be put 
forward concerning the factors which might ac-
count for this apparently paradoxical situation. 
1. T H E HETEROGENEITY OF THE LATIN 
AMERICAN ECONOMIES 
One of the determining factors is probably 
the "structural heterogeneity" of the Latin 
American economies and society, which has been 
a permanent feature of the region's development 
and is becoming even more marked, that is, the 
coexistence of regional and national systems 
and patterns that reflect very different stages 
of growth. This situation is too generalized and 
complex to be described as dualism, a widely-
studied phenomenon which is particularly char-
acteristic of the structure of an "enclave" econ-
omy with a "modernized exporting nucleus" and 
a hinterland that is partly or wholly isolated 
from the dynamic centre. 
The Latin American systems are rather more 
complex. Three major sectors or areas can be 
distinguished in nearly every country (and 
hence the region as a whole): the "modern", 
the "intermediate" and the "primitive". These 
are basically differentiated by the level of 
productivity, and, even more fundamentally, 
by the factors that determine those levels, i.e., 
their assimilation of technological improve-
ments and the pattern of social relationships. 
This interpretation of the situation, unlike the 
theory of dualism, regards each economic area 
as having a "multi-sectoral" component. In 
other words, the "modern" sector includes 
segments of industry, services and primary ac-
tivities and centres geared to the external market, 
and rudimentary technological strata subsist 
in each of the three areas. 
Since the many questions posed by this 
approach cannot be analysed in greater depth in 
this paper, it merely seeks to evaluate the 
principal relationships between the structural 
heterogeneity of the economies and the pattern 
of income distribution. 
In this connexion, special attention should 
be given to the weight carried by the so-called 
"primitive" sector. Although it is not clear 
from the information available whether the 
functional or social distribution of income is 
more inequitable in this sector than in the 
others, it may be assumed in principle that the 
profile of personal income distribution will be-
come more regressive in proportion to the size 
of the labour force employed in activities where 
the level of productivity is very low and the 
social conditions are usually less favourable 
than in other sectors and therefore tend to 
keep wages down. 
Indeed, it may be argued that a reduction or 
elimination of the primitive sector, accompanied 
by a large-scale shift of the active population 
towards the modern sector and an appreciable 
increase in its participation in the economy 
would set in motion a series of changes lead-
ing to a more equitable distribution of personal 
income. In other words, even on the basis of 
a conventional interpretation of the sectoral 
structure, the first assumption to be made is 
that income distribution will be more inequi-
table the larger the primitive sector and the 
population it represents. Conversely, the larger 
the other sectors, the more equally will income 
be distributed. 
This hypothesis is very preliminary, however, 
and must be hedged about with reservations. In 
fact, it is precisely in this respect that allowance 
must be made for the "sectoral heterogeneity", 
i.e., the fact that each grouping comprises a 
variety of components or sub-sectors. 
In the primary or primitive sector, and more 
especially in agriculture, conditions differ con-
siderably according to the relative size and 
distribution of the labour force as between 
subsistence or traditional agriculture and mar-
ketable agriculture, which is capable of produc-
ing sizable surpluses for the domestic and/or 
external market. The relative weight of the dif-
ferent areas naturally affects the structure of 
distribution, both because of the changes pro-
duced by the more rapid development of the 
"marketing" sector and because of the influence 
exerted in each case by the nexus of social 
relationships. 
In marketable agriculture, the main factor 
is the type of farming or method of production 
that is most representative. Some branches, of 
course, such as fishing or grain production, 
normally require very little labour, but in other 
branches, such as coffee-growing, the labour 
factor is far more important. All other things 
being equal, these disparities in themselves have 
an appreciable influence in determining the 
wage-earners' share of the income generated in 
the different activities. In traditional agricul-
ture, it may be presumed that even if the abso-
lute wage level is fairly high the proportion 
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accruing to the wage-earners will tend to be 
smaller than in marketable agriculture. More-
over, the producers' income is probably more 
highly concentrated in the first than in the 
second instance. 
These remarks are also applicable to other 
areas of the primary sector, and to mining in 
particular. In some Latin American countries 
there is a striking dualism, in that the bulk of 
production and income is concentrated in large 
plants that are usually foreign-owned and em-
ploy only a fraction of the available labour 
force although absolute wage levels may be 
high in comparison with the national average. 
Side by side with these plants there are a host 
of small and medium-scale enterprises which 
may provide employment for sizable labour 
contingents, particularly in certain areas. A 
structure of this kind also has a strong effect 
on the system of income distribution. Viewed 
from the "functional" standpoint, it seems prob-
able that labour's share of the total income 
generated will be fairly small, as most of that 
income is generated by the major enterprises. 
Another aspect that should be considered 
and is not always given due attention is the 
division of foreign-owned assets between the 
country of operation and the home country. 
Apart from the fact that less income is avail-
able in such cases for distribution among the 
national factors, the balance left in the country 
of operation is mainly spent on wages and taxes 
and the revenue from the latter is largely ap-
propriated for the payment of government 
employees. The picture would be very different 
if medium or small-scale enterprises, possibly 
under public ownership, were to predominate. 
In this case, although absolute levels would 
no doubt be lower, wages would carry greater 
weight, while entrepreneurs' or owners' income 
would also gain in significance and less income 
would be transferred through taxes to the 
public sector. 
Thus, the general hypothesis concerning the 
importance of the primary sector in income 
distribution patterns can and should be adapted 
to the many specific features of the problem 
in each country and period. Moreover, implicit 
in this hypothesis is the corollary that the 
diversification of the production structure and, 
with it, the increase in the significance of the 
other sectors, will create a more equitable sys-
tem of income distribution. 
In examining this premise, the first question 
to be considered is the role of industry. The 
industrialized economies clearly have a less 
inequitable pattern of distribution than coun-
tries at an earlier stage of development, such 
as those in Latin America. But here too it is 
vital to take certain limitations and factors 
into account. For instance, comparable situa-
tions with respect to the significance of the 
industrial sector may modify income distribu-
tion in many different ways depending on the 
sector's entrepreneurial structure and the level 
and type of technological progress. 
As regards the entrepreneurial structure, it 
may be assumed that where a large proportion 
of manufacturing production has been concen-
trated in large-scale plants which for various 
reasons such as an external bottleneck, a small 
domestic market, etc. are enjoying a complete 
or quasi market monopoly, tiie pattern of dis-
tribution will tend to be more uneven than it 
would be under other conditions. In the first 
instance, which is by no means exceptional in 
Latin America, the entrepreneur-owner will be 
in an advantageous position for securing ad-
ditional income in payment for the factor that 
he contributes. 
The question of technology is equally im-
portant for a proper appreciation of the impact 
of the expansion of manufacturing on the pat-
tern of income distribution. The theory that it 
is beneficial to reduce the primary sector rests 
on the assumption that workers who leave the 
land will find employment in industrial activi-
ties that have a higher level of productivity and 
a more equitable pattern of distribution than is 
to be found in traditional agriculture. However, 
the fact that industry is more or less forced to 
use techniques imported from the major in-
dustrial centres may radically alter the nature 
of the process, since the use of equipment and 
methods largely designed to save on manpower 
may severely restrict any increase in job oppor-
tunities. The "levelling" influences at work 
are thus liable to be offset by the adverse ele-
ments operating in the relationships described 
above. 
Many other factors naturally play their part. 
It must be remembered, for instance, that the 
results of the diversification of production 
and, more specifically, of industrial develop-
ment, will very largely depend on the momen-
tum and continuity of industrial growth and on 
the volume of manpower available. Two possibili-
ties can be foreseen. Either, there would be a 
moderate expansion of the manufacturing sec-
tor and a relatively sizable population shift 
from the country to the towns or growth would 
be fairly rapid, and, either because there were 
no great manpower reserves or, for one reason 
or another, labour remained in the primary 
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sector, there would be no labour surplus in 
manufacturing industry and allied activities. 
The first hypothesis clearly offers better possi-
bilities for an improvement in the structure of 
income distribution. It should also be remem-
bered that the manufacturing sector abounds 
in medium- and small-scale units with unsatis-
factory levels of productivity and hence very 
low wage rates. Although, as far as social 
distribution is concerned, there is no reason to 
believe that the situation is more inequitable 
than in the big enterprises, personal income 
distribution is undoubtedly affected by the low 
absolute level of wages. 
The analysis can be extended by considering 
the significance of the services sector, the other 
main area of employment for the active popula-
tion, and, under the terms of the first hypothesis, 
for the labour contingents who leave or are 
displaced from primary activities. It is recog-
nized that, in Latin American countries, the 
tertiary sector absorbs a fairly sizable propor-
tion of the labour force if income levels are 
taken into account. In some of them, in fact, 
that proportion is larger than in certain de-
veloped countries.^ This structural feature may 
be taken, in principle, to indicate that conditions 
are propitious for a more equitable distribution 
of income, as has been the case in the developed 
countries. However, it has been amply demon-
strated that its causes and effects have their 
own special characteristics in the developing 
nations and they are sometimes the reverse of 
those obtaining in the industrialized economies. 
To begin with, it is obvious that the main 
reason for the expansion of services has not 
been the spread of technology in other sectors— 
particularly in primary activities—^with its in-
evitable effect on income levels and the struc-
ture of demand. Although technology has 
undoubtedly played some part, the main reason 
for this particular trend of development in the 
less advanced economies has been the inability 
or "refusal" of the primary and secondary 
sectors to absorb surplus labour. The expansion 
of the services sector must therefore be regarded 
as a pathological symptom rather than as a 
"necessary" stage in the process of development. 
This point will be made clearer by a break-
down of the services sector, which will show that 
it is made up of a complex of parts and areas 
possibly differing from one another even more 
than is customary in the other activities where 
2 See The process of industrial development in Latin 
America (United Nations publication, Sales No: 
66.ILG.4), pp. 3 and 4. 
the same tendency is evident. It may be argued 
that the growth of the tertiary sector and its 
labour force is "functionally" justified to a cer-
tain extent, because it provides the necessary 
counterpoise to the development of the other 
areas, and gives greater complexity and scope 
to the production system, marketing and financ-
ing and the basic infrastructure. To probe more 
deeply into this question, the effects of in-
dustrial diversification must be examined. At a 
fairly early stage of manufacturing develop-
ment, the relation between the "producers of 
goods" and the suppliers of allied services will 
be very different from what it is at a more 
advanced stage when the intermediate and 
dynamic industries are carrying greater weight. 
In the latter instance, the share of the suppliers 
of related, commercial, technical, financial and 
other services usually increases. 
Nevertheless, it often happens in Latin 
America that the expansion of the services sec-
tor is not due, primarily or even to any great 
extent, to these "functional" requirements. In-
stead, it is contingent on the growth of a host 
of personal and other services which represent 
a poor and uncertain source of income. 
In the circumstances, the top-heavy employ-
ment in tertiary activities is apt to distort the 
patterns of distribution. Although it may be 
assumed that these same conditions led to a 
more equitable distribution of income in the 
developed countries, in the under-developed 
countries the existence and relatively more rapid 
growth of services with very low or minimal 
productivity may well have exactly the opposite 
effect. The end result will, of course, depend 
on a number of other factors, such as the im-
portance and dynamism of the services described 
as "functional" and the volume and qualifica-
tions of workers in that labour market. 
2. INTER-SECTORAL AND INTRA.-SECTORAL 
CHANGES 
The foregoing remarks shed some light on 
the implications of changes in the relative im-
portance of sectors of economic acti\'ity from 
the standpoint of the distribution of total in-
come. 
As has been shown, Latin America's economic 
development in the past few decades has been 
characterized, in almost every country, by a 
decrease in the percentage of the product gen-
erated by the primary sector and in the pro-
portion of the labour force it absorbs. Further-
more, not only do transfers of manpower from 
primary activities to other sectors take place, 
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but manpower shifts within the primary sector 
itself. 
This second point is of particular significance 
in the case of agriculture, where it might be 
stated in terms of the hypothesis that there 
has been a proportional increase in "cash crops" 
and in the active population employed in grow-
ing them, with the correlative decline in "sub-
sistence" farming. However, this trend should 
not be over-estimated; nor should other salient 
features on the situation be overlooked. 
One of these is the size and the "imperme-
ability to change" of the subsistence farming 
areas in several countries, notably those in 
which economic and social barriers are rein-
forced by others of an ethno-cultural nature, 
as is the case wherever there is large indigenous 
population. To this must be added yet another 
aggravating circumstance. The labour force en-
gaged in subsistence farming has had no share 
in the income increments by which other sec-
tors have benefited in varying degrees. On the 
contrary, there are indications that in some 
instances its levels of living have actually de-
teriorated in absolute terms. 
Other branches of primary activity, such as 
mining, present a different picture. Here the 
position is reversed: the introduction of modern 
techniques, even where production has been sub-
stantially expanded, has not been accompanied 
by occupational changes, but rather, in some 
cases, by a drop in employment. Thus, in min-
ing as in other primary activities, the absorption 
of manpower by other sectors is the only 
possible solution. 
The development of the industrial sector also 
displays certain characteristics which have an 
obvious bearing on the question under dis-
cussion. In the first place, countries which were 
relatively late-starters in industrialization, al-
though still concentrating on "traditional" or 
"light" manufactures, commonly apply imported 
techniques with a much stronger labour-saving 
bias than was usual at the corresponding stages 
in the economies that led the way. Secondly, the 
same tendency becomes apparent in these more 
advanced countries as they progress towards 
higher levels of industrial development, and 
spreads to their "traditional" industries. Both 
phenomena imply, in the last analysis, that in 
the industrial sector as a whole the prevailing 
distribution trend is towards a greater degree 
of concentration of income. 
These postulates are borne out by a number 
of factual data. First, in many countries there 
is a divergence—sometimes very marked—be-
tween the growth rate of the industrial product 
and the rate of increase of employment in manu-
facturing. Although the situation is chiefly in 
evidence in the economies where import substi-
tution has been carried farthest, it also seems 
to be "prematurely" reproduced in others whose 
substitution process is still in its initial stages, 
to the extent that they have introduced up-to-
date techniques for purposes of establishing or 
promoting "traditional" lines of manufactures. 
Secondly, there are signs that the share of 
the labour force in the income generated by 
manufacturing industry has diminished, in some 
cases to such an extent that real wages have de-
creased throughout the industrial sector, or in 
large part of it. 
In other respects to which reference has al-
ready been made, recent trends do not look 
particularly encouraging. With few exceptions, 
and those mainly to be found among the smaller 
countries and/or those which are only on the 
threshold of industrial development, manufac-
turing industry is failing to increase its rate 
of expansion. At the same time, the aggravation 
of the "urban marginality" problem and the 
high rates of population growth seem to be 
creating something not unlike the classic 
"reserve army" of wage-earners. A further sig-
nificant fact, pointed out in a recent study, is 
that much of the additional labour force em-
ployed in the manufacturing sector has been 
drawn from the ranks of artisans and small-
scale industry. Moreover, between 1925 and 
1960, the proportion of total non-agricultural 
employment represented by employment in the 
manufacturing sector decreased in the region as 
a whole and in almost all the individual 
countries.® 
Spatial or regional income distribution is an-
other important factor. Viewed from this angle, 
industrial growth can clearly be seen to have 
had a remarkably concentrative effect. True, 
the same tendency was apparent in the devel-
opment process of the "older" industrialized 
economies; but it was undoubtedly less strong, 
and the manufacturing centres did not spring 
up so quickly as to bring about radical changes 
in the spatial pattern of income distribution 
within incredibly short periods of time. 
Recent trends in the services sector—apart 
from what has already been said on the sub-
ject—are all too well-known, and have become 
a major cause of concern. The most important 
phenomenon seems to be the growing magnitude 
of the urban marginality problem, which reflects 
3 Ibid. 
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the plight of those groups of the population 
that are unable to find a niche in the basic 
activities and services, and have to resign them-
selves to employment of the most precarious 
and ill-paid sort, if not to total or partial un-
employment. 
There can be no doubt that this state of 
affairs appreciably affects income distribution 
patterns, especially where personal income is 
concerned. Nevertheless, due account must be 
taken of other changes whose influence operates 
in a contrary and more favourable direction. 
One such change peculiar to Latin America is 
the substantial and often growing importance 
of employment in the public sector, where all 
the income generated, net of investment appro-
priations, is used for the remuneration of the 
labour factor. Needless to say, there are many 
reservations to be made, regarding the produc-
tivity of this income for example, or the exis-
tence of "disguised unemployment" in the 
public sector. But it is beyond all question that 
this development does have an impact on the 
distribution pattern which will vary in ac-
cordance with the share of State activity in the 
over-all product. 
The other positive factor relates to the growth 
of services which were described above as "func-
tionally" essential. Obviously, the diversifica-
tion of production, the accelerated rate of 
urbanization, the expansion of educational serv-
ices, the emergence of new technical and pro-
fessional responsibilities, etc., have gradually 
opened up employment opportunities in the 
tertiary sector which were scarce or non-existent 
in the traditional economy. However true it may 
be that in some cases the social area of such 
changes is not very extensive in either absolute 
or relative terms, their influence on the distri-
bution pattern is plain. 
3 . OTHER FACTORS WHICH PERPETUATE 
INEQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 
In analysing the characteristics of the struc-
ture of production from other points of view, 
it is worth noting that the catalogue of goods 
and services made available to the population 
is contingent upon the pattern of demand, or 
closely linked to it, and is therefore conditioned 
by income distribution. The relations between 
these factors are so complex that the converse 
might also be argued, i.e., that the structure 
of production or of supply is, from some stand-
points, a significant determinant of the distribu-
tion pattern. 
In so far as this is the case, the very struc-
ture of production—and, to a still greater 
extent, any rigidities it may show—becomes a 
factor tending to perpetuate the present charac-
teristics of income distribution. A particularly 
illustrative case is the provision of educational 
facilities, which, at a given point of time, 
largely dependes upon the composition of de-
mand for such services. This applies both to 
)rivate and public education, in so far as the 
atter must be in some degree adjusted to the 
existing demand. At the same time, these circum-
stances will influence future income distribu-
tion, since their efi'ect is to improve, in absolute 
and relative terms, the position of those who 
always have had and always will have readier 
access to educational services and to place 
others at a greater disadvantage than before. 
Another case in point is the slow rate of 
expansion of production of food for the home 
market and "traditional" manufactures, i.e., 
the items of most importance for the welfare 
of the bulk of the population. It would be diffi-
cult to account for this trend in terms of the 
low income-elasticity of demand for such goods 
in relation to those large proportions of the 
population that have had little or no share in 
the increase in average income. On the other 
hand, it can be explained plausibly enough by 
reference to the changes in the pattern of de-
mand in those population sectors that have 
absorbed most of the benefits of expansion. In 
other words, it ultimately proves to be symp-
tomatic of a more regressive trend in income 
distribution. 
The picture is not so clear as regards produc-
tion and availability of particular services, 
especially in view of the expansion of national 
expenditure on urban infrastructure and health 
and housing. Where such expenditure has be-
come substantial, it has not only represented 
an addition to real income, to some extent "in-
visible" or difficult to classify under specific 
heads, but has also opened up possibilities of 
easing some of the pressures that determine 
the income distribution pattern. 
Nevertheless, whatever the scale and poten-
tial influence of these trends, in these respects, 
too, changes for the better have been subject 
to decided spatial concentration; in other words, 
they have operated mainly in favour of the 
urban centres. Thus, their impact has depended 
upon the relative sizes of the urban and rural 
marginal population; it has, of course, been 
more beneficial where the urban population is 
the bigger problem, and vice versa. 
Another point to remember—and here again 
the provision of educational facilities comes to 
the fore—is that the improvement in the supply 
of basic services has benefited principally the 
upper income strata, as is indicated, for ex-
ample, by the fact that secondary and higher 
education expand more rapidly than the pri-
mary and technical levels. 
Underlying these multiple interrelationships, 
there is a "causation spiral", which has been 
more specifically or more graphically called 
the "vicious circle of poverty". The very poor 
account for only a tiny fraction of real demand 
(and therefore of available goods and services). 
Consequently, the production system tends to 
satisfy primarily those who, on the contrary, 
can and do strongly influence demand. The re-
sult is that the poor remain as poor as ever, or 
sink into still greater penury. 
Clearly, a situation of this kind, to the extent 
that other factors are too weak to counteract 
it, will make for the perpetuation of existing 
structures of production and of demand and in-
come, and, what is more, for the consolidation 
of the conditions that generate inequity. 
The other related factor is the relative price 
of the goods and services available to the popu-
lation, and its effect on "real" income dis-
tribution. 
It is hard to generalize concerning changes 
in relative prices which affect certain nominal 
incomes and their incidence on real consump-
tion. Although in some countries visible changes 
take place in specific periods, no conclusions 
can be drawn from them as to general and 
clearly-defined long-term trends. However, it 
may be useful to discuss a few salient aspects 
of the problem. 
Interest has been aroused by a slight but 
perceptible trend in certain countries—rein-
forced by economic policy in some cases— 
towards an improvement in the relative prices 
of agricultural commodities. While its impli-
cations as regards "real" income distribution 
are clear, especially in the urban population 
sectors, this tendency should be viewed in a 
broader perspective. For example, almost every-
where technological progress and its benefits 
have been concentrated in the urban areas, par-
ticularly where industrial complexes and allied 
activities are situated. Accordingly, just as in 
the analysis of relations between the centre and 
the periphery at the international level, this 
new trend in relative prices may be regarded as 
paving the way for the primary sector to share 
in the benefits of productivity in its own 
"centre". 
Irrespective of the dynamic impetus that 
might not be effectually given to the develop-
ment of primary activities, the point at issue 
here is what has been or may be the social dis-
tribution of the advantages of relative price 
changes. Obviously, this will depend not only 
upon factors linked to the structure of the 
primary sector, but also upon other conditions, 
such as the degree of concentration of owner-
ship of property, social relationships, level of 
labour organization, etc. 
Another interesting and obviously significant 
aspect of the problem, which has been less fully 
probed, is the question of the relative prices of 
those goods and services which are mainly of 
concern to the higher income groups. 
There are a number of contradictory elements 
and trends in this situation. In those economies 
which are farthest advanced in respect of in-
dustrial development based on import substitu-
tion and are burdened by serious external 
bottleneck, the substitution process has in-
volved more or less substantial increases in 
the prices of many manufactured goods; 
and this rising trend has been sharpened 
in some cases by the taxes levied on higher-
cost articles (such as automobiles). In more 
open economies the position has been or 
still is different, either because their external 
transactions have followed a more favourable 
course, or for other reasons. Here, apart from 
customs duties and taxes—which are usually 
moderate—a large proportion of conspicuous 
spending (defined by reference to average in-
come levels in the country concerned) goes to 
buy foreign products which are cheap in com-
parison with the potential costs of manufactur-
ing them locally and in relation to the income 
levels of the upper strata. 
If this were the only approach adopted, it 
might well suggest that relative price move-
ments have made for greater equity (or a less 
inequitable "real" income distribution) in the 
first type of situation than in the second. But 
there is another fact which must not be over-
looked. It is largely the owner-entrepreneurial 
sectors, which should suffer most from price 
changes, which instead have enjoyed the biggest 
increases in their income, precisely because they 
have profited most by the process. Briefly, what 
they may have lost through the rise in the price 
of goods which absorb a high proportion of 
their expenditure would seem to have been offset 
in some measure by their participation in the 
import substitution effort and the consequent 
increase in their earnings. 
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4. SoMK FEATURES OF THE SOCIAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
Productive activities, and the related phe-
nomena cursorily reviewed in the preceding 
section, are generated and aifected by various 
social relationships and by a particular institu-
tional framework which often has a special 
effect on income distribution. In other words, 
in every community there are certain relation-
ships between groups and individuals which 
condition or influence their opportunities of 
sharing in the distribution of available goods 
and services. In some circumstances, these rela-
tionships promote more equitable income dis-
tribution, whereas in others they operate con-
versely. 
In this context, the attention has primarily 
been given to the ownership of productive 
assets—land, installed capacity, financial re-
sources, etc.—and the conclusion has been 
reached that their owners are entitled to claim 
part of the income generated as a return on the 
"capital factor". Nor does the significance of 
this factor end here, since it often exerts as 
much or more influence through its indirect 
effects on social status, the system of oppor-
tunities, the exercise of power, etc. 
In addition, relationships of another and to 
some extent more personal type can be identi-
fied, relating to "predominance" or "subordi-
nation" within the social system. For example, 
the "seignorial" or what is often described as 
"semi-feudal" relationships that prevail in some 
productive activities, particularly in the more 
backward agricultural sectors, may be contrasted 
with those of a more "capitalistic" type to be 
found elsewhere, and even with those in the 
public sector and in State enterprises. How far 
the resulting conditions are favourable or un-
favourable for the income distribution pattern 
will depend upon the nature of those rela-
tionships. 
Moreover, the extent to which the various 
groups organize to protect or promote their own 
interests may be a factor in creating the char-
acteristic "spirals" in which the discernible 
causes can also be regarded as effects. For 
example, a large labour force in the under-
privileged agricultural sector weakens the soli-
darity and, therefore, the bargaining power of 
those involved, and this effect in turn becomes 
another cause of their depressed socio-economic 
status. 
Setting aside the controversial problem of 
how far the concentration of agricultural prop-
erty and the proportion of subsistence farms 
have been reduced or increased, there can be 
no doubt that the ownership of agricultural land 
has been gradually losing some of its relative 
weight within the complex of factors, while 
other types of capital, such as those deriving 
from industrial, financial and commercial activi-
ties, have assumed greater importance. 
Latin America as a whole has passed through 
various stages in the production and ownership 
of these other kinds of capital. In an initial 
phase, coinciding with the first steps in the 
diversification process, the ownership of assets 
was dispersed to some extent, at least by com-
parison with conditions in the "traditional 
society". But as time went by there was a trend 
towards its concentration in the new or more 
dynamic activities, as was previously noted with 
reference to the secondary and services sectors. 
The data available in this connexion, although 
fragmentary, are highly suggestive, indicating, 
moreover, that the development pattern of the 
"central" economies has been reproduced in a 
different context and with different timing. Thus, 
monopolistic or oligopolistic situations emerge 
prematurely, in contrast with the wider distri-
bution of property and, by derivation, the 
"atomistic" competition that is assumed to have 
prevailed at similar stages of development in the 
market or private-enterprise economies. 
It is easy to grasp how these factors condition 
income distribution, and their twofold and con-
tradictory influence. On the one hand, they 
presumably lead to the "deconcentration" of 
the ownership of traditional assets (such as 
probably has taken place in respect of land), 
while on the other, they tend to create an 
"agglutination" of other assets—industrial, fi-
nancial, commercial—^produced by the moderni-
zation of operations, the assimilation of tech-
nology from abroad, the nature and level of the 
import substitution process, and similar factors. 
Obviously, the relative significance of these 
opposing forces, and their final impact on dis-
tribution patterns, will depend upon each indi-
vidual country's special situation and stage of 
development. 
The picture seems clearer where there have 
been changes in the organization of social 
groups. Partly as a result of those changes, and 
partly under the impetus of external factors, 
definite progress has been made in respect of 
both economic and political relationships. 
Although trade union organizations often do 
not incorporate the bulk of the wage-earning 
population and are confined mainly to the labour 
force employed in the modernized sectors of the 
production system and in the traditional public 
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services, considerable changes have taken place 
almost everywhere in both absolute and rela-
tive terms. As a result, the bargaining power of 
the wage-earners has been strengthened. A par-
ticularly important and novel trend is the exten-
sion of trade union movements to some of the 
rural areas that have so long been defenceless 
in this respect. 
The same thing seems to be happening, in 
differing degrees, at the political level, where 
the most important development has probably 
been the gradual incorporation of the marginal 
urban sectors. Although they do not yet form 
stable political organizations on their own ac-
count, in some countries these marginal popula-
tion groups have come to represent too signifi-
cant a factor in the power system to be 
disregarded by government policy, especially 
income redistribution policy. 
Lastly, at the institutional level, it is of 
interest to trace the course of State action to 
achieve income redistribution objectives. 
There is a first phase in which the accent is 
placed on labour legislation and social security 
services. In a second phase, these initial ob-
jectives are still kept in view, but in several 
countries various types of transfers and subsi-
dies assume considerable importance. They are 
generally made to offset differences in produc-
tivity favouring the export sector, which were 
maintained largely through discriminatory ex-
change rates. And in a third and more recent 
phase, concern for "social investment"—in edu-
cation, urban infrastructure, etc.—is combined 
with efforts to finance the increasingly costly 
projects of the public sector by less regressive 
tax systems. A final phase, sometimes overlap-
ping with the previous one, is characterized by 
growing emphasis on the so-called "structural 
reforms", among which agrarian reform is para-
mount. 
While those trends can be traced in broad 
outline, it is much more difficult to assess their 
effects on income distribution patterns, although 
some are becoming more or less apparent in 
certain individual cases. In this context, it must 
be borne in mind that State measures are a sort 
of "cross-current", designed to have a cor-
rective effect on the "original" distribution of 
income, as determined mainly by the structure 
of production and of the society. Thus, only 
energetic, comprehensive, and, above all, sus-
tained action can bring about perceptible and 
lasting changes in the original or primary dis-
tribution pattern. And policies of this calibre 
are rare in Latin America. 
Equally important is the fact that State action 
has been somewhat ambivalent in its implica-
tions for income redistribution. Although it 
has pursued the objectives indicated above, 
it has none the less tended to "centralize" its 
efforts from the social standpoint, and, to im-
prove the position of the higher and middle 
income groups, in both absolute and relative 
terms. 
As regards the first tendency, it is generally 
recognized that until recently, and as a general 
rule, governments have been primarily concerned 
with the better-organized minorities among the 
wage-earning sectors, to be found in the "mod-
ernized" and/or urban area. Usually, therefore, 
their action has hardly touched the rural masses 
and the "peripheral" urban population. 
With regard to the second tendency of gov-
ernments, it is equally clear that large groups 
in the middle income brackets and the entre-
preneurial and property-owning strata have ben-
efited enormously, principally as a side-effect 
of government policies to promote industrializa-
tion and urban development, since they have 
absorbed a substantial share of the additional 
income generated by these processes. 
5 . EFFECTS OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION ON 
DEVELOPMENT 
As has been pointed out, the question of the 
influence of different income distribution struc-
tures on the nature and dynamism of economic 
development is outside the much more limited 
scope of these notes. However, the data given 
in the preceding section suggest a few conclu-
sions which might be summarized here, although 
they are fragmentary and highly tentative. 
In over-all terms, Argentina appears to be in 
a much better position than most of the other 
Latin American countries. Its relatively high 
minimum income levels mean that virtually the 
whole of the population is a source of real 
monetary demand; moreover, as income rises 
slowly in the middle of the distribution curve, 
the composition of demand tends to be fairly 
homogeneous, and therefore more favourable 
to a type of industrial development that takes 
advantage of economies of scale. In principle, 
too, the concentration of income in the upper 
brackets seems likely to afford possibilities of 
maintaining high levels of saving, especially as 
most of that income goes to entrepreneurs, so 
that the link between saving and investment is 
more direct than when a considerable propor-
tion accrues to rentier groups. However, in a 
relatively urban and organized economy like that 
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of Argentina, perpetuation of that structure of 
distribution may create serious imbalance, par-
ticularly in a period of economic stagnation 
when the various socio-economic sectors exert 
stronger pressure to increase their share in 
national income. 
From another point of view, a salient feature 
of the Argentine economy is that it is based on 
large numbers of relatively small-scale pro-
ducers. In 1961, in 28.6 per cent of all families 
the head of the household was self-employed, 
and the activities of this group accounted for 
two-thirds of the total domestic product. Such 
an economic structure goes hand-in-hand with 
high unit margins of profit and small volume of 
sales per enterprise. This may not be a serious 
hindrance to growth in the early stages of eco-
nomic development, when the significance of 
economies of scale is not very great, but once a 
certain point is reached, high unit costs may 
obstruct the continuance of the process. 
This feature of the Argentine economy may 
render the more conventional measures of re-
distribution policy ineffectual. For example, 
attempts to reduce inequity by means of direct 
taxation may be frustrated by the greater diflB-
culty of verifying declarations of income in 
circumstances like Argentina's, which are very 
different from those of countries where tax 
evasion is not regarded as a serious problem, 
and the tax laws are designed to benefit the 
small entrepreneur for economic and social 
reasons. 
In some respects, the position in Brazil is 
quite the reverse. Income levels are much lower 
in absolute terms, and comparatively similar for 
practically 80 per cent of the population, which 
means that the middle-income strata are small. 
Obviously, this limits the size of the domestic 
market for certain industrial products, since 
expenditure on food alone absorbs from 53 to 
69 per cent of total expenditure in the lower 
income groups. Moreover, surveys carried out 
in various towns show Áat the item headed 
"household articles" (which includes electrical 
appliances, radio sets, refrigerators and ice-
boxes, furniture, musical instruments and mis-
cellaneous utensils) accounts for less than 11 
per cent of total expenditure in the two lowest 
income categories in the capital cities (41 per 
cent of urban households) and little more than 
6 per cent in hinterland towns in the State of 
Sao Paulo, while in the Nordeste, only 11.1 and 
3.1 per cent of urban homes possess radio sets 
and refrigerators, respectively. The proportions 
in the southern region of Brazil are 53.8 and 
16.4 per cent. 
These data suggest the need for fairly careful 
study of the effects of a change in income dis-
tribution on the pace and pattern of development, 
and emphasize the importance of the subject 
as a social factor or as a criterion of equality. 
Thus, the gradual exhaustion of import substi-
tution possibilities and the weakening of in-
centives to industrial growth might appear in a 
very different light, apart from their close con-
nexion with the problems of technological 
improvement, lack of employment opportunities 
and more efficient use of the available factors of 
production. 
On the other hand, there is the much more 
controversial question of the relationship between 
concentration of income and the savings co-
efficients required to ensure more rapid rates of 
capital formation. The data available for Latin 
America—whether at the level of macro-eco-
nomic studies, special research or consumer 
income and expenditure surveys—seem to afford 
no statistical evidence of a definite correlation 
between the two variables. 
Evaluation of the survey data collected in 
Mexico leads to the conclusion that at the lower 
income levels there is a tendency to over-esti-
mate expenditure. The figures given are often 
much higher than the income declared, with the 
result that considerable personal dissaving is 
shown. Conversely, in the upper strata expendi-
ture is substantially under-estimated, and the 
rates of saving suggested by the declarations are 
therefore very high, even though that what is 
involved in many instances is not personal sav-
ing proper, but saving based on family enter-
prises or on the productive activity of self-
employed workers. 
The same thing probably happens in other 
countries. In Brazil, the surveys reveal striking 
disparities in the proportions of total income 
represented by current expenditure: between 83 
and 88 per cent in towns where income levels 
are higher, and 94 and 96 per cent where lower 
levels of income prevail. But the relationship 
is not as clearly-defined when a comparison is 
drawn between the behaviour patterns of similar 
income strata in different cities, or of different 
categories of recipients in one and the same 
town. In short, savings-and-income comparisons 
do not indicate any direct correlation either 
between towns or between socio-economic groups. 
The average share of saving varies from 3.9 to 
12.6 per cent in the State capitals (with no 
definite correlations in respect of the correspond-
ing average income levels), while its minimum 
and maximum proportions are higher in towns 
in the interior. Within individual towns, al-
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though as a rule the level of saving is higher in relative terms, than the higher income groups; 
the upper income strata, there are significant and in Belo Horizonte dissaving is shown by 
anomalies. In Recife, for example, the group households in the 800,000-1,200,000 cruzeiros 
with incomes ranging from 350,000 to 800,000 category, while saving is characteristic in the 
cruzeiros saves more, both in absolute and in lower income brackets. 
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THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF BOLIVIA IN 1952-64 
The year 1952 marked the beginning of a 
very interesting period from the standpoint of 
analysing economic policy. This study deals 
with policy aims, the means chosen to achieve 
them, the background data underlying that 
choice and the results observed at the end of 
the period. 
Owing to the variety and complexity of devel-
opments and the unreliable nature of informa-
tion, the evolution of economic policy is de-
scribed only in very broad terms. Neither is it 
necessary to repeat the fund of information con-
tained in various studies, which constitute the 
basic bibliography on Bolivia's recent develop-
ment and support the arguments set forth in the 
present study.^ 
^ In addition to official statistics, the following docu-
ments have been used in preparing this study: 
Report of the United Nations Mission of Technical 
Assistance to Bolima (United Nations publication. Sales 
No.: 51.II.B.5) ; Análisis y proyecciones del desarrollo 
During this period, Bolivia's economic policy 
envisaged substantive changes in the structure 
of production and operated in a setting of 
equally significant changes in the country's 
socio-political and institutional structure. Thus 
Bolivia's experience differs considerably from 
that of Brazil and Chile.^ Bolivian enterprise, 
at least in so far as its intentions and some of 
the changes are concerned, compares only with 
that of Mexico and Cuba. 
económico. Vol. IV. El desarrollo económico de Bolivia 
(United Nations publication, Sales No.: 58.11.G.2); 
"Plan de desarrollo económico y social 1962-1971", 
prepared by the National Planning Board and published 
in the periodical Planeamiento, Nos. 3-5 (La Paz, Sep-
tember 1961); "Plan bienal de desarrollo económico y 
social 1963-1964", prepared by the National Planning 
and Co-ordination Department and published in Planea-
miento, Nos. 6-8 (La Paz, January-September 1963); 
and Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc., Informe sobre la situa-
ción de la minería boliviana (1956). 
2 Economic Survey of Latin America, 1964 (United 
Nations publication, Sales No.: 66.II.G.1). 
A. MAIN FEATURES AND STAGES OF BOLIVIA'S DEVELOPMENT 
According to the study undertaken the United 
Nations in 1958 on Bolivia's economic develop-
ment, "this country has many features in com-
mon with other countries of the region. 
However, its geographical location, physical en-
vironment, population and social structure, his-
tory and economy have their own peculiar 
characteristics. It might even be affirmed that 
many of the problems affecting the economic 
and political development of other countries of 
the region appear to have been far more critical 
in Bolivia" 
To take only two salient examples, the "out-
ward-directed" growth model that prevailed for 
nearly all the Latin American countries pre-
sented singular features in Bolivia. These 
diminished the dynamic effects and changes, 
despite all their drawbacks, which occurred 
in other economies of the region. Secondly, 
the opposing forces and fluctuations in 
this form of growth prevented transition to a 
^ El desarrollo económico de Bolivia, op. cit. 
production system based on an "inward-
directed" growth model which could offer other 
stimuli in addition to external demand for its 
raw materials. 
The developments which began in 1952 
stemmed from these two factors. 
1. THE OUTWARD-DIRECTED GROWTH MODEL 
In Bolivia, as in Brazil and Peru, exports of 
primary products have assumed considerable 
importance since the colonial era. But the stand-
ard outward-directed model did not take shape 
until colonial impediments were removed, free 
trade was decreed and conditions were estab-
lished to ensure that the export of primary 
products would have the required internal re-
percussions. Within the political and economic 
framework of the colonial system, the metro-
politan coimtry's objective was not so much to 
trade with its dependencies as to secure any 
surplus produced, mainly precious materials. 
Once they had broken the pattern of complete 
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subordinations, the Latin American countries 
became integrated in the world trade system as 
exporters of raw materials and foods and im-
porters of a wide range of manufactures. These 
new links between the Latin American economies 
and the major industrialized centres, especially 
the United Kingdom in the past century and 
up to the First World War, provided incentives 
for a more intensive utilization of their own 
material and human resources. 
In Bolivia the primary-export model came 
into being relatively late, after the start of tin 
mining at the turn of the century. This does 
not mean that there were no exports before that, 
but it was a long time before the first main 
export flow began. This situation—^which applies 
to other countries too, particularly Venezuela— 
contrasts with that of neighbouring countries 
like Peru, where rubber production was followed 
by the production of nitrate and guano in the 
years 1830-40, petroleum from 1869 onwards, 
and sugar and cotton late in the nineteenth and 
early in the twentieth centuries. 
Bolivia's export flow is smaller than that of 
other countries. In 1928-29, for example, ex-
ports averaged less than 80 million dollars, 
compared with about 220 million in Peru. Even 
allowing for the difference in population, the 
absolute level of exports is still a key factor 
inasmuch as, after consumer imports are de-
ducted, a fairly substantial balance remains for 
imports likely to contribute directly to develop-
ment. 
Moreover, the principal export item is devel-
oped under extremely difficult conditions. Pres-
ent tin production costs in Bolivia are high 
compared with other producer regions, mainly 
because the deposits are usually found in under-
ground veins to which access is difficult and the 
product is contained in a mixture of oxides and 
sulphides for which a more complex treatment 
is necessary. 
Lastly, the position of tin on the world market 
is somewhat weak. World consumption grew 
rapidly, though with sharp fluctuations, until 
shortly before the depression, but failed to 
regain its former levels—except temporarily in 
1939-40—^because technical progress during the 
Second World War and the post-war years re-
duced world demand. United States consump-
tion, for example, has declined in absolute fig-
ures over the last few decades and far more so 
in per capita terms. 
The special features of the export system are 
its concentration and specialization. In the five 
years 1925-29, ores represented over 93 per 
cent of the value of exports and tin nearly three-
quarters of the total. Moreover, nearly the whole 
of this output was for the export market. These 
are or have been relatively common features of 
primary-export economies—except, in some 
degree, producers of staple foods like Argentina 
and Uruguay—but they are particularly marked 
in Bolivia. 
Three major Bolivian groups (Patino, Ara-
mayo and Hochschild) controlled large-scale tin 
mining, whereas in other Latin American coun-
tries mining was being progressively transferred 
to foreign investment, which did not happen in 
the case of agricultural exports except for most 
of the tropical plantations. 
In principle, the result should have been 
a more favourable distribution of export earn-
ings and more autonomy in adopting basic 
decisions, including those relating to the pres-
ervation and expansion of mining assets. This 
did not happen in practice, however, because 
the large corporations were converted into 
international concerns. As early as 1924 the 
Patino company was registered as Patino Mines 
Enterprises Co., Inc., in Delaware, United States. 
In 1930 this firm gained control of the Harvey 
smelter in the United Kingdom and of other 
enterprises operating in the same field. It also 
extended its investments to other production 
centres in the Belgian Congo, Malaya, Burma, 
Thailand and Nigeria. 
There are no data for calculating the pro-
portion of the value of exports that went out of 
the country over the long term. The only esti-
mates are contained in the United Nations study^ 
and cover the years from 1947 to 1952, when 
the mines were nationalized. These figures in-
dicate that remittance of profits and interest 
fluctuated sharply during the period, ranging 
from 15 per cent in 1952 and 12.6 per cent in 
1948 to 1.6 per cent in 1949. The balances are 
clearly associated with the ups and downs 
of the external tin market. Although the esti-
mates do not permit definite conclusions to be 
drawn, they should be considered with due re-
gard for the considerable weight of the value 
of exports in total income: a little over 30 per 
cent around 1950. According to the above-
mentioned study, "the comparison shows that, 
in Bolivia and Venezuela alike, exports repre-
sented a much higher proportion of income than 
in other Latin American countries. But while in 
Venezuela the main reason was the high value 
of its exports—^nearly 300 dollars per head, in 
*Ibid., chapter HI. 
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Bolivia it was the extremely low income levels 
in activities other than the export sector".® 
What is more, only a small proportion of the 
profits of large-scale tin mining were ploughed 
jack into the industry; hence, in addition to the 
natural difSculties and unfavourable external 
market conditions, the state of the plant itself 
became increasingly unsatisfactory. In this 
respect, the United Nations study states that 
"little money has been invested in the last 
twenty-five years, no new exploration has been 
undertaken and much of the plant has been 
allowed to remain idle, in contrast with the 
fairly substantial investments made in Africa 
during the war and later in South-East Asia".® 
Lastly, a noteworthy feature of the Bolivian 
primary-export model is the small degree to 
which tin mining is integrated with the national 
economic system, and the minimal extent to 
which this industry's dynamic force has spread 
to other activities. Tin mining might be con-
sidered as a special export enclave, even if the 
enterprises were Bolivian and under State con-
trol. The expansion of mining activities was not 
accompanied by any appreciable change in the 
situation and traditional relationships of agri-
culture. Moreover, as it absorbed only a frac-
tion of the labour force (about 3 per cent), 
it had no great influence in creating demand for 
domestic goods and inputs, since most of these 
had to be imported. 
2. THE SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MILIEU 
The characteristics of the primary-export 
model are patently reflected in Bolivia's past 
social and institutional structure. The concentra-
tion of the dynamic flow, its relative isolation, 
and the scant movement of the remaining sec-
tors and of areas unrelated to the main export 
item gave the mining owner-groups exceptional 
weight and power. On a social rather than an 
economic plane, this predominance is shared 
by the large land-owners, under whose tute-
lage—often of an absolute and feudal nature— 
are most of the rural working population, of 
indigenous extraction. The landowners' control 
over this population group enables them to 
participate in the balance of power on a more 
or less equal footing with exporters. 
This state of affairs, which was quite un-
exceptional in the past regional milieu but was 
particularly marked in Bolivia, gave the coun-
try a clearly bi-polar social structure, with a 
p. 26. 
6/6íá., p. 32. 
small minority at the apex, generally white or 
mestizo, and the broad rural masses at the base, 
with a minimal representation and participation 
in conmiunity life. 
However, because of the significance this was 
to have in subsequent development, it should be 
taken into account that, partly as an inherited 
effect of the colonial pattern of development 
and partly as a result of the indirect effects of 
outward-directed expansion, a number of urban 
centres were established (La Paz, Cochabamba, 
Santa Cruz, Potosí and Oruro) with some di-
versification of the social structure, in which 
local, and therefore national, importance was 
given to the middle-class groups: government of-
ficials, employees, entrepreneurs, businessmen, 
intellectuals, skilled operatives, etc. In addition, 
the important nucleus of miners, who had to 
endure very hard and unstable working condi-
tions, was to become the principal centre oí 
opposition to the traditional organization. Al-
though extractive industries absorbed only a 
small proportion of the labour force, the nature 
of the work had led to a stronger trade union 
organization than in other activities, added to 
which the sector's economic importance strength-
ened its bargaining position. 
These characteristics were naturally reflected 
in the structure and pattern of Bolivia's institu-
tional machinery in general and that of the 
Government in particular. Except for the slight 
counterweight of pressures generated by the weak 
middle- and lower-income urban and mining 
groups, decisions were essentiaUy adopted by 
exporters and landowners. This is eloquently 
borne out by the fiscal sector's share in the value 
of tin exports. From 1900 to 1910, sales taxes 
ranged from 2 to 4 per cent of their value, ris-
ing slightly to 6 per cent in the following decade. 
Owing to the precarious nature of the main 
and potential source of revenue, the public fi-
nances have shown an almost constant deficit 
since the beginning of the century. 
3 . THE PROGRESSIVELY CRITICAL POSITION 
OF THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM 
In Bolivia, as in nearly all Latin American 
countries, the world depression was a severe 
threat to the outward-directed growth system. 
As in other economies, the impact came after 
the boom years 1925-29 which, paradoxically 
enough, had appeared to consolidate it and open 
up new expansion possibilities. 
The effects of the depression were severe but 
not exceptionally so, and in the mid-nineteen 
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thirties export values, while still far short of the 
extraordinarily high levels reached in 1927-29, 
had recovered notably and continued to rise dur-
ing the Second World War. But Bolivia's eco-
nomic and socio-political system suffered a 
second upheaval with the Chaco Wax (1932-35), 
whose requirements and disrupting effects dis-
sipated any possible sign of consolidation of the 
precarious export base and set ofE a chain of 
rapid and substantive changes in the traditional 
system. 
Although it is not the intention to review 
all those phenomena, there are two facts of 
particular interest. Firstly, in the years preced-
ing and following the turn of events in 1952, 
despite relatively favourable circumstances, the 
export economy ceased to give sufficient sup-
port to the socio-political organization prevailing 
up to the 1920s. Secondly, with the collapse of 
the structure and following the search for de-
fensive or promotional measures, the middle-
class groups that had been evolving began to 
play their part or to carry more weight. In spite 
of the setbacks suffered, this trend was to culmi-
nate in the 1952 revolutionary upheaval and the 
formulation of an economic policy which is 
broadly analysed below. 
It is important to examine the recrudescence 
of inflationary disequilibrium—an old problem 
in Boliiva which has since taken on a new 
significance—^because of its relationship with 
the steady deterioration of the traditional sys-
tem and its impact on subsequent developments. 
The disruption of the economic and social 
bases under the old Bolivian system mainly af-
fected the State machinery. As noted above, gov-
ernment activities usually showed a deficit, sub-
jected as they were to a dual play of forces: 
on the one hand, the demand to maintain or raise 
public expenditure for various purposes, and, 
on the other, the reluctance and even inability 
of large-scale tin mining—the only nucleus pro-
ducing significant surpluses—^to yield the re-
sources to satisfy that demand. 
The conflict turned more critical with the 
economic distortions caused by the depression 
and the Chaco War, while the increasingly im-
portant middle-class groups clamoured for more 
State projects and expenditure. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the trend 
towards inflationary disequilibrium should have 
sharpened, despite temporary improvements 
due to better external conditions and a larger 
contribution from tin, or to the restriction of 
public expenditure or investment at the expense 
of social aspirations.^ The problem, as will be 
seen later, is as yet unsolved and in some meas-
ure was aggravated by the changes which took 
place in 1952. 
For a proper understanding of Bolivia's posi-
tion, it is essential to know about its difficulties 
in adopting measures to counteract the deterio-
ration of its economy. The export sector, with 
its dynamic force restricted in absolute terms and 
by circumstances, was subsequently incapable 
of counterbalancing internal tensions, and the 
production sector failed to reorganize its re-
sources with a view to establishing other promo-
tion nuclei. In other words, Bolivia, unlike other 
countries, failed to diversify its activities suf-
ficiently to achieve an inward-directed develop-
ment. Although there were certainly pressures 
to that effect stemming from the depression or 
the external bottleneck, they were not strong 
enough to bring about even a partial change of 
course. As late as the mid-fifties, to take an out-
standing indicator, the industrial sector was con-
tributing less than 9 per cent to the country's 
revenue; less than 2 per cent of the active popu-
lation was employed in registered industry, or 
slightly over 4 per cent if the labour force en-
gaged in small-scale industry is taken into ac-
count. These proportions are much lower than 
for the region as a whole and even for several 
Central American countries which are smaller 
than Bolivia. 
Thus the impossibility of channelling de-
velopment through other avenues which would 
at least supplement the traditional export ac-
tivities cannot be ascribed purely to the size 
of the market. Although this was and still is a 
paramount factor—as suggested by the absence 
of a deliberate approach to industrial develop-
ment in economic policy at that time and later— 
it was not the only one. A number of others 
would certainly include the extreme concentra-
tion in income distribution and the virtual ex-
clusion of a large part of the population from 
economic life. 
A secondary but significant factor which 
should not be forgotten—and also occurs, 
though on a different scale, in Colombia—is the 
relatively scattered distribution of urban cen-
tres. Although it helped to avoid some of the 
drawbacks inherent in the regional disequili-
brium, the system lacked a consumer centre 
which might attract and provide the necessary 
range of favourable external economies for the 
expansion of manufacturing industry. 
Rates of inflation, which reached 50 per cent in 
the years prior to 1939, dropped to about 24 per cent 
in 194043 (ibid., p. 62, table 44). 
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4 . COMPONENTS OF THE 1 9 5 2 ECONOMIC POLICY 
The economic policy launched in 1952 had 
three major objectives: nationalization of large-
scale tin mining, agrarian reform, and sectoral 
diversification and spatial integration of the 
economic system. These objectives did not stem 
strictly or exclusively from the political move-
ment which came to power at ths time; they 
were really established in response to the serious 
concern about the Bolivian economy and society 
which had long prevailed in some centres of na-
tional thought, and had not found full expression 
for want of a favourable climate of ideas. 
The identification and pursuit of those objec-
tives by no means imply that they resulted in a 
clear-cut strategy with respect to the ultimate 
aims, the means of attaining them, possible dif-
ficulties encountered, and their interrelationships 
and compatibility. Under favourable conditions, 
those objectives became part of government 
policy, and their attainment is sought by im-
provising expedients which are often inconsistent 
wiih one another or conflict with some of the 
targets. It is not difficult to discern a relation-
ship between this prime characteristic and the 
subsequent runaway inflation, which in some 
degree was the expression and consequence of 
those weaknesses. 
Bolivia's purpose in nationalizing tin was to 
acquire ownership and control of the most 
dynamic and strategic nucleus of the economy, 
with the transfer to the State of the three major 
corporations owning those export centres. Agrar-
ian reform was aimed at transforming social 
and economic conditions in the agricultural sec-
tor. Lastly, the sectoral diversification and spatial 
integration of the economic system were in-
tended to expand the production base and in-
corporate two large geographic-economic areas: 
the Altiplano and the Qriente.® This was being 
done by seeking and promoting other activities 
capable of broadening the base for maintaining 
and expanding the system, particularly petro-
leum and agriculture in the Oriente, and finding 
the best population-resources combination 
through shifts of active population from the first 
area to the second. 
® A central project for the purpose—the Cochabamba-
Santa Cruz highway—was formulated during the Second 
World War, but did not materialize until the middle 
of the fifties. 
In addition to these aims and perhaps even 
over-reaching them, a redistribution pattern 
emerged which, in essence, over-estimated the 
surpluses that might be mobilized to attain the 
social targets. 
In this policy, low priority was given to two 
objectives which might have been considered 
of paramoimt importance, given the nature 
of Bolivia's problems. One was the moderniza-
tion of tin mining. It seems to have been the 
prevailing belief that the transfer of assets 
to State ownership would suffice to remove all 
obstacles to the sector's development and make 
its resources available for other economic and 
social aims. Furthermore, the possibilities af-
forded by an expansion and diversification of 
manufacturing were underestimated. Industriali-
zation, which in nearly all the Latin American 
countries had become part of the very essence 
of economic policy, was not given due impor-
tance in Bolivia.® None the less, the State made 
substantial investments in that field, although 
mainly in isolated projects to supplement speci-
fic primary activities. 
Two periods stand out in the evolution of this 
economic policy. In the first, which lasted from 
1952 to 1956, the main objectives were accom-
plished or steps were taken to attain them, but 
it was also a period of growing instability; this 
was followed by a period (1957-64) of pre-
dominating concern over inflationary disequili-
brium, and efforts to continue the original basic 
changes began to flag. With the recovery of 
monetary stability in the last three years of this 
period, there was renewed concern for economic 
development, but not as intense as in the first 
period and it failed to extend to the major 
problems tackled previously. This situation and 
the cumulative political and social tensions led 
up to the political upheaval in 1964 and brought 
the period concerned to a close. 
® Nevertheless, it is useful to remember that the 
industrial sector developed considerably during this 
period. In a first stage, ample exchange benefits, the 
expansion of public expenditure and the activation of 
internal inflation favoured this activity, as a result not 
of an actual broadening of the productive base but 
rather of the exceptional nature of the temporary in-
centives mentioned above. In a second stage, which 
began with the stabilization policy, manufacturing 
suffered a severe setback with the disappearance of 
those artificial conditions, from which it seemed to 
recover partially at the beginning of the sixties, entering 
upon a stage of relative recovery up to 1964. 
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B. OBJECTIVES OF THE POLICY LAUNCHED IN 1952 
1 . NATIONALIZATION OF LARGE-SCALE MINING 
Nationalization of the large-scale mining in-
dustry was one of the first and most important 
decisions adopted as a result of the 1952 revolu-
tion.^ ^^  As noted previously, this sector was and 
still is of key importance for the whole economic 
system. Its evolution had been unstable and rela-
tively modest; the small amounts invested in the 
plants and exploration activities had limited its 
growth possibilities; national ownership of as-
sets had not had very favourable effects since, 
as in practice the enterprises had become "in-
ternationalized". Nevertheless, tin mining con-
tinued to have a decisive influence on Bolivia's 
political and institutional development. 
In addition to these and other factors, it is no 
less significant that the trade union organizations 
of large-scale mining constituted one of the 
pillars of social and political change. From the 
alliance of these groups with the middle-income 
and urban wage-earning sectors sprang the new 
power system which came into being with the 
revolution. 
The participation and influence of mining 
trade unionism is particularly important because 
it gave rise to the fundamental pressure in favour 
of nationalization. 
Lastly, the decision to nationalize was in-
fluenced by the fact that since large-scale tin 
mining was the most productive nucleus of the 
economic system, particularly from the stand-
point of foreign exchange earnings, it was im-
perative that the new Government should con-
trol it in order to direct the economy and use 
any mining surpluses to attain its economic and 
social goals. This point is emphasized because, 
as stated previously, the development and mod-
ernization of the mining-exporter nucleus was 
not a policy aim in itself, and this was to have 
far-reaching repercussions on its future evolu-
tion. Nor was the obvious objective of vertically 
integrating the industry, up to the smelting stage 
at least, defined at that time. 
(a) Evolution of the process 
Bolivia's tin mines may be said to have been 
nationalized by stages. On 13 May 1952 the 
Government set up a commission with instruc-
tions to study, over a period of 120 days, the 
bases, procedures and conditions for expropriat-
i®The large tin mining companies accounted for over 
80 per cent of total mining exports in 1952, the rest 
being products of the medium- and small-scale mining 
companies. 
ing the mines controlled or owned by enter-
prises of the Patino, Hochschild and Aramayo 
groups. Secondly, as a prior step to nationaliza-
tion, a supreme decree was signed on 2 June 
1952 establishing a State monopoly of ore ex-
ports. 
On 2 October 1952 the Government estab-
lished the autonomous Bolivian Mining Corpora-
tion (Corporación Minera de Bolivia— 
COMIBOL) with the following terms of refer-
ence : "To explore, produce and process ore from 
the mines allocated to it by the Government"; 
to market and export mining products . . . "im-
port mining machinery, tools, materials, imple-
ments, and articles for the store (pulpería) to 
supply its own needs and those of other domestic 
mining activities". COMIBOL was also em-
powered to form semi-public enterprises "to 
improve production in certain mines under its 
jurisdiction". COMIBOL's policy, administered 
by the Government through the Ministry of 
Mines and Petroleum, would be implemented at 
the enterprise level by a board of directors con-
sisting of seven persons appointed by the Execu-
tive, two of whom were to be selected from 
three candidates proposed by the Trade Union 
Federation of Bolivian Miners. 
By means of a decree dated 7 October, "each 
and all of the companies owned, controlled or 
administered by the Patino, Hochschild and 
Aramayo mining groups . . . were subjected to 
State supervision or direct State administration, 
according to circumstances as viewed by the in-
tervening body". 
After five and a half months, large-scale min-
ing was finally nationalized by Supreme Decree 
No. 3232 of 31 October 1952. COMIBOL took 
over production in the seventeen companies be-
longing to the three mining groups alluded to 
above. The same decree established "control by 
workers" ("control obrero"), through the 
"participation of their delegates in the local 
administration of all nationalized mines". 
(b) Expropriation on the basis of 
indemnification 
Mines were expropriated on the basis of in-
demnification payable to the former owners. In 
view of the dependence of Bolivia's tin on for-
eign refineries where the interested parties 
wielded great influence, to say nothing of the 
weight they carried in international relations, 
it is not surprising that the levels and terms 
of payment were fairly stringent from Bolivia's 
point of view. In fact, it was decided that in-
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deirmification would be paid automatically in 
dollars in the form of retentions by the actual 
buyers, and would fluctuate according to tin 
quotations. Thus, the agreements concluded be-
tween COMIBOL and Patino Mines, Compagnie 
Aramayo de Mines en Bolivie and Mauricio 
Hochschild, S.A.M.L in July 1953 established 
that Williams Harvey of Liverpool would with-
hold the following percentages of the export 
value on behalf of the three firms mentioned: 
5 per cent if tin prices fluctuated between 1.215 
and 1.06 dollar cents per fine pound, 2.5 per 
cent if between 1.06 and 0.90, 1 per cent if be-
tween 0.90 and 0.80, and nothing if the price was 
less than 0.80 dollar cents per fine pound. For 
wolfram, the quota established was 10 dollars 
per unit exported. 
Prior to this definition, and in accordance 
with the nationalization decree, the State made a 
provisional evaluation of the amount of indemni-
fication payable and decided that any sums owed 
to the State by the enterprises concerned should 
be deducted therefrom. Between its occupation 
of the mines and such time as the net balance 
of the indemnification was paid, the State would 
credit those firms with interest at an annual rate 
of 3 per cent on the sums estimated in the 
provisional evaluation. Furthermore, the Bolivian 
Government undertook to pay any sums the 
companies might owe to third parties, against 
the debit balances outstanding under the head 
of indemnification. The problem, in essence, was 
the payment of social benefits to workers and 
employees on account of the change from one 
type of enterprise to another, and the amortiza-
tion of credit to the Export-Import Bank. 
(c) The nationalized mining industry 
COMIBOL came into being and is developing 
under particular circumstances which should 
be taken into account in evaluating its be-
haviour in subsequent years. Some of those gen-
eral circumstances have already been sufiBciently 
dealt with. Others might be added, such as the 
exodus of managerial and technical personnel 
and the giant administrative task of fusing into 
a single nucleus a variety of enterprises and 
mines which had thus far operated with widely 
differing systems and aims. 
But the vital question is to place COMIBOL 
within the framework of forces and relations that 
were to guide its operation. The Government it-
self takes first place. As indicated above, the 
Government was primarily concerned with en-
suring and increasing the flow of foreign ex-
change generated by large-scale tin mining in 
order to invest the resources in other sectors or 
use them for imports of consumer and other 
goods. Secondly, it was anxious to keep the 
exchange rate down so that import prices would 
also remain low. 
From 1953 to 1955, the foreign exchange 
yielded by COMIBOL fluctuated at slightly over 
40 million dollars, while the relation between 
net sales of foreign exchange to the Central Bank 
and the value of exports from its mines rose 
from approximately 48 per cent (in 1947-49) 
to 57 per cent.^ ^ To judge from these figures, 
COMIBOL may be considered to have complied 
with the Government's requirements, even if 
slightly below its expectations. 
The second official requirement—liquidation 
of foreign currency earnings at a low price—^was 
mainly fulfilled, but represented an undue sacri-
fice for the mining organization, and was a 
basic factor in triggering the inflationary proc-
ess. In view of the rise in domestic prices, the 
establishment of a rigid conversion exchange 
rate gave rise to a marked disparity between 
COMIBOL's operating costs and the product 
of its sales to the Central Bank. From 1953 to 
1956, the Central Bank managed to cover, on 
an average, just over 70 per cent of its total 
costs, apart from the fact that COMIBOL's 
availabilities for the purchase of materials and 
investment purposes were restricted to the maxi-
mum. The only possibility was for the Central 
Bank to extend the necessary credit to enable 
COMIBOL to cover its costs and have some 
working capital available. 
This system meant that the Government, 
through the Central Bank, first of all reduced 
COMIBOL's income and then returned it. How-
ever, the inflationary results were obvious: be-
tween 1953 and 1954, for instance, about half 
the expansion of the means of payment was at-
tributable to the credit accorded to the mining 
corporation. While it is true that it was possible 
to subsidize imports of essential goods bx this 
means and that those purchases were ultimately 
subsidized by bank issues rather than COMIBOL, 
the fact remains that the process caused evident 
distortions in COMIBOL's operations, apart from 
the haggling over foreign exchange to cover 
its own needs. 
Just as the new enterprise sustained govern-
ment pressure from above, it also began to feel 
pressure from below, i.e., that of miners' trade 
unions which, moreover, were influentially 
represented on the COMIBOL board of direc-
The remaining values were accounted for by 
expenditure abroad, retentions under the head of pro-
fits, and, in the period following nationalization, reten-
tions for indemnification. 
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tors. This sector brought pressure to bear in 
various spheres—employment, wages, social bene-
fits and advantages deriving from subsidies for 
imports of consumer goods regardless of the 
direct part it played in operations through trade 
union representatives. 
But these were not the only forces affecting 
COMIBOL's activities. There were also external 
factors deriving mainly from the influence of 
expropriated interests on marketing, financing 
and tin refining, as well as indemnification com-
mitments. From 1953 to 1961, COMIBOL's 
payments under this head amounted to nearly 
22 million dollars. Since prices fluctuated be-
tween 0.90 and 1.06 dollar cents during that 
period, the proportion retained by refineries on 
behalf of the former owners never exceeded 
2.5 per cent of the value of exports. However, 
with the reduction in export values, which was 
intensified between 1957 and 1961, these pay-
ments represented nearly 15 per cent of 
COMIBOL's foreign exchange earnings in the 
last year of the period. 
Several of the circumstances described above 
and the overall situation changed considerably 
after 1956, as a result of the stabilization pro-
gramme. A market foreign exchange rate was 
established, and this improved COMIBOL's fi-
nancial position, making it relatively indepen-
dent of Central Bank credit. Secondly, the new 
political set-up alleviated trade union pressure, 
with the result that the number of workers 
was reduced. Thirdly, the Government's attitude 
to the allocation of resources for modernizing 
the mines gradually altered, and this objective 
was given higher priority as from 1959. 
(d) Effects on employment 
Given the over-all situation, employment con-
stituted one of the prime concerns in nationaliz-
ing the mines, owing to the scarcity of employ-
ment opportunities and the pressure of the 
labour force in seeking work in a sector which 
offered certain relative advantages. Although no 
reliable data are available on the number of 
workers actually employed in the mines before 
nationalization, part-time workers or casual 
labour far exceeded the number of workers on 
the regular payroll. Thus, a major objective of 
the labour organizations was to incorporate this 
supernumerary staff.^^ The same Aing hap-
pened in the so-called marginal mines, where the 
aim was to keep on the operatives who might 
have been considered redundant, on a more 
stable basis. 
Table 1 shows the evolution of the labour 
force engaged in large-scale mining and its 
distribution inside and outside the mines over 
the period 1951-64. The total labour force in-
creased by 50 per cent from 1951 to 1956, and 
the proportion working inside and outside the 
mines altered appreciably. While the proportion 
of the former dropped from 55 per cent to 32 
per cent during the period concerned, with a 
decline in absolute terms, the number of regis-
tered workers outside the mine more than dou-
bled, rising from 45 to nearly 68 per cent of the 
total. 
There seems an obvious relationship between 
those changes and the trade union pressure to 
Added to this were the ivorkers' efTorts to extend 
social security benefits to a larger number of miners. 
Table 1 







End of 1951 13,200 55.0 10,800 45.0 24,000 
1952 14,179 48.9 14,794 51.1 28,973 
1953 46.8 16,352 53.2 30,762 
1954 14,532 44.3 18.242 55.7 32,774 
1955 12,608 36.9 21,569 63.1 34,177 
1956 11,438 32.1 24,222 67.9 35,660 
1957 11,200 33.7 20,931 66.3 32,131 
1958 31.8 18,681 68.2 27,882 
1959 32.0 18,009 68.0 27,180 
1960 32.8 17,963 67.2 27,440 
1961 30.2 17,872 69.8 26,394 
1962 28.8 17,754 70.2 25,479 
1963 36.8 14,615 63.2 24,006 
1964 37.1 14,412 62.9 23,760 
SODBCE: C O M I B O L 
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take advantage of one of the few existing "em-
ployment reserves" and incorporate in COMIBOL 
all or part of the labour force previously en-
gaged in miscellaneous activities in mining areas 
on a part-time or sporadic basis. 
It is also reasonable to assume that 
COMIBOL's labour policy during that period 
was influenced by other factors, such as the 
backwardness of development activities and the 
failure to plan and try out new extraction 
methods, which affected production possibilities 
and compelled the enterprise to shift the sur-
plus workers engaged in direct mining activities 
to jobs outside the mines. The situation changed 
later when the stabilization policy and the pro-
gressive lessening of political contact between 
the organized groups and the Government altered 
the previous trends. Table 1 shows that in 1957-
64 total manpower was practically the same as 
in 1951 and that, although the proportion of 
workers inside and outside the mine altered, the 
latter did not decrease significantly. 
(e) Effects on productivity 
A highly controversial aspect of the nationali-
zation of large-scale mining is its effects on 
mining productivity. As in other cases, there are 
insufficient data available for sound or definite 
conclusions to be reached, but some factors 
which have not always been given due weight 
may help to clarify the question. 
The relationship between mining output and 
manpower clearly depends on the changes which 
take place in the latter. Thus, the large increase 
in manpower up to 1956 and its subsequent de-
cline, due mainly to social and political factors, 
would partly explain the changes in productivity, 
which, therefore, were not due primarily to 
technical and economic factors. 
Various circumstances which have little or 
nothing to do with the nationalization of mines 
and the efficiency of the new administration also 
have some impact on productivity. One is the 
deterioration in the physical conditions for pro-
ducing tin as a result of insufficient investment in 
the past. The firm of consultants. Ford, Bacon 
and Davis, in its report to the Government, esti-
mated that in 1955 about 16 million dollars 
were required to modernize the existing plant. 
Moreover, the tin content of the ore has steadily 
declined; in the Catavi mine in 1954 it was less 
than 10 per cent of the 1925 figure^® (see 
table 2 ) . 
Table 2 (.continued') 
BOLIVIA: AVERAGE TIN CONTENT OF ORE IN 
CATAVI MINE, 1925-64 
tear Percentage 
This decline does not apply only to Bolivia, nor 
only to tin. It is not surprising that such high-grade 
ore was produced in the early years, since the primitive 











SOURCE: National Planning and Co-ordination De-
partment (Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Coor-
dinación), "Plan decenal: Sector minería" (mimeo-
graphed). 
With the decline in the metal content of ore 
in nearly all the COMIBOL mines, the problem 
was to extract a larger quantity" in order to 
obtain the same content of tin. This called for 
changes in production methods (extraction and 
processing) which failed to materialize, except 
on a very limited scale in the Catavi mine. 
In addition, the inadequacy of supplies some-
times halted work, and social disputes caused 
by dismissals or a rise in pulpería prices became 
more serious after 1956, while just at that time 
there were strained relations between the mining 
unions and the Government. 
Although all these factors make it impossible 
to adopt a simplified approach to the evolution 
of mining productivity, it is useful to indicate 
some piecemeal data that are at hand. They re-
late, firstly, to two of the principal mines: Col-
quiri and Catavi. Table 3 shows the number of 
days worked inside the mine, the quantity of 
ore treated and the output in tons per man/day 
for 1950, 1955 and 1959. 
In the Colquiri mine, an increase is recorded 
in both the number of days worked and the 
quantity of ore treated, but the output per 
worker slowly declined. In Catavi, the number 
mines. The question is, therefore, to adopt the most 
suitable techniques to counteract the gradual decline 
in the tin content of the mines. 
l ^ T o gain some idea of the increase in extraction 
necessary to obtain the same amount of tin, as the 
metal content of the ore declines, suffice it to consider 
production in the Catavi mine. While 42.5 tons of run-
of-mine ore were required per ton of fine ore in 1941 
when the tin content averaged 3 per cent, about 200 
tons were required in 1959 when the tin content 
averaged 1 per cent, taking into account the fact that 
recovery had declined from 75 to 50 per cent during 
the period concerned. 
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Table 2 (.continued') 
B O L I V I A : O U T P U T I N S I D E T H E M I N E S A T C O L Q U I R I A N D C A T A V I , 1950, 1955 A N D 1959 
Colguiri Catavi 
1950 1955 1959 1950 1955 1959 
Thousands of days worked . . 
Thousands of tons treated . . 







4 6 8 . 0 0 
4 3 8 . 0 0 
0 .94 









SOURCE: "Plan decenal: Sector minería", op. cit. These data are partly based on a report by the firm of 
consultants, Ford, Bacon and Davis. 
of days worked also increased, but the volume 
treated dropped in 1959 compared with 1955, 
although there was a considerable rise in the 
latter year over 1950. Ouput per worker im-
proved slightly from 1950 to 1955, but declined 
sharply in 1959. 
To complete the above information, a monthly 
average may be taken of the tons of run-of-mine 
ore and fine ore produced by four of COMIBOL's 
principal tin mines, and the relationship with 
the number of workers directly employed in 
mining (see table 4 ) . Between the two periods 
considered, there was a slight reduction in the 
tonnage of ore extracted monthly and a far 
greater reduction in fine ore. Moreover, while 
output per worker rose for run-of-mine ore, it 
dropped sharply for fine ore, the main causes 
being the concentration techniques in use and 
the capacity and state of the plant, apart from 
the richness of the ore. 
Table 4 
B O L I V I A : P R O D U C T I V I T Y O F I N S I D E W O R K E R S 
A T T H E C A T A V I , H U A N U N I , C O L Q U I R I A N D 
C A R A C O L E S M I N E S , 1953-64 
(Tons per month) 
1953-56 1957-64 
Run-of-mine ore . . . 174,846.0 165 ,775 .0 
Run-of-mine ore per 
worker 27.7 30.8 
Fine ore 1,930.0 1 ,345.0 
Fine ore per worker 0 .306 0 .250 
SOURCE: C O M I B O L . 
Although these data are so incomplete, they 
appear in some measure to confirm the assump-
tion that the drop in productivity levels was 
very largely due to the deterioration in technical 
mining conditions and the low tin content of 
the ore, without excluding the economic, finan-
cial and socio-political factors which also affected 
productivity. 
( f ) Wages in the nationalized mining 
industry 
It can be inferred from variations in employ-
ment and social conditions that expenditure on 
wages increased sharply in the first period of 
COMIBOL's life (1952-56) and declined during 
the second, i.e., from the beginning of the 
stabilization period onwards. The only relevant 
data are for the years 1954-59 and are expressed 
in current prices, which reduces their useful-
ness. Unfortunately, there is no way of elimi-
nating the effect of prices, since there is no 
satisfactory cost-of-living index for the country 
or the main regions and the multiplicity of ex-
change rates makes it impossible to select a 
reasonable rate for converting the Bolivian peso 
into dollars or other currencies. At all events, 
between 1954 and 1956 wages increased seven-
fold, while prices—according to the cost-of-
living index for La Paz—increased less than 
fivefold. In addition, some evaluation would have 
to be made of improvements in social welfare 
(family and post-natal allowances, workers' com-
pensation, construction of housing, etc.) and of 
the exchange subsidies for imported consumer 
goods. Losses sustained by the COMIBOL com-
missaries as a result of these subsidies amounted 
in 1955 to about 30 per cent of sales. 
However, these indications of a possible im-
provement in wage conditions in the mines 
must be counterbalanced by the increase in the 
labour force, referred to above. In view of the 
importance of this factor, it is reasonable to 
assume that if there was any progress, it was 
basically in the expansion of employment, i.e., 
that the reason for the increase in expenditure 
on labour was the much larger number of wage-
earners, rather than any significant increase in 
wage levels. 
After 1956 the picture changed. The over-all 
cost of labour remained much the same between 
1957 and 1959, and even diminished in 1958; 
but the amount distributed went to an increas-
ingly smaller number of wage-earners who no 
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longer had the benefit of subsidized imports. 
On balance, therefore, it would seem that there 
was no marked change in the traditional situa-
tion of the worker, except with regard to the 
opening or restricting of job opportunities (see 
table 5 ) . 
Table 5 
BOLIVIA: WAGES PAID BY COMIBOL, 1954-59 








(g) Plans for rehabilitating the nationalized 
mining industry 
With devaluation and the establishment of a 
single exchange rate under the stabilization pro-
gramme which came into force at the end of 
1956, COMIBOL's national currency earnings 
increased. Nevertheless, there was no particular 
improvement in the financial situation of large-
scale tin mining, since the increase in income 
did not even cover current expenditure, let alone 
allow of a policy of investment without other 
sources of financing. 
From 1957 onwards, there was a sharp drop 
in COMIBOL's output, which cancelled out any 
positive effects resulting from the more favour-
able exchange rate. Moreover, although the 
price of tin on the world market began to rise 
from 1959 onwards, this did not make up for 
the drop in the volume of exports up to 1964. 
Two types of measures were adopted in order 
to deal with these problems, under the stabili-
zation policy establishing a reduction in financ-
ing through central bank issues. Firstly, an at-
tempt was made to cut current expenditure by 
reducing the labour force by as many as 12,000 
workers between 1956 and 1964 (see again 
table 1) ; secondly, more money was borrowed 
from abroad.^® These efforts culminated in the 
Triangular Operation for the rehabilitation of 
the mining industry.^® 
The first plans drawn up, which date back to 
1959,^^ ranged from a proposal to improve the 
supply of machinery and equipment to a more 
integral approach which included other mining 
activities. An example of this is the mine 
"Matilde", which is the largest zinc mine in 
Bolivia and also belongs to COMIBOL. 
The so-called Triangular Operation, which 
was launched in 1961, was a short-term pro-
gramme for improving the financial situation 
of large-scale tin mining and raising production 
levels. As much as 80.1 per cent of the planned 
investment was for the renewal and improve-
ment of equipment, the provision of transport 
units, the supplying of the commissaries and 
the transfer of surplus labour. Only 19.1 per 
cent was intended for the discovery of new 
mineral reserves, research to improve recovery 
and reduce production costs, and technical as-
sistance (see table 6 ) . 
The implementation of the plan was divided 
into three phases, of which only two were com-
pleted between 1961 and 1964. In the first phase 
13.6 million dollars were spent, but the objec-
tives listed under items 1, 2, 7 and 8 of table 6 
were only partially attained; in the second, 
12.7 million dollars were spent on covering 
the most urgent needs of the moment. 
The plan was modified as it went along; in 
the second phase, for example, the funds allo-
cated for the transfer of workers were reduced 
to 1.2 million dollars and 3 million dollars was 
added to commissary expenditure, thus increas-
ing the share of that item in total expenditure 
from 7.9 to 15.8 per cent. Also modified was 
the item for metallurgical studies, since over 
the two phases only 750,000 of the 2 million 
dollars budgeted was spent. Finally, an extra 
3 million dollars had to be included for im-
provements in the treatment and recovery of ore. 
It is difficult to evaluate the results of the 
Triangular Operation. However, the recovery of 
tin prices on the world market in the three-year 
period 1964-66 has done more to increase 
i®Up to 1964 COMIBOL's financial obligations 
amounted to a little more than 47 million dollars. An 
official source estimated that, in accordance with its 
payments plan for 1964-1975 in respect of amortization 
and interest, this debt -would represent a disbursement 
of 61,690,000 dollars. 
i®The operation was called "triangular" because it 
was financed by the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
United States of America and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB). Subsequent to the signing 
of the agreement, additional financing was provided 
by Argentina for supplying the COMIBOL commissaries. 
The first plan was based on an offer by the 
United Kingdom to provide 6 million dollars credit. 
Two other plans were known as "Over-aU supporting 
programme for the nationalized mining industry" and 
"Analysis of the nationalized mining industry and 
rehabilitation programme". 
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Table 2 (.continued') 
BOLIVIA: INVESTMENT BUDGET FOR THE TRIANGULAR OPERATION, 1961 
(Thousands of dollars) 
Item Objecüves Total Percentage 
1. To determine mineral potential and locate 
new reserves 4,000 10.6 
2. Research to improve recovery and reduce 
production costs 2,000 5.3 
3. Material and spare parts To renew equipment in the mines and 
ensure proper maintenance 13,500 35.8 
4. Equipment To improve the mines and processing 
plants 4,500 11.9 
5. Transport equipment To increase the mineral transport units 4,000 10.6 
6. Commissaries Provision of suppplies 3,000 7.3 
7. Transfer of surplus labour . . . , 5,250 13.9 
8. Technical assistance 1,050 4.0 
37,750 100.0 
SOURCE: National Planning and Co-ordination Department, "Diagnóstico preliminar del sector minería" 
(mimeographed). 
COMIBOL's value of production than the physi-
cal increases in output brought about by the 
rehabilitation plan. 
(h) General evaluation 
Table 7 contains a number of data on total 
exports and exports by COMIBOL and the prices 
of tin on the world market, taking as the base 
year 1952, which was quite favourable for 
foreign trade. Although tin exports by the 
COMIBOL mines continue to be a decisive 
factor in foreign trade, particularly when prices 
are favourable, it is clear that, to some extent 
independently from the fluctuations in prices 
(particularly in the period 1959-63), there is a 
relative reduction in COMIBOL's share of total 
exports and in their physical volume (see again 
table 7 ) . Although there was a slight recovery 
in output in 1964, this should not be taken to 
imply any long-term modification of the trend 
over the last decade, since the improvement in 
that year seems to have been more the result 
of a jmiip in prices of over 40 per cent. 
At all events, judging solely from the quanti-
tative changes in the value and volume of 
COMIBOL's exports between 1952 and 1964, it 
would seem that nationalization had an adverse 
effect on the tin situation. 
However, there remains the question of what 
would have happened if nationalization had not 
taken place. It is clear from what was said 
above that large-scale tin mining had long been 
imdergoing a process of decline, and in view of 
the previous behaviour of private mine-owners 
as regards investment and technological prog-
there is no reason to believe that there ress, 
would have been any change in the fifties. In 
other words, it may well be that the evolution 
of tin mining can partly be explained by the 
impoverishment of the deposits, which ought to 
Table 7 
BOLIVIA: TIN EXPORTS FROM THE COMIBOL MINES, 1952-64 
Total COMIBOL tin exports 
exports^ Price of 
Period ( millions Millions Thousands Percentage tin 
of of of tons of total (dollars) 
dollars) dollars of fines exports 
1952 141.3 71.2 27.3 50.4 1.20 
1953-58 97.3 46.8 22.9 48.1 0.96 
1959-63 76.8 35.8 15.3 46.6 1.10 
1964 113.8 58.6 17.7 51.5 1.58 
SOURCE: Central Bank of Bolivia and COMIBOL. 
a C.i.f. values. 
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have been offset by the introduction of modern 
technology as in other tin producing countries. 
Furthermore, there was no need to discover new 
techniques; all that needed to be done was to 
apply already known techniques for the gravi-
metric concentration of ores. The mining in-
dustry was also affected by the upheavals of all 
kinds which accompanied and followed the socio-
political transformations commented on above. 
Another factor, which has not perhaps been 
given suficient weight, is the government policy 
launched in 1952. Initially, this policy only took 
account of the possibility that nationalization 
of the mines would enable resources deriving 
from the tin export sector to be transferred to 
other sectors, for various redistributive and 
economic purposes. Consequently, as happened 
in other countries as well as Bolivia, the fact 
was overlooked that this export sector, for all 
its limitations and deficiencies, would have to 
continue to provide, for an indefinite period, a 
basis of support for all economic and social 
objectives, and that it was therefore essential 
that it should be run as efficiently as possible. 
When subsequent efforts were made to ensure 
this, the task was even more difficult, because 
of the general situation then prevailing and the 
decline in domestic resources. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the 
unfavourable situation in 1953-58, in relation 
to 1952, to some extent deteriorated even fur-
ther in 1959-63, despite the fact that during 
this period most of the negative factors opera-
ting in the first years of nationalization had 
already disappeared. This could be taken as 
another confirmation of the chronic nature of 
the decline of the mining industry, which was 
temporarily offset by extremely favourable 
foreign market conditions. 
2 . LAND REFORM 
(a) Physical and socio-economic characteristics 
of agriculture 
During the first half of this century agricul-
ture in Bolivia was virtually at a standstill, both 
because of the specific characteristics of the 
sector and because of the whole economic and 
social system of the country. 
Agriculture is carried on in the three major 
regions: the Altiplano, the Yungas and Valles, 
and the Llanos Orientales. The Altiplano, which 
accounts for 14 per cent of the country's total 
area, comprises the high plateau and its sur-
rounding ranges, and has an altitude ranging 
from 3,300 to 4,500 metres. It has a cold and 
fairly dry climate and the soil is very poor, 
erosion being far-advanced and there being al-
most no organic matter in most of the arable 
land. 
The Yungas and Valles, which make up 16 
per cent of the total area of the country, consti-
tute the intermediate region and are at an alti-
tude of between 500 and 2,800 metres. The 
Yungas have a semi-tropical climate and the 
arable soil varies a great deal in depth, in cer-
tain steep and stony places being less than 30 
centimetres. The Valles, which begin at a height 
of 2,000 metres, are the most important agri-
cultural area under cultivation and have good 
soil, although it is somewhat exhausted. The 
climate is temperate. 
The Llanos Orientales make up 70 per cent 
of the total area and are the largest area suit-
able for farming in the whole country. 
The bulk of the rural population, which 
around 1950 represented about 70 per cent of 
the total, is found in the Altiplano and the 
Yungas and Valles. 
Although agriculture's share in the gross do-
mestic product was about 30 per cent, this was 
because of the large number of people engaged 
in agricultural work. Exports consisted of rub-
ber, Brazil nuts and other less important 
products. 
Since mining and industry imported most of 
the consumer goods and raw materials they 
needed, they provided no stimulus for agricul-
ture to introduce technological changes of any 
importance. In general, the slowness of urban 
and industrial development in Bolivia and the 
relative abundance of foreign exchange meant 
that the backwardness of agriculture did not 
hamper the operation of the traditional economic 
system. 
Agriculture was carried on under a feudal 
system of land tenure and farming, based on the 
concentration of property and social power in 
the hands of a small minority and on clusters of 
minifundios and indigenous communities on 
the periphery of the large estates. In these cir-
cumstances, land was more a factor of social 
power and prestige than a production good. 
Economic activity on the large estates was al-
most entirely based on the rural labour force, 
which worked for four to five days in the week 
without pay. In addition, colonos or tenant 
farmers were obliged to provide human and 
animal labour and farm implements at seed and 
harvest time. 
The indigenous population and those subject 
to the latifundia system constituted, in fact, a 
socially, economically and politically marginal 
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group. This tended to emphasize their isolation 
from the rest of the community and the hermetic 
nature of their culture, which was accentuated 
by their inability to speak any language other 
than Quechua or Aymará. 
Side by side with the bipolar social structure 
of the large estates—with practically no inter-
mediate groups—^was another hierarchy within 
the rural working population itself. At the top 
of the scale was the colono or tenant farmer, 
followed by the peon or day labourer, who 
worked on the large estates at seed and harvest 
time on behalf of the colono or tenant farmer, 
and finally the hutahuahua, who worked as a 
sharecropper on the tenant farmer's lands. To 
this must be added the fact that most of the 
farms were concentrated in only one third of 
the country's territory. 
Although public expression of the need for 
land reform dates back to the twenties, when the 
problem was first raised in university and 
labour circles,^® it was only after the Chaco 
war that it was included as a principle in the 
programmes of the new political forces. 
However, the realization of this need did not, 
in general, extend beyond the small circle of 
intellectuals to the mass of the rural population, 
with the result that the rural worker's vision 
remained confined to his traditional attachment 
to the land. Moreover, in the ideological argu-
ment for land reform, which was presented in 
different terms, ranging from the purely emo-
tional to extremely radical proposals to trans-
form the agrarian structure, no specific model 
or means for changing the present structure 
were ever specified. This led those responsible 
for agrarian policy to combine a variety of posi-
tions and points of view which were supported 
by the various forces in favour of land reform 
but which did not constitute a precise and 
coherent model. 
(b) Evolution of the land reform process 
In the evolution of the land reform process 
in Bolivia, a distinction should be made between 
the formal or legal aspects or the general pat-
terns governing the structural change and the 
action taken on the estates by the rural workers 
themselves, who spontaneously imposed the type 
of land tenure system in force today. 
Land reform, unlike nationalization, did not 
take place in successive stages, except in reía-
is Resolutions of the Third National Workers' Con-
gress (La Paz, January 1927) and the Programme of 
principles of the Bolivian University Federation (La 
Paz, 1928). 
tion to its final authorization by law. It was 
carried out rapidly and intensively as soon as 
political change made it possible for the rural 
workers to take the initiative and begin to sieze 
the land and divide it up in accordance with 
their own criteria or traditional situation, as 
they organized themselves or were organized 
into unions. Meanwhile, at a much slower pace 
and with all the difficulties inherent in the 
heterogeneity of the political base and the ab-
sence of specific criteria on the agrarian ques-
tion, the process was pursued on the official and 
legislative plane. The work was begun in Janu-
ary 1953 by a commission which prepared a 
draft Land Reform Decree and was completed 
in October 1956 when the Decree was promul-
gated. 
Its general objectives are as follows:^® 
(o) To provide landless or near-landless 
agricultural workers with arable land, on condi-
tion that they work it themselves; 
1® The main provisions of the Decree are: 
(a) Small holding. "A small holding is defined as 
otie which will enable the agricultural worker and his 
family to satisfy their needs in a rational manner. 
However, where there is not enough expropriable land, 
it should be divided among all persons having a right 
to land." Existing small holdings, basically described 
as such because of their physical size, are not subject 
to expropriation, except where they have been 
abandoned. 
(b) Medium-size holding. " A medium-size holding is 
one larger than those in the former category, which, 
without having the characteristics of an agricultural 
enterprise, is farmed with the use of paid labour 
and/or technical and mechanical means, and which, in 
addition, produces for the market." As in the previous 
case, such holdings are not subject to expropriation, 
except in the case of land on which agricultural work-
ers have settled. 
(c) Agricultural enterprise. An agricultural enter-
prise is also not subject to expropriation and "is 
characterized by large-scale capital investment and the 
use of paid labour and modern methods". 
({¿) Co-operative farm land. Co-operative farm land 
is: 
( i ) Land granted to farmers who have formed them-
selves into a co-operative in order to obtain the 
land, rehabilitate it and settle on it; 
(ii) Land belonging to small and medium-size 
holders, who have joined together to form the 
capital stock of the co-operative; 
(iii) Land formerly belonging to latifundios granted 
to agricultural workers, if they organize them-
selves into a co-operative in order to farm it. 
(e) Latifundio-. 
( i ) "The State does not recognize the latifundio, 
which is a rural property of large size, varying 
according to its geographical situation, which is 
either not farmed or farmed inefSciently.. 
(ii) "The disappearance of the latifundio is an 
essential condition for passing beyond the feudal 
stage." 
( / ) Restoration of land belonging to indigenous 
communities, defined in the Decree as land "usurped 
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(6) To restore to the indigenous communities 
land which had been taken away from them; 
(c) To free the rural workers from their serf-
like condition; 
(d) To stimulate greater productivity in agri-
cultural industries and improve the marketing of 
their products; 
(e) To preserve the country's natural re-
sources, and 
( / ) To encourage the mobility of the rural 
population. 
(c) Administrative aspects of land reform 
The administrative aspects of land reform, 
together with the legal adjudication procedure, 
have proved the greatest stumbling block to its 
establishment on a legal basis. Two new gov-
ernment agencies were created to deal with the 
general process of administration: the Ministry 
of Rural Affairs and the National Land Reform 
Council. The latter had a subsidiary body—^the 
National Land Reform Service—to carry out its 
after 1 JanuaiTr 1900". Land at present belonging to 
such communities was left outside the scope of the 
Decree on the ground that it would require special 
legislation, which has not yet been effected. Meanwhile, 
the Decree establishes that the property of an indi-
genous community "is not subject to expropriation, 
except in cases to be established under special regula-
tions". It is further stated that "landless agricultural 
workers who live in indigenous commimities without 
belonging to them and work for landowners within the 
community have a right to be granted a piece of land 
in the uncultivated areas, not larger than the present 
average holding of families not belonging to the 
community". 
(g) Allotment of land. "All Bolivians of more than 
18 years of age who are engaged or wish to be en-
gaged in agricultural work shall be allotted land wher-
ever it is available". 
(h) Allotment of land in latifundios for collective 
farming. "With a view to establishing a co-operative 
system, where there is excess pasture land on the large 
estates, this land shall be allotted collectively to the 
beneficiaries." Where a large estate is subject to ex-
propriation and where there is surplus pasture land, 
provision is made to allot part of this land for collec-
tive farming, with a view to promoting "a co-operative 
system". The rest of the area should be used for a 
sohool, sports grounds and urban development, and if 
there is any land left it should revert to the State for 
future allotment to individuals. 
(£) "The trade union is recognized as a means of 
defending the rights of its members and of safeguarding 
social advances." 
( / ) The provision of free labour is abolished and 
wages are to be regarded as the accepted form of 
remuneration. 
(k) The recognized form of expropriation is by means 
of twenty-five-year non-convertible land reform bonds 
which will accrue interest at an annual rate of 2 per 
cent. 
operational activities. These agencies were 
added to the existing machinery and acted com-
pletely independently, although they had few 
resources. 
The Ministry of Rural Affairs was created to 
pursue certain fundamental social and political 
ends. From the political standpoint, its activities 
were directed towards the organization of farm 
workers' imions, and in the social field it con-
centrated on the promotion of rural education 
and on education policy. At the same time the 
Ministry was involved in the processing of land 
reform cases, and this became its chief pre-
occupation, to the extent that it eventually had 
the final say in the settlement of such cases. 
Although the National Land Reform Council 
was in principle established to deal with aspects 
relating to changes in structure—from the 
processing of the cases to technical assistance 
to the beneficiaries—in practice it dealt only 
with the establishment of legal entitlement to 
the land, and became principally an agrarian 
court, although its decisions were not final. 
(d) Extent and depth of the process 
Disregarding the intermediate events leading 
to the break-up of the Bolivian agrarian struc-
ture, the actual and almost immediate imple-
mentation of the reform in the rural areas had 
far-reaching effects, particularly in the zones 
near the urban centres, where there was a 
greater concentration of rural workers who had 
greater mobility, and where political action 
spread rapidly. The changes were also greater, 
as was to be expected, in the large estates where 
the seigneurial system was most deeply rooted. 
Although there are as yet no data which make 
it possible to measure the change in depth, since 
only now are full evaluation studies being made, 
the information obtained in the 1950 Agricul-
tural Census and in the sample survey carried 
out in 1963 by the National Sample Survey 
Office of the Ministry of Finance provides a basis 
for certain hypotheses on the changes in the 
land tenure structure. Both series, apart from 
having their own limitations, are not strictly 
comparable. They have, therefore, been collated 
at very high levels of aggregation, in order to 
reveal a number of trends which, supported by 
empirical observations, might provide a basis 
for certain hypotheses. Nevertheless, these data— 
however incomplete they may be—reveal changes 
which are so far-reaching that it is clear that 
they do reflect the situation with a certain 
amount of objectivity. 
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Only the changes which occurred in the tra-
ditional farming area will be studied,^ since, 
apart from the fact that most of the agricultural 
population lives there, it was the scene of the 
most important land reforms. The farms in the 
Llanos Orientales were not included, because 
they would have distorted the comparison, since 
that region includes the larger units and land 
reform had practically no importance there (see 
tables 8 and 9 ) . The absence of pressure to 
secure land effectively limited action in that 
region and there were no changes of importance 
in the land tenure structure. In view of his dual 
role as small producer and wage-earner, the 
agricultural worker in the Llanos Orientales 
pressed his claims more in terms of the market 
for his products and labour. For those engaged 
in the extraction of rubber and the harvesting 
of Brazil nuts, the basic problem was not so 
much the availability of land as their subordi-
nation to a strongly monopolistic commercial 
activity. The only important movement in favour 
of a change in the land tenure structure in this 
region was in the areas near the city of Santa 
Cruz, and it was more the result of political 
circumstances than of pressure to secure land. 
In the traditional farming area, with the 
mobilization of social and political forces the 
agricultural worker seized possession of the land 
20 According to the 1950 Agricultural Census, the to-
tal farming area was approximately 33 million hectares, 
divided among 86,377 farm units. The large estates 
worked by communities of pegujederos, sayañeros, colo-
nos and tenant farmers possessed 12.7 million hectares, 
and the land owned by the indigenous communities 
amounted to 7.2 million hectares. These two forms of 
tenure accounted for 61 per cent of the total area and 
a little more than 70 per cent of the area under cul-
tivation. (See Antonio Garcia, "La reforma agraria y el 
desarrollo social" in Reformas agrarias en la América 
Latina, ed. Oscar Delgado (Mexico, Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1965), p. 407.) 
on which he was living without delay, and this 
movement spread in various ways and degrees 
to most of the large estates. Table 9 reveals that 
not only did the number and proportion of small 
units increase, but that their share of agricul-
tural land also increased from 1.8 to 50 per cent. 
Apparently, both the large estates and medium-
sized holdings lost part of their land to the small 
holdings, since in both cases the average size 
declined. This is because on almost all farms, 
even in the indigenous communities, there were 
traditional colonos, sharecroppers and landless 
day-labourers who asserted their claims. More-
over, it is a well known fact that the demand for 
suitable land outstripped supply, with the result 
that in 1955, for example, the average size of a 
holding in irrigation areas in the district of 
Cochabamba had to be reduced from 50 to 20 
hectares. (Legislative Decree of 17 February.) 
On the other hand, in 1963 a significant pro-
portion of relatively large estates were still owned 
by very few units, because not all the estates 
in the traditional zone had been expropriated in 
their entirety, either on account of their size, 
type or system of farming, or because of the 
lack of social pressure. Similarly, community 
lands, which contain some fairly extensive prop-
erties, were also not expropriated, except that— 
as on the other estates—^the colonos or share-
croppers, and even the day labourers, took 
possession of the land on which they were living 
either temporarily or as a matter of tradition. 
If all the agricultural land in the country 
were included in the land tenure structure, the 
distribution would be different, but even in this 
case the share of small holdings would increase 
from 0.7 to 20 per cent of the total area (see 
again table 8 ) . 
From the standpoint of farm units, the result 
of the land reform was that the number of large 
units was reduced by 73 per cent, or by 67 per 
Table 8 
BOLIVIA: DISTRIBUTION OF LAND TENURE, 1950 AND 1963 
1950 1963 
























Below 20 77 0.7 3.2 97.8 20 3.9 
20 to 100 , , 9 1.0 42.9 1.4 3 33.5 
Above 100 14 98.3 2,765 0.8 77 2,140.0 
SOURCES: 1950: Statistics and Census Office, Censo agropecuario; 1963: National Sample Survey Office, 
Maestreo estadístico, 1963. 
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Table 2 (.continued') 
BOLIVIA: DISTRIBUTION OF LAND TENURE IN THE TRADITIONAL FARMING 
AREA a 1950 AND 1963 

























Below 20 79 1.8 3.2 98.0 50 3.9 
20 to 100 9 2.9 42.9 1.4 7 33.5 
Above 100 12 95.3 1,051 0.6 43 489.0 
SOURCES: AS for table 8. 
a The Altiplano, Valles and Yungas. 
cent if the Llanos Orientales are also taken into 
account (see table 10) . 
Table 10 
BOLIVIA: PERCENTAGE VARIATION IN CENSUS 
UNITS BETWEEN 1950 AND 1963 
Size of units Increase or 
(hectares) , decrease 
f percentage) 
The whole country. 
Below 20 562 
20 to 100 —16 
Above 100 —67 
The whole country, excluding the Llanos 
Orientales •. 
Below 20 562 
20 to 100 —16 
Above 100 —73 
SOURCES: AS for table 8. 
The reduction in the number of medium-sized 
units was smaller, but stiU significant. In addi-
tion to the causes mentioned above, many land-
owners, either for reasons of security or because 
they had little interest in continuing to farm 
their land in face of the change in labour rela-
tions and the consequent higher costs, abandoned 
their land, which passed into the hands of the 
agricultural workers. Finally, the number of 
small units was 5.6 times higher, and it is this 
increase which constitutes the basic feature of 
the land reform process. 
In view of the size of this increase, a more 
detailed analysis should be made of its eifect on 
the new land tenure structure, which seems to 
have become firmly established now that the 
most dynamic phase of the reform is over. 
Firstly, the average size of small holdings rose 
slightly, from 3.2 to 3.9 hectares (see again 
table 8 ) . However, apart from the fact that the 
change is not very significant and that it might 
have been supposed that the size would decline 
because of the increase in the number of hold-
ings, it should be remembered that the regis-
tered units are often composed of several smaller 
plots quite separate from each other, this being 
a feature of the traditional structure and farm-
ing methods. Because of the periods in which 
the land lies fallow, which ranged from three to 
twelve years, and because the land occupied by 
the indigenous inhabitants was marginal, the 
rural worker's family allotment, apart from 
being small, was divided into several separate 
plots. Thus, the agricultural worker took posses-
sion of his family allotment, plus the other plots 
he was accustomed to work. The first to be 
expropriated were, of course, the ones most suit-
able for farming or the ones already under 
cultivation, to be followed later by the land lying 
fallow. Apart from the fact that this slowed up 
the processing of land tenure cases, it also led 
in the end to greater fragmentation of the small 
holdings and thus held up the development of 
this type of farming. As can be seen in table 11, 
the average size of most of the plots was 0.55 
hectares, and even in the larger holdings it was 
only 1.3 hectares. 
This picture is confirmed by an analysis of 
events of a legal and administrative nature. A 
study which took the individual plots distributed 
as its point of departure, without taking into 
account who the proprietors were, showed that 
the land tenure structure was extremely frag-
mented, with about 520,000 hectares divided into 
135,000 plots.21 Most of them had an average 
of less than 0.31 hectares (see table 12) . In 
contrast, the larger holdings had an average size 
of 31 hectares. 
21 The study was carried out by the National Land 
Reform Council and the Planning Board in 1962 as 
part of the preparatory work for the Ten-Year Develop-
ment Plan, and it covered 49,000 beneficiaries who had 
received their title-deeds between 1955 and 1959. 
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Table 2 (.continued') 
BOLIVIA: SIZE CLASSIFICATION OF PLOTS IN RELATION TO SMALL 























Below 1 hectare ... 55 150 2.8 0.17 0.47 
1 to 5 hectares . . . . 266 1,125 4.2 0.55 2.31 
5 to 20 hectares . . . 114 699 6.1 1.30 7.93 
SOURCES: AS for table 8. 
Table 12 
BOLIVIA: SIZE CLASSIFICATION OF PLOTS TO 
















Below 1 hectare 90 28 0.31 
1 to 5 hectares 32 85 2.66 
Above 5 hectares . . . 13 408 31.0 
TOTAL 135 521 
SOURCES: National Land Reform Council and the 
National Planning and Co-ordination Department. 
Also based on the records of the National 
Land Reform Council, another study,^^ which 
took as its point of departure a breakdown of 
the cases actually processed, showed how much 
land had actually been distributed to the bene-
ficiaries and how much remained in the hands 
of traditional owners. According to the law, 
division of the large estates could give rise to 
two types of ownership at one and the same 
time: individual and collective,^® the second type 
being designed to foster co-operative farming. 
Table 13 shows that there were still 2,900 
landowners with individual title to land repre-
senting 30.4 per cent of the total area distrib-
uted. 
On the other hand, when it is considered that 
1.4 million hectares were handed over to the 
agricultural workers and certain medium-sized 
landowners as collective land, the proportion of 
land remaining in the hands of the old land-
22 National Land Reform Council, with advisory serv-
ices provided by FAO. 
23 Collectively-owned land was usually intended for 
pasture. Where a medium-sized estate has extensive 
pasture land, both the landowner and the agricultural 
workers have the right to use those lands in common. 
owners drops to 16.3 per cent of the total area 
distributed up to 1961. 
(e) Economic evaluation 
The economic repercussions of the land reform 
have constantly engrossed attention. It has been 
held responsible for successes and failures alike, 
whereas the truth is that both have usually been 
due to factors unconnected with the reform 
project itself. For instance, the development of 
agriculture in Santa Cruz, where production of 
sugar-cane, rice, cotton, maize, vegetables and 
other crops has considerably increased, is not 
directly attributable to the process of reform. 
Apart from the fact that the effort to provide 
technical assistance and credit facilities has been 
focused almost entirely on that part of the 
country, road communications have been estab-
lished between the Oriente and the traditional 
consumer centres and sugar-mills have been in-
stalled and improved; and a new agrarian struc-
ture has been organized, based on private in-
vestors and immigrants, with the participation— 
though on a more modest scale—of local small-
holders and new settlers from the traditional 
farming areas. 
On the other hand, decreases in production 
have been imputed to the land reform, as well 
as the expansion of imports. 
As statistics on production are generally in-
adequate, the analysis of its trends is based on 
the evolution and composition of agricultural 
imports. Of the crops grown in the traditional 
farming area,^^ wheat is the only one included 
among Bolivia's main imports of foodstuffs. It 
has been imported in increasing quantities, not 
only because of the insufficiency of the domestic 
2^ The most important of the crops grown in the 
traditional agricultural area are wheat, barley, maize, 
potatoes and quinoa, which account for 80 per cent of 
the farmland in question. Of the total area used for the 
cultivation of each, they take up, respectively, 96, 100, 
71 and 94 per cent. 
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Table 13 












Landowners 2,900 2.9 490 30.4 
Individual allotment (agri-
cultural workers) 96,000 97.1 1,120 69.6 
TOTAL 98,900 100.0 1,610 100.0 
SOURCES: AS for table 12. 
supply, which has remained almost stationary, 
but for other reasons which will be given below. 
Thus, the non-appearance of the other tradi-
tional-area crops among staple food imports 
suggests that in their case there have been no 
supply shortages, except as a result of tempo-
rary circumstances (see table 14). 
Table 14 
BOLIVIA: MAIN IMPORTS OF FOODSTUFFS, 
1945-55 AND 1960-64 
(Thousands of tons) 
Commodity 1945-52 1953-55 1960-64 
Beef cattle 8.6 4.8 1.8 
Lard 2.1 2.8 7.7 
Wheat and wheat flouro 71.0 85.8 135.9 
Milk products 2.5 4.9 5.3 
Sugar 33.5 48.1 14.7 
Edible oils 1.0 1.4 2.8 
8.9 10.8 2.9 
SOURCES: El desarrollo económico de Bolivia, United 
Nations publication, Sales No.: 58.II.G.2, p. 265, table 
189; and National Planning and Co-ordination Depart-
ment, Plan bienal 1965-66: Sector Agropecuario. 
^ Flour is expressed in terms of wboat equivalent, 
by application of an extraction rate of 75 per cent. 
The rise in the value of imports of agricul-
tural commodities which took place in 1953-55 
was purely due to an exchange and price régime 
that favoured consumption of foreign products 
and their re-export to neighbouring markets. 
Wheat was re-exported not only as flour but 
even in the form of bread. Nor was this the 
only period in which wheat production was dis-
couraged. Subsequently, with the stagnation of 
domestic production, imports of wheat and wheat 
flour under agreements with the United States 
Government increased to so marked an extent 
that by 1961 trade with other countries, notably 
Argentina, was affected. Consequently, from 1962 
onwards, in agreements concluded under the 
terms of United States Law No. 480, it was 
stipulated that amounts up to a total of 40,000 
tons could be imported from any market. In 
1958-64, imports of wheat and wheat flour ac-
counted for about 40 per cent of total pur-
chases of agricultural commodities, while in the 
year 1961 their share rose to almost 50 per cent. 
During the same period, a decline was regis-
tered not only in the proportion of total imports 
represented by those of agricultural origin, but 
also in the average amount of foreign exchange 
earmarked for agricultural imports (see table 
15). 
Table 15 
BOLIVIA: SHARE OF AGRICULTURAL COM-
MODITIES IN TOTAL IMPORTS, 1945-55 AND 
1958-64 











1945.52a , . 24.3 66.6 36.48 
1953-55b 28.7 71.6 40.08 
1958-64C 21.9 85.4 25.60 
SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
® Period preceding the land reform, 
b Period preceding stabilization of the currency. 
«Period during which the currency was stabilized. 
With regard to the nature and suitability of 
the structure of ownership and organizational 
patterns that as a result of the land reform have 
superseded the system formerly prevailing in the 
traditional farming area, there are grounds for 
assuming that the new models have also failed 
to provide a favourable basis for the assimila-
tion and diffusion of technical progress in 
traditional agriculture, although opinion is 
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unanimous as to the deficiencies of the previous 
structure. In the first place, the minifundio prob-
lem seems to have been aggravated—a develop-
ment which is all the more serious in view of the 
ecological characteristics of the area where it is 
taking place—^and this presumably means that 
there has been no modification of one of the 
factors determining the stagnation in traditional 
agriculture. To improve the situation, not only 
would it be necessary to introduce further ad-
justments in the agrarian structure and speed up 
the issue of legal title-deeds to the various cate-
gories of owners, but also resources would have 
to be mobilized to improve yields. For all these 
purposes, the active participation of those most 
concerned—Bolivia's rural labour sector—^would 
be a sine qua non. 
( f ) The political and social framework 
Although the impact of the land reform can-
not as yet be precisely assessed, there are indi-
cations that an essential change has taken place 
in social relationships. Rural workers are being 
drawn together by their own common interests, 
and have succeeded in making their presence 
felt in community life. Perhaps this is the most 
significant and most indisputable effect of the 
land reform in Bolivia. Although one of the 
basic objectives pursued was precisely that of 
restoring their human dignity to the rural popu-
lation, Üie dynamics of the process have sur-
passed expectations not only in respect of the 
change in the agrarian structure, but also as 
regards other types of social phenomena. 
"Ownership of the land and the right to vote 
have given the Andean Indian a new approach 
to life, and, above all, have rescued him from 
the state of humiliation in which, pariah-like, 
he had been sunk for centuries. . . . TTie spirit of 
self-betterment which now characterizes the 
Indian inhabitant of the highlands of Bolivia 
is plain to be seen. The school, once so neg-
lected and standing almost idle, is now the insti-
tution most eagerly coveted and supported by 
the indigenous population."^® The progress 
achieved in respect of rural schools and school 
attendance, a high proportion of which is at-
tributable to the indigenous campesinos them-
selves, is evidenced by the fact that between 1950 
and 1963 the nimiber of schools increased from 
1,900 to 6,300 and the number of pupils from 
50,000 to 231,000. 
25 See Olen E. Leonard, El cambio económico y social 
en cuatro comunidades del Altiplano de Bolivia, Insti-
tuto Indigenista Interamericano, Mexico, 1966, intro-
duction. 
3. SECTORAL DIVERSIFICATION AND GEOGRAPHICAL 
INTEGRATION 
The third objective of the economic policy 
brought into operation in 1952 was twofold, 
simultaneously comprising the diversification 
of the production system and the integration of 
two major geo-economic areas—^the Altiplano 
and the Valles—with the Oriente. 
The diversification of the economy was ini-
tiated in the petroleum sector, in an endeavour 
to find a new mainspring of development. The 
petroleum policy applied in the preceding dec-
ade had laid the foundations of this industry, 
which, from 1952 onwards, gained renewed 
and stronger impetus. While investment in the 
previous five years had amounted to over 20 
million dollars, so that about 30 per cent of 
domestic consumption had been satisfied by 
the home industry, in 1952-61 Yacimientos 
Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) in-
vested approximately 140 million dollars, and 
by 1954 domestic consumption requirements 
were already being fully met, except in the case 
of a few special petroleum products. 
In its first phase, YPFB's efforts were directed 
towards its constitution as an integrated in-
dustry covering every stage of activity from de-
velopment operations to marketing. To this end, 
it invested substantial sums in purchasing equip-
ment, drilling extensively both in oilfields in 
production and in exploration areas, laying oil 
pipelines to link up the mines and the Pacific 
coast, constructing refineries, and installing 
storage plants in all the larger towns and major 
distribution areas. Permanent oil camps were 
also built, and endowed with all the necessary 
industrial facilities and social and administra-
tive services. 
As from 1956, however, the momentum gath-
ered began to slacken, largely owing to the 
effects of stabilization policy and to the deple-
tion of the deposits which YPFB had been work-
ing until then. Furthermore, under the Petro-
leum Code promulgated at that juncture, the 
activities of the enterprise were confined to a 
virtually unproductive area. As a result of the 
stabilization measures applied, YPFB's supplies 
of foreign exchange were so considerably re-
duced that it had difiSculty in purchasing equip-
ment and spare parts and meeting the financial 
commitments deriving from the construction of 
the new pipelines. Between 1952-56 and 1957-62, 
YPFB's average foreign exchange receipts 
dropped from 8.08 million to 4.10 million 
dollars. 
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In addition, it was compelled to sell petro-
leum fuels at low and frozen prices, besides 
having to maintain a policy of credit sales to 
other State enterprises, which endangered its 
own financial stability. 
The deterioration of the financial position 
coincided with the stage at which the existing 
oilfields—in particular that of Camiri,^ ® which 
supplied 90 per cent of domestic consumer de-
mand—^had been fully developed, so that in the 
course of nature exhaustion of the reserves was 
inevitable. From 1957 onwards, production be-
gan to follow a gradual downward trend (see 
table 16). 
Table 16 
B O L I V I A : P R O D U C T I O N O F C R U D E P E T R O L E U M 
B Y Y A A M I E N T O S P E T R O L I F E R O S F I S C A L E S 
B O L I V I A N O S ( Y P F B ) , 1942-64 















SOURCE: Central Bank of Bolivia, Boletín No. 176, 
September 1966. 
Although a measure of recovery ensued, 
thanks to a crash programme which raised 
Camiri's output by 100,000 cubic metres of 
crude petroleum in 1963, in view of the progres-
sive depletion of this oilfield a change of trend 
is unlikely; on the contrary, the situation and 
prospects of the State petroleum enterprise will 
probably grow still worse. Thus, apart from the 
need for YPFB to place its finances on a sound 
footing and replenish its capital, its future de-
velopment will be contingent upon the discovery 
of new oilfields. But this again is no easy task, 
since under the 1955 Petroleum Code the areas 
with the highest production potential were 
thrown open to foreign companies, whereas 
YPFB was in effect restricted to working its 
traditional oilfields. 
28 Camiri is in the south-east of Bolivia, in the sub-
Andean watershed. 
The construction of the Cochabamba-Santa 
Cruz highway was the first important step to be 
taken in respect of geographical integration. 
The completion of this road in 1955 opened 
up hopeful prospects, since it permitted mass 
access of financial and human resources to an 
area in which natural resources abounded. As 
a result, cultivation of certain crops increased, 
and stronger interest was aroused in the idea 
of geographical integration throughout the 
whole territory. 
State efforts, backed by substantial credit 
from the Banco Agrícola, were concentrated 
in agricultural industries; a large sugar-mill 
was built, and the existing mills were mod-
ernized. In the field of livestock industries, a 
slaughterhouse and cold-storage plant was con-
structed, with the aim of promoting cattle- and 
pig-breeding and obviating the need to import 
pork lard. 
Branch roads connecting with the main ar-
terial highway were also built, a measure which 
did much to further the development of the 
petroleum industry. 
To improve the geographical distribution of 
the population, the Government started by mak-
ing a few experiments to test the indigenous 
population's capacity for adaptation to condi-
tions in the Oriente. Independent settlers had 
been moving into the area on a fairly large scale 
ever since the Chaco war; but, in addition, a 
recruitment campaign was now initiated and an 
official pilot settlement established. The next 
step was to begin the construction of approach 
roads in the tropical zone with a view to the 
encouragement of larger population shifts and 
the implementation of a planned settlement 
programme. This programme provided for the 
installation of 90,000 households in the Yapa-
cani. Alto Beni and Chapare areas, situated in 
the Departments of Santa Cruz, La Paz and 
Cochabamba, respectively. 
Broadly speaking, the Santa Cruz diversifica-
tion programme enjoyed a good deal of success, 
since most of the import substitution targets 
were attained, and a sensitive structure of pro-
duction, capable of responding to market pres-
sures, was established on a sound footing. For 
example, table 17 shows the large scale on 
which the principal import substitution crops 
were being grown in 1964 by agricultural enter-
prises and on medium-sized farms. The same 
cannot be said of land activities, settlement 
whether officially-planned or independent, for 
in that year the greater part of the farmland 
held by settlers was still under subsistence 
crops. At the end of the first five-year period 
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Table 2 (.continued') 













Independent settlers, officially 
sponsored settlers, and im-
migrantsa 41,500 3,500b 5,000c 
Agricultural enterprises and 
medium-sized farms 26,500 15,750 1,950 
50,000 
56,000 100,000 
SOURCE: National Planning and Co-ordination Department, Plan bienal 1965-66: Sector 
agropecuario. 
a The total number of settlers' households is estimated at 20,000. 
b Immigrants' settlements, comprising 700 households account for 3,000 hectares. 
«The area used for growing sugar-cane is farmed by 2,000 rural families only. 
(1962-66), the targets established for transfers 
of settlers under the government plan were still 
a long way off, since only about 8 per cent of 
the total number programmed for 1962-71 had 
actually been effected. Secondly, the settle-
ments have not been satisfactorily consolidated, 
mainly because of deficient marketing con-
ditions. 
C. THE STABILIZATION PHASE (1957-64) 
1. THE OUITBREAK OF INFLATION IN 1952-56 
The economic policy programme was to en-
counter a severe setback when, from 1952 
onwards, inflationary pressures were unleashed, 
and the average annual rate of increase of over-
all price levels rose from 18 per cent in 1945-51 
to nearly 150 per cent in 1952-56 (see table 18) . 
Table 18 
BOLIVIA: ANNUAL RATE OF INCREASE OF 


















SOURCE: National Department of Statistics and Cen-
suses (Dirección Nacional de Estadística v Censos). 
The inflationary process was aggravated by 
structural factors dating back to the early 
1930s, and others that had their origin in the 
revolutionary movement of 1952. 
Since the Chaco war (1932-35), Bolivia had 
been affected by chronic inflation, although the 
area of its market economy was very small. 
Instead of a national market proper, there 
were a number of local markets, more or less 
cut off from one another, which had grown up 
around the urban centres of La Paz, Oruro, 
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz and their neigh-
bouring agricultural and mining areas. A large 
proportion of the rural population, which still 
represents about 70 per cent of the total popula-
tion of Bolivia, was not incorporated in the 
market, economy; the industrial sector was 
small, and the role played by the banking sys-
tem was insignificant. Lastly, neither the middle-
income urban groups nor even the better-
organized categories of workers, such as the 
miners, constituted strong political and social 
pressure groups. 
With the market economy on such a shaky 
footing, structural imbalances existed, which 
generated an inflationary process of the chronic 
type. In contrast to the situation in other Latin 
American countries during the same period, the 
source of pressure was not the change in the 
development model brought about by an in-
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dustrialization movement based on import sub-
stitution and designed to increase the dynamic 
potential of the domestic market as a factor 
of growth. In Bolivia the economic model was 
still that of a primary exporter country, and 
the distortions that gave rise to inflationary 
pressures must be sought in the evolution of the 
external sector on the one hand and, on the 
other, in the dephasing between the country's 
slow economic growth and the more rapid de-
velopment of political and social forces among 
the groups included in the market economy. The 
external imbalance found expression in fluctua-
tions, and the socio-economic maladjustment 
in the deficit financing to which the public 
sector has resorted, persistently although in 
varying degrees, since the time of the Chaco 
war. 
Prior to 1952, the external sector generated 
inflationary pressure either through limitation 
of the supply of imported goods, as in 1935-39, 
or through the production of internal income 
without counterpart imports of goods and serv-
ices, as, for instance, during the Second World 
War. The socio-political pressures, in their 
turn, stemmed essentially from the middle-
income urban groups, whose demands compelled 
the public sector to increase its expenditure 
on the basis of deficit financing, since they could 
not be satisfied out of the surplus transferred 
from the mining sector and from agriculture 
itself to the State, or directly to the urban 
groups through the manipulation of relative 
prices by means of exchange measures. 
The combination of these two factors kept in-
flationary pressures, of different degrees of in-
tensity, latent throughout the period 1932-51. 
However, the very simplicity of Bolivia's socio-
political structure precluded snowballing effects, 
since there were no such propagation mecha-
nisms as usually exist in more complex societies. 
Hence, during the whole of this period, inflation 
was a chronic type, but did not escape all 
bounds, as it was to do from 1952 onwards. 
For purposes of analysis, the inflationary 
process in the period under discussion can be 
divided into two clearly-demarcated phases. 
The first began in April 1952 and lasted 
throughout 1953, during which time the cost-
of-living index rose by 173 per cent. An initial 
attempt at stabilization during the phase proved 
fruitless, although the rate of increase of prices 
was slowed down a little. The second phase 
covered the years 1954 and 1955, reaching its 
climax in 1956, when the stabilization pro-
gramme was launched. In both phases, recourse 
was had to substantial Central Bank issues in 
order to finance public expenditure and the 
nationalized mining industry. The difference be-
tween the two lay in the fact that whereas in the 
first phase the capacity to import was reduced 
by a decline in exports, during the second im-
ports recovered, thanks to United States aid, 
which began to supplement the country's dimin-
ishing foreign exchange export earnings to a 
significant extent (see table 19) In other 
words, while one of the major causes of the 
acceleration of the inflationary process in 1953 
was a falling-off in aggregate supply, during the 
later months of 1956 the rise in prices was 
speeded up by the propagation mechanism that 
came into play. 
On the demand side, in 1953 the money 
supply doubled in relation to 1952, mainly on 
account of the loans and advances granted to 
the mining sector. In this sector, costs in local 
currency had risen considerably, whereas its 
income in bolivianos did not increase, because 
foreign exchange earnings surrendered by the 
mining companies had to be sold to the Central 
Bank at the oflicial rate of 60 bolivianos to the 
dollar. By way of compensation, to enable the 
sector to operate, it was accorded very liberal 
facilities in the shape of Central Bank credits 
and advances. Moreover, the Government's ex-
penditure in bolivianos was twice as great as 
in 1952. 
Thanks to the relative simplicity of the 
market economy which the Government had in-
herited, in conjunction with the nationalization 
of the bulk of the mining industry and the fact 
that the State had become the sole purchaser 
of all mining products for export, competition 
for the economic surplus could only take the 
form of pressure on the public sector to use two 
mechanisms: the issue of money by the Central 
Bank, and the manipulation of the exchange sys-
tem with a view to the transfer of income from 
the mining sector to the Government and con-
sumers. The over-valuation of the boliviano in 
The following were the external events that speeded 
up the inflationary process in the first phase. The 
favourable world tin market situation brought about 
by the hostilities in Korea began to deteriorate in 1952; 
in 1951 New York tin quotations had averaged 1.27 
dollar cents per pound of fine, and in the months im-
mediately preceding the revolution, the mining com-
panies were negotiating agreements with purchasers 
on the basis of 1.21 cents per pound, but in the course 
of the year a price decline set in. In 1953 quotations 
continued to fall, abruptly this time, dropping to 0.81 
cents in the United States and 0.76 cents in London. 
This was why current foreign exchange income was 
30 per cent lower in 1953 than in 1952, with the con-
sequent serious repercusions on the volume of imports. 
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Table 19 
BOLIVIA: CAPACITY TO IMPORT AND IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES, 1950-64 

































1950 —3.6 +8 .5 + 0 . 4 —9.0 77.3 78.3 +1.0 
1951 126.3 —3.3 +7 .5 +0 .4 —1.1 129.4 119.6 - 9 . 8 
1952 (4-18.8) +13.3 + 1 . 0 —2.7 124.5 122.9 - 1 . 6 
1953 67.0 —1.9 —12.2 +2 .6 +13.1 66.0 89.8 +23.8 
1954 75.4 —1.1 +19.2 +14.7 +6 .6 100.1 91.5 —8.6 
1955 85.4 —4.1 +35.1 +18.9 —15.9 100.5 103.5 +3.0 
1956 87.0 —3.1 +43.8 +18.9 - ^ 3 . 9 83.8 104.1 +20.3 
1957 79.3 —2.6 +25.1 +27.2 +11.2 113.0 108.4 - 4 . 6 
1958 —2.1 +31.7 +26.4 +1 .1 87.6 90.5 +2.9 
1959 ( + 2 . 6 ) +43.8 +22.6 +16.5 94.1 91.8 - 2 . 3 
1960 58.1 (+1 .1 ) +30.9 +12.8 —3.1 87.0 89.7 +2.7 
1961 - 0 . 8 +37.1 +21.4 —6.8 98.4 95.9 - 2 . 5 
1962 —2.9 +47.2 +19.7 —2.3 113.2 117.3 +4.1 
1963 84.4 —2.8 +56 .2 +25.9 —5.2 132.6 127.2 —5.4 
1964 111.4 —3.2 +47.9 +22.9 —12.0 144.1 127.3 —16.8 
SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of data from International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook. 
relation to exports made it impossible to de-
termine production costs in the mining sector, 
and, therefore, to assess the real surplus it 
generated. Accordingly, the path chosen was the 
inflationary issue of money as an illusory means 
of distributing a surplus that in any event was 
too small to satisfy the expectations and finance 
the programmes of the new political and social 
forces which had grown up, and which were 
basically represented by the miners and by 
urban groups linked to the public sector. Fur-
thermore, the over-valuation of the boliviano 
in relation to imports gave rise to a latent 
nominal demand which strongly influenced 
prices, especially at a time when the supply 
of imported goods was dwindling. 
This threefold contingency—a decline in the 
supply of imports, over-valuation of the ex-
change rate and a considerable increase in the 
means of payment unaccompanied by any cor-
responding increase whatsoever in domestic pro-
duction of goods and services, which seems to 
have contracted somewhat in the course of 
1953—began to result in a sharp upswing in 
prices, until, halfway through the year, an en-
deavour was made to put a stabilization pro-
gramme into effect. 
This first attempt at stabilization failed to 
control the inflationary process that had been 
sparked ofl' in 1952. The socio-political pres-
sures engendered by the revolutionary movement 
over-rode concern at the efifects of inflation. 
Moreover, the situation had not become un-
manageable for the public sector, whose atten-
tion was concentrated on the substantive changes 
it was introducing. 
Thus began the second phase of the infla-
tionary process, covering the years 1954 and 
1955 and culminating in the 1956 stabilization 
programme. During this period, the Govern-
ment was compelled to adopt supplementary 
measures which were intended to remedy the 
shortcomings of the stabilization effort em-
barked upon in 1953, but only succeeded in 
making matters worse, until a climax was 
reached in the shape of the hyperinflation that 
took place in the second half of 1956. 
The devaluation of the exchange rate, for 
example, was not an effective solution for the 
problem of the local-currency financing of the 
mining industry, since the resulting increase in 
income proved insufiScient, especially as the 
level of domestic prices continued to rise, and 
with it the local-currency cost of inputs. Thus, 
the Central Bank's loans and advances to the 
mining sector, channelled through COMIBOL 
and the Banco Minero, came to represent a 
major proportion of total issues by the Central 
Bank in 1955. In that year, the exchange rate 
for the foreign currency held by the Banco 
Minero and COMIBOL was raised again, al-
though to a lesser extent in the case of the latter 
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institution. Nevertheless, costs continued to in-
crease much more rapidly, so that the Central 
Bank had to go on providing direct financing 
for the nationalized mining industry. 
In its turn, the attempt to expand real puhlic 
expenditure in order to cover the revolutionary 
movement's programmes, in combination with 
the persistent upward trend of internal prices, 
led the State to resort increasingly to infla-
tionary financing in 1954 and 1955. Regular in-
come was augmented by means of indirect taxes 
on imports and on consumer goods, which bore 
primarily and heavily on the cost of living. In 
the second place, direct recourse was had to 
Central Bank issues to finance public-sector ex-
penditure, in particular that of the autonomous 
institutions, many of which were the executing 
agencies of the Government's programmes. 
The inflationary process continued to spiral, 
and by the beginning of 1954 wage and salary 
increases of 50 per cent for the private sector 
and 25 per cent for public employees had to be 
decreed. Furthermore, to enable the private sec-
tor to finance its operations, the regulations gov-
erning the statutory cash reserve of commercial 
banks were suspended, with the result that in 
1954 and 1955 their turnover increased. Al-
though this movement represented only a small 
proportion of the monetary expansion, in any 
event it spurred on the inflationary process. 
The foregoing circumstances speeded up in-
flation by way of monetary expansion. The other 
important contributory factor in this second 
phase was constituted by exchange policy and 
the speculation that grew up in consequence 
of the combination of a shortage of foreign ex-
change with the maintenance of an over-valued 
exchange rate. The problem was still further 
aggravated because, in order to lessen the dis-
parity between the cost of goods imported at 
the official exchange rate (190 bolivianos to the 
dollar) and the prices paid for them within the 
country, a regime known as the system of "re-
versibles" was established. It consisted in an 
exchange surcharge varying for each category 
of goods and each local market, and determined 
by the Ministry of Economic Afl'airs and by 
local boards, which allocated import quotas for 
the various products. Thus, the maintenance of 
an over-valued exchange rate inevitably led to 
the reintroduction of the multiple exchange 
rates which the first stabilization effort had 
sought to abolish. 
These exchange rates fostered speculation in 
two forms: firstly, the ordinary type of price 
speculation in respect of articles in short sup-
ply; and secondly, the re-export of imported 
goods to neighbouring areas at an over-valued 
exchange rate, which yielded wide margins of 
profit. These profits were equivalent to a 
flight of capital not shown in the statistics, and 
the external-sector imbalance was thus aggra-
vated by a contraction in the real supply of 
imported goods. 
The speculation generated by the over-valua-
tion of the currency and the application of the 
so-called reversibles, which were equivalent to 
a system of multiple exchange rates, proved to 
be one of the factors mainly responsible for 
the fresh impetus gained by the inflationary 
process in 1956. Speculative hoarding and the 
practice of re-exporting reduced supply, particu-
larly in the case of wage goods, to an even more 
marked extent than during the first phase of 
the inflationary process (1952-53), when the 
volume of imports had undergone a fairly sharp 
decline. It must be stressed that this develop-
ment was essentially the result of speculation, 
as the apparent level of imports remained the 
same, and there are no signs that production of 
agricultural commodities or other goods and 
services decreased to any significant extent dur-
ing 1956. 
For the first time since 1952, the component 
of the over-all price index constituted by essen-
tial articles, including, of course, wage goods, 
began to rise much more steeply than the total 
index. In the course of 1956 the cost of wage 
goods almost trebled, whereas prices in general 
were not so much as doubled. With the con-
siderable intensification of the labour sectors' 
pressure for wage and salary increases, the 
price-wage spiral was progressively accelerated, 
until from May onwards prices began to soar, 
at an average monthly rate of a little over 15 
per cent. 
2 . T H E STABILIZATION PROGRAMME 
By the end of 1956, the position was becom-
ing more and more untenable both for the Gov-
ernment and for the labour sectors. The former 
no longer found it possible to manipulate the 
exchange market or to cope with the financing 
of the swelling deficits shown by the various 
public-sector agencies, which were, moreover, 
subject to no central control. The labour sec-
tors, in their turn, had realized that the upward 
trend of prices was far outstripping wage and 
salary increases. Accordingly, it was essential 
to adopt vigorous decisions, which were to 
necessitate and bring about substantial economic 
and socio-political changes. 
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The outcome was the application of a drastic 
stabilization programme. In the first place, a 
sweeping exchange reform was introduced, 
based on the establishment of a single exchange 
rate to supersede the different real rates in force 
for the various import and export items. The 
new quotation originally set by the Central Bank 
at 7,700 bolivianos to the dollar, a rate which 
represented a considerable devaluation in rela-
tion to those in force. During the next few 
years it gradually increased, until it reached 
the level of about 12,000 bolivianos to the 
dollar around which it has been fluctuating 
ever since. At the same time, decrees were issued 
liberalizing foreign trade and exchange transac-
tions for operations of all kinds, with the sole 
important exception that COMIBOL had to 
continue selling its foreign exchange at the 
official rate of the Central Bank, which in its 
turn had to place the exchange in question 
freely at the disposal of the Government and 
the general public. 
Although the subsidies accorded through the 
exchange system to a good many foodstuffs and 
raw materials were abolished, together with the 
subsidies in force for some domestic products, 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs was authorized 
to import the goods concerned on a provisional 
basis when adequate supplies were not forth-
coming in the normal course of trade. Internal 
price controls were lifted, and the Executive 
was empowered to increase public utility tariffs 
in general sufficiently to cover operating costs 
and depreciation and allow for a reasonable 
margin of profit. The system of low-cost com-
missaries existing in the mining and railway 
companies was abolished. The only remaining 
exception to the free internal price regime con-
sisted in the fixing of a ceiling on rentals. 
To cushion the impact of all these measures 
on the cost of living for workers and employees 
in general, a form of compensation was insti-
tuted which covered public employees and ex-
cluded only domestic servants. To make up for 
the disappearance of the commissaries, an extra 
bonus was established for workers in both the 
nationalized and the private mining industries, 
and for railway and factory workers. At the 
same time, salaries, wages and similar remu-
nerations were frozen for one year. 
On the monetary side, cash reserve and other 
measures were adopted with a view to restricting 
bank credit to private activities, and the Central 
Bank deposits of the Banco Minero were frozen. 
It was stipulated that the total amount of ad-
vances, loans and discounts granted to the 
Banco Minero by the Central Bank was not to 
exceed their sum total at the date of promulga-
tion of the decree. 
Similarly, stringent measures were applied 
to stabilize the financial situation of the public 
sector, including the nationalized mining in-
dustry, and to put a stop to the practice of in-
flationary financing. It was established that 
thenceforward the public-sector budget was to 
cover all State institutions or dependencies, 
and that these bodies could not apply to the 
Central Bank for credit. Furthermore, a single 
foreign exchange budget was set up for the 
public sector, which included COMIBOL. 
Royalties were also fixed for exports of mining, 
agricultural and industrial products, to replace 
the fiscal revenue accruing from the multiple 
exchange rate which had been in force up to 15 
December 1956. To that end, a new ad valorem 
tariff was introduced, and advantage was taken 
of the opportunity to eliminate the many spe-
cially-earmarked tariff duties that had previ-
ously been established. 
Lastly, a stabilization fund of 25 million 
dollars was set up, against contributions of 
7.5 million dollars from the International Mone-
tary Fund, 7.5 million from the Government 
of the United States, and 10 million in the 
shape of United States aid, to be invested in 
agreement with the International Co-operation 
Administration (USICA). 
3 . BASES AND RESULTS 
The theory, aims and procedures of this 
stabilization programme did not greatly differ 
from those of its unsuccessful predecessor in 
1953, or from other experiments on orthodox 
lines tried out elsewhere in Latin America. But 
whereas the first attempt failed to attain its 
objectives and had to be renounced very shortly, 
the second programme managed to control the 
visible manifestations of inflation almost en-
tirely and laid the foundations for a situation 
of financial stability which lasted right up to 
the close of the period under analysis. It is 
therefore worth while to look into the causes of 
this success. 
In the first place, attention must be drawn 
to the radical change that had taken place in 
socio-political conditions in Bolivia. The im-
possibility of responding to the pressures of 
the organized groups for the maintenance of 
their own consumption levels and the levels of 
expenditure of the Government and the auto-
nomous institutions had lessened political con-
tact between the groups in question and the 
Government. One factor that operated in favour 
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of the official decisions undoubtedly consisted 
in the lassitude and the obvious distortions 
which the acceleration of the inflationary pro-
cess had fostered among the very sectors that 
might have been expected to benefit by it. 
Unquestionably, another factor of primary 
importance was the liberal support given to 
the stabilization programme through foreign 
loans and donations. This backing was of great 
significance for the implementation of the pro-
gramme. In the first place, it helped to bolster 
up the capacity to import and thus ensure a 
satisfactory supply of foreign goods and serv-
ices of key importance for consumption and 
domestic activities. Secondly, it meant that 
public expenditure could be maintained on a 
non-inflationary basis, whereas in the past, as 
has been repeatedly pointed out, too much 
reliance had been placed upon the illusory ex-
pedient of draining off surpluses from the ex-
port sector. 
As regards this second factor, it is useful to 
bear in mind that foreign aid came to repre-
sent over 25 per cent of the capacity to import 
between 1956 and 1960. Furthermore, about 
55 per cent of transfers from abroad consisted 
of donations, so that subsequent effects on the 
capacity for payments, which in other countries 
had generated the so-called indebtedness spiral, 
were considerably mitigated. Finally, in the 
later years of the period, external aid not only 
financed the public sector's total capital out-
lays, but in several cases helped to defray more 
or less substantial proportions of current ex-
penditure itself. 
Furthermore, the lasting success of the stabili-
zation measures was linked to the fact that they 
did not cause major disturbances or marked 
contractions in the country's economic activity 
as a whole. Manufacturing output declined so 
sharply that only in 1964 did it regain the 
levels it had attained by the mid-1950's. But 
its contribution to the gross domestic product 
was very small in comparison to the correspond-
ing proportion in the other Latin American 
countries—less than 10 per cent—and, in ad-
dition, its expansion up to 1956 had been 
largely artificial, having been promoted more 
by exchange privileges than by any considerable 
expansion and diversification of the structure 
of manufacturing industry. 
For a thorough grasp of the situation, account 
must be taken of more general factors con-
nected with what might be termed the "struc-
tural simplicity" of Bolivia's production system. 
The market economy in Bolivia is only a 
secondary nucleus in the over-all system, which 
is further characterized by a low level of sec-
toral and geographical integration. Thus there 
are not the manifold inter-relationships which 
in more complex economies become sources of 
widespread distortion and set in motion power-
ful inflationary propagation mechanisms. As a 
result, disequilibria, whether inflationary or de-
flationary, are usually localized, and do not 
affect the system as a whole. The agricultural 
sector, for instance, which employs a high 
proportion of the active population and ac-
counts for the biggest share of the gross domes-
tic product, used to be, and to a great extent 
still is, cut off from what might be called a 
domestic commercial market, and linked at most 
with scattered urban centres to which it sells 
a relatively small proportion of its surpluses. 
Another enlightening consideration relates 
to the social costs of sacrifices entailed by the 
prograname and therefore to the opposition it 
might have aroused. In view of the division of 
the system into watertight compartments, these 
sacrifices have been mainly confined to very 
small groups attached to specific activities and 
even areas, such as, for instance, certain groups 
of workers, the mining sector and the urban 
middle class. With these particular groups bear-
ing the brunt of the cost, the inevitable outcome 
was not only a change in the pattern of power 
or of support for the political administration 
but also a significant modification of the orig-
inal economic policy programme. 
In short, the reasons that account for the 
results obtained can be summed up as the con-
trol of social pressures, the backing given by 
foreign aid, and the structural simplicity of the 
economy which minimized the distortions that 
might have been caused. Paradoxically enough, 
these very factors may constitute the Achilles' 
heel of the programme over the longer term. 
If the expectations of the various social groups 
are rekindled and their organization is 
strengthened, or if the flow of external aid is 
interrupted or proves inadequate, some of the 
primary causes of the system's former instability 
would once again come to the fore. 
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D. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The economic policy launched in 1952 set it-
self clearly-defined tasks. The nationalization of 
the mines, the agrarian reform, the geographical 
diversification of activities, and even stabiliza-
tion were at bottom not so much objectives in 
themselves as stepping-stones towards the sub-
stantive goal of steadier and more dynamic 
economic and social development, with a higher 
degree of autonomy and under the segis of a 
national State independent of the overwhelming 
and personalistic influence of the export sector. 
From a relatively narrow standpoint it can be 
seen that in general these intermediary objec-
tives have been attained, the decision-making 
centre of the main export activity was trans-
ferred from outside the economy to within it, 
at least in so far as the exogenous factors affect-
ing all tin producers can be disregarded. A 
radical change was brought about in the struc-
ture of ownership and the system of feudal 
relations which had characterized the traditional 
farming area. New development opportunities 
were opened up, although on a limited scale, 
for agriculture in the Oriente. During the second 
phase of the project, monetary stability was 
achieved although on the somewhat precarious 
basis of external loans and transfers. 
In view of the ultimate aims of the pro-
gramme, however, it may well be asked whether 
the gains have been adequate or sufficient to 
ensure the type of development that constituted 
the basic target. In other words, it is important 
to see how far Bolivia's age-old difficulties have 
been eased by the changes that have taken place. 
A first point to note is that the economic sys-
tem is still vulnerable to the vicissitudes of a 
single export product. The policy in recent years 
has been to assign higher priority to the 
strengthening or modernization of the tin min-
ing industry, but, apart from the weakness of 
the tin market (temporarily mitigated by inter-
national contingencies), the possibility of a 
considerable diversification of exports still 
seems a long way off. This seriously cramps the 
capacity to import, in so far as it is con-
ditioned by national income rather than external 
borrowing or aid from abroad. 
Secondly, consideration must be given to the 
agricultural sector, which is just as important 
as the external sector, or even more so, since 
about 70 per cent of the population depends 
upon it for a livelihood. Here the situation 
seems more complex, owing both to the depth 
of some of the changes and to the magnitude 
of the obstacles to dynamic growth. 
In a sense, the changes in the system of social 
relationships in the traditional farming area 
that have resulted from the agrarian reform 
may possibly be the most significant develop-
ment of all, precisely because of the size of 
the group they have affected. In the first place, 
to take a limited social view, the rural worker 
has succeeded in freeing himself from the 
heaviest of the obligations which made him 
virtually a serf. Secondly, from the macro-social 
standpoint, he has become a figure in Bolivian 
affairs, whatever reservations may be made as 
regards his actual degree of participation. This 
is clearly evidenced by the weight he now 
carries in Bolivia's political balance. In these 
circumstances, it can safely be asserted that by 
way of the land reform, and given the special 
situation of Bolivia's rural population, one of 
the final objectives of the 1952 policy is being 
reached. 
The economic implications of the reform are 
less clear. Its potential, both as a source of 
incentives to agricultural development which 
did not formerly exist, and in view of the prob-
able expansion of rural demand for goods and 
services produced by other sectors, has been 
emphasized by many observers and in many 
studies. Nevertheless, there seems to be a long 
way to go before these repercussions, which 
are hard to evaluate with any degree of accuracy, 
are reflected in a visible activation of farming 
in the Altiplano and the Valles. Without ex-
patiating on the difficulties inherent in this task, 
it should be noted that economic policy has not 
yet been able to map out a clearly defined and 
resolute strategy, broad enough to bring about 
favourable changes in the technological and 
other conditions which are still handicapping 
expansion in the areas in question. 
The outlook is quite different where agricul-
ture in the Oriente is concerned, as was shown 
in an earlier section. Thanks to a number of 
factors—greater abundance and fertility of na-
tural resources, the absence or lesser importance 
of traditional structures, more assistance, on a 
larger scale, from the national authorities and 
from foreign institutions, etc.—new opportunities 
have been opened up for the expansion and 
diversification of agricultural supply. But this 
progress has not implied major advances to-
wards another of the objectives established in 
the preceding phase, i.e., the promotion of 
population and manpower shifts from the Alti-
plano and the Valles to the broader and more 
fertile lands of the Oriente. In fact, the viability 
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of substantial transfers, which in a first analysis 
would seem to be a matter of basic importance 
for future development, is still open to question. 
A third aspect of the problem relates to the 
scanty success achieved in respect to sectoral 
diversification, specifically where industrial de-
velopment is concerned. As noted in the intro-
duction, the economic policy programme was 
oddly indifferent to this problem, and its sub-
sequent evolution has shown no sign of any 
major change. Although the stabilization of the 
currency eliminated what has been described as 
the artificial expansion of the manufacturing 
sector, a favourable environment for sounder 
development does not seem to have been estab-
lished. The absolute levels of industrial produc-
tion are more or less the same as in the mid-
1950s. 
It would be a grave mistake, however, to 
underestimate the vital importance of progress 
in the field, especially in view of the employ-
ment problem. The difficulty will become all 
the more serious in so far as new techniques 
are introduced and disseminated in primary 
production. 
Lastly, with regard to the relative stability 
which such pains have been taken to achieve, 
the progress made is obvious, but the position 
is insecure, since the basic instrument for the 
control of disequilibria is still foreign credit 
and aid. If this support were partly withdrawn, 
or if social pressures—of which a new source 
may lie in the incorporation of the rural 
masses—were to become more insistent, the 
disparity between aspirations and production 
capacity, which, as previously shown, mainly 
affects public expenditure, would make its 
presence felt at least as strongly as in the 
past. 
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THE ECONOMIC POLICY O F COLOMBIA IN 1950-66^ 
1. SOME STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE 
COLOMBIAN ECONOMY 
The Colombian economy has many of the 
features common to developing countries. It 
relies heavily on exports of a single commodity, 
coffee, which accounts for about 70 per cent 
of total exports and whose prices are subject 
to sharp short-term fluctuations; it has a struc-
ture of production in which agriculture employs 
half the labour force but only generates a third 
of the total product; productivity and financial 
resources vary a great deal in the different ac-
tivities and enterprises; and there is a shortage 
of both productive and social capital. Moreover, 
-a&_in^íJiex.XiLtiíl, American^co.untries, foreign 
tcade., and_ foreign investment have played an 
important and_i)ften_decisive. rQle_in_ the^o.un^ 
tJ^X-'s-development. From the colonial era to the 
first quarter of the twentieth century, Colombia 
, had a typical export economy, external demand 
being the main determinant of the level of in-
come and economic activity within the country. 
' In general, the economy depended on sales 
abroad of a single commodity, whether it was 
gold, tobacco, indigo, cinchona bark or, as at 
present, coffee. The external sector has played a 
less dominant role in the last few decades. As 
in other Latin American economies, the crisis 
of the thirties and the subsequent restrictions on 
the capacity to import forced Colombia to stimu-
late production for the home market, although 
this, as will be seen, created a new and more 
complex kind of dependence on the external 
sector. 
Colombia has also experienced the same rapid 
population growth as other Latin American 
l l n addition to official statistics, this study is based 
on the following sources: El desarrollo económico de 
Colombia (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 
57.II.G.3), vol. I l l of the series Analyses and Projec-
tions of Economic Development-, Administrative Plan-
ning Department (DAP) of Colombia, Plan general de 
desarrollo económico y social (Cali, Editorial El Mundo 
Ltda., 1962); El desarrollo industrial de Colombia 
(ST/ECLA/Conf.23/L.17), report submitted by the 
Government of Colombia to the Latin American Sym-
posium on Industrial Development (Santiago, Chile, 
March 1966); Bank of the Republic, Cuentas nacio-
nales 1950-65, National Administrative Department of 
Statistics (DANE), Anuario general de estadística. 
countries, and to an even more pronounced 
degree, the annual natural growth rate of the 
population being as high as 3.2 per cent. The 
annual increase in the urban population is 4.5 
per cent, whereas for the rura population it is 
only 1 per cent. 
In addition to these characteristics, which are 
more or less common to Latin America as a 
whole, there are other structural features of the 
Columbian economy which set it apart from the 
rest of the region. 
First, it should be noted that there is a great 
disparity between the different socio-economic 
areas and the terrain is mountainous, which has 
made the problem of internal communications 
particularly difficult and has entailed heavy in-
vestment without achieving more than partial 
results. Moreover, the population is concen-
trated in an area which covers less than half 
the territory of the country. Large flat areas 
to the east and southeast are virtually uninhabi-
ted, although some land settlement projects are 
now under way. In the populated area, the fact 
that the Andes are split into three great ranges 
caused, until recently, transport and communica-
tion difficulties, and this led to the growth of a 
number of more or less self-contained urban 
centres. Thus, urbanization in Colombia was 
simultaneous and rapid in all these population 
centres, with the result that cultural and eco-
nomic life in Colombia does not revolve around 
one key centre, as in many Latin American 
countries. This can be considered an advantage 
in so far as it has permitted a certain spatial 
diversification; from another standpoint, how-
ever, it can be regarded as an obstacle to the 
expansion of certain activities, such as manufac-
turing, which are usually favoured by the exist-
ence of a "central" market, concentrated in 
one area, easy of access and not entailing more 
than moderate costs for transport, distribution 
and marketing in general. 
Coffee, as was pointed out, continues to be the 
main export of Colombia, accounting for two-
thirds of the total value of exports. It also plays 
a particularly important role in the economy 
as a whole, since it occupies one-third of the 
area under cultivation and generates about 17 
per cent of the domestic agricultural product. 
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Over and above this, there are a number of 
features which place coffee production in a very 
particular situation. This key export item is not, 
as in other cases, relatively separate from the 
national economy. On the contrary, it is deeply 
rooted in the domestic system; in other words, 
cofFee production is closely interrelated with the 
rest of the economy. This is largely the result 
of certain important aspects of the structure 
of ownership, which is based on some 250,000 
coffee farms. Of these, almost 60 per cent have 
an area ranging from one to ten hectares and 
account for 57 per cent of total production. 
There are only 130 farms of more than 100 
hectares, and these account for 26 per cent of 
total production. More than one-third of the 
estates are minifundios of less than one hectare 
and they produce 6 per cent of the coffee crop. 
Sometimes these small units form part of larger 
farms which grow several kinds of crops, and 
four out of every five coffee farms are worked 
by their owners. Coffee production is, therefore, 
in the hands of a conglomeration of small and 
medium-size farmers. Given this structure of 
ownership and system of land tenure, it is easy 
to appreciate the economic and social impact 
of any developments affecting the coffee crop. 
This situation is also largely responsible for 
the existence of institutions such as the Na-
tional Federation of Coffee-Groivsrs, which, al-
though it has its counterparts in other coffee-
producing countries, is far more important in 
Colombia, in view of the, diversity of its func-
tions, the scope of its activities and its influence 
on the formulation of economy policy. An idea 
of the scope of its activities can be gained from 
the fact that they range from marketing (pur-
chase, selection and exporting of coffee beans) 
to the conclusion of international agreements 
relating to coffee. Moreover, its influenuce ex-
tends to the field of national investment: 
through the National Coffee Fund, for example, 
which it administers, it is one of the main 
shareholders in the Flota Mercante Grancolom-
biana, and it has interests in transport, insurance 
and fertilizer companies. 
The continued importance of coffee has not 
prevented Colombia from vigorously pursuing the 
diversification of its productive system, particu-
larly its industrial and supporting activities. For-
eign trade restrictions and the direct or indirect 
help of the State have provided ample incentive 
for the development of import substitution in-
dustries to the point where they replace a large 
proportion of imported consumer manufactures 
and the production of certain intermediate and 
basic goods has been expanded. However, this 
development has fallen far short of achieving 
complementarity and ensuring a sufficient sup-
ply of capital goods and key inputs, and this has 
led to a high degree of dependence on foreign 
sources of supply. Thus, the rate of growth of 
the manufacturing sector is closely tied to 
fluctuations in the capacity to import and, there-
fore, to the fate of exports and the inflow of 
foreign capital. 
After the Second World War there was con-
siderable modernization in agriculture, which 
led to a marked increase in the cultivation of a 
number of cash crops. Particular success was 
achieved in cotton, rice, sugar cane, certain oil-
seeds and stock farming, with the result that 
domestic production satisfied demand for almost 
all foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials. 
One aspect of industrial and general develop-
ment often referred to in studies of Colombia 
is the skill of the entrepreneurial groups, particu-
larly those in the Antioquia area. Their highly 
developed civic pride and business ability have 
enabled them to transform the capital of the re-
gion, Medellin, into the main industrial centre 
in Colombia. They have also played a leading 
role in land settlement, deforestation, the crea-
tion of poptdation centres, and the establishment 
and development of the coffee economy on the 
slopes of the central Andean range. 
Finally, mention should be made of a num-
ber of important elements of the institutional 
structure. 
In the first place, of course, there is the fact 
that the State plays a less important role in 
Colombia than in other Latin American coun-
tries at a similar stage of development. Govern-
ment spending, for example, accounts for slightly 
less than 20 per cent of the gross domestic 
product, whereas it approaches or exceeds 30 per 
cent in countries like Brazil, Chile or Uruguay.^ 
Moreover, the Government has rarely entered 
the field of production of goods, and where it 
has, it is usually through autonomous and de-
centralized enterprises which do not exclude 
the operation of the private sector, e.g. in steel 
and petroleum and petroleum products. In short, 
the State has preferred to play an indirect role 
by providing different kinds of incentives or in-
vesting in social capital. 
Together with the above, it should be em-
phasized that the country has retained its basic 
traditional political structure. Two large groups 
dominate the scene, their differences being 
2 See Economic Survey of Latin America, 1965 (United 
Nations publication, Sales No.: 67.II.G.1), p. 35 
(table 13). 
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mainly political and constitutional, and both are 
influenced by local factors and personalities. 
This seems to be largely responsible for the fact 
there is relatively little variation in the approach 
to many aspects of over-all economic policy. 
2 , DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN 
COLOMBIA IN THE PERIOD 1 9 2 0 - 1 9 5 0 
The period dealt with in this study could not 
be analysed without regard for the main features 
of the country's economic and social structure 
or for the main lines of development in the 
period before 1950. Events since 1950 have their 
roots in the previous decades and take place 
within a structural framework which, it is true, 
changes to a greater or lesser extent with the 
passage of time. 
This retrospective view of the situation cannot 
of course be taken too far back, nor is it possible 
to examine all the relevant questions in detail. 
Thus, only the most significant developments of 
the period since 1920 will be discussed and 
grouped together chronologically for greater 
clarity. 
(a) The twenties 
This important decade presents general fea-
tures that are common to nearly the whole of 
Latin America, especially the second half when 
the inflow of foreign capital and the expansion 
of the external sector enabled the State to play 
a more vigorous role in a relatively new task 
of vital interest to the country: the establishment 
of basic services designed to promote internal 
economic integration, urban growth and diversi-
fication of the structure of production. Economic 
policy guidelines and prospects during this 
period should, however, be considered in the 
light of some specific circumstances. First, the 
so-called "point of departure" is more recent 
than that of other Latin American economies—in 
the southern zone of South America or Mexico, 
for instance—not only because the economy had 
not been as outward-directed as in those coun-
tries, but also because of the fragmentation of 
Colombia's economic system.® Early in the 
twenties, "localism" continued to be a feature 
of this system, composed as it was of isolated 
geographic-economic areas lacking co-ordination 
or stable links between one another, although 
they co-existed in an area that was politically 
dependent upon the central government. 
3 Colombia's per capita exports in 1928 amounted to 
approximately 31 dollars, compared with 95 dollars in 
Chile and 150 dollars in Argentina. 
Secondly, the external resources obtained dur-
ing that exceptional boom period were relatively 
modest compared with those of countries more 
favoured by earlier development, or with the 
needs and tasks arising from the absence of 
territorial and economic integration. The inflow 
of foreign capital in the late twenties is esti-
mated at about 200 million dollars,^ which is far 
less than in the southernmost countries. 
In any case, it was in that period and in those 
circumstances that one of the basic guidelines of 
Colombia's economic policy was clearly defined, 
i.e., to create an integrated economy or establish 
a national production system. However, a 
reservation or clarification is necessary here. 
This aim, particularly as it affected the com-
munications system, was part of another more 
direct and pressing aim: to establish transport 
and exit routes for the export of coffee. In this, 
moreover, Colombia was no different from other 
countries exporting primary commodities. Sub-
sequently, the public investment policy designed 
to integrate the economy gradually shifted, plac-
ing more emphasis on linking up domestic ac-
tivities than on facilitating exports. 
(b) The thirties 
The depression had far-reaching, though not 
exceptional, effects on the Colombian economy. 
Although the volume of exports was maintained 
from 1931 to 1934, the capacity to pay for ex-
ports was halved in relation to 1928-30. 
Nevertheless, as in other cotmtries, external 
sector restrictions and the various excise taxes 
imposed with a view to improving the balance 
of payments paved the way for a period of 
"spontaneous industrialization"; in other words, 
diversification prospered not as the result of a 
particular economic policy decision but as the 
natural outcome of measures imposed because of 
the decline in external purchasing power. 
As regards the instruments used, this phase 
of Colombia's development clearly had a great 
deal in common with that of other Latin Ameri-
can countries. In addition to devaluation, bans 
and strict controls were imposed on imports, and 
tariff reform provided expedients which were 
applied far more stringently and efficiently than 
in other countries. 
However, a distinctive feature of events in 
Colombia at that time was the attempt to im-
prove fiscal means of action. The 1935 t£ix 
reform was perhaps the most striking manifesta-
A proportion oí these foreign exchange resources 
represented compensation paid to the Colombian Gov-
ernment by the United States for the dismemberment 
of Panama in 1903. 
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tion of this concern and was undoubtedly the 
outcome of a decision to keep up the level of 
public expenditure despite the unfavourable turn 
taken by the external sector. This reform not 
only increased the flexibility and tax collection 
capacity of the system, but made it more pro-
gressive than other tax systems in the region. 
Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the 
Colombian economy showed great flexibility in 
adapting to the opportunities opened up by the 
break in the traditional pattern of trade, to the 
extent that from 1933 to 1939 domestic industry 
expanded by nearly 11 per cent annually. 
Various explanations have been suggested for 
this growth, which compares favourably with 
that attained during similar phases in other Latin 
Latin American countries: (i) the low level of 
industrialization when the new opportunities 
arose; (ii) the favourable basis created by in-
vestment in infrastructure and imports of capital 
goods during the previous decade; and (iii) the 
existence of the dynamic "nucleus" of An-
tioquia, with a sizable population, active entre-
preneurial group and relatively high level of 
income. 
However, during that phase of active sponta-
neous industrialization only the slow-growing or 
traditional activities expanded. The vertically 
undiversified structure of manufacturing ham-
pered the process, making it closely dependent 
on imports of intermediate and capital goods. 
These circumstances, which were to have a last-
ing effect on foreign trade problems, also 
prompted a change in economic policy in sub-
sequent periods. 
(c) The Second World War years (1939-45) 
Colombia's problems during the Second World 
War were very similar to those besetting most 
of the other Latin American countries. Import 
difficulties and an increase in the value of ex-
ports to almost pre-war levels resulted in an 
accumulation of foreign exchange, inflationary 
pressures and favourable conditions on the side 
of over-all demand. 
Perhaps the most outstanding development 
during this phase, at least in so far as economic 
policy is concerned, was the express formulation 
of an industrialization policy, even though only 
provisional. This may be considered a result of 
the characteristics and limitations of past manu-
facturing trends and the way in which they 
prevented the sector from expanding spontane-
ously at the same rate as in the previous decade. 
The historic decree No. 1157 of June 1940 
and the establishment of the Industrial Develop-
ment Institute were tangible evidence of the 
Government's increasing concern with manufac-
turing prospects and aims. In the circumstances, 
the vertical diversification of industry was a 
necessary step and Colombia planned to establish 
basic industries such as steel, caustic soda, and 
chemicals in general. Practically at the same 
time, a very similar plan was prepared in Chile 
by the Development Corporation (CORFO), 
founded in 1939. 
Furthermore, the Government continued to 
expand Colombia's infrastructure, although not 
as intensively as in the preceding stage. A 
particular feature of government action during 
this phase was the large scale on which public 
securities were being sold—mainly of necessity— 
on the domestic market. Annual sales in the 
years 1941-45 rose to almost eight times the level 
of 1936-40. Thus public revenue was increased 
and private income absorbed at a time when 
the pressure of demand in the private sector was 
intensified. 
During the war years, economic foreign trade 
policy was more expressly intended to promote 
internal changes through multiple exchange rates, 
which were used almost throughout the region 
at that time. Basically, this was an attempt to 
improve upon the import restrictions imposed 
during the preceding phase to remedy the 
balance of payments position. When the 1931 
tariff modifications (based on specific taxes) 
became less effective, multiple exchange rates 
were introduced to promote imports which could 
help to diversify the domestic economy, and re-
duce or eliminate those less likely to do so. 
In spite of all these interrelated measures, the 
wartime restrictions on strategic imports required 
to expand the economic system, and the nature 
of the first drive towards industrialization out-
lined above made it impossible to sustain the 
intensive rate of economic and industrial expan-
sion achieved in the previous decade. Never-
theless, from 1939 to 1945 manufacturing at-
tained a fairly high rate for Latin America (6 
per cent annually), which was higher than that 
of countries like Argentina or Chile with a longer 
tradition in this field. 
(d) The post-war period up to 1950 
Until the 1949 coffee boom, which was to 
leave its stamp on subsequent development, the 
post-war years in Colombia showed a series 
of similarities and contrasts with economic 
policy developments and reactions in other Latin 
American countries. 
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One outstanding feature was the improvement 
or stabilization of foreign trade, with easier im-
port conditions and sufficient financial resources 
to take advantage of them, thanks to an increase 
in export values because of the improved terms 
of trade and the accumulation of reserves. As a 
result of these circumstances, the whole region, 
including Colombia, eased its foreign trade and 
exchange policy. But at the same time, the pent-
up demand for imports and its steady growth 
soon caused an external imbalance to reappear 
at other levels, which in turn prompted a new 
shift in policy. 
This chain of events is clearly observable in 
Colombia. From 1940 to 1945 import restrictions 
and the increase in export values pushed up 
reserves from approximately 27 to 182 million 
dollars. The removal of restrictions halved this 
figure in less than two years: to 91 million in 
1948. At the same time, the system of controls, 
which began to be eliminated in 1944 with the 
establishment of a single parity for foreign ex-
change, was replaced by stringent controls on 
external operations, in which conventional meas-
ures such as devaluation of the peso were com-
bined with unconventional instruments such as 
different exchange rates for imports and ex-
ports. 
With the elimination of difficulties in the ex-
ternal sector, the wartime policy of deliberately 
promoting industrialization began to lose 
momentum. A somewhat ineifectual exception to 
this was the measures adopted in 1948, and 
maintained in 1953 according tax exemptions 
for new types of industries established in Co-
lombia. It should be borne in mind, however, 
that from 1948 onwards there were serious in-
ternal upheavals, with repeated widespread acts 
of violence, particularly in rural areas. The 
destruction of rural dwellings and facilities, 
abandoned crops and large-scale migration to 
the towns prevented an improvement in the 
agricultural products. 
However, these vicissitudes did not curb in-
dustrial expansion. On the contrary, it proceeded 
at a faster rate from 1945 onwards, exceeding 
the pre-war rate and reaching over 9 per cent an-
nually, or close to the growth rate attained 
in 1933-39. 
Some plausible theories have been advanced 
to explain this somewhat surprising trend. Al-
though with the removal of import restrictions 
purchases of consumer goods increased sub-
stantially, imports of manufacturing equipment 
and inputs also rose sharply, particularly as this 
sector appears to have accumulated sufficient re-
sources to make the most of the opportunities 
offered. A second factor was the drive shown by 
entrepreneurs, who were careful to miss no op-
portunity despite the Government's cooler at-
titude towards industrial development. Lastly, 
stress has been laid on more general factors 
relating to increases in income, greater co-
ordination at the national level, previous govern-
ment policy and the like, all of which provided 
a favourable background for internal diversifi-
cation. 
3 . DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN 
COLOMBIA DURING THE PERIOD 1 9 5 0 - 6 6 
This central part of the study will begin with 
an attempt to make a broad comparison between 
development and economic policy over the three 
decades prior to 1950, and in the period 1950-66, 
highlighting the changing relationships between 
external sector trends and domestic activity. 
Despite some temporary ups and downs, Co-
lombia developed fairly steadily from 1920 to 
1950. In particular, Colombian industry in the 
post-depression era made good progress under 
the stimulus of restrictions on foreign trade, 
mainly on imports. This process was favoured 
by the broader opportunities of acquiring in-
puts and capital goods for manufacturing in-
dustries and infrastructure. 
National accounts data indicate some strange 
phenomena after 1950. Development became ir-
regular and generally followed the same course 
as fluctuations in foreign trade sometimes with a 
time lag. (See tables 1 and 2.) There is there-
fore conflict between the growth of the national 
production system and the behaviour of the ex-
ternal sector, inasmuch as the former was 
periodically hampered by fluctuations in the lat-
ter. These maladjustments had their effect on 
economic policy, which attempted to promote 
internal growth or, alternatively, to correct the 
recurrent disequilibria in the balance of pay-
ments. 
To simplify matters, this period is divided 
into three principal phases: expansion (1950-
54) , contraction (1955-58) and a relative re-
covery with occasional setbacks (up to 1966). 
(a) Expansion in 1950-54 
Colombia, like all the coffee-producing coun-
tries, enjoyed a boom in its chief export com-
modity between 1949 and 1954. Quotations rose 
from 27 cents per pound in 1945-49 to 72 cents 
in 1954. The value of Colombian exports rose 
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Table 1 
COLOMBIA: PRODUCT AND REAL INCOME,» 1950-65 
(Millions of pesos at 1958 prices) 
Gross Annual Real gross Annual 
Year domestic growth domestic growth 
product rate income rate 
1950 14,688.8 15,338.4 
1951 15,146.6 3.1 15,400.0 0.4 
1952 16,102.0 6.3 16,333.0 6.1 
1953 17,081.0 6.1 17,824.7 9.1 
1954 18.262.3 6.9 19,682.5 10.4 
1955 3.9 19,747.3 0.3 
1956 19,745.7 4.1 20,566.8 4.1 
1957 20,186.2 2.2 20,785.2 1.1 
1958 20,682.5 2.5 20,682.5 —0.5 
1959 22,128.6 7.0 21,930.2 6.0 
1960 23,041.8 4.1 22,667.4 3.4 
1961 24,179.0 4.9 23,625.3 4.2 
1962 25,396.0 5.0 24,762.5 4.8 
1963 26,238.0 3.3 25,549.7 3.2 
1964 27,812.3 6.0 27,608.9 8.1 
1965 28,701.7 3.2 28,064.6 1.7 
SOURCE: National Accounts, Bank of the Republic. 
® Real gross domestic income includes direct profits or losses sustained by the 
Colombian economy in foreign trade in goods as a result of variations in import and 
export prices. 
Table 2 
COLOMBIA: FOREIGN TRADE IN GOODS,» 1949-65 













1950 23.2 364.7 37.8 
1951 463.3 17.1 419.0 14.9 
1952 2.2 415.4 —0.9 
1953 596.1 25.9 546.7 31.6 
1954 10.2 671.8 22.9 
1955 —10.1 669.3 —0.4 
1956 —8.0 657.2 —1.8 
1957 —4.8 482.6 —26.6 
1958 460.7 —9.9 399.9 —17.1 
1959 2.7 415.6 3.9 
1960 —1.8 518.6 24.B 
1961 —6.5 557.1 7.4 
1962 463.4 6.7 540.4 —3.0 
1963 446.7 —3.6 506.0 —6.4 
1964 548.1 22.7 586.3 15.9 
1965 , . . 539.1 —1.6 453.5 —22.7 
SOURCE: National Administrative Department of Statistics, foreign trade yearbooks. 
1 Only registered trade. 
b Coffee accounts for 70 per cent of total exports of goods. 
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from about 321 million dollars in 1949 to 657 
million in the most favourable year. The rates 
of growth and absolute increase in imports were 
even sharper; only in 1952 did imports level 
oii as a result of the previous year's measures 
to contain demand for foreign goods, a subject 
which is referred to later. 
The external sector boom 
whole economic system. On an 
product and income (which reflects the im-
provement in the terms of trade) attained the 
highest rates for the period under review. (See 
again table 1.)® The figures for the three years 
1952-54 also show a steep rise in manufacturing 
output. (See table 3.) Agriculture was the only 
sector with a feeble growth, partly as a result 
of the social disruptions referred to above. (See 
table 4.) 
Table 2 (.continued') 
COLOMBIA: PERCENTAGE ANNUAL GROWTH 
OF MANUFACTURING, 1950-65 
Tear 
Increase in the 
manufacturing 
product 
extended to the 
average, both 
6 The 1951 figure will probably be corrected, in sub-
sequent revised versions, since it does not seem justified 
in the light of the changes which took place in foreign 































SOURCE: National Accounts, Bank of the Republic. 
Table 4 
COLOMBIA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT FOR AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AND 
FOR COFFEE, 1950-65 
(Millions of pesos at 1958 prices) 
Year 
Agriculture 














1950 5,553.0 4,831.0 722.0 
1951 5,622.0 1.2 4,900.0 1.4 722.0 — 
1952 6,006.0 6.8 5,051.0 3.1 955.0 32.3 
1953 6,018.0 0.2 5,055.0 963.0 0.8 
1954 6,178.0 2.7 5,207.0 3.0 . 971.0 0.8 
1955 6,327.0 2.4 5,390.0 3.5 937.0 —3.5 
1956 6,528.0 3.2 5,557.0 3.1 971.0 3.6 
1957 6,928.0 6.1 5,896.0 6.1 1,032.0 6.3 
1958 7,146.0 3.1 6,140.0 4.1 1,006.0. —2.5 
1959 7,505.0 5.0 6,473.0 5.4 1,032.0 2.6 
1960 7,513.0 0.1 6,353.0 —1.9 1,160.0 12.4 
1961 7,808.0 3.9 6,579.0 3.6 1,229.0 5.9 
1962 8,063.0 3.3 6,773.0 2.9 1,290.0 5.0 
1963 8,106.0 0.5 6,756.0 —0.3 1,350.0 4.7 
1964 8,564.0 5.7 7,154.0 5.9 1,410.0 4.4 
1965 8,560.0 — 7,090.0 - 0 . 9 1,470.0 4.3 
Average 
percentage 2.9 2.6 4.9 
SOURCE: National Accounts, Administrative Planning Department, Bank of the Republic. 
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Several features of economic policy stood out 
during the period, although that policy had no 
clearly-defined underlying objectives. Special 
measures were taken to invest in infrastructure, 
maintain favourable conditions for import sub-
stitution industries and control the imbalance 
in external transactions. 
From 1950 to 1954, total tax revenue and 
government expenditure increased substantially 
in real terms, the former from some 1,500 mil-
lion to over 2,000 million pesos, and the latter 
from nearly 1,150 million to over 1,800 million 
pesos. (See table 5.) The proportion of total 
expenditure absorbed by investment followed 
an upward trend from 1951 until the beginning 
of the sixties, even though the foreign trade 
boom had already petered out. (See table 6.) 
This subject will be dealt with again later in 
this study. In contrast, income shows little 
change, the relative share of direct and indirect 
taxes remaining virtually the same. In short the 
Government failed to take advantage of these 
circumstances to make the tax system more 
progressive, and it was not until the sixties 
that this reform was instituted under far less 
favourable circumstances. 
Foreign trade policy and changes introduced 
during the coffee boom were to some extent 
conflicting. In the first place, the relatively 
stringent controls imposed at the end of the 
forties were considerably eased, a list of pro-
hibited imports representing the only remaining 
restrictions. At the same time, the application 
of multiple exchange rates was drastically re-
duced. Imports rose as a result of these measures. 
(See again table 2.) However, measures having 
the opposite eifect were adopted concurrently— 
the 1951 currency devaluation and tariff re-
form—and not only curbed the demand for 
imports but helped to protect domestic activities, 
particularly industry, from foreign competition. 
The latest provisions were possibly prompted by 
the rise in imports in 1950, which caused a deficit 
in the balance of payments in spite of substantial 
foreign exchange earnings, and by the fear 
that exports would not continue to expand. Be 
that as it may, the fact remains that this rise and 
fall in the demand for imports facilitated the 
inflow of inputs and capital goods, which 
triggered a new phase of expansion for in-
dustrial activities and infrastructure works. The 
structure of manufacturing was diversified with 
the establishment of new basic industries such 
as steel, caustic soda, sulphuric acid, rayon fibre, 
textile yarn, etc., i.e., virtually the same in-
dustries as those considered in the first industrial 
Table 5 
C O L O M B I A : C E N T R A L G O V E R N M E N T I N C O M E A N D E X P E N D I T U R E , 1950-65 
















1950 565 .6 934.6 1 ,500 .2 856 .0 
1951 596 .6 969.3 1 ,565.9 965 .5 
1 9 5 2 6 6 5 . 2 1,031.7 1 ,696.9 1 ,026 .7 
1953 776.1 1 ,140.2 1 ,916.3 1 ,231 .9 
1954 767 .4 1 ,268.2 2 ,035 .6 1 ,277.3 
1955 8 7 4 . 2 1 ,300.5 2 ,174 .7 1 ,329.4 
1956 989 .0 1,338.1 2 ,327 . 1 1 ,285.1 
1957 1,047.5 1,344.0 2 ,391 .5 1 ,146 .4 
1958 981 .0 1,371.5 2 ,352 .5 1 ,196.1 
1 9 5 9 1 ,198.6 1 ,501.0 2 ,699 .6 1 ,214.3 
1960 1,335.1 1 ,599.2 2 ,934 .3 1 ,339 .6 
1961 1,423.0 1 ,650.4 3 ,073 .4 1 ,413.2 
1 9 6 2 1,554.2 1,766.7 3 ,320 .9 1 ,531.2 
1963 1,617.9 1 ,831.8 3 ,449 .7 1 ,619.4 
1964 1 ,542.4 1,971.1 3 ,513 .5 1 ,641 .2 
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SOURCE: National Accounts, Bank of the Republic. 
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Table 2 (.continued') 
COLOMBIA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE 










1950 . . . . 37.7 62.3 74.5 25.5 
1951 . . . . 38.1 61.9 70.9 29.1 
1952 39.2 60.8 73.3 26.7 
1953 , , , , 40.5 59.5 71.5 28.5 
1954 , , 37.7 62.3 70.5 29.5 
1955 40.2 59.8 64.4 35.6 
1956 42.5 57.5 63.3 36.7 
1957 , 43.8 56.2 64.7 35.3 
1958 . . . . 41.7 58.3 65.7 34.3 
1959 , , . . 44.4 55.6 64.8 35.2 
1960 , . , 45.5 54.5 67.2 32.8 
1961 . 46.3 53.7 63.7 36.3 
1962 46.8 53.2 64.4 35.6 
1963 , ,, 46.9 53.1 69.4 30.6 
1964 , , , 43.9 56.1 68.9 31.1 
1965 42.8 57.2 67.9 32.1 
SOORCE: National Accounts, Bank of the Republic. 
development programme in the early forties, 
which had subsequently failed to materialize. 
At the same time, the Government promoted 
existing activities, such as refineries and tyre, 
paper, paperboard and cotton textile plants, 
which were considerably modernized. 
( b ) The end of the expansion and the insti-
tution of a policy of stability, 1955-58 
The foreign trade boom petered out in 1954, 
and was followed by a four-year decline, which 
became particularly severe during certain 
periods. The effects of this decline on the prod-
uct and income were immediate and appreciable 
although the only outward sign was the failure 
of industry to maintain the same rate of growth. 
(See again tables 1, 2 and 3.) 
During that period, some of the basic eco-
nomic activities were out of kilter, as in many 
other Latin American countries. Table 2 shows 
that in the last two years of the expansion 
(1953-54), imports increased far more rapidly 
than exports and declined much more slowly 
during the next two years. This disproportion 
was dealt with temporarily by external borrow-
ing and the postponement of payments that fell 
due, but the situation became untenable and 
stringent import controls finally had to be 
applied in 1957-58.6 
Foreign trade and fiscal activities also fluc-
tuated considerably. Public expenditure con-
tinued to grow in 1955 and the share of invest-
ment in the total also increased. (See again 
tables 5 and 6.) During this phase, there were 
heavier outlays on the steel installations under 
construction at Paz del Rio and on electrifica-
tion, roads and housing construction. Govern-
ment bonds were floated to finance the internal 
debt (10 per cent of public expenditure was 
subsidized in this way in 1954), making it just 
possible for those activities to be kept up after 
external aid had been sharply reduced. How-
ever, in 1956 and more particularly in 1957, 
expenditure was cut back and did not regain its 
previous level until the early sixties. 
It was against this background of events and 
after a change of government that the stabiliza-
tion policy was first applied in 1957. The years 
of instability were also the years of the decline 
of a regime and serious political disturbances. 
Consequently, the restrictive measures repre-
sented a reaction against the general situation 
and an attempt to restore normality. 
Both in the motivation and consequences, the 
policy decision to make stability the prime ob-
jective had special features distinguishing it 
from those observed during similar phases 
elsewhere. 
The changes in foreign trade trends and terms, 
and the Government's efforts to keep up the 
level of trade in spite of circumstances had 
little impact on domestic prices. As table 7 in-
dicates, consumer prices rose hardly at all in 
1955 and only a little over 5 per cent in 1956. 
In other words, there were apparently no in-
ternal forces either producing or propagating 
inflation as a corollary to the external im-
balance, which seems to indicate that the stabili-
zation measures were based almost entirely on 
the balance of payments. 
However, the continuation of external restric-
tions coupled with the Government drive for ex-
pansion shows that this imbalance undoubtedly 
created a source of inflationary pressures in the 
fiscal system that could only be repressed by 
emergency measures such as a compulsory 
nation-wide government bond issue. 
®In 1957, the debts outstanding amounted to 497 
million dollars, the gold and foreign exchange reserves 
of the Bank of the Republic dropped from 269 million 
dollars in 1954 to 144 million in 1956 but, in general, 
the market was kept artificially primed by imported 
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Table 7 
COLOMBIA: CONSUMER PRICE (COST-OF-LIVING) INDEXES, 1954-66 
(ANNUAL AVERAGES) 









1954 (6 months) 99.5 99.9 
1955 100.9 1.4 100.1 0.2 
1955 5.1 105.6 5.5 
1957 15.0 124.0 17.4 
1958 137.9 13.1 140.4 13.2 
1959 8.5 151.9 8.2 
1960 158.6 6.0 160.5 5.7 
1961 171.1 7.9 174.1 8.5 
1962 180.6 5.6 181.6 4.3 
1963 224.9 24.5 231.1 27.3 
1964 260.1 15.7 272.1 17.7 
1965 8.7 291.3 7.1 
1966 (first six months) 321.7 13.8 332.7 14.2 
SOURCE: DANE, monthly bulletins. 
Another endogenous factor in inflation was 
the sluggish growth of agricultural production. 
While not as slow as in some countries, the 
growth rate was certainly very low if coffee is 
excluded. (See again table 4.) Agriculture 
seems even more backward when contrasted 
with the dynamic development of industry and 
services and the high rates of population 
^owth (over 3 per cent) and urbanization (a 
little under 5 per cent). The growth rate of the 
agricultural product (except coffee) was well 
below these levels since it did not amount to 
more than 2.6 per cent annually during that 
period, and fluctuated violently. However, a 
few crops, notably cotton, certain oil-seeds and 
rice, made good progress, and imports of these 
commodities could be cut down or stopped 
altogether. The growers concerned generally 
formed associations and were successful in ob-
taining credit, protection and incentives from 
the Government. 
The effects of this process on inflation should 
be assessed in the light of another factor in 
which Colombia differed considerably from 
other Latin American countries. This was the 
degree of social pressure in the country, as 
reflected in demands for higher wages, which, 
in Latin America, have sometimes been largely 
responsible for intensifying structural imbal-
ances. For various reasons, which cannot be 
explained at length here (one being the small 
organized labour movement), the pressures in 
Colombia were undoubtedly fairly slight. 
To revert to the main point under discussion, 
it should be stressed that during the two-year 
period 1957-58, the primary aim of economic 
policy, to which all others were subordinated, 
was to remedy the imbalances in foreign trade. 
A number of instruments were used for this 
purpose; some of them were traditional, while 
others strengthened Colombia's reputation as 
an innovator in methods and procedures. 
The peso was devalued, and a new exchange 
system of "certificates" was established for most 
foreign trade transactions and certain move-
ments of capital. A free exchange rate was 
fixed for all other negotiations. 
A novel element in the system was the crea-
tion of the "exchange regulation fund" and of 
the Superintendencia Nacional de Importacio-
nes for the purposes of preventing sharp fluc-
tuations in foreign exchange transactions, regu-
lating imports of certain goods, and approving 
requests for foreign exchange to pay for goods 
requiring an import licence in advance, as 
well as authorizing imports of machinery and 
equipment. As further measures of control, 
more goods were added to the list of embargoed 
imports, while prior deposits were increased 
considerably and frozen in the Bank of the 
Republic. 
Economic policy had more than one target in 
fiscal matters. In the first place, it aimed at 
reducing public expenditure, and did so by 
roughly 13 per cent in 1957. (See again table 5.) 
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Equally or even more important were the tax 
measures, headed by a 15 per cent dollar tax 
on export earnings from coffee, bananas and 
precious metals, and of a 10 per cent tax on 
drawings of foreign exchange. The revenue from 
these taxes was made available to the Bank 
of the Republic and used in the main for settling 
trade arrears. The taxes also served to syphon 
off some of the export profits obtained as a 
result of devaluation. In the case of the coffee 
crop, which increased less rapidly in 1956-57, 
15 per cent of the volume of exports had to be 
withheld in kind. (See again table 4.) 
In any attempt to evaluate these measures 
aimed partly at curbing domestic demand and 
the demand for foreign imports, they should be 
taken as a whole, bearing in mind that the 
Government had to finance the coffee surpluses 
produced by the decline of the market and 
rising output. 
Although seemingly paradoxical, the relatively 
steep rise in prices (17 per cent in 1957 and 
13 per cent in 1958) that followed the stabili-
zation measures was actually an indirect proof 
that inflationary pressures originating in the 
external sector were active. The main reason for 
the price increases was the change in the ratio 
of external to domestic prices as a result of 
devaluation. In this sense, therefore, there was 
no incompatibility between the rise in prices 
and stabilization policy. 
The external imbalance was reduced con-
siderably by a sharp cut in imports that con-
siderably exceeded the fresh drop in the value 
of exports. (See again table 2.) While imports 
decreased by about 27 and 17 per cent in 1957 
and 1958, exports declined by only 5 and 10 
per cent. 
These measures also had a pronounced al-
though not spectacular effect on the growth of 
the product and income and on industrial de-
velopment. (See again tables 1 and 3.) The 
gro^vth rate of the product dropped to an 
average of about 2.3 per cent in 1957-58, while 
that of income rose less than 1 per cent as a 
result of the deterioration in price ratios. Mean-
while, the growth rate of manufacturing produc-
tion fell to 4.5 per cent as an average for the 
two years of stabilization. 
This review seems to indicate that stabili-
zation was only a passing phase and that it was 
useful only in so far as it met the need to 
restore the balance of foreign trade. However, 
viewed in conjunction with the expansionist 
phase that preceded it, it assumes more im-
portance because the two phases constitute the 
first clear demonstration of the increasingly 
unfortunate economic effects of the fluctuations 
in the external sector, and a foretaste of the 
dilemma to be faced in the next few years when 
domestic expansion would have to be reconciled 
with preservation of a balanced external sector. 
(c) Policy in 1959-62 
In 1957-58, economic policy managed to bring 
under control the most violent maladjustments 
in the external sector. However, its depressive 
effect on the domestic economy and a temporary 
improvement in exports, which rose 2.7 per cent 
after four years of decline (see again table 2) , 
led to the adoption of a more liberal approach 
in 1959 which was maintained up to 1962. The 
immediate result was a substantial increase in 
the value of imports (approximately 25 per cent 
in 1960), more public expenditure (see table 
5) , the recovery of industry, which achieved 
growth rates of over 8 per cent in 1959 and of 
6 per cent thereafter up to 1962 (see again 
table 3) , and, lastly, a satisfactory growth rate 
for the product and income (see table 1). It 
should be emphasized that this expansion was 
accompanied by a reduction in inflation (see 
again table 7 ) , since prices rose less between 
1959 and 1962 than in the two years of stabili-
zation. 
These developments show that many of the 
instruments and mechanisms perfected previ-
ously were put to good use, and a great effort 
was made to devise a truly national economic 
policy and co-ordinate its objectives by strength-
ening the planning system, and adopting public 
sector plans and a General Development Plan. 
These, especially the former, contributed appre-
ciably to the reorganization of the public admin-
istration, the analysis of government investment 
and expenditure and a more rational allocation 
of resources. 
Several of those instruments and mechanisms 
are worthy of special mention. The retention 
of a certain proportion of export income, mainly 
from coffee, kept some of the surplus of Colom-
bia's major export item off the market. The 
revenue obtained from the 15 per cent tax on 
coffee sales helped to normalize payments on 
the external debt and to finance a certain 
amount of public expenditure, thus making it 
unnecessary to use potentially inflationary de-
vices to subsidize the growth of such expendi-
ture. At the same time, the authorities' purchases 
of non-exportable coffee surpluses were reduced, 
and it was decreed that importers with foreign 
currency debts for which the State assumed 
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responsibility were to pay their liabilities in 
local currency. 
Public finances were strengthened because 
tax collection, particularly collection of income 
tax, was more strictly controlled. As table 5 
indicates, this led to an appreciable increase in 
the revenue from direct taxes. In 1959 their 
share of total tax income began to rise from 
around 42 per cent, at which it had stood the 
year before, to over 46.5 per cent by 1961-62. 
(See again table 6.) 
These measures, which were largely the re-
sponsibility of the State, were applied together 
with others mainly designed to safeguard and 
encourage industrial development. The customs 
tariff established in 1951 was revised so as to 
give greater protection to the traditional in-
dustries (food, tobacco, wood, etc.) and to 
increase still further the customs duties levied 
on consumer goods to the benefit of raw ma-
terials. In addition, a special customs duty was 
imposed on certain agricultural items (wheat 
and wheat flour, cotton, oats, hops, oil-seeds, 
etc.) and the revenue used to promote the cul-
tivation of those crops in Colombia. 
The policy of tax incentives for priority ac-
tivities was also strengthened. Export earnings 
from all items except unprocessed coffee, petro-
leum and petroleum products, bananas, hides, 
raw tobacco and precious metals were declared 
exempt from payment of income tax. Total or 
partial exemption from payment of income tax 
was also granted up to 1970 to corporations 
concerned exclusively with establishing and 
operating basic industries, or with developing 
industries connected with iron production which 
used inputs from the Paz del Rio steel plant. 
Those corporations were also empowered to 
form special reserves, exempt from payment of 
income tax, for investment in the production of 
raw materials and goods for import substitution. 
Tax exemptions were also accorded to other 
high-priority activities, such as the national air-
lines and construction for low- and medium-
income groups. 
Monetary policy concentrated on stabilization 
by keeping both the expansionist and restrictive 
forces in check. The money supply was in-
creased only very gradually irrespective of the 
fluctuations in prices. (See table 8.) In 1959-60, 
there was a moderate rise in prices and a rela-
tively small increase in the money supply (12 
and 10 per cent a year respectively), and, in 
1961-62, a rather more substantial increase in 
the two (25 and 21 per cent). In 1963, how-
ever, the situation changed altogether: prices 
climbed rapidly although there was less mone-
tary expansion. Without entering into greater 
detail, it seems clear that other forces must be 
held responsible both for the price movements 
and the trend of the money supply. 
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In order to deal with a basic problem of its 
agrarian structure, the Government of Colombia 
set up a National Agrarian Committee (Comité 
Nacional Agrario) to assist it in "the study of 
legislative and executive measures relating to 
the reform of the agrarian social structure, the 
development of agricultural productivity and 
the organization and improvement of the level 
of living of the rural population". The Com-
mittee drafted a bill which was submitted to 
Congress for discussion, and which served as 
a basis for the Agrarian Reform Act (Ley de 
Reforma Social Agraria) passed in 1961. The 
Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (Insti-
tute Colombiano de Reforma Agraria) was 
established under the Act itself as its executing 
agency. This Institute purchases farm land for 
the purpose of parcelling it out in smaller 
lots and transferring the ownership or con-
structing canals, dams, roads, etc. Its primary 
objectives were not so much an expeditious 
and radical reform of the structure of owner-
ship of lands already farmed, as the settlement 
of unused and State-owned land, the building 
of neighbourhood roads, land reclamation and 
preparation, irrigation programmes, reforesta-
tion and forest conservation. It was also engaged 
in such activities as the granting of supervised 
credit, the encouraffement of certain lines of 
im 
crop farming, and of studies on soil climate, 
meterological conditions, etc., with its assistance^ 
As pointed out, the other salient feature and, 
in a sense, the ultimate effort to systematize 
economic policy objectives consisted in the for-
mulation of public investment plans and of the 
over-all development plan {Plan General de De-
sarrollo) promulgated in 1961. 
Under the Plan General, an attempt was made 
in allocating resources, to define their implica-
tions in each sector with reference to a co-
ordinated programme; at the same time, a 
basis was provided for government politico-
economic decisions aimed at improving the 
average standard of living of the population. 
The preamble of the Plan specified the Govern-
ment's wish to channel national efforts in the 
economic and social fields towards the attain-
ment of the optimum rate of development com-
patible with Colombia's resources, and with the 
increasing extension of the benefits of progress 
to the most depressed sectors. 
Through development planning Colombia 
sought to simplify and rationalize State inter-
vention in economic affairs, by discarding the 
makeshift and empirical approach which often 
led to the dissipation and ineflScient use of finan-
cial and natural resources and ensuring proper 
co-ordination of public and private efforts on 
behalf of economic progress. The intention 
was not to increase direct State intervention, to 
broaden the sphere of action of the public au-
thorities, to introduce more and more control 
procedures, but to guarantee the effectiveness 
of economic policy by making it at once more 
carefully thought out and more resolute. 
Like all plans, the Colombian plan used a 
diagnosis of the status and prospects of the 
economy as a basis for establishing definite 
Land settlement in Colombia had been on a modest 
scale up to the end of 1964. According to available 
information, 1,400 farmers were actually settled on the 
land as at that date and 13,600 hectares had been 
distributed. One year later, the Colombian Institute for 
Agrarian Reform (Instituto Colombiano de Reforma 
Agraria—^INCORA) announced that about 1.3 million 
hectares had been allotted to some 33,000 households. 
The Agrarian Reform Act stipulates that it shall be 
enforced in stages on the basis of decrees for each 
part of the country. Purchases of private land for re-
distribution are confined to uncultivated estates of over 
2,000 hectares, with the inclusion, in some instances, 
of land needed for settlement programmes. The Act 
establishes, however, that the publicly-owned land shall 
be distributed first, and later, should it prove necessary, 
the private estates. The following is the order of priority 
for the distribution of the latter: unused land, ineffi-
ciently utilized land, properties farmed by tenants or 
sharecroppers, and farms that the owners wish to sell 
directly. 
over-all and sectoral targets for the economy 
in the period under consideration, and for 
evaluating and determining the means of attain-
ing them. Broadly speaking, this plan was in 
essence an attempt to orient economic policy 
towards relatively rapid economic and social 
expansion without upsetting external equilibrium 
and the stability of over-all price levels. 
The cumulative annual growth rate of the 
product established as a target under the plan 
was 5.6 per cent, which in practice implied a 
higher rate of development, since the base year 
to which the target rate related was 1959. To 
attain this objective, not only more active and 
rational utilization of installed production ca-
pacity was called for, but also a vigorous capi-
tal-formation effort. In view of the Colombian 
economy's vulnerability to external sector fluc-
tuations, and on the assumption that interna-
tional coffee prices would go down, it was felt 
that the first essential was to boost other exports 
(meat, cotton, sugar, manufactured goods, etc.) 
in order to maintain a favourable balance of 
payments. Clearly, however, this alone would not 
suffice, and the country would need blanket 
assistance from abroad for the implementation 
of the over-all plan, not merely sporadic aid 
for the purpose of correcting maladjustments. 
This assistance would have to be granted on 
exceptional terms in the form of subsidies or 
long-term loans with flexible conditions of pay-
ment, to ease service commitments on a dispro-
portionately large external debt and meet the 
growing need to import materials and equipment. 
Together with its purely economic targets, 
the plan envisaged changes in various aspects 
of the social structure: the education and public 
health sectors, housing, public utilities, etc. The 
development process should generate economic 
prosperity and convince the country that it was 
desirable and necessary to overcome its back-
wardness. 
Although the plan was not detailed on many 
points except with respect to the activities of 
the public-sector and industry, it constituted a 
useful guide and frame of reference open to 
improvement and adjustment, since it made no 
claim to lay down hard and fast rules for the 
course that Colombia should follow in the 
period covered. Instead it was a set of flexible 
hypotheses, subject to the situation of the econ-
omy and its foreseeable prospects. 
(d) Fluctuating development trends from 1963 
onwards 
The impetus that had been given to the econ-
omy since 1959 petered out at the end of 1962, 
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and in the following year, according to almost 
all the relevant indicators, there was another 
recession and another transitory outbreak of in-
flation. From 1963 onwards, development began 
to fluctuate, while economic policy lagged be-
hind striving to adjust its decisions to the move-
ments of the major variables. The cycles were 
very short—virtually annual. The downturns of 
1963 were followed by a slight recovery in 
1964, a relapse in 1965 and a further mild 
recovery in 1966. Policy had to be adapted to 
the particular circumstances of the moment: 
it vacillated between certain expansionist im-
pulses and a preoccupation with the external 
imbalance. 
Among the circumstances prevailing in 1963, 
the external transactions of decisive importance 
showed negative rates, since exports dropped by 
3.6 per cent and imports by 6.4 per cent. (See 
again table 2.) Public expenditure contracted, 
although moderately, as did agricultural pro-
duction, except for coffee, and the expansion 
of the manufacturing sector levelled off. (See 
again tables 3, 4 and 5.) In the course of the 
year the growth rates of the product and income 
declined to a little over 3 per cent. Furthermore, 
these downturns were accompanied by a sub-
stantial rise in prices: the workers' cost-of-living 
index showed any increase of almost 18 per 
cent. (See again table 7.) 
Apart from the decline in agricultural pro-
duction which can be explained by natural 
conditions, the chain of events which led to this 
situation is not difficult to trace, particularly as 
it reproduces a familiar sequence in the vicissi-
tudes of the Colombian economy. 
With regard to the fluctuations of foreign 
trade, it can be seen from table 2 that the 
expansion of exports in 1959 was followed by 
successive contractions in 1960-61, and, after an 
upswing in 1962, by another decline in 1963. 
Moreover, the growth rate of imports, which in 
1959 had already exceeded that of export earn-
ings, soared in 1960 (reaching almost 25 per 
cent) and continued positive in 1961 (a little 
over 7 per cent). Thus, despite the improvement 
in the export trade in 1962, both in that year 
and in the next the flow of purchases abroad 
had to be restricted, a step which inevitably 
heralds a decline in development in general 
and in the manufacturing sector and investment 
in particular. To make this restriction effective, 
the authorities again had to devaluate the cur-
rency and apply various measures to control 
demand for imported goods, while at the same 
time resorting to external financial assistance 
in order to mitigate the consequences. These 
decisions, and the special circumstances which 
led to their adoption,® were obviously the basic 
causes of the renewed rise in prices in 1963-64 
(see again table 7). The external origin of in-
flationary movements again became obvious, that 
is, it became manifest that inflation was struc-
turally inherent in the economy because of its 
vulnerability to fluctuations in the market for 
its main export, cofi'ee. 
In addition to this depressive combination of 
circumstances, a factor of a different kind super-
vened: the weakening of the planning process. 
The guidelines and operational machinery estab-
lished in the plans came to exert less influence, 
in practice, as instruments of economic policy. 
Between 1964 and 1965-66 another drastic 
change typical of this period took place. Once 
again, in 1964, a recovery in external transac-
tions produced repercussions throughout the 
Colombian economy, as can be seen from the 
most representative figures (see again table 2 ) . 
Inter alia, the public sector became more active, 
industrial expansion was speeded up, the over-
all growth rate rose and inflationary pressure 
on prices diminished. 
But the boom was of very brief duration. In 
1965, starting from its point of origin, the 
chain of events unwound in the opposite direc-
tion. As shown in table 2, a slight decrease of 
under 2 per cent in the value of exports was 
accompanied by another, far more marked (ap-
proximately 23 per cent), in imports, although 
during the previous year's short-lived prosperity 
the ratio between external income and expendi-
ture had been much more favourable and con-
servative than usual (the former had increased 
by almost 28 per cent, whereas the latter had 
risen by only 16 per cent). But the economy was 
already operating at a relatively high level of 
indebtedness, especially in respect of trade 
arrears, so that temporary increases in income 
(or new credits) were largely absorbed by the 
servicing of commitments.® 
® The devaluation was preceded by a considerable 
expansion of the means of payment, amounting to 20.6 
per cent, during the second half of 1962. Moreover, 
the discussion of the measure in Congress before it 
became law sparked oif various forms of speculation 
prior to its adoption (changes in price levels, hoard-
ing, stock-piling, pressure for imports, etc.). Labour 
clamoured for the maintenance of real wages, and 
concurrently with the devaluation a wage increase 
was granted, which exceeded the 1962 rise in prices 
and was to be adjusted every year in accordance with 
the variations in the cost of living. This system was 
abrogated the following year. 
® By 1965, the external public debt totalled about 
833 million dollars, and debt services represented some 
108 million dollars, as against approximately 540 mil-
103 
The relapse that occurred in 1965 was essen-
tially reflected in the external imbalance, since 
its inflationary implications were almost neg-
ligible, as is evidenced by a price rise of about 
8 per cent (see again table 7) . It led to the 
adoption of a new stabilization programme, 
which was launched in the last quarter of 1965 
and continued in operation until the end of 
1966. The usual combination of measures and 
instruments was applied. Devaluation of the 
currency was accompanied by yet another ex-
periment in the liberalization of a given propor-
tion of imports, while at the same time the 
system of multiple exchange rates was expanded 
and strengthened, and customs tariffs were fur-
ther increased. Moreover, a special surcharge 
on income táx^° was introduced, and investment 
in government securities was made compulsory 
for investment associations and agencies and in-
dividual taxpayers. While the State was thus 
provided with non-inflationary resources, which 
enabled it to raise its level of expenditure— 
although the share of investment was relatively 
small as it had been since 1963 (see again 
tables 5 and 6)—the monetary authorities suc-
ceeded in moderately reducing the expansion of 
the money supply (see again table 8 ) . Despite 
these decisions and as a result of the exchange 
measures, a device used previously in similar 
circumstances, prices rose by about 14 per cent 
in the first half of 1966. 
(e) Recent developments 
In November 1966 a new foreign exchange 
regime was adopted as an emergency measure, 
and the partially free exchange system that had 
been in force was rescinded. The factors that 
determined the reform were listed in a decree of 
that date as the fall in coffee prices, and 
world coffee market fluctuations during the past 
few months; the maturing of external commit-
ments contracted by the central bank (Banco de 
la República), the Government and the National 
Federation of Coffee-Growers (Federación Na-
cional de Cafeteros) to strengthen international 
lion accruing from exports of goods (see again table 2 ) . 
These figures do not include private commitments. See 
Planning Department of Colombia (Departamento Ad-
ministrativo de Planeación de Colombia—DAP), Alga-
nos aspectos de la economía colombiana, 1961-65. 
10 The increase in wages and salaries (including 
those payable in the public sector) granted at the end 
of 1962, and the sharp rise in over-all price levels in 
1963, were early signs of the inelasticity of the tax 
system in the latter year. As a result of this inelasticity, 
serious difficulties in the financing of official pro-
grammes arose, and were partly evaded by recourse to 
stopgap expedients such as the special income tax sur-
charges decreed in 1963 and 1965. 
reserves; and the difficulties encountered by the 
Government and the central bank in bringing 
their new external credit operations to a success-
ful conclusion. On all these grounds, it was 
considered essential to prevent abrupt distor-
tions in the use of foreign exchange and out-
breaks of speculation that might cause social 
unrest. 
In brief outline, the provisions of the new 
regime were as follows: only the Banco de la 
República could buy and sell gold and foreign 
exchange; foreign exchange could not be dis-
posed of without prior authorization from the 
Office of the Superintendent of Foreign Trade 
(Superintendencia de Comercio Exterior), which 
was to be accorded subject to the regulations of 
the Monetary Council (Junta Monetaria); the 
Monetary Council was to fix the rates at which 
the Banco de la República should buy and sell 
foreign exchange, which had hitherto been freely 
negotiable (the rates were set at 16.25 and 
16.30 pesos to the dollar, respectively); and 
until the supply of foreign exchange was regu-
larized, the Monetary Council was to determine 
an order of priorities for external payments. 
Furthermore, severe penalties for infringement 
of these regulations were established, and, as a 
supplementary measure, the Board of Foreign 
Trade (Junta de Comercio Exterior) decided 
that all goods which were being imported freely 
should be brought under the import permit 
regime. 
In addition to the foregoing measure, prices 
were frozen and controls were intensified to 
ensure that no improper advantage was taken of 
the new situation. 
These emergency regulations obviously were 
imperative because of the chronic structural 
weakness of the balance of payments, as a 
result of which external aid has been negotiated 
annually to make up for the inadequacy of the 
country's regular income. With some interna-
tional agencies, such agreements have been 
increasingly difíicult to conclude, and the terms 
have been hardening. It was proposed to make 
new credit resources for 1967 conditional upon 
a large-scale devaluation, which could be fol-
lowed by others in succession, according to the 
levels shown by international reserves. The Gov-
ernment repudiated this type of condition be-
cause of its effect on the stability of prices and 
wages and because it was felt to be at variance 
with the principles of liberty and autonomy in 
the conduct of national economic affairs. 
A matter of immediate concern was to make 
the foreign trade regime clear-cut and perma-
nent in every respect. Early in 1967 a foreign 
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exchange statute was promulgated, which was 
designed to act as an effective instrument of 
economic development. To this end, exchange 
controls were instituted, and the free market for 
foreign exchange was abolished, as well as the 
free import system. Regulations for foreign in-
vestment in Colombia were also established, and 
conditions and amounts were stipulated for the 
repatriation of foreign capital and profits and 
for the payment of royalties. A fund to promote 
and finance exports was created, with substan-
tial resources and extensive operational capacity. 
This exchange statute met with a favourable 
reception in international circles. With its entry 
into force, external credit for balance-of-pay-
ments purposes and for specific projects was 
re-established. 
(Í) Final considerations 
To conclude this cursory review of the main 
features of Colombia's development and the 
reaction of economic policy to events, it may be 
useful to emphasize a few salient points. 
^ First, there is clear evidence of ingenuity and 
efficiency at the level of institutional creative-
ness and management of the instruments of 
economic policy. The combination of orthodox 
and unconventional expedients found in Colom-
bia is outstanding in the experience of Latin 
America as a whole. Another striking feature is 
the wide range of institutes and agencies re-
sponsible for specific problems and activities. 
Secondly, although the relatively long period 
covered is distinguished by no radical proposals 
for structural reforms of the economic system, 
this does not imply that economic policy has 
been inconsistent or failed to define targets. 
Circumstances have often compelled it to con-
centrate upon certain problem areas of key 
importance to the nation. 
Unquestionably, one of the main problem 
areas is the economy's structural dependence 
upon a single export item. To make matters 
worse, this key product, coffee has not only 
been subject to abrupt and recurrent fluctuations, 
but has not found the market very favourable 
in the last ten years. This trend is particularly 
serious in view of the relative importance and 
pervasive influence of coffee in Columbia's pro-
duction system. 
Closely linked to the foregoing problem is a 
second form of dependence: the dynamic possi-
bilities of the diversification of production—spe-
cifically, industrial development—are contingent 
upon the expansion and contractions in the 
capacity to import. As in other countries, al-
though the import substitution process has been 
another mainspring of the economic system, 
which in the past was wholly subordinated to 
external sector trends, it has also involved in-
creasing requirements of inputs and capital 
goods for the expansion of manufacturing ac-
tivities, particularly as in those branches of 
production substitution has taken place only on 
a very modest scale.^^ In so far as periodic 
fluctuations or inadequate growth of the ca-
pacity for payment make it difficult to meet 
these needs, the process slackens or comes to a 
standstill. And if due proportion is not pre-
served, and that limitation is disregarded the 
outcome is almost inevitably a balance-of-pay-
ments crisis, with all the consequences described 
in earlier sections, including inflationary pres-
sures. 
Lastly, to underline only what seems of pri-
mary importance, there is the major problem 
of Colombia's geographical and economic inte-
gration, which, despite the endeavors and 
achievements of government policy, is still only 
a distant objective—not to speak of its cost— 
because of the country's topography. Incidentally 
integration is also an urgent need at the social 
and political levels. 
As was shown in the last section of the analy-
sis, economic policy entered upon a new phase 
of readjustment in 1966-67 in response to 
another external imbalance, and in an endeavour 
to break away from the conventional procedures 
which at the best have barely served as pallia-
tives in emergencies. The programme now under 
way is closely linked to the major "problem 
areas" which call for immediate attention, so 
that its basic objectives are easy to identify. 
It is essentially concerned with the diversifica-
tion and expansion of the economy's export 
base. An Export Promotion Fund {Fonda de 
Promoción de Exportaciones) was established 
not long ago, and it will gain strength from the 
progress of the Latin American integration 
movement. To fill up the gaps and hiatuses in the 
industrial structure left by the spontaneous 
growth of substitution industries—a field which 
seems to offer plenty of room for development 
with a potential market of a little under 20 mil-
lion inhabitants—is now one of the express aims 
of government action. The Industrial Develop-
ment Institute (Instituto de Fomento Industrial— 
IFI) has been financially and operationally 
"Traditional" industries still account for about 60 
per cent of manufacturing output. Moreover, in 1963 
approximately 20 per cent of all industrial inputs came 
from foreign sources, while the figure for intermediate 
products, fuels and capital goods exceeded 34 per 
cent. 
105 
strengthened to fit it for this task. Priority is obtained for given projects. All these funda-
being given to the construction of the key links mental aims of current economic policy go hand 
in the communications network and in the in hand with sopial objectives, in the broad 
economic infrastructure, so as to unify the sense of the term/In its next stages in particular, 
country geographically and lay sounder founda- this programme will probably not only require 
tions for providing incentives and facilities for a more explicit formulation of targets and their 
the economy. For this purpose, resources from proper co-ordination, but will force the State to 
the newly established Highway Fund (Fondo play a more active promotional role than in the 
Fial) are being used, together with the tradi- past, just as has been or is necessary in other 
tional budget allocations and external financing Latin American economies. 
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THE MEASUREMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN REAL INCOME 
IN U.S. DOLLARS 
INTRODUCTION 
It has long been recognized that official ex-
change rates provide an unsatisfactory method 
of expressing national income data in a common 
monetary denominator. They are an indication 
of monetary equivalence covering that part of 
a country's transactions which involve the move-
ment of funds across national frontiers, often 
reflecting governmental efforts to achieve or to 
maintain a given financial situation in spite of 
varying pressures on the balance of payments, 
and irrespective of any disequilibrium which 
exists between external and internal price levels. 
The economic history of Latin American coun-
tries provides countless and recurring instances 
where a given exchange rate has been main-
tained for a lengthy period of time, even though 
the internal price level has long since fallen 
out of line with prices in other parts of the 
world—equilibrium in the balance of payments 
being achieved only by drawing on exchange 
reserves, by loans, exchange controls or such 
other expedients as are open to the government 
in order to meet an emergency situation. 
An additional problem arises in that fre-
quently no single or unique rate of exchange 
exists and the economist wishing to express na-
tional data in a selected currency is given a 
choice of free rates, controlled rates, preferen-
tial, basic, auction, non-preferential, etc. rates 
depending on the monetary system applicable at 
any given time. In addition, inflationary condi-
tions characterize the price structure of many 
Latin American countries, and a price or ex-
change rate relationship which was applicable 
for a given date may be completely inappro-
priate a few months later. 
In this connexion, it should be noted that in 
all developing countries, and in some developed 
countries, the exchange rate is determined largely 
by the level of prices of a few basic products 
in which the country concerned has a cost 
advantage, thus reflecting the eSiciency of the 
export industries instead of indicating compara-
tive costs for the economy as a whole. While this 
may be of greater significance in other contexts 
(e.g. in studies of integration, promotion of trade 
flows, development of national industry, etc.), 
it is important in explaining why, and to what 
extent, the currencies of some Latin American 
countries can be considered as undervalued in 
relation to others. Hence, while exchange rates 
may or may not be adequate measures of the 
demand/supply situation relating to a country's 
international transactions, they cease to be valid 
measures of purchasing power as soon as they 
are applied to the internal price or cost struc-
ture of the country. As a corollary, the applica-
tion of prevailing exchange rates to income 
earned or to output gives data of very limited 
utility in making inter-country comparisons of 
values and prices or for establishing absolute 
levels in terms of a common currency. 
The problem is not a new one. Its existence 
has long been recognized by economists working 
in the field of international trade or monetary 
comparisons; but it is difficult to evaluate 
statistically and few serious attempts have been 
made to develop alternative conversion factors 
suitable for comparing or for aggregating na-
tional accounts data which relate to countries 
with difi"erent monetary denominators.^ 
The data given in the present study reflect the 
efforts made by the Economic Commission for 
Latin America to overcome this problem and to 
express data in a monetary denominator indica-
tive of the value of currencies when these are 
measured in terms of purchasing power in the 
country concerned. 
i^The best known of these were the pre-war calcula-
tions of Colin Clark in his Conditions of Economic 
Progress and, more recently, those of Gilbert, Kravis 
and Associates in two OEEC publications: An Interna-
tional Comparison of National Products and the 
Purchasing Power of Currencies (Paris, 1954), and 
Comparative National Products and Price Levels (Paris, 
1958). 
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A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PURCHASING POWER EQUIVALENTS 
The first estimates of the Economic Commis-
sion for Latin America giving income in terms 
of dollar equivalents appeared in the 1951-52 
edition of the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, values for the period 1945-1952 being 
expressed at 1950 prices. The methodology made 
no pretence to sophistication and in many cases 
the estimates of purchasing power equivalence 
were extremely arbitrary. In Mexico, Central 
America and the Caribbean, prevailing exchange 
rates, for instance, were assumed to provide a 
purchasing power equality between the national 
currency and the dollar. Elsewhere (i.e., for most 
South American countries), 1937 or 1938 ex-
change rates were extrapolated to provide a 
"parity" rate for 1950. This was justified on the 
ground that in the pre-war period the rates 
were more indicative of purchasing power than 
in the post-war years when multiple exchange 
rate systems, governmental controls, imperfect 
trade flows and the influence of accumulated ex-
change reserves distorted the situation. Where 
an extrapolation of the pre-war rates failed to 
produce acceptable results (as in Brazil), or was 
impracticable because of a lack of a precise 
rate for that period (as in Chile), estimates were 
made very arbitrarily in accordance with the 
empirical judgement of economists familiar with 
prices in the countries concerned. The conversion 
factors and the resulting dollar estimates of the 
gross domestic product are shown below in 
table 1. 
Although the extrapolation of rates prevailing 
in a so-called "normal" period has been prac-
tised by national and international organiza-
tions in order to obtain a more realistic rate 
for current periods, the weakness of assuming 
"normality" in any reference period is widely 
recognized. Less recognition has however been 
given to the distortions which arise when a 
single rate is applied to the various components 
of the gross domestic product or income. Con-
version into dollars with a single rate assumes 
that the purchasing power of currency used for 
investment goods is, for example, the same as 
for governmental or private consumption; alter-
natively, that goods and services have the same 
price relationship in national currency as in 
dollars (or in any other currency); likewise, 
that the value of the output of each branch of 
activity can be revalued in the prices of an-
other country by the adoption of a single con-
version factor that applies equally to agricul-
ture, mining, manufacturing, construction, in-
ternal trade, distribution, administrative services, 
and so on, even though the price relationships 
for these sectors inter se differ substantially 
from country to country. In the same way, the 
use of a single index (usually based on con-
sumer prices) to measure price changes between 
a reference year and the current period is open 
to serious objections, particularly when applied 
across-the-board to all components of the gross 
domestic product, expenditure or national in-
Table 1 
TOTAL AND PER CAPITA INCOME IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1950» 




















Argentina 17.2 6.3 Peso 53,700 8,524 496 
Brazil 52.1 25.0 Cruzeiro 270,900 10,836 208 
Chüe 5.8 85.0 Peso 131,900 1,552 268 
11.3 2.7 Peso 6,124 2,268 201 
Cuba 5.4 1.0 Peso 2,010 2,010 372 
El Salvador 1.9 3.0 Colón 846 282 148 
Guatemala 2.8 1.0 Quetzal 464 464 166 
Mexico 25.7 8.0 Peso 43,300 5,412 211 
Peru 8.5 15.0 Sol oro 15,240 1,016 121 
Venezuela 4.9 3.5 Bolívar 8,353 2,388 487 
Other countries 19.7 — — — 3,568 181 
LATIN AMERICA 155.3 — — — 38,320 247 
SOURCE: Economic Survey of Latin America, 1951-52 
(E/CN.12/291/Rev.I). 
" As estimated by the Economic Commission for 
Latin America in 1953. 
"Units of national currency per U.S. dollar. 
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come. This means in practice that the extra-
polated results are not influenced directly by 
price changes applicable to investment, govern-
mental consumption, and a large part of per-
sonal and professional services. Finally, there 
is the basic problem that, no matter how reliable 
the indexes used for extrapolation may be, all 
the inaccuracies of the original data are per-
petuated, and often magnified, in the process 
of extrapolation. 
Recognizing these limitations, ECLA, while 
continuing to publish^ its dollar estimates for 
total and per capital gross domestic product 
(first at 1950, and later at 1960, prices) set 
about devising some system to measure com-
parative purchasing power statistically and pro-
vide a valid means for expressing national ac-
counts data in a common monetary denominator. 
The work carried out by ECLA is described in a 
study,® and only the salient features need be 
noted here. These were as follows: 
(1) Practical considerations to a large extent 
determined the choice of the formula, the scope 
of the study, the planning and execution of the 
field work and the derivation of the final results. 
(2) Specifications were drawn up for a com-
mon market basket of commodities representa-
tive of the expenditure pattern of the nineteen 
Latin American countries included in the com-
parison. This basket comprised 261 consump-
tion goods and 113 investment goods, many of 
the latter being subdivided according to quality, 
size, type, horsepower or other salient charac-
teristic. 
(3) Prices were collected from shops or out-
lets in each of the capital cities of the countries 
concerned during the period 1960-62.^ Adjust-
ments were made for seasonality and other 
sources of incomparability, the results being 
related to the common reference periods of June 
1960 and June 1962. 
(4) A quantitative weighting pattern was de-
rived from 1960 per capita expenditure data 
given for each country in its national accounts, 
with supplementary information such as con-
sumer expenditure surveys, trade and produc-
tion statistics, governmental accounts etc. being 
used for a breakdown at the item level. Quanti-
ties were then averaged for the nineteen Latin 
American countries in order to reflect the rela-
tive importance of each item during the base 
year. A somewhat similar procedure was adopted 
in order to provide a per capital weighting sys-
tem indicative of the 1960 expenditure pattern of 
the United States. 
(5) The application of quantity weights to 
the 1960 (and 1962) prices of each country 
gave a revaluation of the market basket in each 
currency using first, average Latin American 
and secondly United States quantitative expendi-
ture patterns. This in turn yielded a set of price 
relatives and purchasing power equivalents for 
1960 and 1962 with alternative weights for each 
main expenditure sector—viz., private consump-
tion, government consumption, construction, and 
producers' equipment—the geometric and arith-
metic crossing of the results providing further 
estimates of purchasing power which reflected 
(without exactly measuring) an average of Latin 
American and United States expenditure patterns 
in quantitative terms. 
(6) Being of a fixed weight aggregative type, 
the formula for the price relatives was as fol-
lows: 
L'Phu — 
i = 1 Ptt qfo 
(1) 
and 
< = 1 Pla <Jio 
[i = 1 , 2 , 3 j nitems) 




i = 1 Pa qm 
f = 1 Pik qju 
(2) 
2 Data were published for individual countries only 
in the 1952-53 editions of the Economic Survey of 
Latin America. These figures were nevertheless still 
calculated in order to obtain the annual regional 
aggregates whicli appeared in the later Economic 
Surveys. 
® ECLA, A Measurement of Price Levels and the 
Purchasing Power of Currencies in Latin America, 
1960-62 (E/CN.I2/653). 
^ In some cases more than one city was covered; 
while for those countries where inflation could jeopar-
dize the results, pricés were collected both in 1960 and 
in 1962. 
where 
k is any Latin American country, and u is 
the United States; 
Pik, Piu are the prices of item i in countries 
k and K; 
q¡¿ and qju are average per capita quantities 
purchased of item j in k and u ( / and i 
being virtually identical), and 
L-Ptcu is a Laspeyres-type price index of coun-
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try k relative to county u with quantity 
weights based on the Latin American ex-
penditure pattern; while 
P-Pjcu is a Paasche-type index with weights 
based on the United States expenditure 
pattern. 
As purchasing power is inversely proportional 
to the level of prices, the purchasing power 
equivalent R for any Latin American country k 
vis-á-vis the United States u may be written: 
(with United States quantity weights) 
Where a Fisher-type formula is used to estab-





i = 1 P»M qfo 
n 
2 
i = 1 Piu ^jn 1 
\ 
n 
2 1 = 1 Pik lío 
n 
2 









1 = 1 Pile qfo 
(with average Latin American quantity weights) 
or 
P-Puu 
i = 1 Piu qju 
i = 1 Pih qju 
(4) 
Other formulae could have been used to give 
alternative results, e.g., by the geometric averag-
ing of weights, the arithmetic crossing of results 
using Laspeyres and Paasche-type indexes, the 
adoption of a total (rather than an average per 
capita) expenditure weighting pattern, and so 
on. Nevertheless, for ECLA's objectives it was 
considered that formulae (3) , (4) and (5) 
provided the most satisfactory measures of pur-
chasing power, taking into account the scope of 
the study and the material plus the resources 
available to ECLA at that time. 
Additional calculations were subsequently 
made to cover changes in inventories (to the 
extent that these were recorded in the national 
accounts); while in the case of the foreign trade 
balance, ofScial or trade exchange rates were 
considered appropriate. In this way, a full set 
Table 2 
PURCHASING POWER EQUIVALENTS OF LATIN AMERICAN CURRENCIES, BY MAIN SECTOR OF 
EXPENDITURE, JUNE 1960 














(a) With Latin American quantity iveights 
Argentina Peso 42.9 22.1 71.0 151.9 42.6 82.7 
Bolivia Peso 6.81 2.52 7.02 16.79 7.41 11.88 
Brazil New Cr. 0.0989 0.0749 0.1180 0.3003 0.09600 0.1376 
Chile Escudo 0.830 0.481 0.707 1.853 0.865 1.050 
Colombia Peso 4.46 2.36 3.85 9.30 4.79 6.60 
Ecuador Sucre 10.47 4.93 8.80 22.72 11.77 . 15.78 
Paraguay Guaraní 65.9 33.5 83.3 195.5 71.5 119.1 
Peru Sol oro 15.07 6.59 16,92 34.81 16.16 27.24 
Uruguay Peso 5.73 2.71 7.96 19.13 6.28 11.43 
Venezuela Bolivar 4.09 4.15 4.27 4.18 4.16 3.35 
Costa Rica Colón 4.65 2.47 5.02 7.66 5.17 6.20 
Dominican Republic . . Peso 0.945 0.451 0.861 1.350 1.097 1.00 
El Salvador Colón 2.00 1.12 1.65 2.93 2.34 2.50 
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Table 2 (.continued') 
PURCHASING POWER EQUIVALENTS OF LATIN AMERICAN CURRENCIES, BY MAIN SECTOR OF 
EXPENDITURE, JUNE 1960 (continued) 
(Units of national currency per U.S. dollar) 
Country Currency 
Consumption Construe' Producers' Inventory Trade 
unit Private Government tion durables changes balance 
Guatemala Quetzal 0.889 0.474 0.701 1.188 0.969 1.00 
Haiti Gourde 3.60 2.04 3.16 5.81 4.04 5.00 
Lempira 1.900 0.838 1.579 2.506 2.075 2.000 
Mexico Peso 7.23 5.45 8.46 15.12 8.13 12.50 
Nicaragua Córdoba 5.93 3.60 6.69 9.28 6.78 7.00 
Panama Balboa 0.841 0.463 0.984 1.196 0.899 1.00 
(b) JFith United States quantity weights 
Peso 64.4 32.5 70.8 178.5 64.5 82.7 
Peso 10.12 4.48 6.28 17.63 11.94 11.88 
Brazil New Cr. 0.1501 0.0972 0.1076 0.3503 0.1394 0.1376 
Chile Escudo 1.295 0.725 0.682 2.169 1.405 1.050 
Colombia Peso 6.85 3.31 3.22 9.23 7.18 6.60 
Ecuador Sucre 14.52 7.41 7.64 20.52 16.81 15.78 
Paraguay Guaraní 94.9 46.2 68.6 194.9 144.7 119.1 
Peru Sol oro 20.61 9.78 14.53 36.82 23.40 ll.'2A 
Uruguay Peso 8.27 4.02 6.94 22.02 10.14 11.43 
Venezuela Bolivar 5.84 4.46 3.07 4.12 5.54 3.35 
Costa Rica Colón 6.21 3.56 3.74 8.29 6.87 6.20 
Dominican Republic . . Peso 1.240 0.695 0.610 1.400 1.480 1.000 
El Salvador Colón 2.46 1.50 1.26 3.06 2.86 2.50 
Guatemala Quetzal 1.140 0.718 0.534 1.268 1.289 1.000 
Haiti Gourde 4.54 2.73 2.80 6.07 5.41 5.00 
Honduras Lempira 2.431 1.248 0.998 2.566 2.661 2.000 
Mexico Peso 9.53 6.70 6.88 15.44 11.58 12.50 
Nicaragua Córdoba 7.98 4.67 5.52 10.20 9.72 7.00 
Panama Balboa 1.045 0.638 0.699 1.214 1.090 1.000 
(c) Geometric mean 
Argentina Peso 52.6 26.8 70.9 164.6 52.4 82.7 
Bolivia Peso 8.30 3.86 6.64 17.20 9.41 11.88 
Brazil New Cr. $ a 0.1219 0.0853 0.1126 0.3243 0.1157 0.1376 
Chile Escudo 1.036 0.590 0.694 2.000 1.103 1.050 
Colombia Peso 5.53 2.79 3.52 9.27 5.87 6.60 
Ecuador Sucre 12.33 6.04 8.20 21.60 14.06 15.78 
Paraguay Guaraní 79.0 39.4 75.6 195.2 90.6 119.1 
Peru Sol oro 17.62 8.03 15.68 35.80 19.45 27.24 
Uruguay Peso 6.88 3.30 7.43 20.52 7.98 11.43 
Venezuela Bolivar 4.89 4.30 3.62 4.15 4.80 3.35 
Costa Rica Colón 5.37 2.97 4.33 7.97 5.96 6.20 
Dominican Republic . . Peso 1.082 0.559 0.725 1.375 1.274 1.000 
El Salvador Colón 2.22 1.30 1.44 3.00 2.59 2.50 
Guatemala Quetzal 1.007 0.583 0.613 1.228 1.117 1.000 
Haiti Gourde 4.04 2.36 2.97 5.94 4.68 5.00 
Honduras Lempira 2.149 1.023 1.255 2.536 2.350 2.000 
Mexico Peso 8.30 6.04 7.63 15.28 9.70 12.50 
Nicaragua Córdoba 6.88 4.10 6.08 9.73 8.12 7.00 
Panama Balboa 0.937 0.543 0.829 1.205 0.990 1.000 
SOURCE: Economic Commission for Latin America: 
Series compiled by the Special Studies Section. 
a New Cr. $ (New Cruzeiro) = : 1,000 cruzeiros (as 
from February 1967). 
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of purchasing power equivalents, suitable for 
expressing national expenditure data in the 
various Latin American currencies or in U.S. 
dollars, was elaborated. The equivalents, in terms 
of units of national currency per U.S. dollar, 
are shown in table 2 for June 1960 which was 
the principal reference point of the ECLA 
study.® These in turn formed the basis of the 
estimates of real income in dollar terms which 
are analysed in the following chapters. 
®In the ECLA study, results were obtained for both 
1960 and 1962. These data were then used in order 
to estimate purchasing power equivalents for each 
expenditure sector annuaEy beginning 1955 and quar-
terly beginning 1963. 
B . D O L L A R E S T I M A T E S O F E X P E N D I T U R E S O N T H E G R O S S 
D O M E S T I C P R O D U C T , 1 9 6 0 
1. TOTAL AND PER CAPITA INCOME FOR 
THE REGION 
Unfortunately, a detailed breakdown of the 
gross domestic product by type of expenditure is 
available for very few countries in Latin 
America, and only very broad categories can 
usually be distinguished, these being private 
consumption, governmental consumption, con-
struction, producers' durables, transport equip-
ment and the foreign trade balance. Changes in 
inventories are recorded for only half the coun-
tries, the figures being incomplete since many 
inventories, e.g. those held by wholesale and 
retail traders, are generally omitted. To the 
extent that published data were however avail-
able, dollar values were established by applying 
to the data for each sector in national cur-
rency,® the conversion factors corresponding re-
spectively to (o) official exchange rates,''^  and 
(6) purchasing power equivalents with quantity 
weights based on an average Latin American 
expenditure pattern, a United States pattern and 
a geometric average of the two. The results are 
given as regional aggregates in table 3, from 
which it will be observed that while the applica-
tion of official (or trade) rates gave a regional 
average expenditure of 337 dollars per head, 
the use of purchasing power equivalents raised 
the figure to 502 dollars when a Latin American 
weighting pattern was adopted; 373 dollars when 
the weights were based on the United States; 
437 dollars when an arithmetic average of the 
two was taken: and 431 dollars when the calcu-
® National currency data were based on statistics 
actually published by the individual countries. In 
some cases, the United Nations Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics, 1965 was used as the source. 
When no breakdown of fixed investment was available, 
the sub-division between construction and producers' 
equipment had to be estimated. 
Where these were not available, the exchange rates 
implicit in the country's trade statistics were applied 
(these being obtained through relating the value of 
trade in dollars to the value of the same trade in 
national eurrencv). 
lation was carried out in accordance with the 
Fisher "Ideal" formula. These data may be 
compared with the estimate of 392 dollars per 
head which appeared in ECLA's Economy Sur-
vey of Latin America for 1965 (when conversion 
factors were obtained principally by an extra-
polation of pre-war exchange rates). 
Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
IN U.S. DOLLARS, 1960, CALCULATED AT 
OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATES» AND WITH 
PURCHASING POWER EQUIVALENTS 







At prevailing exchange rates 
Previous ECLA estimates® . . 
Based on purchasing power 
equivalents^ 
(а) With Latin American 
weights 
(б ) With United States 
weights 
(c ) Arithmetic mean 














•> Where no official rates were available, trade rates 
were used. 
<= 1965 edition of the Economic Survey of Latin 
America. 
"i Each expenditure sector was calculated separately 
and results summarized in order to provide the over-all 
total. 
The use of purchasing power equivalents in 
place of exchange rates thus raised the average 
regional level of the 1960 gross domestic product 
by almost 50 per cent when a Latin American 
expenditure pattern was used for weighting pur-
poses, 10 per cent when a United States pattern 
was used and a little less than 30 per cent when 
a crossed average of the two was taken. This 
is in keeping with the disparity observed by 
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other investigators, notably Gilbert and Associ-
ates of the OEEC, whose data for eight European 
countries gave on the average an increase of 67 
per cent in 1950 (and 54 per cent in 1955) 
when purchasing power equivalents based on 
national expenditure patterns were used instead 
of exchange rates (the increase being 19 and 
11 per cent for the same two years when a 
United States pattern was u s e d ) F o r indi-
vidual European countries, there was, moreover, 
a greater range between maximum and minimum 
data than that observed for Latin America, 
though this may well be due to differing 
methodology—particularly since national weight-
ing was used for the European study and average 
regional weighting for Latin America. 
A precise evaluation has not been made for 
Latin America as to the possible effect of 
applying national rather than regional weighting 
patterns; but a short-cut method using price 
relatives for homogeneous groups of commodities 
indicated that in practice national weights 
changed the results very little—^the dollar valua-
tion being generally 2 to 5 per cent lower, with 
the average expenditure level of the region fall-
ing from 502 to 4S4 dollars per head. 
The figures for total (as distinct from per 
capita) expenditure indicate that the Latin 
American region had a global gross domestic 
product in 1960 valued at 67,000 million dollars 
if measured on the basis of official exchange 
rates, 100,000 million if measured with purchas-
ing power equivalents using a Latin American 
weighting pattern, 74,000 million with equiva-
lents based on a United States pattern, and 
86,000 million using a geometric mean of the 
two. These estimates may be compared with a 
1960 total of 501,000 million dollars for the 
United States—^the per capita figure for that 
country being 2,775 dollars, or roughly six 
times the Latin American level in terms of pur-
chasing power and eight limes the level obtained 
with official exchange rates. 
2. ESTIMATES FOR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES 
Figures for individual countries calculated 
with exchange rates and with alternative 
measures of purchasing power equivalence, are 
given in table 4—^both total and per capita data 
being presented. (See also figures V and V L ) 
®An extrapolation to 1960 would give a 73 per cent 
increase -with national weights and 0.3 per cent with 
U. S. weights, though such extrapolations are notori-
ously unreliable. SOURCE: Comparative National Pro-
ducts and Price Levels, op. cit. 
The main points which emerge are as follows: 
(a) At official rates of exchange 
At official rates of exchange, 1960 expenditure 
on the gross domestic product in Latin American 
countries ranged from a nominal level of 70 
dollars per head for Haiti to 1,040 dollars per 
head for Venezuela. In the upper brackets, Chile 
appears with over 600 dollars, followed closely 
by Argentina with 560. Next came Uruguay, 
Panama, Costa Rica, and Mexico with nominal 
incomes between 300 and 500 dollars, followed 
by Guatemala, Colombia, Brazil,® the Do-
minican Republic, Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
Ecuador and Peru, with a range from 200 to 300 
dollars. Three countries—Honduras, Paraguay 
and Bolivia—had levels which at official ex-
change rates varied between 100 to 200 dollars. 
Haiti was distinguished as the only country with 
a nominal income below the hundred dollars 
mark. 
(b) With regionally-weighted purchasing power 
equivalents 
The adoption of purchasing power equivalents 
to measure real income or expenditure involved 
a change of substantial magnitude for most 
countries, especially when the calculations were 
based on a Latin American quantity weighting 
pattern. In virtually all cases, this increased the 
dollar valuation substantially—^the exception 
being Venezuela where the results decreased by 
roughly one-sixth (the price level being higher 
than in the United States). For Uruguay, Bo-
livia, Peru, Argentina, Paraguay and Ecuador 
on the other hand, the dollar estimates, on the 
basis of regionally weighted purchasing power 
equivalents, increased by fifty to one hundred 
per cent. Lesser increases applied to such coun-
tries as Brazil, Colombia, Chile, etc., while 
smallest increases were registered for Honduras, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and the Dominican Re-
public where the price level was more similar to 
that of the United States. 
In absolute terms, the highest real expendi-
ture figures corresponded to Argentina and 
Uruguay—the per capita levels in these two 
countries being respectively 1,045 and 1,012 
dollars in place of 561 and 477 dollars at pre-
vailing exchange rates. Next highest were 
Venezuela and Chile where the real expenditure 
level was between 800 and 900 dollars. After 
these came Mexico, Costa Rica and Panama 
with real levels between 500 to 600 dollars. Then 
followed six countries in the range 300 to 400 
® The level was affected substantially by the exchange 
rate selected (an implicit trade rate being used in 
the absence of an official rate). 
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Table 2 (.continued') 
DOLLAR ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURE ON THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN LATIN AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES, 1960 
(Calculated with alternative conversion factors) 
Total (million dollars) Per capita (dollars) 
With purchasing power equivalents 
based on: 
With purchasing power 
equivalents based on: 
Country exchange Weighting exchange Weighting 
rates pattern oí: Geometric rates pattern of: Geometric 
Latin United mean Latin United mean 
America States America States 
Argentina 11,602 21,602 14,914 17,947 561 1,045 721 868 
376 745 499 609 102 201 135 165 
17,575 24,080 17,213 20,305 250 342 245 289 
Chile 4,724 6,304 4,177 5,128 606 809 536 658 
Colombia 4,003 6,133 4,470 5,203 259 396 289 336 
Ecuador 933 1,518 1,141 1,312 216 352 264 304 
Paraguay 283 524 389 450 160 296 220 255 
Peru 2,074 3,899 2,958 3,387 207 389 295 338 
Uruguay 1,188 2,522 1,798 2,124 477 1,012 722 853 
Venezuela 7,648 6,388 5,595 5,933 1,043 871 763 809 
Costa Rica 453 648 501 568 376 537 415 471 
Dominican Republic . . 723 863 686 766 239 285 226 253 
567 765 640 698 228 307 257 280 
Guatemala 1,021 1,230 980 1,094 271 327 260 291 
Haiti» 298 436 350 390 72 105 84 94 
Honduras 378 418 372 405 194 230 191 208 
Mexico 12,471 20,965 16,735 18,688 346 582 464 518 
Nicaragua 337 409 317 359 228 277 214 243 
Panama 448 531 443 484 439 520 434 474 
LATIN AMERICA*» 67,072 100,012 74,178 85,850 337 502 373 431 
^ Where official rates were not available, trade rates 
were used. 
dollars; and four coxmtries from 200 to 300 
dollars. At a low extreme were Haiti and Bolivia 
whose real expenditures (on the basis of a Latin 
American weighting pattern) were 105 and 201 
dollars respectively. 
This involved a certain change in the ranking 
of the countries, Venezuela dropping to third 
highest when valued in terms of purchasing 
power, instead of highest (easily) at prevailing 
exchange rates. Argentina moved up, from third 
to first; Uruguay from fourth to second; Mexico 
from seventh to fifth; Colombia from ninth to 
eighth; Ecuador from fourteenth to tenth; Peru 
from fifteenth to ninth; and Paraguay from 
seventeenth to fourteenth. On the other hand, 
Chile fell from second to fourth; Panama from 
fifth to seventh; Guatemala from eighth to 
twelfth; Brazil from tenth to eleventh; the 
Dominican Republic from eleventh to fifteenth; 
Nicaragua from twelfth to sixteenth; and Hon-
duras from sixteenth to seventeenth. The rela-
l» Excluding Cuba. 
tive positions of Costa Rica (sixth). El Salvador 
(thirteenth), Bolivia (eighteenth), and Haiti 
(last) were unchanged. 
(c) With United States weighted purchasing 
power equivalents 
The revaluation of Latin American expendi-
ture at U.S. prices using a national or a regional 
(quantitative) weighting pattern gives dollar 
levels at a high extreme—mainly because of the 
strong inverse correlation between prices charged 
and quantities consumed (expenditure in each 
situation tending to adjust itself in such a way 
that a greater quantity of cheap items are con-
sumed and a lesser quantity of the expensive 
ones). When Latin American weights are used, 
the quantitative consumption of items cheap in 
the region is in normal circumstances maxi-
mised. However, the U.S. prices applied to those 
quantities are in many cases also at a high 
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Geometric overage of results obtolnsd with Latin American and 
United States weights 
Results obtained with exchango rates (when official rates were 
not ovoilable, trade rates were used) 
The combination of large quantitative consump-
tion and high relative prices affects the pur-
chasing power equivalence in such a way that a 
correspondingly high dollar valuation is given 
to Latin American income or expenditure. 
The converse was true when a United States 
(quantitative) weighting pattern was applied to 
prices—the dollar values being this time at a 
low extreme. The change was not xmiform, how-
ever, southernmost countries (Argentina, Bo-
livia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay) being af-
fected most and the northernmost countries 
(Mexico, Central America plus Venezuela) least. 
Tropical countries in South America occupied 
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an intermediate position. Accordingly, with 
United States weights, Venezuela with an ex-
penditure of 763 dollars per capita regained its 
role as the country with the highest real ex-
penditure in the region, followed closely by 
Argentina (721) and Uruguay (722). Chile 
(536) and Mexico (464) remained fourth and 
fifth highest. However, the relative positions of 
Panama (434) and Costa Rica (415) were re-
versed, as were those of Peru (295) and Co-
lombia (289). In the same way both Guatemala 
(260) and El Salvador (257) displaced Brazil 
(245), while the Dominican Republic displaced 
Paraguay. The ranking of other countries re-
mained unchanged, only the absolute levels 
being affected. 
(d) With a geometric crossing of Central 
America weighted and United States 
weighted equivalents 
A geometric crossing of the respective equiva-
lents provided a series which were inevitably 
intermediate in level vis-a-vis regionally-weighted 
or United States-weighted estimates. The dollar 
values for Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Para-
guay, Peru, Uruguay and Mexico were never-
theless still 50 to 60 per cent higher than those 
obtained with exchange rates Uhe percentage 
being almost 80 in the case of Uruguay). For 
Chile, Brazil, most of Central America and the 
Caribbean, the percentage increase was less 
pronounced, while for Venezuela, the dollar 
level was 20 per cent below that obtained with 
exchange rates. As a result, Venezuela (with 809 
dollars per capita in place of 1,043 dollars with 
exchange rates) was once more only third high-
est in the region—Argentina (868) and Uru-
guay (853) both surpassing it. After Venezuela 
came Chile (658), Mexico (518), Costa Rica 
(471) and Panama (474). Other countries 
were in the 200-400 dollar bracket, except 
Bolivia (165) and Haiti (94). 
This meant that if a comparison is made with 
the United States, no Latin American country 
has a per capita expenditure level equal in pur-
chasing power to one-third of that prevailing in 
the United States (2,775 dollars) in 1960. At a 
low extreme were two countries—Haiti and 
Bolivia—where expenditures (measured on the 
basis of geometrically-crossed equivalents) were 
only 3 and 6 per cent respectively of the United 
States level; four countries were in the range 
of 7.5 to 10 per cent; six from 10 to 12.5 per 
cent; three from 17 to 20 per cent; one has 
24 per cent; one 29 per cent and, for two, 31 
per cent of the 1960 United States level. 
It must, of course, be recognized that com-
parisons of this kind are venturesome in view of 
the wide differences in income and expenditure 
patterns which characterize the United States 
and Latin America (especially the poorer coun-
tries). However, the results do servé to provide 
rough orders of magnitude and to emphasize 
the fact that in many parts of the region, in-
habitants had a real income figure far below 
what would be considered a subsistence level in 
the United States. 
Averaging results for the whole Latin Ameri-
can region, it will be found that the real ex-
penditure level was 16 per cent of that in the 
United States (18 per cent if items are combined 
in accordance with their relative importance 
within the Latin American region). Nominal 
dollar expenditure, obtained by applying official 
or trade exchange rates, was of course still 
lower, being only 12 per cent. However, what-
ever figure is accepted, it is obvious that an 
extremely wide gap in income levels existed, and 
in only one or two countries did it approximate 
average per capita income in the poorer sectors 
of the population of the United States. (See 
table 5.) : 
T a b l e s 
REAL PER CAPITAL PRODUCT OR EXPENDI-
TURE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED 
STATES, 1960 
IN U . S . DOLLARS: AND AS INDEXES 
(Indexes: USA—100) 
Based on purchasing pover 
Bastd etfuivalents 
C«,metric excZn,, „ . . ~ cüT 
United States . . . . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
LATIN AMERICA 12.1 18.1 13 .4 15 .5 
Argentina 20.2 37.7 26.0 31.3 
Uruguay 17.2 36.5 26.0 30.7 
Venezuela 37.6 31.4 27.5 29.2 
Chile 21.8 29.2 19.3 23.7 
Mexico 12.5 21.0 16.7 18.7 
Panama 15.0 18.7 15.6 17.1 
Costa Rica 13.5 19.3 15.0 17.0 
Peru 7.5 14.0 10.6 12.2 
Colombia 9.3 14.3 10.4 12.1 
Ecuador 7.8 12.7 9.5 11.0 
Guatemala 9.8 11.8 9.4 10.5 
Brazil 9.0 12.3 8.8 10.4 
El Salvador 8.2 11.1 9.3 10.1 
Paraguay 5.8 10.7 7.9 9.2 
Dominican Republic 8.6 10.3. 8.1 9.1 
Nicaragua 8.2 10.0 7.7 8.8 
Honduras 7.0 8.3 6.9 7.5 
Bolivia 3.7 7.2 4.9 5.9 
Haiti 2.6 3.8 3.0 3.4 
a Arranged according to income levels when calculated 
•with geometrically-crossed formulae. 
Weights applied to prices in order to calculate 
purchasing power equivalents. 
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C. EXPENDITURE ON THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTOR, 1960 
1. T H E MAIN SECTORS OF EXPENDITURE 
In the preceding chapter, an analysis was 
made of the dollar aggregates obtained when 
alternative conversion factors were applied to 
the national currency data for each expenditure 
sector. The relative importance of the sectors 
varied, however, from country to country and 
different price levels applied to each. For this 
reason, it is convenient to examine each sector 
individually, at the same time relating them to 
total expenditure. In this chapter, an analysis is 
accordingly made of results obtained on the one 
hand with exchange rates, and on the other with 
purchasing power equivalents, calculated, it 
should be noted, as a geometric mean of the 
regionally weighted and the United States 
weighted purchasing power equivalents. These 
data are given in summary form in tables 6 
and 7— t^he latter showing the per capita level 
in relation to the corresponding level in the 
United States. 
(a) Private consumption expenditure 
At official rates of exchange private consump-
tion expenditure in 1960 ranged from 60 dollars 
per head (for Haiti) to 584 dollars (for Vene-
zuela), with intermediate levels of 492 dollars 
for Chile, 390 dollars for Argentina, 377 dollars 
for Uruguay, 281 dollars for Mexico and 172 
dollars for Brazil, etc. 
When measured on the basis of geometrically' 
crossed purchasing power equivalents, Venezuela 
(401 dollars) was superseded as the Latin 
American country with the highest level of per 
capita private consumption by Uruguay (626), 
Argentina (615), Chile (500) and Mexico 
(424). Next came Panama (340 dollars) and 
Costa Rica (330 dollars). Remaining countries 
had levels which in no case exceeded 250 dollars 
in real terms—three of these (Honduras, Bo-
livia and Haiti) being under 150 dollars. For 
the region as a whole, the average in terms of 
purchasing power was 306 dollars (as com-
pared with 242 dollars at oiEcial exchange 
rates). 
As already pointed out, the wide disparity in 
income levels, expenditure patterns, etc., makes 
a comparison of levels in Latin America and 
the United States highly controversial. The pres-
ent estimates would, however, suggest that, in 
terms of purchasing power, the average level of 
private consumption expenditure for the region 
was approximately 18 per cent that of in the 
United States (the corresponding figure being 
14 per cent when measured with exchange rates). 
For individual countries, the levels varied con-
siderably. For Uruguay and Argentina, in pur-
chasing power terms, it was as high as 37 per 
cent; in Chile 29 per cent (the same figure being 
obtained with official exchange rates); in Mexico 
25 per cent; Venezuela 23 per cent; while 
Panama and Costa Rica were each 20 and 19 
per cent of the corresponding United States 
level. Countries having levels below the regional 
average vis-a-vis the United States included 
Colombia (14 per cent), Guatemala (13 per 
cent), Peru (12 per cent), Brazil, Ecuador, 
Paraguay and Nicaragua (each 11 per cent), 
with Bolivia (7 per cent) and Haiti (4 per 
cent) at the bottom of the scale. It must of 
course be recognized that these levels are only 
approximate as they reflect not only differences 
in income and expenditure characteristics but 
also the crudity of the original national cur-
rency estimates (private consumption being 
generally calculated as a residual). They can, 
nevertheless, be used to provide some guide 
regarding probable orders of magnitude. 
(b) Governmental consumption expenditure 
As table 6 shows, per capita expenditure in 
the government sector was low in Latin American 
countries, even when purchasing power equiva-
lents were used for conversion purposes. For 
1960, only Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela and 
Chile had, in real terms, an expenditure exceed-
ing 100 dollars; while of the remainder only 
Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, Panama and 
the Dominican Republic spent the equivalent of 
fifty dollars or more. Lowest estimates apply to 
Haiti, where the amount spent probably repre-
sented between 10 and 15 dollars per head of 
population. This meant that, on the average, the 
regional expenditure was only 67 dollars per 
head in real terms (35 dollars at official rates of 
exchange). Both these estimates were very much 
below that of the United States where a figure 
of approximately 500 dollars in 1960 reflects 
both a high income level and a more compre-
hensive infrastructure with heavy commitments 
for items like defence, foreign aid, etc. which 
had little counterpart in the national accounts 
of the Latin American region.^® 
When individual countries are considered, it 
will be observed that government consumption 
expenditure in purchasing power terms repre-
sented 37 to 39 per cent of the United States 
level for Argentina and Uruguay; 28 per cent 
for Venezuela and Chile; 21 to 23 per cent for 




MAIN SECTORS OF EXPENDITURE ON THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1960 
(Estimated in dollars with exchange rates and with purchasing power equivalents) 
Country Consumption 
Prívate PubUc 





















(a) Total (million dollars) 
Argentina 8,065 1,042 2,518 117 —140 11,602 12,716 3,223 1,%8 181 —140 17,947 
318 30 54 3 —29 377 453 115 65 4 —29 609 
Brazil 12,103 2,693 2,904 137 —262 17,575 13,669 4,345 2,390 162 —262 20,305 
Chile 3,834 485 487 21 —103 4,724 3,897 866 449 20 —103 5,128 
3,001 251 731 98 —80 4,003 3,583 594 995 111 —80 5,203 
Ecuador 668 120 125 17 4 933 821 300 170 17 4 1,312 
Paraguay 214 22 48 c 0 283 330 67 53 c 0 450 
Peru l,4fl0 174 348 100 53 2,074 2,179 595 419 142 53 3,387 
Uruguay 938 107 179 30 —67 1,188 1,558 372 217 44 —67 2,124 
Venezuela 4,284 1,058 1,432 —86 959 7,648 2,937 824 1,272 —60 959 5,932 
Costa Rica 344 53 77 6 —27 453 398 11 81 c —27 568 
Dominican Republic . . 501 92 75 c 55 723 463 164 83 c 55 766 
El Salvador 457 57 79 c —26 567 515 no 98 c —26 698 
Guatemala 852 80 103 6 —20 1,021 846 137 126 5 —20 1,094 
Haiti* 250 26 20 c 2 298 310 54 25 c 2 390 
Honduras 297 37 48 5 —8 378 277 72 62 4 —8 406 
Mexico 10,138 639 1,858 c —165 12,471 15,279 1,322 2,252 C —165 18,688 
Nicaragua 274 28 46 c —10 337 279 48 43 c —10 359 
Panama 325 47 62 6 — 2 448 347 92 76 c —25 489 
LATIN AMERICA^ 48.263 7.043 11,193 460 112 67.067 60M57 13,407 10.834 643 112 85.850 
(b) Per capita (1960 dollars) 
Argentina 390 50 122 6 —7 561 615 156 95 9 —7 868 
Bolivia 86 9 14 1 —8 102 123 31 18 1 - 8 165 
Brazil 172 38 41 2 -A 250 194 62 34 2 —i 289 
Chile 492 62 62 3 —13 606 500 111 58 2 —13 658 
Colombia 194 16 47 6 —5 259 232 38 64 7 —5 336 
Ecuador 155 29 28 4 1 216 190 70 39 4 1 304 
Paraguay 121 12 27 c 0 160 187 38 30 C 0 255 
Peru 140 17 35 10 5 207 217 59 42 14 5 338 
Uruguay 377 43 72 12 —27 477 626 149 87 17 —27 853 
Venezuela 584 144 195 —12 131 1,043 401 112 174 —8 131 809 
Costa Rica 285 44 64 5 —22 376 330 92 67 5 —22 471 
Dominican Republic . . 165 30 25 c 18 239 153 54 27 b 18 253 
El Salvador 183 23 32 c —10 228 207 44 39 b —10 280 
Guatemala 226 21 27 1 —5 271 225 36 33 1 —5 291 
Haiti» 60 6 5 c 0 72 75 13 6 c 0 94 
Honduras 152 19 24 2 —4 194 142 37 32 2 208 
Mexico 281 18 52 c —5 346 424 37 62 c —5 518 
Nicaragua 186 19 31 c —7 228 189 32 29 c —7 243 
Panama 318 46 61 6 —22 439 340 85 65 6 —22 674 
LATIN AMERICA^ 242 35 56 2 1 337 306 67 54 3 1 431 
a Geometric average of results obtained with Latin American and United 
States weights. 
•> Probably included with 
"Excluding Cuba. 
'Private consumption expenditure". 
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Table 2 (.continued') 
REAL PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE IN LATIN AMERICA COMPARED WITH THE UNITED STATES, I960 
BASED ON DOLLARS OBTAINED WITH EXCHANGE BATES AND WITH PURCHASING POWER EQUIVALENTS 
(Indexes: United States = 100) 
Country 









Prívale Public Private PubUc 
United States 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
23.0 12.5 18.6 20.2 36.2 39.0 14.5 31.3 
Bolivia 5.1 2.2 2.1 3.7 7.2 7.8 2.7 5.9 
Brazil 10.1 9.5 6.2 9.0 11.4 15.5 5.2 10.4 
Chile 29.0 15.5 9.5 21.8 29.4 27.8 8.8 23.7 
Colombia 11.4 4.0 7.2 9.3 13.7 9.5 9.8 12.1 
9.1 7.0 4.4 7.8 11.2 17.5 6.0 11.0 
Paraguay 7.1 3.0 4.1 5.8 11.0 9.5 4.6 9.2 
Peru 8.2 4.2 5.3 7.5 12.8 14.8 6.4 12.2 
22.2 10.8 11.0 17.2 36.9 37.2 13.3 30.7 
Venezuela 34.4 36.0 29.8 37.6 23.0 28.0 26.6 29.2 
Costa Rica 16.8 11.0 9.8 13.5 19.4 23.0 10.2 17.0 
Dominican Republic . . 9.7 7.5 3.8 8.6 9.0 13.5 4.1 9.1 
El Salvador 10.8 5.8 4.9 8.2 12.2 11.0 6.0 10.1 
13.3 5.3 4.1 9.8 13.2 9.0 5.0 10.5 
Haiti* 3.5 1.5 .3 2.6 4.4 3.2 .9 3.4 
9.0 4.8 3.7 7.0 8.4 9.2 4.9 7.5 
Mexico 16.6 4.5 7.9 12.5 25.0 9.2 9.5 18.7 
Nicaragua 11.0 4.8 4.7 8.2 11.1 8.0 4.4 8.8 
Panama 18.7 11.5 9.3 15.0 20.0 21.0 9.9 17.1 
LATIN AMERICA^ 14.3 8.8 8.5 12.1 1S.0 16.8 8.2 15.5 
® Geometric mean of results obtained with Latin 
American and United States weights. 
Panama and Costa Rica; 14 to 18 per cent for 
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru and 
Brazil; 7 to 11 per cent for El Salvador, Para-
guay, Colombia, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua and Bolivia; but only 3 per cent for 
Haiti. 
(c) Fixed investment 
At ofiScial rates of exchange, 1960 fixed in-
vestment in the Latin American region ranged 
from 5 to 195 dollars per inhabitant—the re-
gional average being 57 dollars, or roughly 
one-tenth of the per capita fixed investment 
level in the United States.^^ 
When a revaluation was made on the basis 
of geometrically crossed purchasing power 
Exact information in this respect was dif&cult to 
obtain and many items, e.g. construction for defence 
purposes, were classified differently in the various 
national statistics. Strict comparability within the 
region and with the United States was not therefore 
possible. (This problem also affected the comparability 
of data relating to governmental consumption ex-
penditure.) 
•• Includes inventory changes and the foreign trade 
balance. 
<= Excluding Cuba. 
equivalents, the dollar estimates for countries 
such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela 
fell—in this way reflecting a high cost of 
locally produced equipment and, in the case of 
imported goods, high trade barriers, which in 
addition to transport costs and dealers' mark-
ups, automatically raised the price of equipment, 
machinery, etc. substantially above the United 
States level. To some degree, low construction 
costs brought the sector price levels down (ex-
cept in Venezuela where the reverse was true); 
but, generally speaking, it was only in non-
industrialized countries plus Mexico that the 
dollar valuation of fixed investment was higher 
in terms of purchasing power equivalents that 
at prevailing exchange rates. 
From the estimates for individual countries, 
it will be seen that Venezuela alone had a per 
capita fixed investment level equivalent to 100 
dollars or more, the figure in real terms being 
174 dollars (195 dollars at prevailing exchange 
rates). Next followed Argentina with 95 dollars. 
Six other countries had levels equivalent to 50 
120 
dollars or more—these being Uruguay, Panama, 
Costa Rica, Colombia, Mexico and Chile. Else-
where, the level ranged from 30 to 50 dollars 
per head, though for the Dominican Republic, 
Bolivia and Haiti still lower levels prevailed. 
For the region as a whole, the average in real 
terms was 54 dollars per head, as against 56 
dollars per head at official rates of exchange. 
That is to say, for Latin America generally, 
fixed investment in purchasing power terms was 
only 8.2 per cent of the per capita level in the 
United States—the percentages for individual 
countries fluctuating between 1 per cent for 
Haiti and 27 per cent for Venezuela, with inter-
mediate levels of 14 per cent for Argentina,^^ 
13 per cent for Uruguay, 10 per cent for Co-
lombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Panama, a 
notably low figure of 9 per cent for Chile (where 
construction could be much understated), 5 to 
6 per cent for Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay, but 
only 3 to 4 per cent for Nicaragua, the 
Dominican Republic and Bolivia. 
(d) Changes in inventories 
Changes in inventories are ill-defined for most 
Latin American countries and are probably re-
corded in part only. For some, e.g. Paraguay, 
El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and 
the Dominican Republic—the sector was not 
shown separately, the common practice being 
to include the values implicitly in private con-
sumer expenditure since this was frequently 
obtained as a residual. Where changes in stocks 
were actually registered, they related to a few 
readily-identifiable commodities only, e.g. agri-
cultural raw materials in Argentina; and coffee, 
livestock, etc., in Colombia. The method of 
valuation was also a potential source of error 
and little could be ascertained regarding prac-
tices adopted in national accounting—particu-
larly in cases where inflationary price conditions 
affected the figures assigned to the commodities 
concerned. For the most part, the magnitudes— 
recorded or unrecorded—of inventory changes 
would not however be large; and even in statis-
tically-advanced countries, as in Western Europe, 
they rarely exceed two or three per cent of the 
gross domestic product. In Latin America for 
1960, only Colombia and Uruguay showed mag-
nitudes of 2 per cent or more—the majority 
being at the level of 0.5 to 1.0 per cent. In 
dollars at prevailing exchange rates, this repre-
sented exceedingly small per capita amounts. 
the maximum being 12 dollars for Uruguay, 
10 dollars for Peru and 6 dollars for Colombia. 
A revaluation with purchasing power equiva-
lents (calculated on the assumption that the 
inventories were comprised almost entirely of 
non-durable consumer goods or raw materials) 
changed the level very little, the maximum value 
being 17 dollars per capita for Uruguay and 
14 dollars for Peru. The influence on over-all 
expenditure was accordingly minimal. 
(e) The foreign trade balance 
This was converted into dollars with the ex-
change rates which actually applied to inter-
national trade, and, according to the concept 
adopted, the magnitudes remained unaltered in 
terms of dollar purchasing power. As was the 
case for inventory changes, the sector repre-
sented a minor fraction of the gross domestic 
product—^though this varied considerably from 
country to country and from year to year. In 
the case of Venezuela, for instance, the excess 
of exports over imports in 1960 was 131 dollars 
per head or 1,000 million dollars in total—^thus 
constituting one eighth of the 1960 gross do-
mestic product. In the Dominican Republic, the 
per capita figure was 18 dollars and in Peru 
5 dollars. Elsewhere, the balance was either 
negligible or unfavourable—^the negative magni-
tudes ranging up to 22 dollars per head in 
Panama and 27 dollars per head in Uruguay. 
As the situation was so unstable over time, 
undue importance should not, however, be at-
tached to these figures. 
2. T H E EXPENDITURE STRUCTURE, BY COUNTRY 
In national currency or at prevailing exchange 
rates^ ® 1960 expediture in Latin America was 
allocated in the proportions of 72 per cent to 
private consumption expenditure, 10.5 per cent 
to government, 17 per cent to fixed investment 
and 0.6 per cent to inventories. The trade balance 
represented only 0.2 per cent of the total. A 
valuation in terms of geometrically crossed pur-
chasing equivalents changed the relative situa-
tion substantially—the explanation being found 
in the widely divergent price levels for the 
various sectors. Because of this, the proportions 
The level was over 19 per cent when exchange 
rates were used for conversion purposes. 
If the same rate is applied to all sectors, the 
structure in dollars will be identical with that in 
national currency. Where a different rate is applicable 
to trade (as in countries with dual exchange rates) 
there would theoretically be some difference in the 
two sets of figures. In practice, the trade balance is 
so small that any differences can safely be ignored. 
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devoted to governmental consumption rose while 
fixed investment fell (private consmnption show-
ing little over-all change). 
When the data shown in table 8 are exam-
ined, it will be found that in the fixed investment 
sector the most striking change applied to 
Argentina where the proportions of the total 
product allotted to the sector declined from over 
21 per cent on a national currency basis to 11 
per cent in terms of dollar equivalence. (A com-
pensating increase, from 9 to 18, applied to 
governmental consumption expenditure.) For 
Brazil, fixed investment fell from 16 per cent 
of the total in national currency to 12 per cent 
when the relatively high prices of producers' and 
transport equipment were taken into account. 
For Mexico, the percentage also dropped, from 
15 to 12; for Uruguay, from 15 to 10; for 
Paraguay and Peru, from 17 to 12. In a few 
cases—notably Venezuela, Honduras and Co-
lombia—the application of purchasing power 
equivalents to investment data had the opposite 
effect, the percentage being rather higher in real 
terms than in national currency or at prevail-
ing exchange rates. 
As already indicated, governmental consump-
tion expenditure generally increased its im-
portance in terms of purchasing power equiva-
lence. At a high extreme were Ecuador, the 
Dominican Republic and Brazil, in respect of 
which the sector represented from 21 to 23 per 
cent of total expenditure in real terms as against 
13 to 15 per cent in national currency. For 
eight other countries, government consumption 
in dollar equivalents represented 17-19 per cent 
of the gross domestic product as against 9-11 
per cent on a national currency basis. At a low 
extreme was Mexico where a figure of 7 per cent 
in real terms (or 5 per cent in national cur-
rency) is difficult to reconcile with the expendi-
ture distribution on other countries at similar 
income levels or with similar administrative 
infrastructures. 
With percentages ranging from 65 to 75 in 
the majority of countries, the share of private 
consumption in total expenditure was generally 
lower in purchasing power terms than in na-
tional currency (thus reflecting very largely the 
increased importance of governmental consump-
tion expenditure). Chief changes applied to 
Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Panama and the Dominican Republic 
where the share of the sector declines by six 
or seven percentage points when measured in 
terms of dollar equivalence. Lesser—but still 
pronounced—declines applied to Colombia, Chile, 
Peru, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Haiti; while 
only in the case of Argentina and Mexico did 
the percentages actually increase. (In Argentina 
this reflected the decline in the relative im-
portance of investment, not fully offset by the 
increased importance of governmental consump-
tion.) In the case of Venezuela, the percentage 
for the sector was exceptionally low, whether 
measured in national currency or in terms of 
purchasing power. This is however explained by 
the unusual characteristics of the Venezuelan 
economy since national income originates largely 
in the mining industry and expenditure is de-
voted partly to payments abroad, partly to 
investment, and only a relatively small part (56 
per cent on a national currency basis; 50 per 
cent in terms of purchasing power) to private 
consumption. If the foreign trade balance is 
excluded, the proportion devoted to private 
consumption rises in Venezuela's case to 64 per 
cent on a national currency basis, and 59 per 
cent in terms of dollar purchasing power. For 
Bolivia, the situation was reversed—1960 private 
consumption representing 85 per cent (in na-
tional currency) when the foreign trade balance 
was included, but only 78 per cent if the latter 
is omitted. (Corresponding figures are 76 and 72 
when a valuation is made on a purchasing power 
basis.) 
Despite the changes brought about when a 
valuation was made with purchasing power 
equivalents rather than exchange rates, the pro-
portion of the gross domestic product devoted 
to private consumption expenditure was still 
unusually high for Chile, Guatemala and Nica-
ragua (all about 75 per cent), Haiti (80 per 
cent) and Mexico (a rather doubtful 81 per 
cent). Peculiarities, however, exist in the na-
tional accounts data of all these countries: e.g. 
consistently negative household savings for Chile 
and a low value placed on construction for the 
same country; an unusually high proportion (28 
per cent) of the gross domestic product derived 
from internal trade in Guatemala; and 26 per 
cent (at 1950 prices) for the same sector in 
Mexico; etc. This serves to strengthen the view 
that in Latin America (as in other parts of the 
world) national accounts estimates are still 
subject to wide margins of error, this being 
especially so when inflation distorts the price 
and value structure and when sectors such as 
private consumption expenditure (or savings) 
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In national currency In U.S. dollar equivalents^ 
Consumption Fixed 




Inventories Trade balance Private PubUc 
invest' 
ment Private Public 
69.5 9.0 21.7 1.0 —1.2 70.8 18.0 11.0 1.0 _ 
84.0 8.6 14.2 0.8 —7.7 74.4 18.9 10.7 0.7 —4.8 
68.9 15.3 16.5 0.8 —1.5 67.3 21.4 11.8 0.8 —1.3 
81.2 10.3 10.3 0.4 —2.2 76.0 16.9 8.8 0.4 —2.0 
75.0 6.3 18.3 2.5 —2.0 68.9 11.4 19.1 2.1 —1.5 
71.6 12.8 13.4 1.8 0.4 62.6 22.9 13.0 1.3 0.2 
75.6 7.6 16.8 b 73.4 14.8 11.8 b 
67.5 8.4 16.8 4.8 2.5 64.3 17.6 12.4 4.2 1.6 
79.0 9.0 15.1 2.6 - 5 . 6 73.3 17.5 10.2 2.0 —3.1 
56.0 13.8 18.7 - 1 . 1 12.5 49.5 13.9 21.4 —1.0 16.2 
76.0 11.7 17.0 1.2 - 6 . 0 70.0 19.5 14.2 LI —4.8 
69.3 12.7 10.4 b 7.6 60.5 21.4 10.8 b 7.2 
80.5 10 1 13.9 b - 4 . 5 73.8 15.8 14.0 b —3.7 
83.5 7.8 10.1 0.6 —2.0 77.3 12.5 11.5 0.5 —1.8 
84.1 8.6 6.8 b 0.5 79.4 13.9 6.4 b 0.4 
78.7 9.7 12.7 1.2 —2.2 68.2 17.6 15.3 1.0 —2.1 
81.3 5.1 14.9 b —1.3 81.8 7.1 11.9 b —0.9 
81.3 8.3 13.6 b —3.1 77.7 13.2 11.9 b —2.9 
77.7 11.2 14.8 1.4 —5.2 71.7 17.9 13.7 1.3 —4.6 
71.9 10.5 16.7 0.7 0.2 70.9 15.6 12.6 0.7 0.1 
a Geometrically-crossed equivalents obtained with Latin American and 
United States weights. 
•> Presumably included in private consumption expenditure, 
c Excluding Cuba. 
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D. HISTORICAL SERIES: 1955-1964 EXPENDITURE EXPRESSED IN 
DOLLARS OF 1960 PURCHASING POWER 
1. TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
Estimates for the period 1955-64 in dollars of 
1960 purchasing power were obtained by ap-
plying to the data of each country (expressed 
in national currency at 1960 prices) conversion 
factors applicable to each expenditure sector in 
1960—the sectoral data being aggregated in 
order to obtain the regional total for each year. 
As three means of conversion were utilized, 
namely, prevailing exchange rates, regionally 
weighted purchasing power equivalents and 
United States weighted purchasing power equiva-
lents, three basic series were obtained, while 
the geometric averaging of the values obtained 
for each sector with regional and United States 
weighting patterns provided a fourth set of data 
along similar lines. The estimates thus obtained 
are shown in table 9: 
Table 9 
LATIN AMERICA:» EXPENDITURE ON THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 1955-64, IN 1960 DOLLARS 
Calculated with exchange rates and with purchasing power equivalents 
Total (miUion I960 dolían) Per capita (I960 dollars) 
ÍTith equivalents based on With equivalents based on 
With Weighting Weighting 
Tear exchange pattern of Geometric With pattern oí Geometric fates 
Latin United mean 
exchange 
rates Latin United mean 
America States America States 
1955 53,106 80,619 59,727 68,455 308 467 346 397 
1956 55,170 83,474 62,114 70,972 311 470 350 400 
1957 58,846 88,439 65,458 75,137 322 484 358 411 
1958 61,556 92,407 68,443 78,864 327 491 364 420 
1959 63,500 94,409 70,059 80,452 328 488 362 416 
1960 67,279 100,263 74,415 85,850 338 504 374 431 
1961 70,458 105,076 77,867 90,390 344 513 380 442 
1962 73,410 109,104 80,920 93,584 349 518 384 444 
1963 75,185 110,805 83,183 95,747 347 511 384 442 
1%4 79,313 118,235 88,954 102,461 356 531 399 460 
® Excluding Cuba. Data for some of the countries were estimated in certain years. 
The aggregation of regional data presumes a 
comparability and reliability which unfortunately 
does not always hold true for an area like 
Latin America where methods of compilation 
are inconsistent (and often of varying degrees 
of accuracy). This may not be of transcendental 
importance in studying data for an individual 
country, where changes over time are of more 
interest than absolute magnitudes. On the other 
hand, the usefulness of regional data could be 
seriously prejudiced, especially where inter-
country relationships are concerned. Moreover, 
since the regional aggregates are dominated by a 
few large countries—Brazil, Argentina and 
Mexico—any errors in the estimates for these 
will inevitably influence the aggregate to a 
greater extent than errors for, say, Haiti, Bo-
livia or Nicaragua (which are specifically men-
tioned seeing as the data used in this study 
contain—outwardly at least—^the greatest ele-
ment of estimation). Moreover, for a series 
over time, the incomparabilities are greater than 
they are for a single year, the expression of 
annual data at base-year prices introducing addi-
tional errors because of the methods used to 
deflate the current price data or to extrapolate 
data compiled for a benchmark period. In the 
first case, price indicators and, in the second, 
quantum indexes are generally applied (some 
countries relying on one method, some on the 
other, and some on a mixture of the two). In-
variably, the indexes used are subject to severe 
limitations, since only in exceptional cases does 
a country calculate such series specially for 
deflating or extrapolating its national accounts. 
The totals shown in table 9 must therefore be 
treated with caution, since the summation of 
country data compiled with widely different 
methods (and also accuracy) leads to a set of 
regional estimates in respect of which not all 
changes can be attributed to variations in the 
actual expenditure or income levels. 
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Subject to these limitations, the data do show 
a marked increase in real income or expendi-
ture for the period reviewed—the change being, 
on a per capita basis, from 308 dollars in 1955 
to 356 dollars in 1964 with the use of official 
exchange rates; from 467 dollars to 531 dollars 
for the same years when regionally-weighted 
equivalents of purchasing power were applied; 
from 346 to 399 dollars when the weights were 
based on a United States quantitative expendi-
ture pattern; and from 397 to 460 dollars when 
a geometric average of the last two series was 
used. This signified an average annual increase 
for the region of 1.6 per cent for each inhabi-
tant, as compared with 3.0 per cent over the 
same years for the United States—per capita 
income of this country being 2,328 dollars in 
1955 and 3,180 dollars in 1964. (In Western 
Europe, it may be noted, the rate of increase 
was 2.6 and 2.9 per cent in the United Kingdom 
and Sweden, 3.0 to 3.9 per cent in Switzerland, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway; 
4.0 to 4.9 per cent in Denmark and France; 
and over 6 per cent for Italy and Western 
Germany. Elsewhere, in Australia the rate was 
2.2 per cent; in Canada, 1.9 per cent; and in 
Japan a high of 13.7 per cent . ) " 
The data for Latin America show that, ex-
pressed in 1960 dollar equivalents, the expendi-
ture on the gross domestic product grew at a 
slightly faster rate in the 1956-61 years when, 
with the exception of 1959, a per capita increase 
approximating two per cent was maintained, 
^ginning 1961, a slowing down took place 
while a decline occurred in 1963 when Brazil, 
Chile, Argentina and Uruguay all showed a 
reduction in the level of their expenditure, rela-
tive to 1962. The upward trend was resumed in 
1964. 
Per capita data for individual countries (using 
geometrically averaged purchasing power equiva-
lents for conversion purposes) are shown in 
quantum index for ( 1 9 6 0 = 1 0 0 ) in table 10, 
countries being rearranged in order to indicate 
more clearly quantitative movements over time 
for real product or expenditure. From the latter, 
it is apparent that the fastest per capita increases 
applied to Panama, Guatemala, Peru, Mexico 
and El Salvador for which the annual rate of 
growth ranged from 2.5 to 3 per cent. Next came 
Brazil, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic, 
with approximately a 2 per cent annual increase; 
Argentina, Columbia, Costa Rica, Chile, Hon-
duras and Ecuador with a 1 per cent increase; 
while Nicaragua and Bolivia had very little 
l^All figures relate to the years 1955 and 1964 only. 
Intervening years are ignored. 
over-all change (though with substantial year-
to-year fluctuations). Paraguay and Haiti had 
a slight tendency to decline; while Uruguay was 
the only country where per capita expenditure 
fell off to any appreciable degree—^this being 
most pronounced in the 1962-64 years as a 
result of the economic recession which was ex-
perienced by that coimtry. 
Absolute levels are given in table 11 and 
figure VII, from which it will be seen that while 
in the 1955-57 years, Uruguay was the country 
with the highest per capita income figure, it 
was then superseded by Argentina and, in 1963, 
by Venezuela as well. In the same way, the 
substantial gap in expenditure levels between 
Venezuela and Argentina was steadily reduced 
until in 1963 Venezuela became (temporarily at 
least) the country with the highest per capita 
expenditure level—^Argentina regaining that role 
in 1964. Chile remained throughout the period 
in fourth place with an expenditure level rang-
ing from 600 to 700 dollars—^though Mexico and 
Panama showed more rapid growth and substan-
tially reduced the margin in their income levels 
vis-a-vis Chile (both approaching 600 dollars 
per capita in 1964). Costa Rica, whose per 
capita expenditure in 1955 had roughly equalled 
that of Mexico and Panama had a much slower 
rate of growth, per capita expenditme reaching 
only 500 dollars in 1963-64. This was neverthe-
less sufficient to maintain a level well ahead of 
Colombia and Peru, both of whom (despite a 
comparatively rapid growth rate for Peru) re-
mained in the 300-400-dollar bracket. The rank-
ing of these two countries, however, changed. 
Peru being the higher from 1960 onwards. 
The trends for Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
and Guatemala were all very similar, per capita 
expenditure increasing from approximately 250 
dollars in 1955 to 310 and 320 dollars in 1964. 
Paraguay and Nicaragua on the other hand 
failed to show any significant increase; and, 
as a result, the expenditure level in these coun-
tries was more or less equalled in 1964 by that 
of the Dominican Republic (per capita expendi-
ture for which had been some ten per cent 
lower in 1955). Honduras and Bolivia both 
showed a slight increase, though the figures for 
the latter are largely estimated and hence un-
reliable. The same remarks apply to Haiti 
where a virtual stagnation in expenditure (at 
the 95-dollar mark may or may not be accurate. 
If national rather than per capita levels are 
examined, it will be seen from table 12 that the 
regional total was throughout the period domi-
nated by three countries—^Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico—which together represented 66-67 per 
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Table 11 (.continued) 
REAL PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE ON THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1955-64, IN 1960 DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS» 
(Indexes: 1960=100) 
Country 19SS 1956 19S7 19S8 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
89 91 97 95 97 100 105 115 118 120 
86 96 98 99 101 100 101 100 108 113 
Peru 92 91 88 91 93 100 104 111 112 118 
87 90 94 96 95 100 100 102 105 112 
93 98 102 101 100 100 101 109 111 117 
Brazil 87 86 90 92 96 100 104 107 106 106 
87 93 96 95 99 100 96 100 102 106 
90 96 100 103 99 100 92 102 104 106 
96 96 96 96 100 100 102 105 105 108 
92 88 93 96 98 100 98 101 104 106 
Chile 95 92 98 98 97 100 101 106 104 105 
Honduras 93 100 101 100 101 100 100 103 101 100 
94 94 95 94 96 100 100 100 99 102 
Nicaragua 109 108 112 107 104 100 102 110 112 109 
108 103 99 99 98 100 101 104 109 112 
96 96 99 104 96 100 107 100 94 103 
Paraguay 105 100 102 106 102 100 102 102 101 103 
Haiti 103 110 100 104 97 100 97 101 101 101 
104 110 106 99 95 100 99 96 93 93 
L A T I N AMERICA' ' 92 93 95 97 97 ICQ 103 103 103 107 
® Based on geometrically-averaged purchasing power equivalents for 1960. Excluding Cuba. 
Table 11 
REAL EXPENDITURE ON THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1955-64, IN 1960 DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS® 
Country 1955 1956 1957 195B ¡959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
(a) Total (million 1960 dollars) 
16,033 16,819 18,012 16,916 17,947 19,477 18,555 17,790 19,612 
Bolivia 593 576 565 580 581 608 629 662 710 747 
Brazil 15,228 15,554 16,613 17,639 18,903 20,305 21,749 23,002 23,432 24,224 
Chile 4,268 4,663 4,773 4,822 5,128 5,306 5,718 5,722 5,922 
4,334 4,477 4,602 4,700 5,041 5,203 5,475 5,786 5,961 6,295 
1,050 1,082 1,129 1,153 1,216 1,312 1,354 1,397 1,421 1,511 
Paraguay 417 413 426 455 450 450 472 478 496 513 
Table 11 (.continued) 
REAL EXPENDITURE ON THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1955-64, IN 1960 DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS^ 
Country «55 J955 J957 Í958 19» 1960 1961 1962 1963 
Peru 2,741 2,759 2,764 2,921 3,050 3,387 3,648 3,988 4,163 
Uruguay 2,075 2,226 2,169 2,050 1,991 2,124 2,122 2,100 2 053 
Venezuela 4,279 4,737 5,097 5,257 5,670 5,933 5,920 6,347 6,736 
Costa Rica 427 425 470 506 536 568 582 622 668 
Dominican Republic 591 652 696 741 737 766 734 840 880 
El Salvador 558 608 653 666 678 698 730 809 848 
Guatemala 815 929 984 1,022 1,071 1,094 1,136 1,159 1 295 
Haiti 360 391 363 388 370 390* 386» 411'' 421® 
Honduras 321 355 372 382 397 406 422 447 455 
Mexico 13,782 14,756 15,961 16,829 17,210 18,688 19,342 20,266 21623 
Nicaragua 330 338 360 358 358 359 381 424 '447 
Panama 374 393 429 432 454 489 531 573 625 
TOTAL, LATIN AiiERicAb 68,455 70,972 75,137 78,864 80,452 85,850 90,390 93,584 95,747 
(b) Per capita (1960 dollars) 
Argentina 840 833 857 902 832 868 927 869 820 
Bolivia 178 170 163 164 161 165 166 171 180 
B-^ a i^l 252 250 259 266 277 289 300 308 305 
Chile 627 605 645 644 635 658 665 699 684 
Colombia 322 324 324 321 335 336 344 354 354 
Ecuador 285 285 287 285 291 304 304 305 301 
Paraguay 267 256 259 270 261 255 261 257 260 
Peru 312 306 299 308 313 338 353 375 380 
Uruguay 884 937 904 844 810 853 841 822 794 
Venezuela 707 751 776 770 801 809 780 808 828 
Costa Rica 434 415 439 454 463 471 464 477 492 
Dominican Republic 228 244 253 261 251 253 234 259 263 
El Salvador 260 275 287 284 280 280 284 305 310 
Guatemala 250 278 285 288 293 291 294 291 316 
Haiti 97 103 94 98 91 94* 91* 95« 95* 
Honduras 193 208 210 209 210 208 209 214 210 
Meaco 449 466 488 498 493 518 519 526 542 
Nicaragua 265 262 271 260 252 243 249 268 273 
Panama 422 432 458 449 458 474 499 545 558 
TOTAL, LATIN AMERICA»" 397 400 411 420 416 431 442 444 442 



































Fignre V I I 
LATIN AMERICA: REAL PER CAPITA 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1955-65a 
(DOLLARS AT 1960 PURCHASING POWER) 
Semi-logarithmic scale 
Dollars 
I Z O O 








^ A R G E N T I N A 
V i ^ S A L V A D O R 
E C U A D O R 
¿ ^ • ' " ' B R A Z I L 
...I I I I I I I I 1 
" IMS 60 « 6 
a Based on figures from table 11 (b). 
cent in all years. The stagnation of the Argen-
tina economy and the more dynamic trend dis-
played by Mexico (less so by Brazil) is however 
reflected in the individual country data— 
Mexico's share of the total increasing from 20 
per cent in 1955 to 23 per cent in 1964, and 
Brazil's from 22 per cent to 24 per cent for the 
same years. (1962-63 figures were slightly 
higher.) In contrast, the importance of Argen-
tina fell steadily from 23 per cent in 1955 to 19 
per cent by the end of the period under review. 
In the case of Venezuela, a slight rise (from 
6.2 to 7.0 per cent) is in evidence, while Peru 
also increased its relative importance (from 4.0 
to 4.4 per cent). Colombia's share remained 
fairly stable with approximately 6.0 per cent— 
as also was the case for Chile until 1964 when a 
decline from 6.0 to 5.8 occurred. A still greater 
decline characterized the relative position of 
Uruguay—its share of the total dropping from 
3.0 per cent in 1955 to 2.0 in 1964. For other 
countries, the share in the regional total was 
limited and the percentage figures lack real 
significance. 
2 . PRIVATE CONSUMPTION KXPENDITURE 
The relatively large share of the gross do-
mestic product devoted to private consumption 
expenditure signified that in most respects the 
trends for total expenditure were reflected in 
those for the private consumption sector. That 
is to say, the rates of growth were, generally 
speaking, similar and the relative importance 
of each country within the region was the same. 
With per capita consumption of roughly 600 
dollars, the highest level throughout the period 
was reached by Argentina and Uruguay—Uru-
guay ranking first in certain years (1956, 1957 
and 1960) and Argentina in the remainder. (See 
table 13.) Next came Chile (rising from 440 
dollars in 1955 to 490 dollars in 1957, there-
after showing only a small increase); Mexico 
(360 dollars in 1955 rising steadily to 470 dol-
lars in 1964); Venezuela (350 dollars in 1955, 
460 dollars in 1957 but declining to 400 dollars 
in subsequent years); and Costa Rica increasing 
gradually from 310 to 330 dollars at the end 
of the period). A faster rate of growth was 
displayed by Panama where the level of almost 
400 dollars in 1964 contrasted with 280 dollars 
nine years earlier. Peru also showed a sub-
stantial increase—most of all in the 1962-64 
period when its level surpassed that of Colom-
bia. Others to show a sizable growth (from 200 
to 250 dollars) were El Salvador and Guate-
mala. In contrast, the level for Brazil, Paraguay, 
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Country 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
23.2 22.6 22.4 22.8 21.0 20.9 21.5 19.8 18.6 19.1 
0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Brazil 22.2 21.9 22.1 22.4 23.5 23.6 24.1 24.6 24.5 23.6 
Chile 6.3 6.0 6.2 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.9 6.1 6.0 5.8 
6.3 6.3 6.1 6.0 6.3 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.1 
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Peru 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.4 
3.0 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 
Venezuela 6.2 6.7 6.8 6.7 7.0 6.9 6.5 6.8 7.0 7.0 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 
0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 
El Salvador 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 
1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 
Haiti 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 (0.4) (0.4) 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 (0.4) 
20.1 20.8 21.2 21.3 21.4 21.8 21.4 21.6 22.6 23.3 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 (0.4) 
Panama 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
TOTAL, LATIN AMEBICA" 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 lOOJO 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 12 











































































«Based on geometrically-averaged purchasing power equivalents for 1960, using Latin American and United States weights. 
"Excluding Cuba. 
t—' 
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Table 13 
REAL PRIVATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE, 1955-64, IN 1960 DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS» 
Country 19SS 19S6 1957 ms J9S9 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
(a) Total (million 1960 doUars) 
Argentina 11,927 11,786 12,568 13,522 12,246 12,716 14,077 13,520 13,219 14,551 
Bolivia 421 430 433 443 445 453 475 491 527 550 Brazil 10,615 10,389 11,272 12,515 12,933 13,670 14,125 15,092 15,101 15,889 
Chile 3,028 3,085 3,555 3,598 3,556 3,897 4,068 4,073 4,247 4,319 
2,970 2,942 3,052 3,095 3,337 3,583 3,721 4,020 4,114 4,378 
684 711 737 774 781 821 830 852 854 896 
324 318 319 337 338 330 346 349 371 388 
Peru 1,890 1,894 1,914 2,011 2,137 2,179 2,320 2,596 2,884 3,116 Uruguay 1,482 1,604 1,618 1,411 1,355 1,558 1,514 1,561 1,449 1,534 
Venezuela 2,128 2,361 3,019 2,845 3,179 2,937 2,942 3,112 3,261 3,606 
Costa Rica 305 315 336 348 388 398 405 427 453 471 Dominican Republic 368 406 426 452 413 463 458 581 628 669 
688 El Salvador 421 439 471 468 4(51 515 518 585 620 Guatemala 674 722 774 817 842 846 853 875 974 1,064 Haiti 278 287 283 299 289 310* 314* 332* 337* 348* 
230 242 266 278 275 277 294 306 324 333 
11,086 11,948 13,081 13,838 13,995 15,279 15,815 16,494 17,599 19,507 Nicaragua 247 260 270 275 258 279 286 318 330 320* 
248 264 302 324 348 347 368 389 422 465 
TOTAL, LATIN AMERICAII 49,323 50,403 54,698 57,653 57,607 60,857 63,729 65m 67,714 73J07 
(b) Per capita (1960 dollars) 
Argentina 631 612 641 677 602 615 670 (33 610 661 
127 125 125 125 123 123 126 127 133 136 
176 167 176 189 190 194 195 202 197 201 
Chile 441 437 492 485 4€8 500 510 (98 507 504 
221 213 215 212 222 232 234 Í46 245 253 
185 187 188 191 187 190 186 L86 181 184 
207 197 194 200 196 187 191 188 195 198 
Peru 215 210 207 212 219 217 225 Í44 263 276 
631 675 674 581 551 626 600 611 560 586 
Venezuela 352 374 460 417 449 401 388 596 401 428 
Costa Rica 310 307 315 313 335 330 323 327 334 334* 
Dominican Republic 142 152 155 159 151 153 146 180 187 193 
El Salvador 196 198 207 200 191 207 202 221 227 244 
Guatemala 207 216 224 230 231 225 221 .222 238 252 
Haiti 75 75 73 76 71 75* 74* 77* 77* 77* 
Honduras 139 141 150 152 146 142 146 146 150 149* 
Mexico 361 377 400 410 401 424 424 428 441 473 
Nicaragua 199 202 203 199 181 189 187 201 201 189* 
280 290 323 337 352 340 350 359 377 403 
TOTAL, LATIN AMERICA" 286 284 299 307 298 306 311 313 312 328 
® Calculated for 1960 on the basis of geometrically-averaged purchasing power equivalents, using Latin American and United States weights, 
b Excluding Cuba. 
w 
Nicaragua (all al the 200 dollars mark), 
Honduras and Bolivia (in the 100-150-dollar 
bracket) and Haiti (75 dollars) failed to reveal 
any noteworthy change. However, figures for 
some of these countries—notably Haiti, Bolivia 
and Nicaragua—^which are largely estimated 
ought to be considered only as indicating orders 
of magnitude rather than absolute levels. In 
the same way, the marked irregularity which 
characterized expenditure levels in various 
countries suggests that this was due not only to 
economic factors but also to the method gen-
erally adopted of calculating private consump-
tion expenditure as a residual (thus including 
the net errors of other sectors plus the global 
error in the gross domestic product). 
3 . GOVERNMENTAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE 
Expenditure in the governmental sector in-
creased at a slightly more rapid pace than that 
of the private sector, particularly in the 1959-
1960 years when sudden increases for Brazil, 
Venezuela, Panama and Mexico (less so, Ar-
gentina and Chile) were reflected in an increase 
of over ten per cent in the regional total. Fur-
ther increases took place in later years, but 
only in keeping with the demographic expan-
sion. In consequence, the per capita level in 
1960-64 remained fairly steady with a figure of 
67-70 dollars, as against 59-62 dollars at the 
beginning of the period. (See table 14.) 
Of the individual countries, Uruguay and 
Argentina with just over 150 dollars per head 
of population constituted the countries with the 
highest levels of governmental expenditure— 
the figure declining for Argentina in 1963-64 
when it approximated only 140 dollars. The 
Chilean level remained relatively stable with a 
figure around 110 dollars. For Venezuela on 
the other hand, expenditure rose rapidly from 
90 dollars in 1954-56 to roughly 110 dollars 
in subsequent years—a similar increase (from 
77 to 100 dollars) being registered for Costa 
Rica and Panama. Governmental expenditure in 
remaining countries was generally about 30 to 
50 dollars, the trend being an increasing one 
for Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, El Salvador, 
Mexico and the Dominican Republic; stable for 
Honduras, and declining for Paraguay and 
Haiti. 
4 . FIXED INVESTMENT 
On a purchasing power basis, fixed investment 
in most years represented about 18 per cent of 
the total Latin American gross domestic prod-
uct, the figure being slightly lower in the 
1959-61 period. The regional total was, how-
ever, influenced considerably by the fluctuation 
which applied to investment in Venezuela and 
to the conflicting trends displayed by Mexico, 
Argentina and Brazil, particularly during the 
1962-64 years. (See table 15.) 
The average per capita regional level (still 
measured in terms of geometrically-crossed 
purchasing power equivalents) fluctuated from 
52 to 55 dollars. The variations for individual 
countries were, however, much greater. In Vene-
zuela, for instance, it approximated 230-240 
dollars in the 1955-59 years, fell to 143 dollars 
in 1961-63 but rose again to 166 dollars in 
1964. For Argentina, it rose from 76 dollars in 
1955 to 106 dollars in 1961, falling to 78 
dollars in 1963 when the economic recession 
for that country was reflected in all sectors of 
expenditure. For Brazil, the per capita level 
rose from 26 dollars in 1955 to 36 dollars in 
1961, declining to 30 dollars in 1964 when eco-
nomic difficulties affected its investment also. In 
Mexico, on the other hand, the increase was 
sustained throughout the period, the level rising 
from 53 dollars in 1966 to 73 dollars nine 
years later. If some of the intervening years are 
ignored, an expansion in per capita investment 
can also be discerned for Chile and Panama. 
This was not the case for other countries—the 
per capita level being more or less stable for 
Colombia, Ecuador (until 1964), Paraguay 
(with certain exceptions), Costa Rica and Hon; 
duras. For the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, 
Peru, El Salvador and Guatemala, an undulat-
ing pattern prevailed, with periods of expansion 
off'set by a decline in the subsequent years. In 
the worst position was Uruguay where the 
trend was continually downwards—the level of 
58 dollars per capita in 1964 being little more 
than half that of 110 dollars which applied in 
1955. In consequence, while in 1955 Uruguay 
ranked as the country with the second highest 
per capita level of fixed investment (being ex-
ceeded only by Venezuela), it was by 1964 in 
eighth position, preceded by Venezuela, Argen-
tina, Panama, Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico and 
Colombia. Haiti, with an estiniated investment 
level of only 6 dollars per head in real terms, 
remained easily in last position, being exceeded 
(in ascending order) by Bolivia, Paraguay, 
Brazil, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Gua-
temala, Ecuador, Peru and the Dominican Re-
public—^the sequence of these countries being 
very little different in 1964 than in 1955. 
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E. HISTORICAL SERIES: 1955-1964- EXPENDITURE EXPRESSED IN DOLLARS 
OF CURRENT PURCHASING POWER 
In the tables so far presented, all values have 
been expressed in dollars with the purchasing 
power equivalence which applied in the year 
1960. The comparison of data over a period such 
as 1955-64 thus provided a quantitative series 
in which the distortions due to price changes 
were ostensibly removed.^® For some purposes, 
it may not be convenient to use 1960 as the 
reference point, not to have data expressed 
uniquely at the prices of a selected year. Ac-
cordingly, an alternative set of data has been 
constructed in which the national accounts aggre-
gates are expressed in dollars at the parity 
prevailing in each particular year. 
Since both the dollar and the Latin Ameri-
can currencies changed in purchasing power 
from one year to the next, it is obvious that 
these data will differ from those at 1960 prices 
by factors which reflect the changes in prices 
of the United States relative to changes in the 
prices (converted at exchange rates prevailing 
in each year) of the Latin American country. 
Thus, when both prices and exchange rates were 
stable in a Latin American country (e.g. Pana-
ma) or when Latin American price movements 
were accompanied by a corresponding revalua-
tion in the exchange rate, the only difference^® 
between the dollar series at 1960 prices and the 
dollar series at current prices would result from 
the moderate inflation of the United States price 
level (and the consequent devaluation of the 
dollar) which applied in the period under re-
view. More commonly, however, price changes 
in Latin American countries occurred without a 
compensatory modification to the exchange rate 
—any currency revaluation differing in extent 
and in timing from the movement of internal 
prices. Accordingly, an additional factor due 
to fluctuations in the external purchasing power 
of the Latin American currency was introduced, 
which had a consequent impact on dollar values 
when expressed in current (as distinct from 
constant) prices. 
As price data were not available for the cal-
culation of purchasing power equivalents in 
each year, the only practical expedient (given 
15 Unfortunately this was not always true—par-
ticularly when values at base year prices were obtained 
by applying inappropriate price indexes to current 
value series—or vice versa. 
DifiFerences due to statistical inaccuracies—or to 
the incompatibility of the national accounts data and 
the indicators used for extrapolation or deflation 
purposes—are ignored. 
the resources available) was to rectify the 1960 
(and 1962) equivalents to take account of over-
all price changes for each sector of expendi-
ture. Price indexes were accordingly obtained 
for each group or sub-group (e.g. meat, fruit, 
transportation, governmental purchases, con-
struction, etc.), and a revaluation was made 
of the 1960 (and 1962) market baskets. When 
these were compared with the corresponding 
basket in the United States, a series of pur-
chasing power equivalents was obtained at the 
expenditure sector level for each year based on: 
(a) Latin American quantity weights; (6) 
United States quantity weights; and (c) a geo-
metric average of the two. The dollar values 
based on the geometrically-crossed equivalents 
are presented as regional aggregates in table 
16—figures at constant (1960) prices being at 
the same time shown in order to illustrate the 
relationship of the two series in the various 
years. 
In terms of current prices, the regional total 
rose from 64 thousand million dollars in 1955 
to 86 thousand million in 1960 and 112 thou-
sand million in 1964. This meant an increase 
in per capita expenditure from 270 dollars in 
1955 to 431 dollars in 1960 and 501 dollars 
in 1964. 
The levels in current values, it will be ob-
served, were slightly lower than those in con-
stant values prior to 1960,but slightly higher 
thereafter—a result to be expected because of 
the moderate price inflation in the United States 
during the period under review. There seemed 
nevertheless to be a tendency for Latin Ameri-
can prices in recent years to rise more rapidly 
than those of the United States—^the price index 
implicit in the relationship of the current and 
constant value data suggesting that by 1964 the 
price level for Latin America had increased 9 
per cent relative to 1960, as against a 5 per 
cent increase for the United States. (See table 
17.) Too much significance cannot, however, 
be attached to these differences since the Latin 
American total is a composite in which coun-
tries had a varying importance in each year 
(e.g. in 1963, Argentina constituted a smaller 
proportion of the total, and Mexico a larger 
one than in any of the earlier years). Further-
more, different methods of calculation were used 
in the individual countries in order to obtain 
I'^The years 1958 and 1959 were an exception, due 

























TOTAL, LATIN AMEBICAI» 
1955 ¡956 mi I9S8 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
(a) Total (million 1960 dollars) 
2,651 2,946 2,834 2,912 2,946 3,223 3,304 3,170 3,076 3,046 98 100 101 103 104 115 127 139 150 156 2,886 3,195 3,347 3,402 3,664 4,345 4,711 4,970 5,310 5,176 
937 787 757 806 798 811 866 878 1,070 942 589 569 508 530 538 594 626 679 718 827 233 235 239 239 259 300 327 334 332 364 72 74 64 76 68 67 67 68 69 69 492 533 528 536 542 595 685 717 751 839 366 365 374 372 363 372 379 397 
844 
392 396 543 534 570 788 718 824 828 929 904 
76 78 82 89 94 111 108 117 141 146* 114 130 146 168 173 164 159 202 209 204 78 82 103 106 108 110 120 125 127 128 94 108 117 122 136 137 144 132 127 136 72 77 61 61 58 54* 53* 57* 58* 59* 46 65 61 69 68 72 76 73 76 76* 951 1,025 1,123 1,188 1,201 1,323 1,386 1,489 1,640 1,800 43 45 47 48 47 48 51 53 56 66* 70 77 74 77 79 86 92 105 112 117 
10^61 10,996 11,185 11,683 11,977 13,405 14,121 14,740 15,215 15,446 
(b) Per capita (1960 dollars) 
Argentina 140 153 144 146 145 156 157 148 142 138 
Bolivia 30 29 29 29 29 31 34 36 38 39 
Brazil 48 53 52 51 54 62 65 67 69 66 
Chile 114 107 111 108 107 111 110 131 113 109 
Colombia 44 41 36 36 36 38 39 42> 43 48 
Ecuador 63 62 61 59 62 70 73 73 70 75 
Paraguay 46 46 39 45 39 38 37 37 36 35 
Peru 56 59 57 57 56 59 66 67 68 74 
Uruguay 156 154 156 153 148 149 150 155 153 151 
Venezuela 90 85 87 115 101 112 109 107 114 107 
77 76 77 80 81 92 86 90 104 103 
Dominican Republic 44 49 53 59 59 54 51 62 62 59 
El Salvador 36 37 45 45 45 44 47 47 45 45 
Guatemala 29 32 34 34 37 36 37 33 31 32 
Haiti 19 20 16 15 14 IS'!' IS'» 13'» 13" 13' 
Honduras 28 38 34 38 36 37 38 35 35 34® 
Mexico 31 32 34 35 34 37 37 39 41 44 
Nicaragua 35 35 35 34 33 32 34 33 34 39 Í. 
Panama 79 85 79 80 80 84 87 97 100 101 
TOTAL, LATIN AMERICAI> 59 62 61 62 62 67 69 70 70 69 
® Calculated for 1960 on the basis of geometrically averaged 
Excluding Cuba. 
purchasing power equivalents, using Latin Americar 1 and United States weights. 
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TOTAL, LATIN AMERICA^ 
195S mi 1957 MSB 1959 I960 mi 1962 1963 1964 
(a) Total (million 1960 doUara) 
1,441 1,499 1,623 1,799 1,422 1,968 2,225 2,012 1,702 1,791 
73 50 4S 49 58 65 54 78 85 86 
1,561 1,682 1,887 2,001 2,219 2,390 2,613 2,564 2,610 2,335 
404 341 346 336 338 449 596 630 609 629 
1,074 1,049 896 849 937 995 1,084 1,122 1,056 1,102 
139 141 140 134 156 170 177 168 169 219 
32 30 53 52 47 53 56 53 53 57 
439 543 576 510 390 419 527 596 559 599 
259 239 241 197 200 217 218 203 173 153 
1,382 1,510 1,595 1,578 1,617 1,272 1,080 1,121 1,173 1,401 
69 73 87 83 81 81 86 92 96 103 
134 147 154 165 116 83 70 114 153 189 
82 112 104 94 95 98 86 85 97 118 
104 164 178 158 146 126 132 134 151 185 
28 30 22 26 23 25* 24* 26* 26* 27* 
80 63 62 67 59 58 62 58 75 81 
1,625 1,798 1,924 1,903 1,913 2,252 2,268 2,270 2,556 3,016 
57 54 59 49 45 43 48 66 71 79* 
4« 56 68 65 66 66 79 86 101 89 
9,014 9,581 10,067 10,107 9,927 10,834 11,481 11,495 11,521 12,258 
-
(b) Per capita (1960 dollars) 
Argentina 76 78 8 3 90 70 95 105 9 4 78 81 
Bolivia 22 15 14 14 16 18 14 2 0 22 21 
Brazil 2 6 2 7 2 9 30 32 34 36 34 3 4 30 
Chile 59 4 8 4 8 45 4 4 5 8 75 7 7 73 73 
Colombia 80 76 63 58 62 64 6 8 69 63 64 
Ecuador 38 37 36 33 37 39 4 0 37 36 45 
21 19 32 31 2 7 30 31 29 28 2 9 
Peru 5 0 60 62 54 4 9 42 51 56 51 53 
110 101 101 81 81 87 86 7 9 67 58 
Venezuela 229 239 243 231 228 174 142 143 144. 166 
70 71 81 75 7 0 67 69 70 71 73 
Dominican Republic 52 5 5 5 6 58 39 2 7 22 35 46 55 
38 51 4 6 40 4 0 39 33 32 36 42 
Guatemala 32 4 9 52 45 40 33 3 4 34 37 44 
Haiti 7 8 8 7 6 6 * 6* 6 * 6® 6* 
Honduras 3 8 36 38 32 31 3 2 29 36 37 3 6 * 
Mexico 53 57 5 9 56 55 62 61 5 9 64 73 
Nicaragua 46 42 4 4 36 32 2 9 32 42 44 47 
Panama 5 4 62 72 68 67 65 75 79 90 77 
TOTAL, LATIN AMERICA») 52 54 55 54 51 54 56 55 53 55 
® Calculated for 1960 on the basis of geometrically-averaged purchasing power equivalents, using Latin American and United States weights. 
1» Excluding Cuba. 
-J 
Table 16 
LATIN AMERICA:» EXPENDITURE ON THE GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1955-64, IN CURRENT AND 
CONSTANT (1960) DOLLARS 
Calculated mth geometrically-crossed purchasing power 
equivalents^ 
Total (million dollars) Per capita (dollars) 
Year In In In In 
current I960 current 1960 
dollars dollars dollars dollars 
1955 63,942 68,455 370 397 
1956 69,377 70,972 391 400 
1957 74,241 75,137 406 411 
1958 79,817 78,864 425 420 
1959 80,929 80,452 418 416 
1960 85,850 85,850 431 431 
1961 91,340 90,390 446 442 
1962 , , , 98,376 93,584 467 444 
1963 100,538 95,747 464 442 
1964 111,676 102,461 501 460 
" Excluding Cuba. Data for some countries were es-
timated in certain years. 
Obtained by crossing equivalents obtained with 
average Latin American and United States weights. 
expenditure data in current and constant prices. 
As a result, the implicit price deflator has a 
rather erratic movement which limits its useful-
ness in measuring temporal price changes. 
For individual countries, the trends of ex-
penditure in current and constant (1960) prices 
were for the most part so similar that no useful 
purpose would be served by analysing them in 
detail. The data are therefore presented in table 
18 and figure VIII without comment. In table 
19, however, the per capita expenditure level 
in each year is related to that prevailing in the 
United States. 
It will be seen that expenditure in Latin 
America progressed at the same rate as in the 
United States—regional expenditure being be-
tween 15 and 16 per cent of the United States 
per capita level in virtually all years. There 
were however notable exceptions—countries with 
faster growth rates being Paraguay, Peru, 
Mexico and Panama—those with a slower 
growth, Argentina, Brazil (particularly in 1962-
64) , Costa Rica, Guatemala and (from 1957) 
Venezuela. For Uruguay, despite the economic 
dif&culties of that country, the level was sur-
prisingly stable and even rose in 1964 (though 
this may be due to problems of measurement). 
In this connexion, it must be emphasized that, 
as with the constant value series, many of the 
apparent anomalies result from inadequate esti-
mation methods, especially when current and 
constant values are derived one from the other 
with the aid of inadequate price or quantum 
indexes. 
Table 17 
LATIN AMERICA:» INDEXES OF EXPENDITURE 
ON THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, IN 
DOLLARS, 1955-64 
Expressed at current and constant (1960) prices^ 


















1955 74.5 79.7 93.4 91.2 
1956 80.8 82.7 97.8 92.2 
1957 86.5 87.5 98.8 95.5 
1958 93.0 91.9 101.2 98.0 
1959 94.3 93.7 100.6 99.0 
1960 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1961 106.4 105.3 101.0 101.0 
1962 114.6 109.0 105.1 102.9 
1963 117.1 111.5 105.0 103.9 
130.1 119.3 109.0 104.9 
a Excluding Cuba. 
b Obtained with geometrically-averaged purchasing 
power equivalents, using Latin American and United 
States weights. 
c Obtained by dividing the regional total in current 
dollars by the corresponding total in 1960 dollars. 




L A T I N A M E R I C A : R E A L P E R C A P I T A G R O S S 
D O M E S T I C P R O D U C T , 1955-65A 
(DOLLARS AT EACH YEAR'S PURCHASING POWER) 
Semi-logarithmic scale 
Dollars 
S O O 
I9SS 6 0 6 9 
a Based on figures from table 18 (6). 
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Table 18 
REAL EXPENDITURE ON THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTS, 1955-64, IN CURRENT DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS» 
Expressed at parities prevailing in each year 
Country 1955 1956 1957 ¡953 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 mi 
(a) Total (million dollars) 
Argentina 13,m 15,304 15,793 17,788 17,533 17,947 18,896 18,734 18,230 22,111 
Bolivia 643* 642* 632* 619 561 608 633 641 712 734 
15,621 16,906 17,443 19,402 19,636 20,305 21,406 23,647 22,964 23,845 
Chile 4,112 4,169 4,262 4,545 4,682 5,128 5,484 6,233 6,321 6,701 
4,144 4,452 4,547 4,790 5,203 5,544 6,239 6,110 6,616 
912 998 1,070 1,114 1,179 1,312 1,347 1,429 1,472 1,566 
Paraguay 290 317 353 400 407 450 466 499 544 557 
Peru 2,437 2,621 2,740 2,963 3,122 3,387 3,767 4,170 4,524 4,933 
Uruguay 1,774 1,824 1,935 1,934 1,834 2,124 2,308 2,400 2,523 2,852 
4,731 5,728 5,823 5,945 5,933 6,399 6,756 7,158 1,U2 
Costa Rica 409 428 472 513 529 568 586 630 660 686 
Dominican Republic 548 632 712 741 711 766 772 917 1,004 1,093 
567* 576* 661 653 698 728 827 877 959 
924 1,006 1,019 1,049 1,094 1,134 1,217 1,340 1,420 
Haiti* 317 382 340 368 361 390 380 431 425 395 
344 354 380 391 406 419 463 480 493 
12,717 13,765 15,629 16,215 16,757 18,688 20,149 22,109 24,017 27,769 
285 311 330 347 329 359 387 442 511 548 
Panama 348 368 414 438 460 484 535 592 666 686 
LATIN AMERICA^ 63,942 69,377 74,241 79,817 80,929 85,850 91,340 98,376 100,538 111,676 
(b) Per capita (dollars) 
Argentina 740 795 805 890 863 868 899 877 840 1,004 
Bolivia 193* 189* 185* 175 155 165 168 166 180 182 
258 271 272 293 288 289 298 317 299 303 
Chile 599 591 589 613 616 658 687 762 755 782 
290 300 313 311 318 336 348 381 363 382 
Ecuador 247 263 272 275 282 304 302 312 311 321 
186 196 214 237 236 255 259 268 285 285 
Peru 277 291 297 313 320 338 365 392 413 437 
Uruguay 755 768 806 796 746 853 897 939 976 1,090 
Venezuela 680 750 872 853 840 809 841 860 880 916 
Costa Rica 416 418 442 461 457 471 467 482 486 486 
Dominican Republic 212 237 259 261 242 253 246 283 300 315 
El Salvador 232* 257* 253* 282 270 280 284 312 321 340 
Guatemala 235 276 292 287 287 291 293 306 327 337 
Haiti® 85 100 88 93 89 94 90 99 96 87 
Honduras 168 201 200 208 207 208 208 222 222 220 
Mexico 414 434 478 480 480 518 541 574 602 673 
Nicaragua* 229 242 248 252 231 243 253 279 312 323 
Panama 393 405 442 455 464 474 508 545 595 595 
LATIN AMERICA'' 370 391 406 425 418 431 446 467 464 501 
•> Calculated with geometrically-crossed equivalents of purchasing 
•' Excluding Cuba. 











































































"Calculated with geometrically-cros ed equivalents of purchasing    i  i   i   i . 
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Table 19 
P E R C A P I T A E X P E N D I T U R E I N L A T I N A M E R I C A C O M P A R E D \S1TH T H A T O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S , 1955-64 
CALCULATED IN CURRENT DOLLARS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PARITY" PREVAILING IN EACH YEAR 
(Indexes: USA = 100) 
ifff W5Í 19^ I95S J»» im mi mi ma mi 
United States 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 0 100 0 
Argentina 30.9 32.0 31.3 34.7 31.7 31.2 31.8 29.4 27.2 310 
Bolivia 8.1* 7.6* 7.1* 6.8 5.7 5.9 5.9 5.6 5.8 5.6 
Brazil 10.8 10.9 10.6 11.4 10.6 10.4 10.6 10.6 9 7 9 3 
OiUe 25.0 23.8 22.9 23.9 22.6 23.7 24.3 25.6 24.5 24.1 
Colombia 12.1 12.1 12.2 12.1 11.7 12.1 12.3 12.8 11.8 118 
Ecuador 10.3 10.6 10.6 10.7 10.4 10.9 10.7 10.5 10.1 9 9 
Paraguay 7.8 7.9 8.3 9.2 8.7 9.2 9.2 9-.0 9 2 8 8 
Peru 11.6 11.7 11.5 12.2 11.8 12.2 12.9 13.2 13.4 13.5 
Uruguay 31.5 30.9 31.3 31.0 27.4 30.7 31.8 31.5 31.6 33.6 
Venezuela 28.4 30.2 33.9 33.3 30.8 29.2 29.8 28.8 28.5 28.3 
Costa Rica 18.2 17.3 18.0 18.2 16.7 16.9 16.5 16.2 15.8 15.0 
Dominican Republic 8.8 9.5 10.1 10.2 8.9 9.1 8.7 9.5 9 7 9 7 
El Salvador 9.7* 10.4* 9.8* 11.0 9.9 10.1 10.1 10.5 lo!4 105 
Guatemala 9.8 11.1 11.3 11.2 10.5 10.5 10.4 10.3 10 6 10 4 
Haiti» 3.5 4.0 3.4 3.6 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.1 2 7 
Honduras 7.0 8.1 7.8 8.1 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.4 7 2 6 8 
Mexico 17.3 17.5 18.6 18.7 17.6 18.7 19.2 19.3 19 5 20 8 
Nicaragua* 9.6 9.8 9.6 9.8 8.5 8.8 9.0 9.4 101 10 0 
Panama 16.4 16.3 17.2 17.7 17.0 17.0 18.0 18.2 19.3 18.3 
LATIN AMEMCA»> 15.7 15.9 16.6 15.3 15JS 15.8 15.7 15.0 15.4 
«Obtained by geometrically crossing purchasing power equivalents for each expenditure sector, using average Latin America and United States 
weights. 
i» Excluding Cuba. 
RECENT ACTIVITIES OF ECLA 
Twelftli session of the Economic Commission for Latin America^ 
The twelfth session of the Economic Commis-
sion for Latin America was held at Caracas 
from 2 to 13 May 1967 at a time when Vene-
zuela was celebrating the four hundredth anni-
versary of the founding of its capital. The ses-
sion was attended by delegations from twenty-
eight Member States of the United Nations also 
members of the Commission^ and eight other 
States not members of the Commission.® An asso-
ciate member of the Commission,^ a State not a 
member of the United Nations,® a number of 
specialized and other agencies of the United 
Nations and of inter-governmental and non-
governmental organizations were also repre-
sented at the session. 
At the opening meeting, statements were made 
by Mr. Raúl Leoni, President of the Republic of 
Venezuela; Mr. Philippe de Seynes, Under-
Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs of the 
United Nations, who also read out a message 
from the Secretary-General; Mr. Luis Hernández 
Solís, Minister for Development of Venezuela, 
in his capacity as Chairman of the twelfth ses-
sion; and Mr. Guillermo Hoyos Osores, Ambas-
sador of Peru to Venezuela, on behalf of the 
delegations attending the session. At the closing 
meeting, statements were made by Mr. Luis 
Pereira Souto-Maior, representative of Brazil, 
on behalf of the delegations; Mr. Carlos Quin-
tana, Executive Secretary of the Commission; 
and Mr. Luis Hernándes Solís, Minister for De-
velopment of Venezuela, in his capacity as 
Chairman of the Commission. 
The bureau consisted of Mr. Luis Hernández 
Solís (Venezuela), Chairman; Mr. Plácido 
García Reynoso (Mexico) and Mr. Ashton 
1 See the report of the twelfth session (E/4359) and 
the programme of work adopted (E/4359/Add.l). 
2 Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United 
States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
® Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Romania, 
Spain, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugo-
slavia. 
4 British Honduras (Belize). 
® Federal Republic of Germany. 
Wright (Jamaica), Vice-Chairmen; and Mr. 
Jorge Méndez Munévar (Colombia), Rap-
porteur. 
The Commission discussed the item dealing 
with the position of the Latin American economy 
in plenary meeting. A statement (E/CN.12/ 
771) , by the Executive Secretary of the Com-
mission, Mr. Carlos Quintana, led off the dis-
cussion. The remaining items of the agenda were 
discussed in two comumittees established for the 
purpose, one dealing with items relating to de-
velopment planning and the other with those 
referring to trade policy and integration. Mr. 
Rolando Pardo (Bolivia) was Chairman of 
Committee I and Mr. Armando González Campo 
(Guatemala) was its Rapporteur. Mr. Gabriel 
Martinez (Argentina) was Chairman-Rapporteur 
of Committee U. A special working group 
chaired by Mr. Manlio Martinez (Honduras) 
considered the programme of work and priori-
ties for the period 1967-69 by which the secre-
tariat was to be guided. 
There follows a summary of some of the 
principal items discussed® together with the 
resolutions adopted and a general appraisal of 
the results of the twelfth session. 
THK POSITION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN 
ECONOMY 
The reports of the secretariat (E/CN.12/767 
and Add.1-3 and E/CN.12/768) show that the 
principal causes of the recent decline in the 
rate of economic growth are the persistence of 
long-term structural obstacles and the influence 
of conjunctural factors. Although in the present 
decade there are considerable differences be-
tween the various Latin American countries, 
the average growth rate has been extremely 
unsatisfactory and the implementation of de-
velopment plans has been greatly hampered by 
internal and external factors in nearly all coun-
tries. As a result, there were frequent references 
in the Commission's discussions to development 
policy and its potentialities as an instrument for 
® See above, pp. 33-37, the debate on development 
planning and the relevant resolution adopted. 
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exploring substantive solutions. Emphasis was 
laid on the progress that had been made in 
that respect. For example, most delegations con-
sidered that the signing of the Charter of Punta 
del Este 1961 had encouraged the establish-
ment of multilateral institutions and produced 
new strategies for releasing new dynamic forces 
within the region. There was a recognition of 
the need for a vigorous mobilization of national 
resources and for substantial changes in eco-
nomic and social structures, as well as in the 
policies of the industrialized countries and the 
international financial agencies. On the other 
hand, the work being done in the United Nations 
in accordance with guidelines established in its 
programme for the Development Decade and 
the recommendations of the first session of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment were seen as extremely significant 
developments. In addition to clarifying the na-
ture of the problems of the developing countries 
at the international level, the majority of dele-
gations took the view that the work of tiie United 
Nations would represent a truly effective con-
tribution to the solution of those problems if 
United Nations recommendations were trans-
lated into specific decisions by the industrialized 
countries. 
The combined effect of these and other fac-
tors has aroused great expectations and legiti-
mate aspirations for economic and social prog-
ress in the Latin American countries. Develop-
ment plans have been drawn up and structural 
and institutional reforms discussed. Progress 
has been made in many countries in carrying 
out administrative reforms and in organizing 
planning systems. Tax revenue has been in-
creased and the influx of external public funds 
has made it possible to step up investment in 
social and infrastructure projects, although this 
reaction has not been uniform in all countries. 
Land settlement and land reform programmes 
have been started, although the extent to which 
they have been applied and the means used 
have varied. Progress has been made in reform-
ing the tax structure and anti-inflationary poli-
cies have been more strictly enforced. More 
attention has been paid to the social aspects of 
development, and programmes in education, 
vocational training, housing and public bealth 
have been studied and put into practice. Prog-
ress has also been made in the movement to-
wards economic integration and in many 
countries specific measures have been taken to 
expand and diversify exports. 
This progress was not sufficient to offset the 
effects of the traditional factors which continue 
to hamper development. Development plans are 
only being partially implemented. Anti-infla-
tionary policies led to positive results in so 
far as they were successful in checking inflation 
and correcting imbalances with a view to greater 
financial stability. However, action in this field 
cannot be really effective unless it is linked more 
systematically with a determination to attack the 
root causes of the showdown in economic de-
velopment. Much can be done if more effort is 
made to mobilize national resources by re-
stricting luxury consumption, increasing em-
ployment, stimulating personal saving and 
applying equitable solutions to social problems, 
in an attempt to correct the unfavourable 
effects of the extreme inequality of income 
distribution. 
In the course of the debate, several delega-
tions supplied new information on recent eco-
nomic developments in their respective coun-
tries. While these data generally confirmed the 
main points made in the secretariat documents, 
they highlighted the diversity of the situations 
prevailing in the different countries; in some 
cases that situation depended on the extent to 
which the economy was influenced by long-term 
structural factors, while in others, it had been 
produced by conjunctural factors. 
In addition to discussing the characteristics 
and rate of economic growth in the region or in 
specific countries, the Commission also showed 
interest in basic aspects of development policies, 
as regards measures for strengthening the do-
mestic structure of production and the direct 
and more complete incorporation of social ob-
jectives in development strategy. In this last 
connexion, numerous references were made to 
the subject of income distribution, one of the 
most important elements in the whole complex 
of problems requiring action now and in the 
future. 
It was pointed out that the problem of em-
ployment, was one of those most urgently re-
quiring solution and most clearly justifying a 
general reorientation of development policy. It 
is essential to achieve a labour absorption ca-
pacity commensurate with the increase in the 
population of working age, the rate of rural-
urban migration and the general desire of the 
population for an improvement in the living 
standards, through an effective policy of indus-
trialization, assimilation of technology, choice 
of techniques and allocation of resources. Stress 
was also aid on the need to strengthen research 
and formulate specific guidelines on human 
resources covering the aspects mentioned above 
as well as education and training. In a more 
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general way, mention was made of the value of 
analyses as a basis for consideration of the 
problems implicit in population growth. 
Several delegations referred to the sluggish-
ness of the industrialization process, and the 
factors which in many countries prevent the in-
dustrial sector from becoming more competi-
tive in world markets. In evaluating the efforts 
of various Governments and regional institu-
tions to increase productivity and promote ex-
ports of industrial products, it was recognized 
that such activities should become more wide-
spread and of broader scope, taking advantage 
of the possibilities offered by regional integra-
tion schemes and the increased volume of tech-
nical assistance to be expected from the recently 
established United Nations Industrial Develop-
ment Organization (UNIDO). 
The Commission took note of the progress 
made in some countries in land settlement and 
land reform and in programmes for technical 
improvements and diversification of agricultural 
production. However, it had to be recognized 
that in Latin America as a whole the agricul-
tural sector was still lagging behind, thus seri-
ously affecting the supply of staple food-stuffs 
and hampering efforts to improve the level of 
consumption of the population. In view of these 
circumstances, there was general agreement on 
the need to intensify the process of structural 
change and to put greater emphasis on other 
agricultural development programmes, which 
would solve the problems of supply and have 
the further advantage of ensuring greater ab-
sorption of manpower and import substitution. 
The consensus of the debate was that it was 
possible to accelerate the implementation of a 
development policy capable of dealing effec-
tively with current problems and stimulating the 
region's economic and social progress. But one 
delegation expressed the opinion that such 
efforts would be fruitless without far-reaching 
and revolutionary changes which would radi-
cally transform existing structures. 
In connexion with the effect of foreign trade 
on the growth of the Latin American economies, 
it was pointed out that the persistent decline 
in Latin America's share in world trade flows 
was determined not only by internal factors 
but by external obstacles and difficulties which 
had not been eliminated despite the commit-
ments assumed by the industrialized countries 
at the first session of the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development. It was 
hoped that at the second session specific deci-
sions and agreements would be reached, and 
stress was laid on the need for the Latin Ameri-
can countries to make appropriate preparations 
for their participation in it and on the technical 
co-operation wídch could be offered by the 
EGLA secretariat. 
Several delegations suggested that trade with 
the socialist countries might offer opportunities 
for the diversification of Latin American ex-
ports. 
With regard to external financing, concern 
was expressed at the reduction in net inflows 
resulting from the increase in external debt 
service payments and the slow growth of gross 
inflows of capital from abroad. It was con-
sidered essential that external contributions 
should increase faster than debt servicing, or 
that some way should be found to reduce 
future external debt service payments in 
order to prevent a further deterioration of 
the situation. The supplementary financing 
procedure being studied by UNCTAD should 
produce more resources and not merely spread 
out existing funds. It was pointed out that the 
real impact of external financial assistance 
should not be evaluated solely in terms of its 
direct effects on the balance of payments, but 
also in terms of its contribution towards im-
proving over-all levels of development, employ-
ment, and prospective foreign exchange income. 
In that connexion, the Secretary General oí 
UNCTAD stated that ways and means of ex-
panding the volume of international transfers 
of funds would be studied at the second session 
of UNCTAD. He added that the matter should 
be discussed in conjunction with a possible re-
form of the international monetary system, since 
the balance-of-payments problems of some of 
the industrialized countries often made it diffi-
cult for them to offer more financial aid. 
In connexion with the financial implications 
of integration, the view was expressed that the 
formation of the common market should be 
carried out mainly by the entrepreneurs of the 
region. For that purpose they would require 
external financial assitance in order to prevent 
direct foreign investment from exploiting a 
disproportionate share of the oportunities af-
forded by integration. 
TRADE POLICY 
The secretariat document describes the ex-
ternal trade problems which confront Latin 
America and the trade policy factors which have 
influenced its development. It draws attention 
to the circumstantial nature of the factors 
responsible for the favourable trend in Latin 
American exports in recent years and to the 
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discouraging prospects created by the policies 
being followed by the major industrialized 
countries or groups. It suggests that concrete 
progress should be sought through negotiations 
on specific aspects of trade policy during the 
second session of UNCTAD, and points to the 
need for action by the Latin American countries 
to harmonize and co-ordinate the positions they 
will adopt at that Conference. 
The delegations of most developing countries 
expressed complete agreement with the content 
and conclusions of the document, although they 
recognized that it had to be brought up to date 
and supplemented in some respects. They laid 
particular stress on the problems affecting the 
commodity trade of the region, particularly 
access to markets, prices, financing, internal 
taxation and anti-economic production of those 
commodities in the developed countries. 
On the subject of access to markets, they 
agreed that limited progress had been made in 
the case of a few primary commodities, but that 
there had been serious setbacks in others which 
had been subject to more and more restrictions 
since the first session of UNCTAD. 
Emphasis was placed on the need to create 
eifective machinery to stabilize the prices of 
primary commodities on international markets 
at fair and remunerative levels for the exporting 
countries. They noted the lack of progress in 
concluding commodity agreements and in laying 
the foundations for the organization of world 
markets. 
Some delegations pointed out that the financ-
ing of buffer stocks should be included in the 
agenda of the second session of UNCTAD, and 
that it should consider methods of financing for 
the purpose of eliminating surpluses and the 
changes they would entail in the structure of 
production. They further emphasized the need 
to assess the effect of internal taxation in limit-
ing demand for certain primary commodities 
and the possibility of stimulating larger pur-
chases by the countries with centrally planned 
economies by reducing the marketing margins 
of State enterprises in those countries. 
Some delegations of the developed countries 
said that they could not endorse some of the 
judgements and findings in the secretariat docu-
ment and questioned the accuracy of some of 
the figures and data presented. They disagreed 
with the references to non-compliance with the 
principles and recommendations of UNCTAD 
and commitments adopted in GATT, and states 
that it was their intention to continue studying 
the problem raised by the developing countries 
and to seek satisfactory solutions within the 
framework of commodity agreements, market or-
ganization and other types of arrangements 
they considered appropriate. 
Most of the delegations of the developing 
countries having stressed the need to abolish 
discriminatory preferences in respect of primary 
commodities, some delegations of Latin Ameri-
can countries which enjoyed such advantages 
pointed out that they should be considered sepa-
rately from the establishment of any system 
of general non-discriminatory preferences for 
manufactures and semi-manufactures of the de-
veloping countries. Any action taken to elimi-
nate such preferences should be gradual, and 
should be accompanied by compensatory 
measures. 
A significant exchange of views took place on 
such aspects of the problem of trade in manu-
factured and semi-manufactured products as the 
establishment of systems of general preferences 
and problems of supply and demand in relation 
to exports from the developing countries. The 
delegations taking part in the discussion were 
definitely inclined to favour the establishment 
of general non-discriminatory preferences, on a 
non-reciprocal basis, for exports of manufac-
tures and semi-manufactures from developing to 
developed countries. Some of them, however, 
suggested that a possibility to be kept in reserve 
was the extension of non-general preferences 
granted by any developed countries which 
wished to join the system to those developing 
countries which did not already enjoy such dis-
criminatory preferences. Most of the delegations 
of industrialized countries said that they 
favoured systems of general preferences. 
Some delegations stressed the importance to 
the developing countries of promoting their ex-
ports of manufactures and semi-manufactures. 
Several delegations urged that such efforts 
should be supplemented by more favourable 
treatment in the consumer markets of the in-
dustrialized countries, not only through the 
elimination of quantitative restrictions or the 
reduction of duties, but also through efforts on 
the part of the industrialized countries to intro-
duce the structural changes required to facilitate 
the access of products which the developing 
countries were particularly well equipped to 
manufacture. They also stressed the need to 
ensure the continuity of that type of trade, and 
to prevent the unilateral application of safe-
guard clauses, as in the case of restrictions based 
on the concept of "market disruption" which 
created uncertainties for the export trade of de-
veloping countries and discouraged productive 
investment. 
With regard to financing, several delegations 
emphasized the need for an increase in the net 
inflow of external resources and for financing 
to be granted on terms compatible with the fi-
nancial resources of the recipient countries. 
They also stressed that supplementary financing 
should not only be subject to specific conditions 
and requirements, but that the resources ear-
marked for that purpose should really supple-
ment the funds for basic financing now available 
to the countries of the region and other develop-
ing countries. 
In connexion with the preparatory work for 
the second session of UNCTAD, several delega-
tions insisted that UNCTAD should constitute 
a true forum for negotiation, for considering 
specific resolutions on problems which had been 
sufficiently elucidated by the time it convenes. 
Other delegations said that in addition to that 
fundamental condition, at its second session the 
Conference should evaluate compliance with the 
agreements and principles defined at the first 
session and explore possibilities of future agree-
ment on problems which had not yet been prop-
erly defined or clarified. Most delegations 
agreed that the agenda should be limited to 
items which were of particular concern to Latin 
America and other developing countries rather 
than waste effort on issues on which the area 
of agreement was too narrow to warrant a move 
to the negotiating stage or to permit any real 
progress in exploring new fields of action. 
There was also a general desire on the part 
of the Latin American countries to develop a 
concerted position before the second session of 
UNCTAD. Several delegations referred to the 
part which the ECLA secretariat should play in 
that effort and some stressed the importance of 
achieving such co-ordination. To that end, the 
ECLA secretariat should revise document E / 
CN.12/773. 
Several delegations of developing countries 
mentioned other points which the secretariat 
should take into account. They included the 
problem of higher import duties as the products 
manufactured by developing countries from their 
own raw materials became more sophisticated, 
the continuance in developed countries of un-
economic production of many primary products 
of special interest for the developing countries, 
and the possibility of giving the latter a larger 
share of the developed countries' markets. Other 
points mentioned were the special position of 
the economically relatively less developed coun-
tries, and possible preferential treatment for 
those countries in respect of primary com-
modities, manufactures and semi-manufactures, 
inter alia, appraisal of the results of the Ken-
nedy Round from the viewpoint of Latin Ameri-
can countries, and alternative or additional 
measures which might be used in tariff negotia-
tions in order to meet the requirements of those 
countries. Suggestions were made for a survey 
of new ways of expanding trade with the coun-
tries with centrally planned economies, with a 
view to developing practical methods of ex-
ploiting that trade; and for a study of various 
measures to expand trade and economic rela-
tions among developing countries. 
The delegation of one developed country ob-
served that the developing countries could and 
should do a great deal to help themselves, 
particularly by expanding and diversifying their 
production, and by promoting their exports and 
removing existing disincentives to the expansion 
of exports. 
LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
In taking note of the secretariat report en-
titled "The economically relatively less de-
veloped countries and Latin American integra-
tion" (E/CN.12/774 and Add.1-2), some dele-
gations said that the report, when submitted in 
its final form to the meeting of relatively less 
developed countries which was to be convened 
to consider it, should contain constructive and 
specific suggestions on various questions. They 
included, inter alia, financial and technical as-
sistance, development of infrastructure, identifi-
cation of potential regional industries, and 
systems for granting preferences and advantages 
to the relatively less developed countries with-
in the framework of existing integration ma-
chinery. Several delegations referred to the 
effectiveness of sub-regional integration agree-
ments as instruments for accelerating the move-
ment towards a Latin American common market 
and promoting the region's smooth and balanced 
growth, since they ensured the participation of 
relatively less developed countries and focused 
attention on the special problems of countries 
with insufficient markets. The value of sectoral 
agreements for integration purposes was also 
noted. 
Most of the delegations referred to the Decla-
ration of the Presidents of America, stressed its 
political implications and the need for decisions 
by the Governments and regional integration 
bodies to give it effect. Other technical organs 
like ECLA could contribute advice and assis-
tance to promote a concerted effort to merge the 
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existing integration systems and induce non-
memher countries to join them, with a view to 
substantially completing the integration of the 
Latin American common market by 1985. How-
ever, one delegation considered that, unless the 
conditions generally prevailing in Latin America 
were radically changed, genuine integration of 
the region's economies would be impossible. 
Reference was made, in particular, to the 
position of the relatively less developed coun-
tries and countries with insufBcient markets and 
attention was drawn to the need to find ways of 
enabling those countries to share in the benefits 
of integration, and to take the steps to counter-
act possible adverse effects on their development. 
As a result of its deliberations on trade policy 
and external trade, the Commission approved 
various draft resolutions, in particular resolu-
tion 264 (XII ) , entitled "Latin America and the 
second session of the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development" which recom-
mends that the secretariat should revise and 
update document E/CN.12/773 after consulting 
the Governments of the developing countries 
with a view to convening a meeting of govern-
ment experts. In the revision and updating of 
the document, the secretariat is to take into 
account the comments, statements and recom-
mendations made during the twelfth session and 
to propose operational formulae and machinery 
for ensuring full implementation of the prin-
ciples and recommendations of UNCTAD in 
connexion with various points of special interest 
to the developing countries. It should also make 
an evaluation of the results of the Kennedy 
Round from the standpoint of the Latin Ameri-
can countries; an analysis of various measures 
for expanding trade and economic relations be-
tween the Latin American countries and the 
countries with centrally planned economies, and 
with other developing countries and regions; 
and a list of specific cases of non-compliance 
with recommendations and commitments ac-
cepted by the developed countries. It is further 
requested to keep in touch with the secretariats 
of the Economic Commission for Africa and the 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, 
and to collaborate with and advise the Latin 
American group at the meeting of the seventy-
seven developing countries to be held at Algiers, 
and at the second session of UNCTAD. After 
the Conference, the secretariat is to convene the 
Trade Committee of ECLA, which will analyse 
and evaluate the results and, in the light of its 
conclusions, work out a plan of action with 
respect to foreign trade. 
With reference to the Declaration of the 
Presidents of America, the Commission adopted 
resolution 273 (XII) which recommends that 
the secretariat, in consultation and in co-ordi-
nation with the regional integration bodies, 
should co-operate in carrying out studies to 
facilitate government decisions in relation to 
Latin American integration. 
Some delegations disagreed with the evalua-
tion of the policy followed by their countries in 
the negotiations concerning international cocoa 
and sugar agreements and with the accusations 
that the developed countries had not adhered 
strictly to the principles and recommendations 
of the first session of UNCTAD and had failed 
to fulfil the commitments assumed in GATT. 
In connexion with these issues, the following 
resolutions were also adopted: resolution 265 
(XII) on Latin American economic integration; 
resolution 266 (XII) on objectives of the second 
session of UNCTAD; resolution 267 (XII) and 
271 (XII) on costs and prices; resolution 268 
(XII) on financing; resolution 269 (XII) on 
the United Nations programme for the promo-
tion of exports of manufactures and semi-
manufactures from developing countries; reso-
lutions 270 (XII) and 274 (XII) on access to 
markets and resolution 272 (XII) on trade 
restrictions on groimds of market disruptions. 
LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL PLANNING 
The Commission discussed the activities of 
the Latin American Institute for Economic and 
Social Planning and took note with satisfaction 
of the results of the action taken by the Execu-
tive Secretary of ECLA and the Director-General 
of the Institute with a view to ensuring the 
continuity and development of the Institute's 
activities. 
The Institute had concentrated on major Latin 
American problems, to which it had applied the 
fruits of national and international planning 
experience, and had strongly supported plan-
ning in individual countries in the formulation 
and the implementation phases. It was agreed, 
in that connexion, that the Institute's study of 
a close link between planning and economic 
integration was in line with the current move-
ment towards integration in Latin America. 
It was pointed out that the Institute had, in 
its first five years of operation, trained 3,984 
professionals throughout Latin America: the 
Commission also took note of the changes in 
the basic course, held at Santiago, in order to 
keep pace with planning developments in Latin 
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America and to take into account the results 
of the Institute's economic and social research 
and the practical and direct experience acquired 
in advising countries. In the intensive courses-
increasing emphasis is being placed on specific 
projects in agriculture, infrastructure and other 
areas. Prominent among the special courses 
given in 1966, which included the usual courses 
on health, educational and housing planning, 
was a new course for trade union leaders in 
Latin America, organized with the co-operation 
of ECLA and the ILO. The Commission consid-
ered that this course, together with those sched-
uled by the Institute for other private sector 
groups, would increase the active participation 
of that sector in planning. 
Advisory activities had been spurred on in 
1966 by a supplementary project of the Special 
Fund component of the UNDP to set up a 
special advisory division in the Institute. It was 
therefore possible for advisory services to be 
provided to fourteen Latin American countries 
during 1966 and for advisory work to be con-
centrated on two aspects: {a) strengthening the 
links between planning agencies and policy-
makers and administrators responsible for 
adopting and implementing decisions, by formu-
lating development strategies; and (6) develop-
ing methods for making plans more operational 
and for establishing annual operational plan-
ning systems in each country. Moreover, with 
the help of IDB and FAO, strategic projects for 
plan preparation and execution in various coun-
tries and various economic sectors are being 
worked out. 
The Institute is conducting research on Latin 
American economic development, with a view to 
gaining a deeper understanding of that process, 
on external sector problems as a handicap to 
development and on the possible contribution 
that a regional import substitution programme 
might make in eliminating the external bottle-
neck. 
The first printed publications of the Insti-
tute began to appear at the end of 1966. The 
issuance of those publications and their wide 
distribution are helping to publicize the Insti-
tute's work and research. 
The Commission agreed that the work of 
the Institute reflected scientific and technical 
competence in its three major fields of activity. 
A number of delegations expressed the hope 
thai the Institute would be provided with the 
funds necessary for its continued operation. In 
that connexion, two Latin American delegations 
announced that their Governments had decided 
to sign the Plan of Operations for the Institute's 
second phase and the Plan of Operations for 
the Advisory Services Division. 
One representative stressed that the Insti-
tute's co-operation had made it possible to 
develop and organize his country's present plan-
ning system. Another representative said that 
the Institute's assistance in several national 
projects had been most valuable, particularly in 
the case of one project recently started in one 
of the most backward regions of his country. 
A spokesman for the States members of the 
Central American Common Market thanked the 
Institute for co-operating with SIECA and other 
Central American integration bodies and said 
that the four intensive courses that had been 
organized at the regional level had provided 
technical training for a large number of gov-
ernment officials of the five countries concerned. 
The representative of a European State mem-
ber of the Commission observed that the Insti-
tute had not only intensified and extended the 
scope of the activities in its fields of competence 
but had achieved a soimdly balanced work 
programme, so that its training, research and 
advisory services were not provided as separate 
activities, because research and training were 
the basis of the advisory services and they, in 
turn, provided new subjects for research and 
training. He also expressed its appreciation of 
the Institute's policy of availing itself wherever 
possible of external co-operation and of increas-
ing the volume of research and projects under-
taken in conjunction with other national and 
international bodies. 
The Commission elected the following persons 
to serve as members of the Governing Council 
of the Institute in addition to the members ap-
pointed by ECLA, IDB and OAS: Helio Beltrao 
(Brazil); Alberto Fuentes Mohr (Guatemala); 
Plácido García Reynoso (Mexico); Gustavo 
Guerrero (Nicaragua); Enrique Iglesias (Uru-
guay) ; José Antonio Mayobre (Venezuela); 
Sergio Molina (Chile); and Manuel San Miguel 
(Argentina). The new Council will remain in 
office until new elections are held at the next 
session of the Commission. 
PROGRAMME OF WORK AUD OTHER MATTERS 
In approving resolution 280 (XII) and conse-
quently the programme of work for 1967-69 
(E/4359/Add. l ) , the Commission expressed its 
satisfaction at the changes in the presentation 
of the programme and at the greater use of the 
performance budgeting technique. 
Several delegations commended the co-ordina-
tion of ECLA's activities with those of other 
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bodies -within the United Nations system, par-
ticularly UNCTAD and FAO. The joint activi-
ties of ECLA and FAO were an example of the 
type of co-operation that should exist between 
the regional economic commissions and spe-
cialized agencies. The hope was expressed that 
such co-operation would be extended to the 
recently established United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO). 
This willingness to co-operate was expressed 
in resolution 277 (XII) on co-operation with 
the ILO and other agencies in the study of man-
power planning and employment policy within 
the framework of over-all development plan-
ning, and in resolution 279 (XII) and 281 (XII) 
on the future relations of ECLA with UNIDO 
and its continuing relations with FAO. 
The representative of British Honduras 
(Belize) expressed his Government's great in-
terest in the study on the possibilities of eco-
nomic co-operation between his country and the 
Central American countries, to be completed 
within the next few months. 
The Commission also adopted resolution 275 
(XII ) , concerning the study of foreign invest-
ment in the under-developed countries of the 
region, and resolution 276 (XII) , requesting 
the secretariat to pursue its activities in prepa-
ration for the forthcoming International Sym-
posium on Industrial Development and inviting 
Goverrmients to participate in the Symposium 
and to enlist the participation of all groups 
interested in the promotion of industrial devel-
opment. 
In commemoration of the twentieth anniver-
sary of the establishment of ECLA, which falls 
on 25 February 1968, the Commission, by its 
resolution 278 (XII) , recommended to postal 
administrations of the States members that they 
issue a commemorative postage stamp. 
Under resolution 282 (XII) , the Commission 
decided to hold its next session in April or May 
1969 at Lima, Peru. 
GENERAL APPRAISAL 
Economic and social development, the state of 
planning, regional economic integration and 
problems of trade and external financing in the 
Latin American countries were the major items 
of discussion at the twelfth session of ECLA. 
Emphasis was placed on those subjects in the 
light of the various developments, some un-
favourable and others very favourable, which 
have affected the present position of the Latin 
American economies. Among those develop-
ments, special attention was given to the agree-
ments adopted at the Meeting of American 
Chiefs of State held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, 
from 12 to 14 April 1967. The burden of the 
Coromission's discussion was that the secre-
tariat's future activities should help to imple-
ment the decisions adopted at the Meeting. One 
delegation, however, considered that, since the 
Meeting of American Chiefs of State did not 
represent the unanimous views of the Latin 
American countries, the secretariat of the Com-
mission should adopt in its work an approach 
which covered the problems common to all 
countries of the region. 
During the discussion of recent economic 
trends, serious concern was expressed regarding 
the decline in the growth rate for the region as a 
whole, although it was recognized that it had 
not occurred in a uniform way to all the Latin 
American countries. In the past year, per capita 
income had remained at exactly the same level, 
in contrast to the favourable evolution in the 
two pervious years. Consequently, sluggishness 
and instability were still regarded as the pre-
dominant features of the development process; 
the lack of dynamism of the Latin American 
economies, and the maintenance of traditional 
growth patterns, had kept productivity low, in-
creased unemployment and aggravated social 
tensions. 
The persistence of those conditions made it 
more urgent to implement the measures and ob-
jectives that were being formulated at the inter-
American level, and to frame an effective de-
velopment policy with due regard to the changes 
that were taking shape at this stage of the eco-
nomic evolution of these countries. It would be 
illusory to expect to attain development tar-
gets—particularly, in fulfilment of integration 
objectives—^without altering some of the funda-
mental factors which were adversely affecting 
the behaviour of the Latin American economies. 
The prospects of neutralizing those factors de-
pend primarily on the possibility of intensifying 
and giving continuity to the efforts being made 
within each country. That point was repeatedly 
stressed during the discussion of subjects re-
lating to planning, industrialization and agri-
cultural development. 
However, the discussions once again confirmed 
that the external sector bottle-neck was one of 
the major impediments to Latin American de-
velopment. Although export earnings had in-
creased to some extent in the last few years, it 
was pointed out that the increase was temporary 
in nature and did not reflect changes in the 
structure of foreign trade or in the policy of 
the industrialized countries. 
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Further concern was expressed because the 
heavy burden of external debt servicing had 
greatly reduced the purchasing power of the 
Latin American countries, notwithstanding the 
increase in their export earning and in gross 
inflows of capital. 
In the circumstances, the prospects of accele-
rating the growth rate in order to attain mini-
mum targets of employment and increased pro-
ductivity and the implementation of economic 
and social reforms were extremely unfavourable 
unless there were substantial changes in foreign 
trade trends and in the volume and terms of 
external financing. 
It was further pointed out that the dynamism 
of intra-regional trade flows had recently de-
clined sharply as compared with previous years, 
in contrast with the many potential opportuni-
ties created by integration schemes. In some 
cases, that decline reflected the limitations of 
increasing trade only on the basis of the main 
traditional trade flows, and in others, it showed 
that the economic activities of the various coun-
tries were not sufSciently complementary. 
In that connexion, it should be noted that, in 
the view of most delegations, the desire to give 
renewed vigour to the establishment of a Lat&i 
American common market had been fully re-
flected in the agreements concluded at the Punta 
del Este Meeting of American Chiefs of State. 
It has been agreed to create the common market, 
to establish a legal and institutional framework 
for the gradual amalgamation of the two inte-
gration systems, to incorporate other countries 
in those systems and to create sub-regional 
groupings. However, action formulae and proce-
dures still have to be worked out and adopted 
to enable Latin America finally to emerge from 
the initial stage and overcome the obstacles to 
its economic integration on a basis of equity 
and reciprocity, with one regard to the special 
needs of countries with relatively less developed 
economies and those with insufficient markets. 
The need to stimulate internal development 
and co-ordinate its aims with regional integra-
tion objectives shows how important it is to 
strengthen planning efforts in each country and 
extend them to regional activities as well. That 
is also a prerequisite for a more rapid improve-
ment in levels of living. 
In considering the problems described above, 
the Commission expressed great satisfaction at 
the efforts which the secretariat had been mak-
ing to broaden the scope of its activities. In 
that connexion it welcomed the establishment 
of an oiSce at Bogotá which would have com-
petence in Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador, 
and another at Trinidad, which would deal with 
the afi"airs of the Caribbean countries. 
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